LETTER XVI.

From the antagonism of the two impulsions, and from the association of

two opposite principles, we have seen beauty to result, of which the

highest ideal must therefore be sought in the most perfect union and

equilibrium possible of the reality and of the form. But this

equilibrium remains always an idea that reality can never completely

reach. In reality, there will always remain a preponderance of one of

these elements over the other, and the highest point to which experience

can reach will consist in an oscillation between two principles, when

sometimes reality and at others form will have the advantage. Ideal

beauty is therefore eternally one and indivisible, because there can only

be one single equilibrium; on the contrary, experimental beauty will be

eternally double, because in the oscillation the equilibrium may be

destroyed in two ways--this side and that.

I have called attention in the foregoing letters to a fact that can also

be rigorously deduced from the considerations that have engaged our

attention to the present point; this fact is that an exciting and also a

moderating action may be expected from the beautiful. The tempering

action is directed to keep within proper limits the sensuous and the

formal impulsions; the exciting, to maintain both of them in their full

force. But these two modes of action of beauty ought to be completely

identified in the idea. The beautiful ought to temper while uniformly

exciting the two natures, and it ought also to excite while uniformly

moderating them. This result flows at once from the idea of a

correlation, in virtue of which the two terms mutually imply each other,

and are the reciprocal condition one of the other, a correlation of which

the purest product is beauty. But experience does not offer an example

of so perfect a correlation. In the field of experience it will always

happen more or less that excess on the one side will give rise to

deficiency on the other, and deficiency will give birth to excess. It

results from this that what in the beau-ideal is only distinct in the

idea is different in reality in empirical beauty. The beau-ideal, though

simple and indivisible, discloses, when viewed in two different aspects,

on the one hand, a property of gentleness and grace, and on the other, an

energetic property; in experience there is a gentle and graceful beauty

and there is an energetic beauty. It is so, and it will be always so, so

long as the absolute is enclosed in the limits of time, and the ideas of

reason have to be realized in humanity. For example, the intellectual

man has the ideal of virtue, of truth, and of happiness; but the active

man will only practise virtues, will only grasp truths, and enjoy happy

days. The business of physical and moral education is to bring back this

multiplicity to unity, to put morality in the place of manners, science

in the place of knowledge; the business of aesthetic education is to make

out of beauties the beautiful.

Energetic beauty can no more preserve a man from a certain residue of

savage violence and harshness than graceful beauty can secure him against

a certain degree of effeminacy and weakness. As it is the effect of the

energetic beauty to elevate the mind in a physical and moral point of

view and to augment its momentum, it only too often happens that the

resistance of the temperament and of the character diminishes the

aptitude to receive impressions, that the delicate part of humanity

suffers an oppression which ought only to affect its grosser part, and

that this coarse nature participates in an increase of force that ought

only to turn to the account of free personality. It is for this reason

that, at the periods when we find much strength and abundant sap in

humanity, true greatness of thought is seen associated with what is

gigantic and extravagant, and the sublimest feeling is found coupled with

the most horrible excess of passion. It is also the reason why, in the

periods distinguished for regularity and form, nature is as often

oppressed as it is governed, as often outraged as it is surpassed. And

as the action of gentle and graceful beauty is to relax the mind in the

moral sphere as well as the physical, it happens quite as easily that the

energy of feelings is extinguished with the violence of desires, and that

character shares in the loss of strength which ought only to affect the

passions. This is the reason why, in ages assumed to be refined, it is

not a rare thing to see gentleness degenerate into effeminacy, politeness

into platitude, correctness into empty sterility, liberal ways into

arbitrary caprice, ease into frivolity, calm into apathy, and, lastly, a

most miserable caricature treads on the heels of the noblest, the most

beautiful type of humanity. Gentle and graceful beauty is therefore a

want to the man who suffers the constraint of manner and of forms, for he

is moved by grandeur and strength long before he becomes sensible to

harmony and grace. Energetic beauty is a necessity to the man who is

under the indulgent sway of taste, for in his state of refinement he is

only too much disposed to make light of the strength that he retained in

his state of rude savagism.

I think I have now answered and also cleared up the contradiction

commonly met in the judgments of men respecting the influence of the

beautiful, and the appreciation of aesthetic culture. This contradiction

is explained directly we remember that there are two sorts of

experimental beauty, and that on both hands an affirmation is extended to

the entire race, when it can only be proved of one of the species. This

contradiction disappears the moment we distinguish a twofold want in

humanity to which two kinds of beauty correspond. It is therefore

probable that both sides would make good their claims if they come to an

understanding respecting the kind of beauty and the form of humanity that

they have in view.

Consequently in the sequel of my researches I shall adopt the course that

nature herself follows with man considered from the point of view of

aesthetics, and setting out from the two kinds of beauty, I shall rise to

the idea of the genus. I shall examine the effects produced on man by

the gentle and graceful beauty when its springs of action are in full

play, and also those produced by energetic beauty when they are relaxed.

I shall do this to confound these two sorts of beauty in the unity of the

beau-ideal, in the same way that the two opposite forms and modes of

being of humanity are absorbed in the unity of the ideal man.

Aesthetical Essays of Friedrich Schiller · 第 28 / 57 题