the Navigation of the Mississippi._
Translation.
"The question between Spain and the United States of North America is,
how to regulate their respective limits towards the Ohio and the
Mississippi. The Americans pretend, that their dominion extends as far
as the Mississippi, and Spain maintains the contrary.
"It is evident, that the Americans can only borrow from England the
right they pretend to have to extend as far as the Mississippi;
therefore, to determine this right, it is proper to examine what the
Court of London has thought and done on this head.
"It is known, that before the treaty of Paris, France possessed
Louisiana and Canada, and that she considered the savage people,
situated to the east of the Mississippi, either as independent, or as
under her protection.
"This pretension caused no dispute; England never thought of making
any, except as to the lands situated towards the source of the Ohio,
in that part where she had given the name of Alleghany to that river.
"A discussion about limits at that time took place between the Courts
of Versailles and London, but it would be superfluous to follow the
particulars; it will suffice to observe, that England proposed in 1755
the following boundary. It set out from the point where the River de
Boeuf falls into the Ohio, at the place called Venango; it went up
this river towards lake Erie as far as twenty leagues, and setting off
again from the same place, Venango, a right line was drawn as far as
the last mountains of Virginia, which descend towards the ocean. As to
the savage tribes situated between the aforesaid line and the
Mississippi, the English Minister considers them as independent; from
whence it follows, that according to the very propositions of the
Court of London, almost the whole course of the Ohio belonged to
France, and that the countries situated to the westward of the
mountains were considered as having nothing in common with the
Colonies.
"When peace was negotiated in 1761, France offered to make a cession
of Canada to England. The regulation of the limits of this Colony and
Louisiana was in question. France pretended that almost the whole
course of the Ohio made a part of Louisiana, and the Court of London,
to prove that this river belonged to Canada, produced several
authentic papers; among others, the chart which M. Vaudreuil delivered
to the English commandant when he abandoned Canada. The Minister of
London maintained at the same time, that a part of the savages
situated to the eastward of the Mississippi were independent, another
part under its protection, and that England had purchased a part from
the five Irequois nations. The misfortunes of France cut these
discussions short; the treaty of Paris assigned the Mississippi for
the boundary between the possessions of France and Great Britain.
"Let us see the dispositions, which the Court of London has made in
consequence of the treaty of Paris.
"If they had considered the vast territories situated to the eastward
of the Mississippi as forming part of their ancient Colonies, they
would have declared so, and have made their dispositions accordingly.
So far from any such thing, the King of England, in a proclamation of
the month of October, 1763, declares in a precise and positive manner
that the lands in question are situated between the Mississippi and
the ancient _English establishments_. It is, therefore, clearly
evident, that the Court of London itself, when it was as yet sovereign
of the Thirteen Colonies, did not consider the aforementioned lands as
forming part of these same Colonies; and it results from this in the
most demonstrative manner, that they have not at this time any right
over these lands. To maintain the contrary, every principle of the
laws of nature and nations must be subverted.
"The principles now established are as applicable to Spain as to the
United States. This power cannot extend its claims beyond the bounds
of its conquests. She cannot, therefore, pass beyond the Natchez,
situated towards the thirtyfirst degree of latitude; her rights are,
therefore, confined to this degree; what is beyond, is either
independent or belonging to England; neither Spain nor the Americans
can have any pretensions thereto. The future treaty of peace can alone
regulate the respective rights.
"The consequence of all that has been said is, that neither Spain nor
the United States has the least right of sovereignty over the savages
in question, and that the transactions they may carry on as to this
country would be to no purpose.
"But the future may bring forth new circumstances, and this reflection
leads one to suppose, that it would be of use that the Court of Madrid
and the United States should make an eventual arrangement.
"This arrangement may be made in the following manner. A right line
should be drawn from the eastern angle of the Gulf of Mexico, which
makes the section between the two Floridas, to Fort Toulouse, situated
in the country of the Alabamas; from thence the river Loneshatchi
should be ascended, from the mouth of which a right line should be
drawn to the Fort or Factory Quenassee; from this last place, the
course of the river Euphasee is to be followed till it joins the
Cherokee; the course of this last river is to be pursued to the place
where it receives the Pelisippi; this last to be followed to its
source, from whence a right line is to be drawn to Cumberland river,
whose course is to be followed until it falls into the Ohio. The
savages to the westward of the line described should be free under the
protection of Spain; those to the eastward should be free, and under
the protection of the United States; or rather, the Americans may make
such arrangements with them, as is most convenient to themselves. The
trade should be free to both parties.
"By looking over the chart we shall find, that Spain would lose almost
the whole course of the Ohio, and that the establishments, which the
Americans may have on this river, would remain untouched, and that
even a very extensive space remains to form new ones.
"As to the course and navigation of the Mississippi, they follow with
the property, and they will belong, therefore, to the nation to which
the two banks belong. If then, by the future treaty of peace, Spain
preserves West Florida, she alone will be the proprietor of the
course of the Mississippi from the thirtyfirst degree of latitude to
the mouth of this river. Whatever may be the case with that part,
which is beyond this point to the north, the United States of America
can have no pretensions to it, not being masters of either border of
this river.
"As to what respects the lands situated to the northward of the Ohio,
there is reason to presume that Spain can form no pretensions thereto.
Their fate must be regulated with the Court of London."
I did not return M. Rayneval any answer to his letter, nor any remarks
on his memoir, but the first time I saw him afterwards I told him, I
had received his letter and memoir he had done me the honor to write,
and that I should send a copy of it to our Secretary for Foreign
Affairs.
As both the letter and memoir were _ostensibly_ written by him in a
private character, it did not appear to me expedient or necessary to
enter into any formal discussions with him on those subjects.
The perusal of this memoir convinced me,
1st. That this Court would, at a peace, oppose our extension to the
Mississippi.
2dly. That they would oppose our claim to the free navigation of that
river.
3dly. That they would _probably_ support the _British_ claims to all
the country above the 31st degree of latitude, and _certainly_ to all
the country north of the Ohio.
4thly. That in case we should not agree to divide with Spain in the
manner proposed, that then this Court would aid Spain in negotiating
with Britain for the territory she wanted, and would agree that the
residue should remain to Britain.
In my opinion, it was not to be believed that the first and
confidential Secretary of the Count de Vergennes would, without his
knowledge and consent, declare such sentiments, and offer such
propositions, and that, too, in writing. I therefore considered M.
Rayneval as speaking the sentiments of the Minister, and I confess
they alarmed me, especially as they seemed naturally to make a part of
that system of policy, which I believed induced him rather to postpone
the acknowledgment of our independence by Britain to the conclusion of
a general peace, than aid us in procuring it at present.
You will now be pleased to recollect the postscript to M. Rayneval's
letter.
On the 9th of September I received certain information that on the 7th
M. Rayneval had left Versailles, and was gone to England; that it was
pretended he was gone into the country, and that several precautions
had been taken to keep his real destination a secret.
A former page in this letter informs you, that a little before this,
Mr Oswald had despatched a courier with letters, recommending it to
his Court to issue a new commission, styling us _United States_, and
that I had agreed to prepare a letter to the Count de Vergennes,
stating our objections to treat with Mr Oswald under his present one.
This, therefore, was a period of uncertainty and suspense, and
whatever part Britain might take, must necessarily be followed by very
important consequences. No time was, therefore, to be lost in
counteracting what I supposed to be the object of M. Rayneval's
journey. But before I enter into that detail, I must here insert a
copy of the letter, which I wrote to the Count d'Aranda, agreeably to
his request herein beforementioned.
TO THE COUNT D'ARANDA.
"Paris, September 10th, 1782.
"Sir,
"Agreeably to your Excellency's request, I have now the honor of
repeating in writing, that I am not authorised by Congress to make any
cession of any counties belonging to the United States, and that I can
do nothing more respecting the line mentioned by your Excellency, than
to wait for and to follow such instructions as Congress, on receiving
that information, may think proper to give me on that subject.
"Permit me, nevertheless, to remind your Excellency that I have full
power to confer, treat, agree, and conclude with the Ambassador or
Plenipotentiary of his Catholic Majesty, _vested with equal powers_,
of and concerning a treaty of amity and commerce and of alliance, on
principles of equality, reciprocity, and mutual advantage.
"I can only regret, that my overtures to his Excellency, the Count de
Florida Blanca, who was _ex officio_ authorised to confer with me on
such subjects, have been fruitless.
"It would give me pleasure to see this business begun, and I cannot
omit this opportunity of assuring your Excellency of my wish and
desire to enter upon it as soon as your Excellency shall be pleased to
inform me, that you are authorised and find it convenient to proceed.
"I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN JAY."
To this letter, the Count returned the following answer.
COUNT D'ARANDA TO JOHN JAY.
Translation.
"Sir,
"I have the honor to reply to your note of yesterday, that I am
furnished with ample instructions from my Court, and am authorised by
it to confer and treat with you on all points on which you may be
instructed and authorised to treat by your constituents.
"As soon as you communicate your propositions, they will be examined,
and I will submit to you my observations on them, in order that we may
be able to agree on both sides.
"I have the honor to be, &c.
THE COUNT D'ARANDA."
On the same day, viz. the 10th of September, a copy of a translation
of a letter from M. Marbois to the Count de Vergennes, against our
sharing in the fishery, was put into my hands. Copies of it were
transmitted to you, enclosed with my letter of the 18th of September,
of which a duplicate was also forwarded.
I also learned from good authority, that on the morning of M.
Rayneval's departure the Count d'Aranda had, contrary to his usual
practice, gone with _post horses_ to Versailles, and was two or three
hours in conference with the Count de Vergennes and M. Rayneval before
the latter set out.
All these facts taken together led me to conjecture, that M. Rayneval
was sent to England for the following purposes.
1st. To let Lord Shelburne know that the demands of America, to be
treated by Britain as independent previous to a treaty, were not
approved or countenanced by this Court, and that the offer of Britain
to make that acknowledgment in an article of the proposed treaty was
in the Count's opinion sufficient.
2dly. To sound Lord Shelburne on the subject of the fishery, and to
discover whether Britain would agree to divide it with France to the
exclusion of all others.
3dly. To impress Lord Shelburne with the determination of Spain to
possess the exclusive navigation of the Gulf of Mexico, and of their
desire to keep us from the Mississippi; and also, to hint the
propriety of such a line as on the one hand would satisfy Spain, and
on the other, leave to Britain all the country north of the Ohio.
4thly. To make such other verbal overtures to Lord Shelburne, as it
might not be advisable to reduce to writing, and to judge from the
general tenor of his lordship's answers and conversation, whether it
was probable that a general peace, on terms agreeable to France, could
be effected, in order that if that was not the case an immediate stop
might be put to the negotiation.
Having after much consideration become persuaded, that these were M.
Rayneval's objects, I mentioned his journey to Mr Oswald, and after
stating to him the first three of these objects, I said everything
respecting them, that appeared to me necessary; but at the same time
with a greater degree of caution than I could have wished, because I
well knew it would become the subject of a long letter to the
Ministry. On reflecting, however, how necessary it was, that Lord
Shelburne should know our sentiments and resolutions respecting these
matters, and how much better they could be conveyed in conversation
than by letter; and knowing also, that Mr Vaughan was in confidential
correspondence with him, and he was and always had been strongly
attached to the American cause, I concluded it would be prudent to
prevail upon him to go immediately to England.
I accordingly had an interview with Mr Vaughan, and he immediately
despatched a few lines to Lord Shelburne, desiring that he would delay
taking any measures with M. Rayneval until he should either see or
hear further from him.
Mr Vaughan agreed to go to England, and we had much previous
conversation, on the points in question; the substance of which was;
That Britain, by a peace with us, certainly expected other advantages
than a mere suspension of hostilities, and that she doubtless looked
forward to cordiality, confidence, and commerce.
That the manner as well as the matter of the proposed treaty was
therefore of importance, and that if the late assurances respecting
our independence were not realized by an unconditional acknowledgment,
neither confidence nor peace could reasonably be expected; that this
measure was considered by America as the touchstone of British
sincerity, and that nothing could abate the suspicions and doubts of
her good faith, which prevailed there.
That the interest of Great Britain, as well as that of the Minister,
would be advanced by it; for as every idea of conquest had become
absurd, nothing remained for Britain to do, but to make friends of
those whom she could not subdue; that the way to do this was by
leaving us nothing to complain of, either in the negotiation or in the
treaty of peace, and by liberally yielding every point essential to
the interest and happiness of America; the first of which points was,
that of treating with us on an equal footing.
That if the Minister really meant to make peace with us, it was his
interest to make us believe so, and thereby inspire us with a certain
degree of confidence, which could no otherwise be obtained; that his
enemies charged him with insincerity on this very point, and that it
must be useful to him to convince all the world that such a charge was
groundless.
That it would be vain to amuse themselves with expectations from the
affected moderation of France on this head; for that America never
would treat on any but an equal footing, and, therefore, although such
expectations might cause delay, they would ultimately be fruitless.
That a little reflection must convince him, that it was the interest
and consequently the policy of France to postpone if possible the
acknowledgment of our independence, to the very conclusion of a
general peace, and by keeping it suspended until after the war,
_oblige us by the terms of our treaty, and by regard to our safety, to
continue in it to the end_.
That it hence appeared to be the obvious interest of Britain
immediately to cut the cords, which tied us to France, for that,
though we were determined faithfully to fulfil our treaty and
engagements with this Court, _yet it was a different thing to be
guided by their or our construction of it_.
That among other things we were bound not to make a separate peace or
truce, and that the assurance of our independence was avowed to be the
object of our treaty. While therefore Great Britain refused to yield
this object, we were bound, as well as resolved, to go on with the
war, although perhaps the greatest obstacles to a peace arose neither
from the demands of France nor America. Whereas, that object being
conceded, we should be at liberty to make peace the moment that Great
Britain should be ready to accede to the terms of France and America,
without our being restrained by the demands of Spain, with whose views
we had no concerns.
That it would not be wise in Great Britain to think of dividing the
fishery with France and excluding us; because we could not make peace
at such an expense, and because such an attempt would irritate America
still more; would perpetuate her resentments, and induce her to use
every possible means of retaliation by withholding supplies in future
to the fishery, and by imposing the most rigid restraints on a
commerce with Britain.
That it would not be less impolitic to oppose us on the point of
boundary and the navigation of the Mississippi;
1st. Because our right to extend to the Mississippi was proved by our
charters and other acts of government, and our right to its navigation
was deducible from the laws of nature, and the consequences of
revolution, which vested in us every British territorial right. It was
easy therefore to foresee what opinions and sensations the mere
attempt to dispossess us of these rights would diffuse throughout
America.
2dly. Because the profits of an extensive and lucrative commerce, and
not the possession of vast tracts of wilderness, were the true objects
of a commercial European nation.
That by our extending to the Mississippi to the west, and to the
proclamation bounds of Canada to the north, and by consenting to the
mutual free navigation of our several lakes and rivers, there would be
an inland navigation from the Gulf of St Lawrence to that of Mexico,
by means of which the inhabitants west and north of the mountains
might with more ease be supplied with foreign commodities, than from
ports on the Atlantic, and that this immense and growing trade would
be in a manner monopolized by Great Britain, as we should not insist,
that she should admit other nations to navigate the waters that
belonged to her. That therefore the navigation of the Mississippi
would in future be no less important to her than to us, it being the
only convenient outlet, through which they could transport the
productions of the western country, which they would receive in
payment for merchandise vended there.
That as to retaining any part of that country, or insisting to extend
Canada, so as to comprehend the lands in question, it would be
impolitic for these further reasons. Because it would not be in their
power either to settle or govern that country; that we should refuse
to yield them any aid, and that the utmost exertions of Congress could
not prevent our people from taking gradual possession of it, by making
establishments in different parts of it. That it certainly could not
be wise in Britain, whatever it might be in other nations, thus to sow
the seeds of future war in the very treaty of peace, or to lay in it
the foundation of such distrusts and jealousies as on the one hand
would forever prevent confidence and real friendship, and on the
other, naturally lead us to strengthen our security by intimate and
permanent alliances with other nations.
I desired Mr Vaughan to communicate these remarks to Lord Shelburne,
and to impress him with the necessity and policy of taking a decided
and manly part respecting America.
Mr Vaughan set off the evening of the 11th of September. It would
have relieved me from much anxiety and uneasiness to have concerted
all these steps with Dr Franklin, but on conversing with him about M.
Rayneval's journey, he did not concur with me in sentiment respecting
the objects of it; but appeared to me to have a great degree of
confidence in this Court, and to be much embarrassed and constrained
by our instructions.
Nothing now remained to be done but to complete the letter we had
agreed to write to the Count de Vergennes, stating our objections to
treat with Mr Oswald under his present commission. I accordingly
prepared the following draft of such a letter, and it was under Dr
Franklin's consideration, when the news of our success in England
rendered it unnecessary.
_Proposed Draft of a Letter to Count de Vergennes._
"Sir,
"The question, whether we ought to exchange copies of our respective
commissions with Mr Oswald, and proceed to business with him under
his, is not only important and consequential in itself, but derives an
additional degree of weight from the variance subsisting between your
Excellency's sentiments and our own on that subject.
"The respect due to your Excellency's judgment, our confidence in the
friendship of our good and great ally, and the tenor of our
instructions from Congress, all conspire to urge us to lay before your
Excellency a full state of the facts and circumstances, which create
our objections to treating with Mr Oswald under the commission in
question.
"We flatter ourselves, that in the course of this discussion, some
light will be cast upon the subject, and it gives us pleasure to
reflect, that our objections will be reviewed by a Minister, possessed
of candor to acknowledge their force on the one hand, and talents to
detect and discover to us their fallacy on the other.
"It appears to us unnecessary to premise, that on the 4th day of July,
1776, the representatives of the then late Thirteen United Colonies,
in Congress assembled, did in the name and by the authority of the
good people of those Colonies, and for the reasons in that act
specified, 'solemnly publish and declare, that the said United
Colonies were and of right ought to be _free and independent States_,
that they were absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and
that all political connexion between them and the State of Great
Britain was and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as _free and
independent States_, they had _full power_ to levy war, _conclude
peace_, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other
acts and things, which independent nations might of right do. And for
the support of that declaration, with a firm reliance on the
protection of Divine Providence, they did mutually pledge to each
other their lives, their fortunes, and their _sacred honor_.'
"This declaration was immediately ratified by legislative acts of the
different States, all of whom have ever since so uniformly abided by
it, that the authority of the King of Great Britain has never from
that day to this extended over more ground in that country, than was
from time to time under the feet of his armies.