[66] Let the reader notice, in passing, the passage which we have
italicised. We shall consider the exercise of the royal warrant by the
Government hereafter; but it may be observed in the meanwhile how
completely the above passage justifies (what, indeed, was not
seriously denied by any competent authority) the legality of Mr.
Gladstone's measure. The purchase system is there made absolutely
dependent on the continued permission of the royal will. The moment
that permission is withdrawn, the purchase system ceases to be. The
Queen simply withdrew the royal warrant which authorized it, and there
was an end of the matter legally and constitutionally.
[67] The Duke of Argyll questioned the constitutional character of
this amendment, and not without reason, as trenching on the royal
prerogative, acting through the responsible ministers of the Crown.
'Parliament has a right to call for full information in regard to
military matters, for the purpose of enabling it to vote with
discretion and intelligence. But this right must not be held to
justify an unreasonable interference in respect to the details of
military administration.'--_Todd's Parliamentary Government in
England._ Vol. i. p. 328.
[68] Mr. Göschen is certainly much to be pitied. If a first class
man-of-war is driven at midday on a well-known rock he is held
responsible for the disaster, and if he inflicts condign punishment on
the culpable officers, he is accused of unjust and arbitrary conduct.
Indeed, some of our Conservative friends have not hesitated to say
that Mr. Göschen exceeded his power in superseding the peccant
admirals in the Mediterranean. Such an opinion is in the teeth of
legal authorities. Let us quote one of the latest and best known:--'It
is essential to the constitution of a military body,' says Mr. Todd
('Parliamentary Government in England,' vol. i. p. 326) 'that the
Crown should have the power of reducing to a lower grade, or of
altogether dismissing, any of its officers from service in the army or
navy at its own discretion, _and, if need be, without assigning any
reason; such power being always exercised through a responsible
minister, who is answerable_ for the same, if it should appear to have
been exercised unwarrantably and upon an insufficient ground.' So well
established is this rule that it was decided by the Court of Queen's
Bench, in the case of Dickson _v._ Viscount Combermere, that the
discretionary power of the Crown to remove officers is so absolute
that even if an officer had been tried by a court of inquiry and
acquitted, the Crown was justified in removing him from office upon
the advice of a minister responsible to Parliament.