'But, when men pride themselves on a list of
five-and-twenty ancestors, and trace them back to Heracles,
the son of Amphitryon, it seems to him surprising that they
should make these trumpery reckonings; and they should not
be able (further) to calculate that the twenty-fifth from
Amphitryon backwards was just such a person as fortune
chanced to make him, or at least the fiftieth from him, and
thus to get rid of the vanity of a senseless mind,--at this
he cannot suppress a smile.'
In p. 194, C., the words τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς
τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος, &c., should be rendered, 'the
impressions entering us through our senses, leaving their marks on
this _heart's core_, as Homer called it, intending to express in
allegory the resemblance between κῆρ and κηρός,' &c. Mr. Jowett rather
loosely turns it,--'the impressions which pass through the senses and
_sink into the_ [waxen] _heart of the soul_, as Homer says in a
parable,' &c. And just below, the words εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν
αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα, which he renders 'and are not liable to
confusion,' might just as well have been brought out in their true
sense, 'and further, they do not misapply the impressions of (or left
by) the senses;' for παραλλάσσειν is 'to change wrongly,' and is a
word selected as exactly and most happily representing the idea Plato
wished to convey, that confused memories owe their confusion to not
keeping distinctly apart the impressions formerly received. A few
lines further on, ὅταν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ᾖ, ὃ δὴ ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ πάντα
σοφὸς ποιητὴς, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες &c., there are some points which only a
careful rendering will bring out. In taking a delicate impression of a
seal or gem on clarified wax, a hair left in it would mar the
impression. And the dark yellow colour of natural wax was thought by
the Greeks to be made foul by the dirt of the insects; clarifying it,
in fact, was 'defæcation.' So we render it thus:--'When, then, a man's
heart has hairs in it, which is the state the all-wise poet referred
to [in calling it λάσιον κῆρ], or when it has dirt left in it, or is
made of wax that is not pure [but adulterated], or too soft or too
hard, then,' &c. Now this hardly appears in Mr. Jowett's version, 'But
when the heart of any one _is shaggy_, as the poet who knew everything
says, or muddy and of impure wax, or very soft, or very hard, then,'
&c.
Of the _Phædrus_, as a whole, Mr. Jowett appears to us to give a
correct account, in saying (Introd., p. 552) that
'the continuous thread which appears and reappears
throughout is rhetoric. This is the ground into which the
rest of the dialogue is inlaid, in parts embroidered with
fine words, "in order to please Phædrus." The speech of
Lysias and the first speech of Socrates are examples of the
false rhetoric, as the second speech of Socrates is adduced
as an instance of the true. But the true rhetoric is based
upon dialectic, and dialectic is a sort of inspiration akin
to love; they are two aspects of philosophy in which the
technicalities of rhetoric are absorbed. The true knowledge
of things in heaven and earth is based upon enthusiasm or
love of the ideas; and the true order of speech or writing
proceeds according to them.'
With regard to the first speech of Socrates on Love (p. 237, C., to
241, D.) it appears to us that it is not so much 'an example of the
false rhetoric,' as a proof how much better and more logically even a
paradoxical subject can be treated by a dialectician than by a mere
rhetorician. The hit at Phædrus for having given no definition
whatever of his subject (p. 237, C.) is one of the points of contrast
which is very significant; and there is this subtle irony underlying
the whole speech, that whereas Socrates undertook to prove that
χαρίζεσθαι μὴ ἐρῶντι was better than χαρίζεσθαι ἐρῶντι, his essay is
made to turn, in fact, simply on the latter point, μὴ χαρίζεσθαι
ἐρῶντι, so as to be a diatribe against vicious παιδεραστία; only a
word or two at the end being added in _apparent_ sanction of the
other, and by way of verbally fulfilling the engagement he had made:
λέγω οὖν ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ὅτι ὅσα τὸν ἕτερον λελοιδορήκαμεν, τῷ ἑτέρῳ
τἀναντία τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσεστι(p. 341, _fin._) And the _palinodia_, or
pretended recantation (p. 244, _seq._), cleverly pursues the same
theme, by showing that love, in its philosophical and nonsensual
phase, is a divine emotion, and the source of every blessing to man.
The famous allegory that follows, which means that Reason should
control Passion, gives a sketch of the orderly and well-trained man,
gradually recovering, even as the depraved mind gradually loses, the
impressions and memories of the god-like existence men enjoyed in a
previous state. The latter part of the dialogue hangs on to the
allegory, not indeed very directly; rather, we should say, it reverts
to the former part, and is intended to show, by a critique of the two
essays, that no essayist or speech-maker can hope to succeed, who
derives all his art from rules and treatises and the pedantic
phraseology of the teachers. He must trust to dialectic, _i.e._, the
science of hard and close reasoning, if he would rise above mere
δημηγορία, or clap-trap; and psychology itself must form the basis of
dialectic.
Mr. Jowett's version of this dialogue is fully as lax as that of the
_Symposium_. Still it reads pleasantly, and if one could forget the
incomparable and often so much more expressive Greek, one would be
fairly content with the general correctness of the paraphrase. Almost
at the outset, he renders εἴ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν, 'if you have
leisure to _stay and listen_,' instead of 'to _walk on_ and listen,'
where a slight satire is intended on the 'constitutional' and
prescribed exercise of the effeminate youth. And γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ ὁ
Λυσίας πειρώμενόν τινα τῶν καλῶν, οὐχ ὑπ' ἐραστοῦ δὲ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο
καὶ κεκόμψευται means, 'Lysias, you must know, has written about one
of the handsome youths having proposals made to him, not, however, by
a lover; but this is the very point he has put in a new and quaint
light.' (Of course, κεκόμψευται, to which we have given a medial
sense, may also be taken as a passive.) Mr. Jowett gives us nothing
nearer to the above than 'Lysias _imagined_ a fair youth who was being
tempted, but not by a lover; and this was the point; he ingeniously
proved that,' &c. In p. 229, A., κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισσὸν ἴωμεν should be
rendered, 'let us go _along_ or _down_ the Ilissus,' _i.e._, in the
bed or channel, or even along the bank; certainly not, 'let us go _to_
the Ilissus.' Nor is ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ (p. 329, _fin._), this sort of
'_crude_ philosophy,' but 'an uncourteous (or uncivil) kind of
philosophy,' viz., that which employs itself in giving the lie to
received traditions.
The charming and justly celebrated passage in p. 230, B.--one of the
few in Greek literature that indicate intense feeling for the beauties
of nature--we propose to render as follows, nearly every word being a
_close_ representative of the equivalent Greek:--
'Upon my word, the retreat is a charming one; for not only
is this plane-tree of ample size and height, but the dense
shade of this tall _agnus_ is quite beautiful to behold; in
full flower too, so as to make the place most fragrant! Yon
spring, also, is most grateful, that flows from under the
plane-tree with a stream of very cold water, as one may
judge by the feeling to the foot. Moreover, there appears,
from the images and ornaments, to be a shrine here to
certain Nymphs and to the Achelöus. Pray notice, also, the
balmy air of the place, how delightful and exceeding sweet,
and how it rings with the shrill summer chirp of the chorus
of cicadas! But the quaintest thing of all is the growth of
the grass, which on this gentle slope springs up in just
enough abundance for one to recline one's head and be quite
comfortable. So that you have proved a most excellent guide
for a strange visitor, my dear Phædrus.'
Some extra pains might have been fairly bestowed on a passage almost
without rival in Greek literature. But Mr. Jowett gives us the
following bare and clipped paraphrase of it:--
'Yes, indeed, and a fair and shady resting-place, full of
summer sounds and scents. There is the lofty and spreading
plane-tree, and the agnus castus, high and clustering, in
the fullest blossom and the greatest fragrance; and the
stream which flows beneath the plane-tree is deliciously
cold to the feet. Judging from the ornaments and images,
this must be a spot sacred to Achelöus and the Nymphs;
moreover, there is a sweet breeze, and the grasshoppers
chirrup; and the greatest charm of all is the grass like a
pillow gently sloping to the head. My dear Phædrus, you
have been an admirable guide.'
In p. 248, C., θεσμὸς Ἀδραστείας is not 'a law of the goddess
Retribution,' but simply 'a law of necessity.' Had we space, we could
point out not a few very inadequate, not to say inaccurate, renderings
in the grand and mystical passage about the ἰδέα of beauty, p. 250.
For instance, Mr. Jowett does not see that we should construe
κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ (viz., κάλλος) διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν
ἡμετέρων, 'we realize it (here on earth) by the clearest of all our
senses,' viz., the sight of the eye. The whole translation of the
great allegory, in fact, reads as if it came from one who had never
taken the trouble to make out _exactly_ what the Greek meant; and, as
it is very difficult, and the passage itself very sublime, the student
ought to have found in Professor Jowett a safe and cautious and
accurate guide to the language as well as to the mind of Plato.
We are compelled to pass on, rapidly and very briefly, to that most
difficult of Platonic dialogues, the _Philebus_. This treats of a life
made up of pleasure and intellectuality, φρόνησις, combined in certain
proportions, a μικτὸς βίος, as the best and happiest. And the doctrine
of πέρας and ἄπειρον, the Finite and the Infinite, which Aristotle
(Eth., ii. 5) attributes to Protagoras,τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ
Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου, is so applied as
to show that mere pleasure carried to excess is self-destroying. This
also is touched upon in the Tenth Book of the Ethics, ch. ii., where
the μικτὸς βίος of ἡδονὴ and φρόνησις combined is preferred to either
alone. It has sometimes occurred to us, that in this dialogue Plato
has purposely used involved constructions and an affected obscurity of
style, as if to satirize Heraclitus, or some sophist of the Ephesian
school. The scholastic formulæ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ, implying synthesis and
analysis, and μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, 'the more or less,' to denote the
ἄπειρον, which can always be carried forward or backward, as in 'hot
and cold,' till πέρας, or definite quantity, is brought to limit
them,--these and other subtleties give to the _Philebus_, besides its
linguistic difficulties, which are great, an aspect which is seldom
inviting to younger students.
In the difficult passage (p. 15, B.), about ἰδέαι, Mr. Jowett has
again failed to give the exact sense. Plato says, one difficulty about
them is, 'whether we must assume that the abstract principle of each
quality (_e.g._, abstract beauty) pervades concretes and infinites,
dispersed and separated in each, or exists _as a whole outside of
itself_.' That is to say, if an abstract or ἰδέα is one thing
indivisible, which yet exists in different objects, it must reside
outside itself, and apart from the centre of its own οὐσία, or
essence. The words εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς χωρὶς, Mr. Jowett oddly
translates, 'or as still entire, _and yet contained in others_.' In p.
15, D., ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενα is, 'this doctrine of
"one and many" being the same, brought into existence (or, as we say,
brought before our notice) by discussions,' not 'the one and many are
identified _by the reasoning power_;' nor is ἄγηρων πάθος τῶν λόγων
αὐτῶν, just below, 'a quality of reason, as such, which never grows
old,' but 'a conditions of discussion themselves,' &c. Surely, to
render the plural λόγοι by 'reason,' is a singular error. In p. 23,
D., by not noticing the emphatic ἐγὼ the author has failed to see that
there is a reference to the clumsy attempts of _tiros_ at synthesis
and analysis, p. 15. _fin._; so that Socrates intends to say that he
fears _he_ is not much more skilful. A few lines below, where the
doctrine of causation is introduced, the words τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων
πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὅρα, 'consider now the _cause_ of the union of
these conditions (the finite and the infinite) with each other,' is
poorly rendered by 'find the cause of the third or compound.' In p.
24, D., Socrates argues that, if the principle of limitation (πέρας)
were admissible in, or could co-exist with, 'more or less,' _i.e._
progressive degree, the infinite would cease, by _ipso facto_ becoming
finite. And he concludes, κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγνοιτ' ἂν
τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τοὐναντίον ἅμα, 'according to this way of putting
it, the "hotter" would become at the same time infinite and finite.'
Surely Mr. Jowett quite misses the sense in rendering it, 'which
proves that comparatives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be
ranked in _the class of the infinite_.' In p. 26, B., Socrates says
that 'the goddess Harmony, perceiving the general lewdness and badness
of men, and that there was no limiting principle in them, either of
pleasures or of satisfying them, introduced law and order, containing
in themselves the finite. And you, Protarchus (he adds), say that she
thereby spoiled our pleasures; whereas I say, on the contrary, that
she saved them.' If the text is right, πέρας οὐδὲν ἐνὸν is the
accusative absolute; but we propose to read καὶ πέρας, &c., so that
the accusative will depend on κατιδοῦσα. Mr. Jowett's version
is--'Methinks that the goddess saw the universal wantonness and
wickedness of all things, having no limit of pleasure or satiety, and
she devised the limit of the law and order, tormenting the soul, as
you say, Philebus, or, as I affirm, saving the soul.'
It is no disparagement to the best of scholars to say that a perfect
translation of the whole of Plato is too great a task for any one
person to perform. It would be hardly possible to have the same
knowledge of every dialogue, and those less familiar to the translator
would not be wholly free from some mistakes. The scholarship that can
grapple with and gain a perfect mastery over the Greek of Plato, to
say nothing of his philosophy, must be of a very high order. No man,
perhaps, could have done the task better than Professor Jowett; and no
man, probably, is more fully aware that it might have been a good
deal better even than it is.