Once more, a small and literal instance: if a charitable body is

founded,—an “institution” in that limited and unlovely sense,—in the

“inmates,” both officials and beneficiaries, speedily appears the spirit

of that body, and a very disagreeable one it is. Wherever interdependent

functions are established appears organic life; a common body to perform

these functions, a common spirit to co-relate them.

The social spirit is a common consciousness developed by common

activities, and appearing in us in proportion to the extent and

interrelation of those activities. To share in it demands of the

individual, male or female, a share in the collective activities which

constitute human life.

Activities performed by one’s self alone, for one’s self alone, or one’s

immediate physical relatives, are not distinctively human, and do not

develop the human spirit.

An agricultural population manifests certain traits in common the world

over. Distinctions of blood and of religion are in abeyance before the

unifying force of a common industry as a modifier of character.

Fishermen, or sailors, or miners, or traders invariably show marked

traits in common, however otherwise differentiated.

If all men followed one industry we should have one principal character;

but fortunately our social processes are increasingly varied. There does

arise, however, a steadily widening field of common character as the

traits demanded by all industries alike increase among us. All

industries require peace and self-control; a regard for law and for

organisation; and these tendencies steadily improve the social spirit as

we leave savagery farther and farther behind.

Commerce requires honesty and accuracy, and steadily develops them,

though commerce is more open to certain retroactive influences than the

directly productive processes. Productive industry, being the economic

necessity which brings us together, is the source of our social spirit,

and that spirit is constantly modified by changes in the forms of

industry.

Our social consciousness is of slow and partial development, as is

easily explicable. The highly developed personal consciousness which the

most primitive savage brought with him into social relation, and which

occupies the same field of sensation as the wider social consciousness,

has operated to prevent easy recognition of the latter. The social

pleasures and the social pains we took to be personal and sought or

avoided them as such. Even the most sublimated and morbidly acute social

consciousness, as shown in a passionate philanthropy, is still diagnosed

by some as a form of self-gratification, so persistent is the dominance

of the egoistic concept.

Another reason is that as our external activities, requiring conscious

cerebration, are more perceptible than our internal ones, so we were far

more easily impressed by the external activities of Society than by its

deep-seated organic processes; these external ones were more telic,

partook more of the nature of personal actions, and were readily thought

to be such.

A third and very strong force operating against our recognition of

social consciousness is that it so generally hurts. So long as our

organic social processes went on normally they were unconscious.

Individual man, well fed, well guarded, reproducing the race in peace

and comfort, sported in the sea of social well-being and failed to

observe that there was such a thing. But let any industry become

inflamed, or paralysed, or arrested, and the pain is felt far and wide.

No one likes to be hurt. The more socially we felt our pain the more it

hurt, of course, being bigger. To be hungry one’s self is one thing—to

_feel a famine_ is another. People with the most social consciousness

suffered most, so long as social processes were not healthy; and,

therefore, our effort has been to resist the increase of social

consciousness.

We say “mind your own business”—“don’t concern yourself about other

people,” “let the other man walk.” We try _not_ to feel the famine in

India, the flood in China, the ignorance in Russia, the cruelty in

Armenia, the crimes and casualties, the deformities and diseases of our

own great cities. But in spite of our natural reluctance to a widening

of the sensorium that thrills most to pain, it is widening in spite of

us.

More and more every year we are feeling common evils, and seeking to

remove them. It is not that “I” am seeking to relieve “my” distress and

improve “my” conditions, but that “we,” in institute and association,

club, congress, and convention, are rousing more and more to a

consciousness of “our” distress, and seeking methods by which “we” may

improve “our” conditions. This marks the growth of social consciousness.

A pleasant thought here is that as fast as social conditions improve so

fast does social consciousness become an avenue of pleasure instead of

pain, and so we shall encourage instead of oppose it; thus the

improvement will widen more and more rapidly.

Something we see already of the larger joy obtainable in social

consciousness, in our pleasure in one another’s work. I do not mean in

personal consumption of it, so to speak, but in our satisfaction in the

achievements of “our” business men, “our” “scientific men,” “our”

inventors, mechanics, artists, discoverers, teachers, and the like. “We”

take pleasure and pride in what “we” do—requiring social consciousness.

Children’s games show the natural development of this feeling in the

human being. A child likes to play alone if he has to; but children like

far better to play together—the excitement and joy of co-ordinate

activity being far greater than in individual activity. This delight in

collective expression increases from age to age. As measured merely by

popular sports and amusements, the game involving a contest of team with

team is more enjoyed than the older sport of individual race and

contest, both by spectator and player.

There remains one more strong cause for our slow-born recognition of

social consciousness, and that is the position of women. Their

activities being confined to an excessive development of sex functions,

and industry on the low stage of solitary disconnected performance, or

at most the first step of group labour, personal service; and this

industry, too, confined to self or family interest altogether; it is not

to be expected that any high degree of social spirit could be attained

by this inchoate mass of individuals in society, but not of it, taking

no part in its processes economic or politic, and no share in its

growing responsibilities; nor is it to be expected that men, though

increasingly socialised by themselves, could avoid the influence of this

unsocialised half of humanity, both through its daily companionship and

the tremendous effect of maternity.

We are still further affected by the result of the position of women in

maintaining an abnormal degree of sex-tendency, and we have seen how

anti-social an influence is the natural belligerence and destructiveness

of masculine energy in excess; therefore, it is no wonder at all that

our social development has been slow, erratic, and liable to extremely

morbid forms and processes. Nothing will conduce so much to the right

growth of society in body and spirit as the progress of women from their

position of prehistoric sex-bound egoism and familism, to their

rightful share and place in the vital processes of Society. They, as

half the component individuals of Society, will then contribute their

share of modern social feeling and action; they, becoming more human and

less disproportionately sexual, will reduce the influence of morbid

sex-tendency in both male and female; and they, as mothers, will rapidly

fill the world with full-blood human beings, instead of the present

half-bloods,—half socialised through the father, but held in prehistoric

individualism through the mother.

The social spirit is as “natural” as the individual spirit. It is

conspicuously visible in action among us, but we have hidden it under

false names.

“Altruism” is one of these. This in its very assumption of “others”

preserves the ego intact, and that ego has never yet been convinced of

any rational cause for surrendering to those other egos. We have only

been able to urge it under our equally mistaken Pay concept, trying to

show that we should meet reward either from the other egos, or from God.

And as our nobler instincts have always revolted from the Pay concept,

the progress of Altruism has been retarded.

We need merely to understand it to withdraw all this opposition. What we

call altruism should be called—has been called[1]—“omniism”; it is a

feeling for all of us, and _includes_ the ego. It is, if you please, an

extension of self-consciousness, a recognition that my self is society,

and my “ego” only a minute fraction of the real me.

Footnote 1:

By Mr. J. G. Phelps Stokes. Article in _Wilshire’s Magazine_, March,

1903.

This omniism is as normal a growth as egoism. The preservation of the

individual by individual action required egoism, and developed it. The

preservation of society, by collective action, requires omniism and

develops it. That it is not more generally developed is due to the

resistance and confusion of our brains.

The superiority of omniism to egoism is in its being a later and more

complex development, an organic superiority. As the single cell is lower

than the organism, so cell-consciousness, if there be such, is lower

than self-consciousness, and as the single organism is lower than the

social organism so self-consciousness is lower than social

consciousness. Egoism is common to all beasts, is perfectly natural,

useful, right; but omniism is a human distinction, progressively

developed as we become socialised.

My “self” is my conscious area of working machinery, wherewith I receive

impressions and produce expressions, and if I were a tenfold Siamese

twin—if I felt, and thought, and worked with the bodies of twenty

men—those twenty men would be my “self,” and to care for them would be

as “selfish” as it is for a solitary animal to care for itself, and as

perfectly right. Not to care for them, to be only actively conscious of

my twentieth part “self,” would be a condition of arrested development,

pitiable rather than blameworthy. In a social condition of existence,

the life and prosperity of each member is absolutely interwoven with

that of the others, of the whole, and not to recognise this, and act

accordingly, is to manifest an inferior plane of development.

Organic relation of any sort is mutual, involving mutual obligation,

duty, and, if necessary, sacrifice. When a physical body is starving to

death, it is impressive to note the gradual surrender of its constituent

parts in the order of their importance. First, he calls in all his

savings,—the fat. Then the muscles slowly feed in their store. Lastly

the “vital organs.” And all this is unconscious, managed by the

long-established mechanism inside, without any dictation from the

cerebral consciousness the man calls “self.”

Our internal social functions, the immediately necessary economic

processes, may proceed unconsciously to quite a degree of development

under the direction of egoism, because, as the social life is the main

protection of the individual, so the interests of the individual and of

society are in many ways identical, and the individual may serve society

very fully and never dream that he is doing anything more than to “take

care of himself.” But Society cannot proceed far in development before

the interests of the whole may involve a temporary subversion of the

interests of the past, and here a beneficial social conduct requires

social consciousness.

Our carefully preserved ego concept acts mischievously in proportion to

the progress of society. The more complex the social process, the larger

the social interests involved, the more injurious is this primitive

spirit of egoism. The selfishness of a peasant is far less harmful than

the selfishness of a railroad-owner. In the orderly development of

social economics this would have been taken care of by the natural

extension of feeling accompanying the extension of action, but that has

been checked, as usual, by our mental heirlooms. Nevertheless we can

observe this natural relation of action and feeling in spite of our

opposition.

The growth of altruism in certain special industries is most instructive

to study, as showing precisely what conditions most regularly and

rapidly develop it. Look, for instance, at the distinctive

characteristics educed by the industries of agriculture and navigation.

Sailors, as a class, are generous, quick in heroism, licentious,

intemperate, and profane.

Farmers, as a class, are by no means generous—frequently stingy; you

never heard of a sailor who was a miser, but often of farmers who are

such. The farmer is not quick to heroism, but, on the contrary, is slow

to recognise his class-needs, hard to organise, prone to the most

primitive individualism. On the other hand the farmer is comparatively

chaste, and temperate, and guarded in speech.

Why these obvious distinctions, in men of the same race, class, and

time, often of the same families? As obviously from the difference in

their industries.

The farmer is engaged in our most remote and ancient industry, the one

nearest the bottom, in fact it is the bottom of real social growth; only

the cattle-keeper stands between the farmer and the savage. The farmer

is more nearly self-supporting than any other member of society. He is

still in the short-circuit activities of the self-feeder; while his

surplus product does in truth feed the world and give us all a chance to

grow, he sees nothing of the world he feeds, and, blinded by our customs

of exchange, thinks that in selling corn he is but feeding his family.

Therefore the farmer is naturally egoistic—inevitably so unless he

recognises the social nature of his function.

But as the farmer marries early and easily; woman, too, on that plane of

economic activity being a valued co-agent in living, like the squaw; so

the farmer is under no strong temptation to unchastity. His life of

out-of-door muscular exertion is another help here. Lacking other forms

of association, the church is a welcome social ground for the farmer and

his wife; so he conforms easily to the current standard of morality. And

with this moral tendency and lack of startling events, we find the

reason for his temperance in speech and other habits.

In the sailor’s life, the opposite conditions obtain. His is a late and

highly socialised industry. He combines with other men in elaborately

specialised labour for the benefit of innumerable widely scattered

people. His combination is absolute for considerable periods of time,

and physically isolated from all other social forms. The dangers of the

profession are great, requiring constant watchfulness and the most

prompt and perfect interdependence. From the seamen singing and hauling

together to the quick co-ordination between the captain on the bridge

and the uttermost sailor on the yards, there is this constant interplay

and conspicuous interdependence. Of course, they develop a high degree

of comradeship—of course, they stand by one another to the last degree

of danger. It indicates no greater nobility in Jack Jones, who went to

sea, over Jedediah Jones, who stayed on the farm; it is a quality of his

industry, that is all.

So with the other traits. The sailor is communally fed while engaged in

these common activities. The ego is not called out in any way. Then, his

private share of wealth being given him at the same time when he is

turned loose to provide for himself, he naturally pours forth the money

freely; a trait well known by all the barnacles and borers who infest

the sailor ashore, as others do the ships at sea.

The sailor has no wife; he cannot marry as early as the farmer, because

Jack has to support his wife at long range out of his earnings; she

being of no service in maintaining the family. Or, if married, he must

be away from his wife for long periods. Thus denied the natural

relations of the sexes and exposed when ashore to the instant swooping

down of the parasitic female animal in her frankest form, he is,

inevitably, “immoral.” Let Jedediah go to sea and Jack stay at home, and

you reverse the characteristics of each.

The intemperance comes under the action of these last conditions,

long-enforced abstinence and sudden profusion; and the profanity is

coincident with the sudden shocks of excitement in his work, with all

the jars, difficulties, and dangers involved. For similar reasons

ox-drovers are less given to profanity than mule-drivers. Thus we see

the vices and virtues of a given profession inhere in its conditions.

Individual character may fight against it, and there is a difference

always in the personal expression, but as industrial classes the farmer

and the sailor manifest certain distinctive characteristics involved in

their form of industry.

Miners furnish another conspicuous instance of this force. In no class

of men—not even in sailors—is altruism, even to heroism, more prominent.

Given death and danger well-nigh certain, but comrades to be saved, and

the miners always volunteer at once. If valour and self-sacrifice among

miners were rewarded as they are in some sporadic rescue of the

drowning, we should need to run a factory of decorations. The miner,

like the sailor, is engaged in a highly socialised industry. He works at

great personal sacrifices to promote the social welfare.

The farmer, in his corn, sees tangible immediate food for himself and

family. The miner sees no such prompt advantage in his coal. The farmer,

safely and alone, pursues his individual labours. The miner, in danger

and in company, pursues his group labour. They are cut off from the rest

of the world, the mining group, and easily develop a common

consciousness. Their danger is a common danger, only to be met and

overcome by common action. Hence they act in common and for each other.

This may be studied in varying degree in all industries. The effect of

household labour on the growth of altruism is even worse than that of

farm labour. The farmer does in truth connect with the whole world,

serve the whole world through his products. The domestic labourer

connects with nothing but the family, serves nothing but the family.

Absolutely the most primitive form of human labour surviving among us is

that of the woman “doing her own work” like the squaw. The only

enlargement admitted is that of domestic service, being a survival of

the next lowest form, slave labour. This industry, in its shortest of

short circuits, develops no social spirit whatever; nothing but egoism

and familism grow from it.

Altruism, due to other causes, may be felt and manifested by the

domestic worker, but the work does not conduce to it. Conversely, when

this stage of labour is at last abandoned; when we have socialised these

antiquated industries; an immense increase of altruism will appear. We

are so accustomed to think of men as egoists, and women as altruists

that it will be a blow to many to advance this position, but seeing that

altruism, the social spirit, is but the essential condition and result

of our social co-activities; that only men take part in these

activities, and that women have been arrested in this natural

development and forced to remain as they began, working in solitude and

utter disconnection, for their own families solely; it is plain that the

world’s growth in altruism comes through men as a class, and that women

as a class contribute to the social spirit only an exaggerated familism

and egoism. That animal instinct shown in “the maternal sacrifice,” or

the devotion to one’s mate of exaggerated sex development, have nothing

to do with the larger human love—with omniism.

The two are constantly blended through heredity, but the industrial

influence of the sexes is as above stated, and it is through industrial

development that our altruism comes. Observe that the nations most

“humane” are those most advanced in industry, and those least “humane”

are those most primitive in industry, down to the savage who has only

the rudiments of either industry or humanity. Altruism is recognised by

religion as a virtue and urged upon us, but it appears in us only in

proportion to our social progress in interrelated service. Our own

principal religion, Christianity, is altruism incarnate—but it is not

altruism understood. It preaches altruism as a virtue and a duty, but it

does not show altruism to be a natural product of certain industrial

relations and urge upon its followers their entering upon those

relations as the chief means of developing altruism.

Religion has not showed us the _naturalness_ of altruism. It has taught

that it was natural for man to be selfish, and that to be unselfish was

a continual struggle, needing the grace of God to attain it. When we

learn at last that the social instincts are as natural as the personal,

that they are evolved under the same biological laws, that our failure

to manifest them in due proportion is due to unnecessary social

conditions quite within our power to change—the burden on man’s

conscience will be lifted forever.

We shall learn to lay no false stress on altruism as a lofty and

difficult virtue, but see it to be the spirit of civilisation; and the

lack of it, the uncivilised egoism still so prominent and evilly active,

we shall perceive to be merely an anachronism, which needs only to be

recognised to be despised, and only to be despised to be outgrown.

A man still maintaining a visible egoism in a period of dominant

altruism, would feel as uncomfortable as a man with a tail. A tail was

“natural” to us once,—not now.

Another vital error, maintained by our religions, is the confusion of

altruism, the social spirit, with that abnormal action known as

“charity”—“benevolence,” “philanthropy.” We are taught to regard the

expression of this rare and hard-won feeling of altruism as requiring us

to “sell all we have and give to the poor.”

Giving to the poor, from direct alms to the subtle ramifications of

organised charity, bears about the same relation to a healthy working

altruism that the transfusion of blood bears to a mother’s nursing a

child. There are times when a direct transfer of subsistence is called

for in society, as in some great disaster, like the Chicago fire, or

Johnstown flood, or awful submersion of Galveston.

So there are cases when one human being may save another’s life by

giving him his own blood through a syringe. But you would find it

difficult to raise men to a daily level of devotion willing to transfer

blood as a steady diet to their anæmic friends; and it is similarly

difficult to persuade the healthy working mass of society that any such

sacrificial transfer of property is right and reasonable.

They are quite correct in this position. Charity is not right. It may be

necessary at times, but it is not a normal organic process. A healthy

working altruism involves no sacrifice of one to another, but the common

good-will, and common effort for a common good. We err in the very

word—it should not be “other-ism”—but “our-ism.” There is no justice or

benefit in “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” but there is in each giving to

all—for all includes each.

Just as our foolish “business” methods deal and shuffle money among the

rich without adding a cent to our wealth, so does our foolish charity

deal and shuffle it among the poor, with similar uselessness. The fact

that we are, and always have been, so open to the demands of charity,

proves our social spirit, but proves also that we have not understood

its nature and its use.

One more error that hinders our realisation of this great feeling is our

persistent misuse of the word “self.”

Human Work · 第 7 / 22 段