The wearisome assertion that the last session of Parliament has been a
'barren' one, has become a sort of political axiom among a large
section of the community. Writers and speakers innumerable assume it
as a self-evident fact, which no sane person would dream of disputing.
It is, nevertheless, our serious intention to dispute it, and,
moreover, to prove that the session, so far from being utterly barren,
has produced a legislative harvest of more than average fruitfulness.
Putting aside the last two sessions, and that which witnessed the
triumph of free trade, we have no hesitation in saying that no session
since the first Reform Bill has produced so many measures of equal
importance as the last session. It would not be difficult to point to
session after session during that period which, for any good the
country has derived from their labours, might as well have never been.
But no one can say that with truth of the session that has just gone
by. On the contrary, we believe that it will be regarded a few years
hence as one of the most important sessions of this century. To those
who choose to echo an unreasoning cry, rather than take the trouble
to think for themselves, this will, no doubt, appear a wild assertion.
But what are the facts? The present Parliament was elected chiefly for
the purpose of settling the Irish question, and the sessions of
1869-1870 were devoted almost exclusively to the affairs of Ireland.
The Irish Church Bill and the Land Bill, however, having been settled,
there seemed to be a kind of general understanding that the session of
1871 should be given up to the consideration of English, or at least
imperial interests. Ireland accordingly hardly occupied any place in
the programme of the session. And yet, in the very region where it was
expected, as a matter of course, to be peculiarly barren, the session
of 1871 has borne a crop of goodly fruit. Let us glance at a few of
the Irish measures of the session.
'It is the very ancient privilege of the people of England,' says
Edmund Burke, 'that they shall be tried, except in the known
exceptions, not by the judges appointed by the Crown, but by their own
fellow-subjects.' Trial by jury has probably exercised more influence
than any other institution in moulding our national character, and in
impressing on it especially that inborn reverence for law which has
become proverbial. But with that singular perverseness which has
characterized all our dealings with Ireland for centuries, we not only
imposed our own institutions on that unhappy country, but we imposed
them shorn of all that which made them precious to Englishmen. This is
true in an aggravated sense of trial by jury. The very essence of
trial by jury is, as Burke has observed, that the accused 'shall be
tried, not by the judges appointed by the Crown, but by his own
fellow-subjects.' But how did we carry out this principle in Ireland,
in the case of political prisoners in particular? By simply ignoring
it. We retained the name and the forms of trial by jury, but we so
perverted its intention and spirit, that what Englishmen regard as the
_palladium_ of their liberty became in Ireland the symbol of every
species of injustice and wrong. When it was an object with the
authorities of Dublin Castle to secure the conviction of a prisoner,
they never hesitated to pack the jury that tried him. Names which
ought to have been on the panel were systematically and arbitrarily
excluded, and the jury-box was filled with men of whom it might have
been predicted with tolerable certainty beforehand that they would
bring in a verdict of guilty. Let us illustrate our argument by a
typical example. In 1844, the Government of the day succeeded in
getting a verdict of guilty against Mr. O'Connell, a man of whom
Macaulay has declared truth that 'the place which he held in the
estimation of his countrymen was such as no popular leader in our
history, I might perhaps say in the history of the world, has ever
attained.' If ever there was an occasion when the Government should
have been scrupulously careful to administer justice fairly, it was
the trial of O'Connell; for the eyes not only of Ireland, but of all
Europe, were upon them. But so inveterate had the habit of managing
verdicts become in Ireland, that on a crucial occasion, when trial by
jury itself might be said to be on its trial, the authorities
shamelessly packed the jury which sat in judgment on the great
tribune. Twenty-seven names were omitted from the panel which ought to
have been on it. And then from 'this mutilated jury-list,' as Macaulay
indignantly calls it, forty-eight names were taken by lot. 'And
then'--we must tell the rest of the story in Macaulay's burning
language--
'And then came the striking. You struck out all the Roman
Catholic names; and you give us your reasons for striking
out these names, reasons which I do not think it worth
while to examine. The real question which you should have
considered was this: Can a great issue between two hostile
religions--for such the issue was--be tried in a manner
above all suspicion by a jury composed exclusively of men
of one of those religions? I know that in striking out the
Roman Catholics you did nothing that was not according to
technical rules. But my great charge against you is that
you have looked on this whole case in a technical point of
view, that you have been attorneys when you should have
been statesmen. The letter of the law was doubtless with
you; but not the noble spirit of the law. The jury _de
medietate linguæ_ is of immemorial antiquity among us.
Suppose that a Dutch sailor at Wapping is accused of
stabbing an Englishman in a brawl. The fate of the culprit
is decided by a mixed body of six Englishmen and six
Dutchmen. Such were the securities which the wisdom and
justice of our ancestors gave to aliens. You are ready
enough to call Mr. O'Connell an alien, when it serves your
purposes to do so. You are ready enough to inflict on the
Irish Roman Catholics all the evils of alienage, but the
one privilege, the one advantage of alienage, you deny him.
In a case which of all cases most required a jury _de
medietate_, in a case which sprang out of the mutual
hostility of races and sects, you pack a jury all of one
race and all of one sect.... Yes, you have obtained a
verdict of Guilty; but you have obtained that verdict from
twelve men brought together by illegal means, and selected
in such a manner that their decision can inspire no
confidence.'--(Macaulay's Speeches, p. 314.)
Now let it be observed that this system, which treated the Roman
Catholics of Ireland as aliens in their own country, and at the same
time denied them the rights and privileges of aliens, has been in
force up to this year. And yet many on this side of the Channel are
innocently surprised that the Irish people have no great reverence for
English law, and no great love for British institutions; and so they
rashly conclude that the only way to govern such a lawless race is by
the strong arm of power. But the simple fact is, that the Irish from
time immemorial have been remarkable for their love of justice. To
this fact their bitterest enemies bear witness. In that category may
certainly be reckoned Sir John Davys, Irish Attorney-General under
James I.; yet this is the testimony which he bears:--'There is no
nation of people under the sun that doth love equal and indifferent
justice better than the Irish, or will rest better satisfied with the
execution thereof, although it be against themselves, so as they may
have the benefit and protection of the law when upon just cause they
do desire it.' 'The truth is,' he adds, 'that in time of peace the
Irish are more fearful to offend the law than the English, or any
other nation whatsoever.' That simple expression, 'in time of peace,'
explains the whole matter. English law has unfortunately too often
presented itself to the people of Ireland as a cruel enemy, against
which it was a duty and a necessity to wage a chronic warfare; and it
is no great marvel if they take some time to learn that their enemy of
yesterday has suddenly become their friend. We have no faith in sudden
political conversions, especially in the case of nations; and we do
not despair of Mr. Gladstone's legislation for Ireland, because we
find that its healing properties are percolating but slowly through
the crust of inevitable prejudice which it had to encounter. We must
persevere in the good work, and Mr. Gladstone has shown his
earnestness in the ungrateful task of conciliating Ireland by passing
last session several measures of great importance to the welfare of
that country. Chief and foremost among them is the Juries (Ireland)
Bill. It is an elaborate piece of remedial legislation, though it
passed through Parliament without exciting attention, and it cannot
fail to produce an excellent effect in Ireland, as its character
becomes gradually known. It will no longer be possible for the most
violent partisan to pack a jury in Ireland, and we may reasonably
trust that in process of time Irishmen will learn to appeal to English
justice with a confidence to which they have been so long strangers.
Another Irish measure of great importance which received the sanction
of the Legislature last session is the Local Government (Ireland)
Act. Its clauses are thirty-two in number, and its object is to amend
the law relating to the local government of towns and populous places
in Ireland. It is not necessary to go through its provisions, but we
may say that their general effect is to make all illegality and
corruption in municipal elections and in the elections of local
commissioners impossible, or at least perilous; to put a stop to
anything like jobbing or any corrupt expenditure of public money by
the governing bodies of towns; to extend to Ireland, with the
necessary modifications, the provisions with regard to the public
health which prevail in England; and to empower the governing bodies
and ratepayers of all towns in Ireland to obtain lands at a cheap
rate, to unite or separate districts, and to alter rates. Another
clause of the bill empowers the Lord Lieutenant, with the approval of
the Treasury, to create a new Local Government Department of the Chief
Secretary's office, 'the salaries of such persons to be paid out of
the moneys to be provided by Parliament for such purpose.' The
tendency of the whole bill is to develop the faculty of
self-government throughout Ireland, and to give the country 'home
rule' in the only sense in which that boon would be practicable or
beneficial. What is needful above all things is to instil into the
minds of the Irish people habits of self-reliance and a respect for
English law; and the two bills which have elicited these observations
are most valuable contributions to that result. Viewing them in all
their bearings, we are bold to say that if the session had produced
nothing else, these two bills alone would have redeemed it from the
reproach of being a 'barren' session. In the election campaign of
1868, Mr. Gladstone described Protestant ascendancy in Ireland as a
great upas tree which was casting its baleful shadow over the whole
land; and ever since he has been in office he has set himself
vigorously and with unwearied patience not merely to cut down the
wide-spreading branches of that fatal tree, but to root up one by one
the noxious growths which flourished beneath its friendly shade. The
Jury Bill and the Local Government Act are the natural fruits of the
Church Bill and the Land Bill. It would have been impossible to pass
them while Protestant ascendancy existed. Other Irish bills have been
passed this session which, though of less importance than those we
have named, have a very practical bearing on the well-being and
conciliation of Ireland. Yet all these measures have been simply
ignored in the various criticisms of the session which have come
under our notice. As if, forsooth! the prosperity and contentment of
Ireland were not of the last consequence to the empire at large.
So much for the work of the Government in the field of Irish
legislation. Let us now turn to its tale of successful measures in
matters of English and imperial policy.
The Army Bill demands, of course, the first and chief place in our
review; and we must remark, _in limine_, on the singular ill-luck
which overtook the Government in introducing it. During the autumn and
winter of last year, the country very generally, and even
passionately, demanded a large scheme of army reorganization. Radicals
and Conservatives differed, no doubt, in their views of what was
desirable in a good scheme of army reform. The latter wished merely to
supplement and improve the existing system, which they considered as
near perfection as could reasonably be expected. The former were not
quite agreed among themselves. Some had a hankering after the Prussian
system, and some preferred the Swiss. But Conservatives, Whigs, and
Liberals were all agreed on one point, namely, that Mr. Cardwell's
scheme ought to be a large and comprehensive one, and that a large and
comprehensive scheme involved expense. The Conservatives wished that
expense to go towards the enlargement and perfecting of the old
system. On the other hand, the Liberals, as a body, demanded the
abolition of the purchase system, and the development of a new system
in its place. But all admitted the necessity of a considerable
expenditure, and there was a general acquiescence throughout the
country in the prospect of an increased income-tax. Meanwhile Bourbaki
made his fatal march to the frontier, Chanzy's army was defeated and
scattered, and Paris was obliged to capitulate. The preliminaries of
peace were agreed upon soon afterwards, and the Eastern question,
which Prince Gortschakoff had reopened in so insolent a manner, was in
a fair way to a pacific solution.
The return of calm after so violent a storm in the political firmament
soon began to tell on English nerves; the panic which prompted, during
the bewildering achievements of the German armies, the cry for an
efficient scheme of army reform subsided by degrees as the danger of
war receded from our shores, and even 'The Battle of Dorking' failed
to impress the British taxpayer with any fear of an imminent invasion.
The consequence was, that by the time Mr. Cardwell laid his scheme
before Parliament, the enthusiasm for army reorganization had cooled
down to the temperate, and among some philosophical Radicals, even to
the frigid zone. The measure of the Government was admitted on all
hands to be thorough and comprehensive, and it received the cordial
acquiescence of the country. But the panic was over, and, as a
consequence, there was an absence of that enthusiastic support which
enables a minister to defeat summarily anything like an attempt at an
organized system of factious opposition. Had the Franco-German war
ended two months earlier than it did, it is questionable whether the
Government would have received sufficient encouragement to attack the
purchase system, considering the expense which its abolition entailed
on the country. There can be no question that if Mr. Gladstone had
taken up the subject and made it his own, as he did the Irish Church
Bill and the Land Bill, he could at any time have commanded such
support from the country as would have carried all opposition before
it. One or two rousing speeches from him, exposing the manifold evils
of the purchase system, and explaining the plan of the Government,
would have done the thing. But the misfortune of Mr. Cardwell was that
he elaborated and matured his scheme at a time when the country was
prepared for almost any expense that would give us an army which would
secure the safety of the empire, and enable us to hold our proper
place in the councils of Europe; and that he propounded his scheme
when the looming spectre of increased taxation appeared a more
tangible evil than the danger of a foreign invasion. The Opposition
availed itself adroitly, if not very patriotically, of the turn of the
tide, and wooed the aid of the extreme Radicals by the cry of
extravagant expenditure. Nor did it cry altogether in vain. There are
a few Radicals in the House of Commons who cannot forgive Mr.
Gladstone for being a Christian. That a man of his commanding genius
and varied acquirements should still retain the faith of his childhood
is an enigma to them. But that he should ever presume to baulk their
efforts to sap and overthrow its foundations is an offence to them;
and, if the truth must be told, they would far rather have a leader of
the Epicurean type of Lord Palmerston or Mr. Disraeli. One or two of
these pseudo-Liberals have been practically in opposition all through
the session, and we shall be curious to see how they defend themselves
before their constituents when the day of reckoning comes. One fact at
all events is certain: it was in a great measure through the help
which they gave to the Opposition that the session has not been more
fruitful than it has been. Whenever the Opposition wished to waste a
night in purposeless debate, the manoeuvre was sure to be seconded
by this handful of Voltairean Radicals below the gangway.
Such are the circumstances under which the Government introduced their
Army Bill. But it is impossible to appreciate the importance of that
bill, or to understand the virulence of the opposition which it
encountered, without glancing at the evil which it sought to remedy.
When the Government resolved to ask the assent of Parliament to a
large scheme of army reform, they found themselves hampered and
fettered on all sides by the purchase system. The army was enclosed in
a network of vested interests which it was found impossible to break
through for the purpose of effecting even so slight a reform as the
abolition of the ranks of ensign and cornet. It had, in fact, ceased
to be the property of the nation, and was no longer under the control
of the sovereign. It had become mortgaged to the officers, and it was
absolutely necessary to get it out of pawn before it could be
effectually dealt with. In short, the purchase system must cease to
exist, or all ideas of army reorganization must be abandoned. Does
anyone think this too strong a statement of the case? Let him consider
the history of the purchase system, and he will think so no longer.
We have been told _ad nauseam_ that the purchase system has been the
mainstay of the British army. The bravery of our officers, their
well-bred manners, their discipline, even their patriotism and
loyalty, have all been ascribed to the magic of the purchase system,
and so has the _esprit de corps_ of the men. Now it seems to us that
there is a hitch in this style of reasoning, inasmuch as it implies
that the things which happen to exist together are necessarily related
to each other as cause and effect. The officers of the British army
may be all that their admirers declare them to be,--on that point we
shall have something to say presently--but it by no means follows that
the purchase system is the cause of their excellence. Nearly all the
merits which are claimed for the purchase system were conspicuous in
the German army in the last war; yet the purchase system is unknown in
the German army, and, in fact, in every army in the civilized world,
England alone excepted. Nor, indeed, does it embrace the whole of the
English army. The navy and the marines, the artillery and the
engineers know it not. Its advocates are therefore forced to this
dilemma: they must deny to the navy and to the non-purchase corps of
the army all those qualities which they claim as resulting from the
purchase system, or they are bound to admit that those qualities are
independent of the purchase system, and may continue to exist without
it. For our own part, we have no doubt whatever that the many
admirable qualities of the British officer are not only independent of
the purchase system, but that they remain in spite of it; for the
purchase system, as it has been in practice among us, is essentially a
demoralizing system. We say as it has been in practice among us,
because the purchase system and the illegal custom of paying more than
the regulation price for the value of commissions have been proved to
be inseparable. This has been demonstrated by the Royal Commission
which examined into the subject last year. The payment of
over-regulation prices has been forbidden in every variety of form for
more than a century, but it has grown and prospered on its
prohibitions. On a revision of the prices of commissions, in 1766, by
a board of general officers, a royal warrant was issued, which
contains the following stringent order with respect to over-regulation
prices:--'We having approved of the same (_i. e._, the prices
recommended by the board), our will and pleasure is, that _in all
cases where we shall permit any of the commissions specified therein
to be sold_,[66] the sum to be paid for the same shall not exceed the
prices set down in the said report. And all colonels, agents and
others, our military officers, are hereby required and directed to
conform strictly and carefully to the regulation hereby laid down and
established, upon pain of our highest displeasure.' In 1772 and 1773,
some other royal warrants were issued, prohibiting over-regulation
prices in equally peremptory terms. Still the unlawful traffic went on
unchecked, and in 1783 another step was taken to put a stop to it. A
general order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief requiring every
officer, in sending his application for leave to dispose of his
commission at the regulated price, 'solemnly to declare, on the word
and honour of an officer and a gentleman, that nothing beyond the
price limited by his Majesty's regulations was stipulated or promised,
directly or indirectly, and that no other mode of compensation or
gratuity was in contemplation of the parties, or should be given or
accepted in respect of such sale or purchase.' A similar declaration
was required of the officer desiring to purchase. He 'expressly
pledged his word and honour as an officer and a gentleman that he
would not, either then, or at any future time, give, by any means or
in any shape whatever, directly or indirectly, anymore than the
regulated price.' The commanding officer of the regiment was further
required to declare that he verily believed the established regulation
with regard to price was intended to be strictly complied with, and
that no clandestine bargain subsisted between the parties concerned.
This prohibition was extended to cases of exchange from half-pay to
full-pay, and from one corps to another. The commanding officer was at
the same time ordered to transmit the names of such officers in the
regiment as were willing to purchase in succession; and in cases where
the commanding officer recommended a junior for promotion over a
senior's head, he was to give his reasons for such recommendation. It
appears, therefore, that in establishing the rule of seniority,
tempered by selection, in regimental promotion, Mr. Cardwell has
simply revived an item of military reform attempted about ninety years
ago. But not to dwell on that, the general order from which we have
been quoting went on to clench its prohibition of over-regulation
prices in the following explicit language:--
'His Majesty has, by the advice of his board of general
officers, been further pleased to declare his determination
that any officer who shall be found to have given, or to
have stipulated, or promised, directly or indirectly, to
give anything beyond the regulated price, in disobedience
to these his Majesty's orders, or by any subterfuge or
equivocation to have evaded the same, _and to have thereby
shamefully forfeited his honour as an officer and a
gentleman, shall be dismissed from his Majesty's service_.'
Still the evil went on. Officers found means of evading the law and
escaping punishment, apparently without any prejudice to their honour
as officers and gentlemen in the eyes of the profession. Three years
later, therefore, that is, in 1786, another attempt was made to compel
British officers to keep their solemn and plighted word of honour; for
it came to that. A circular letter was addressed by the Secretary of
War to colonels of regiments, forbidding officers about to retire to
make any stipulation as to their successors, and insisting that they
should sell out or exchange 'in favour of such persons as his Majesty
should think fit to approve.' For it was discovered that by leaving
officers at liberty to select their successors they found means to
elude the strict orders prohibiting over-regulation prices.
In 1804, two circulars were issued by the Commander-in-Chief, one
addressed to army agents against the secret traffic in respect to
commissions, carried on with officers of the army; the other to
commanding officers of regiments, giving them precise directions,
which were to be strictly observed, in the purchase and sale of all
commissions. This paper states that 'his Majesty's regulations in
regard to the sums to be given and received for commissions in the
army,' had 'in various instances been disregarded.' The previous
orders on the subject are therefore repeated, and then 'the
Commander-in-Chief thinks proper to declare that any officer who shall
be found to have given, directly or indirectly, anything beyond the
regulated prices, in disobedience to his Majesty's orders, or to have
attempted to evade the regulations in any manner whatever, will be
reported by the Commander-in-Chief to his Majesty, in order that he
may be removed from the service.' Up to this time, and for three years
more, the prohibition of payments in excess of the regulation price
rested entirely on royal warrants and regulations. In 1807, however, a
clause was inserted in the Mutiny Act, making it a misdemeanor for any
agents to traffic in the sale of commissions, since 'great
inconvenience had arisen to his Majesty's service,' from the fact that
'much larger sums than are allowed by his Majesty's regulations are
often given and received for commissions, and great frauds committed.'
This is the first Parliamentary condemnation of over-regulation
prices, and it will be observed that the enactment applies to army
agents only; officers are not included. But in the year 1809, an Act
was passed for the 'Further Prevention of the Sale and Brokerage of
Offices,' and in that Act Parliamentary sanction is given for the
first time to the various prohibitions of over-regulation prices by
royal warrant. Not only was an officer to be immediately cashiered who
paid, received, or connived at the payment of over-regulation prices,
but further, 'as an encouragement for the detection of such practices,
such commission so forfeited shall be sold, and half the regulated
value (not exceeding £500) shall be paid to the informer.'
It is not necessary to follow the various alterations which the Mutiny
Act underwent in 1815-1829, for they are of no great importance. But
it is time that we should take stock of our inquiry thus far, and
endeavour to gauge the influence of the purchase system on the
character of the officers affected by it, as attested by competent
witnesses. It is obvious that up to the period at which we have now
arrived, that is, up to the year 1829, the payment of over-regulation
prices was found to be practically inseparable from the purchase
system. Nothing could have been done to stop it which was not done,
except the detection and condign punishment of the offenders. The
Sovereign, the Commander-in-Chief, the War Secretary, and Parliament,
all set their faces against the illegal traffic, and fulminated
threats and penal enactments against it; but all their efforts proved
unavailing, because there was an evident conspiracy among the general
body of officers to defeat the law, and, it is sad to add, to
dishonour their own word. For let it be remembered that the officer
who sold, and the officer who bought, and the commanding officer of
the regiment in which the transaction took place, were all required
'solemnly to declare,' and did 'solemnly declare on the word and
honour of an officer and a gentleman,' that, 'neither directly nor
indirectly,' had anything been paid or stipulated for beyond the
regulated price. And yet it was notorious that officers were
constantly in the habit of evading all their engagements 'by
subterfuge or equivocation,' and were thereby habitually violating
their plighted word, or, to quote again the language of the royal
warrant, 'had thereby shamefully forfeited their honour as officers
and gentlemen.'
Now, we should be inclined to say, _à priori_, that a system which
encouraged and enabled officers in the army to 'shamefully forfeit
their honour as officers and gentlemen,' could not fail to have a
vicious and demoralizing influence, not only on their professional
character as officers, but on their whole ἦθος as men. The Duke of
Wellington has often been quoted in recent debates as having said that
he had an army 'which could go anywhere and do anything.' No doubt the
Duke of Wellington succeeded, by dint of hard fighting, and the rare
qualities which he possessed as a commander, to manufacture such an
army out of the materials that came to his hand; but that was by no
means the kind of army which the purchase system gave him. On the
contrary, he was continually complaining, up to Waterloo, of the
ignorance, the stupidity, the insubordination, and, in short, the
general inefficiency of his officers. He could trust them in nothing,
he said; for they either could not understand and execute his
commands, or they deliberately disobeyed them. And in some cases he
found them shirking their duties, and asking permission to return to
England on trivial pleas. But it will be better to let the Duke speak
for himself. On the 15th of May, 1811, he wrote to the Earl of
Liverpool a letter, in which he expresses great vexation at the escape
of 1,400 of the enemy, although he had 'employed two divisions and a
brigade to prevent their escape,' and 'had done everything that could
be done in the way of order and instruction.' And then he goes on to
add:--
'I certainly feel every day more and more the difficulty of
the situation in which I am placed. I am obliged to be
everywhere, and if absent from any operation something goes
wrong. It is to be hoped that the general and other
officers of the army will at last acquire that experience
which will teach them that success can be attained only by
attention to the most minute details, and by tracing every
part of every operation from its origin to its conclusion,
point by point, and ascertaining that the whole is
understood by those who are to execute it.'
In another letter to the Earl of Liverpool, dated July 20, 1811, he
recommends
'the adoption of the rule which I have made in respect to
staff appointments attached to the British army, viz., that
those who hold them shall receive no emolument on account
of them if absent from their duty on account of their
health for a greater length of time than two months, unless
their absence should have been occasioned by wounds.'
He thinks that this rule will probably be considered harsh, but he
insists on it as necessary, on account of 'the abuse of sick
certificates.' In a letter dated 29th September, 1811, and also
addressed to the Earl of Liverpool, he uses the following strong
language:--
'I must also observe that British officers require to be
kept in order, as well as the soldiers under their command,
particularly in a foreign service. The experience which I
have had of their conduct in the Portuguese service has
shown me that there must be an authority, and that a strong
one, to keep them within due bounds; otherwise they would
only disgust the soldiers over whom they should be placed,
the officers whom they should be destined to assist, and
the country in whose service they should be employed.'