A REJOINDER TO REV. C. VAN DER DONCKT'S REPLY.
I have read with great interest and I trust with due care the Rev. C.
Van Der Donckt's Reply to my discourse on "Mormon Doctrine of Deity."
With regard to his Reply in general, I observe three things: first,
the Reverend gentleman labors with some pains to demonstrate that
"Mormon" views of Deity with respect to the form and nature of God are
at variance with the Catholic and even the orthodox Protestant views on
that subject; second, the "Mormon" views of Deity are in conflict with
the accepted Christian philosophy; third, that "Mormon" doctrines stand
in sharp contrast to both Catholic and Protestant ideas respecting the
unity of God. All this is easily proved; and would have been conceded
cheerfully without proofs. "Mormons" not only admit the variances
but glory in them. The foregoing, however, is not the issue between
Mr. Van Der Donckt and myself. After the variances referred to are
admitted, these questions remain: Which is most in agreement with what
God has revealed concerning his form and nature, "Mormon" or orthodox
Christian doctrine? Which is most in harmony with sound reason and
the scriptures, "Mormon" doctrine, or the commonly accepted Christian
philosophy? Which in their teaching presents the true doctrine of God's
unity, "Mormons" or orthodox Christians? These are the issues; and so
far as the Reverend gentleman has maintained the orthodox Christian
doctrine against the "Mormon" doctrine, I undertake to controvert his
arguments.
I.
THE FORM OF GOD.
Following the order of my treatise, the gentleman first deals with the
form of God. His first premise is that "_God is a Spirit_," quoting
the words of the Savior (John 4:24;) and Paul's words, "The Lord is
a spirit," (II Cor. 3:17.) He then argues that a spirit is different
from a man, and quotes the remark of Jesus to his disciples, when he
appeared to them after his resurrection: "A spirit hath not flesh and
bones as ye see me have" (Luke 24:37-39). Also the words of Jesus to
Peter, "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it [that is, that Jesus
is the Christ] unto thee, but my _Father_ who is in heaven." (Matt.
16:17.) The gentleman in all this sees a striking contrast between
_men, flesh and blood,_ and the _Father_; which "conveys the sense that
God hath not flesh and blood like man, but is a spirit."
That God is a spirit Mr. V. holds is proved also from his being called
"invisible" in the Bible; and from this premise argues: "All material
beings are visible. Absolutely invisible beings are immaterial, or
bodiless:" and therefore, to help the gentleman out a little, not like
man in form.
With reference to the passage--"Flesh and blood hath not revealed
it unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven," and the Reverend
gentleman's remarks thereon, I wish to say, in passing, that the
antithesis between man and God in the passage extends merely to the
fact that the source of Peter's revelation was God, not man; and is
no attempt at defining a difference between the nature of God and the
nature of man. Here also I may say that the Latter-day Saints do not
hold that God is a personage of _flesh_ and _blood_, but a personage
of _flesh and bone_, inhabited by a spirit, just as Jesus was after
his resurrection. Joseph Smith taught concerning the resurrection that
"all [men] will be raised by the power of God, having _spirit_ in
their bodies, and not _blood_."[A] Again, in speaking of the general
assembly and church of the first born in heaven (Heb. 12:23), he said:
"Flesh and blood cannot go there; but flesh and bones, quickened by
the Spirit of God, can."[B] So that it must be remembered throughout
this discussion that the Latter-day Saints do not believe that God is
a personage of flesh and blood; but a personage of flesh and bone and
spirit, united.
[Footnote A: Discourse delivered at Nauvoo, March 20, 1842. _Mill.
Star_, Vol. xix, p. 213.]
[Footnote B: Discourse delivered at Nauvoo, Oct. 9, 1843. _Mill. Star_,
Vol. xxii, p. 231.]
I would remind the reader, also, that while Jesus said, "God is a
spirit," and that a spirit "hath nor flesh and bone as ye see me have,"
he nowhere says that a spirit is immaterial or not substance. That is
a conclusion drawn by the theologians from the false philosophy of the
ancient pagans.
But let us examine these premises and arguments of Mr. Van Der Donckt,
more in detail. The inspired apostle says: "_Our God is a consuming
fire_" (Heb. 12:29). "Now," to use the words of Mr. V., "although we
must believe whatever God reveals to us upon one single word of his,
just as firmly as upon a thousand; nevertheless, I will add" that
Moses, who solemnly received the word from God which he delivered
unto Israel, also says, "_The Lord thy God is a consuming fire_"
(Exod. 4:24). Is Mr. V. ready to believe on these solemn assertions of
scripture--hence of the Lord--that God is a fire, and therefore that
fire is God? Or would he insist upon interpreting these passages by
others, and by reason? Would he not want to quote Moses again where
he says, "Thy God is * * * _as_ a consuming fire" (Ex. 9:3), and
accept this as a reasonable interpretation of the passage stating so
definitely that "God is a fire"?
Again, "God is light" (I John 1:5). Would Mr. V. from that definition
of God believe and teach that God is light, mere cosmic light? Or
would he find an interpretation, or explanation necessary? And still
again, "God is love" (I John 4:7, 16). Love is an attribute of mind,
of spirit; must one conclude then from this definition that God is a
mere attribute of mind? These reflections will demonstrate that these
definitions of God, so far as they are such, together with the one with
which Mr. V. commences his argument, "God is a Spirit," need defining.
He endeavors to anticipate the "Mormon" answer to this argument by
saying:
I am well aware that the Latter-day Saints interpret those texts
as meaning a spirit clothed with a body, but what nearly the whole
of mankind, Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans, have believed for
ages, cannot be upset by the gratuitous assertions of a religious
innovator of this last century.
At this point I will not appeal to or quote the "gratuitous assertions
of a religious innovator of this last century"--meaning Joseph Smith.
There is no need of that. If I were an unbeliever in the true Deity
of Christ, I might take up the gentleman's argument in this way: You
say God is a spirit, and hence bodiless, immaterial? His answer must
be, "Yes." But Jesus says, "a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye
see me have"--hence Jesus is not God, because he is a personage of
flesh and bone, in the form of man--not bodiless or immaterial. This,
of course, is not _my_ point. I merely refer to it in the beaten way
of good fellowship, and by way of caution to my Catholic friend, who,
I am sure, in his way, is as anxious to maintain the true Deity of
the Nazarene as I am; but his method of handling the text, "God is a
spirit," might lead him into serious difficulty in upholding the truth
that Jesus was and is true Deity, if in argument with an infidel.
But now for the "Mormon" exposition of the text. Is Jesus Christ God?
Was he God as he stood there among his disciples in his glorious and,
to use Mr. V.'s own word, "sacred," resurrected body? There is but one
answer that the Reverend Catholic gentleman or any orthodox Protestant
can give, and that is in the affirmative--"yes, Jesus is God."[A]
But "God is a spirit!" True, he is; but Jesus is a spirit inside a
body--inside an immortal, indestructible body of flesh and bone;
therefore, if Jesus is God, and God is a spirit, he is an embodied
spirit, just as the Latter-day Saints teach.
[Footnote A: "His acts proved his Deity; Jesus is Jehovah, and
therefore we sing unto him as the Lord." "Treasury of David"
(Spurgeon). Vol. iv, p. 371.]
Now let it be understood that Latter-day Saints are not so foolish as
to believe that so much phosphate, lime, carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen
as may compose the body of a perfected man, is God. They recognize the
fact that the body without the spirit is dead, being alone; but the
spirit having through natural processes gathered to itself a body, and
that body having been purified by the power of God--who has promised
in holy scripture that he will "change our vile body, that it may
be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working
whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself" (Phil.
3:20, 21)--when this is done, even the body takes upon it some of the
divine nature. It indeed becomes "sacred," and something more than
"sacred"--it becomes incorporated with and forever united to, a spirit
that is divine, and henceforth becomes an integral part of God. Of
which process, of a divine spirit taking on a body of flesh and bone,
Jesus Christ is the most perfect example.
At this point, I shall pass for the present a few items that stand
next in order in Mr. Van Der Donckt's argument, that I may consider
some statements and arguments of his made further on in the "Reply,"
because they are immediately related to what has just been said. Mr. V.
holds that it is proved by Holy Writ that "angels as well as God are
bodiless beings." After quoting passages of scripture in support of
this statement, he then adds: "Could plainer words be found to teach
that angels, both good and bad, are spirits, devoid of bodies? Now, the
Creator is certainly more perfect than his creatures, and pure minds
are more perfect _than minds united to bodies_[A] (men)." In support
of which he quotes the following: "The corruptible body is a load upon
the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind" (Wisdom
9:15)[B]; and Paul's saying, "who shall deliver me from this body of
death?"[C] (Rom. 6:24). _Therefore the Creator is a pure spirit._
[Footnote A: Italics are mine.]
[Footnote B: This is a book received by the Catholic Church on alleged
apostolical tradition, but not found in the Hebrew Bible nor Protestant
versions of the Bible.]
[Footnote C: Quoted thus by Mr. V. In both Catholic and Protestant
Bibles it stands: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"]
I fear Mr. V. in these statements has run into more difficulty. Let us
see. According to his doctrine, "Angels as well as God are bodiless
beings." "Angels, both good and bad, are spirits, devoid of bodies. The
Creator is more perfect than his creatures, _and pure minds_ [minds
separated from bodies] _are more perfect than minds united to bodies_.
* * * Therefore the Creator is a pure spirit." But where does this
leave Jesus?
Was and is Jesus God--true Deity?
Yes.
But Jesus is a spirit and body united into one glorious personage. His
mind was and is now united to and dwelling in a body. Our Catholic
friend says, "pure minds [i. e. minds not united to bodies] are more
perfect than minds united to bodies." He also says, "Angels, both good
and bad, are spirits (i. e. minds) devoid of bodies." Therefore, it
must follow from his premises and argument that angels are superior to
Jesus since his spirit is united to a body, while they are minds _not_
united to bodies! I will not press the point, that the same conclusions
could be drawn from his premises and argument with reference even to
bad spirits, whom he says are bodiless, and hence, upon his theory,
superior to minds or spirits united to bodies, for that would be
ungenerous upon my part, and would lay upon his faulty argument the
imputation of awful blasphemy, which I am sure was not intended and
would be as revolting to him as it would be to myself. Mr. V., I am
sure, would contend as earnestly as I would that Jesus is superior to
the angels, though it is perfectly clear that he is a spirit united to
a body. "When he had by himself purged our sins, [Jesus] sat down on
the right hand of the majesty on high; being made so much better than
the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name
than they. * * * And again, when he bringeth in the first begotten
into the world, he saith, and let all the angels of God worship him.
And of the angels he saith, who maketh his angels spirits, and his
ministers a flame of fire. _But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne,
O God, is for ever and ever_" (Heb. 1:3-8). In this passage the
superiority of Jesus over the angels is manifested in four ways: first,
by the direct affirmation of God, that he was made "better" than the
angels; second, that by inheritance he obtained a more exalted name;
third, that the angels are commanded to worship him; fourth, God, the
Father, addressing Jesus, said, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and
ever." In this passage the Father directly addresses Jesus by the
title "God." And as God is exalted above all angels, Jesus must be
superior to angels, for he is "God," if we may believe the words of the
Father--whom to disbelieve would be blasphemy.
Mr. Van Der Donckt admits in his argument,'of course, that Jesus is
God; and also admits the persistence of him in the physical condition
in which he left the earth with his resurrected body. For in explaining
the scripture passage about seeing God "face to face," he remarks:
The first and chief element of the happiness of heaven will
consist in the beatific vision; that is, in seeing God face to
face, unveiled, as he really is. The "face to face," however, is
literally true only of our blessed Savior, who ascended into heaven
with his sacred body. Otherwise, as God is a spirit, he has no
body, and, consequently, no face.
From this it is clear that, in the mind of the Reverend gentleman,
Jesus not only ascended into heaven with his "sacred body," but now
dwells there spirit and body united; and the blessed, who shall inherit
heaven will see him there literally "face to face."[A] Otherwise than
this "face to face" view of Jesus--according to Mr. V.--we shall only
see God, since he is a spirit, "with the spiritual eye; with the soul's
intellectual perception, elevated by a supernatural influx from God!"
This admission with reference to Jesus and his existence as an immortal
personage of flesh and bone, and our literal view of him in heaven
"face to face," draws with it some consequences which my Catholic
friend evidently overlooked. In the creed usually named after St.
Athanasius, it is said: "_Such as the Father is, such is the Son._"
I take it that this, in the view of those who accept the Athanasian
creed, has reference to the "substance of the Father," as well as to
other things pertaining to him; for, according to that creed, the
"substance" of the Father and Son is one and undivided. "We worship
one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity," says the creed; "neither
confounding the persons nor _dividing the substance_." It must be,
therefore, according to Mr. V.'s creed, that all the "substance" of God
there is, is in Jesus Christ, as well as the attributes of God. The
terms of the creed forbid us believing that part of the "substance"
of God was enclosed in the flesh and bone body of Jesus, and the
remainder existed outside of that body; for that would be dividing the
"substance" of God, a thing the Athanasian creed forbids: therefore,
all the "substance" of God inhabits the body of Jesus Christ, and he
is wholly God. In this view of the subject, there is no God except the
Deity enclosed in the flesh and body of Jesus Christ. But that would
place our Catholic friend--after all he has said about God being a
spirit, and about the superiority of pure minds (i. e. spirits not
united to bodies) over minds united to bodies--under the necessity
of accepting as God, the Supreme, the Almighty, a personage that is
a spirit and body united in one glorious personage, and in form like
man--a thing most abhorrent to our friend's principles.
[Footnote A: In an article for the _Improvement Era_, on the Doctrines
and Claims of the Catholic Church, Bishop Scanlan, of Salt Lake City,
also said of the Divinity of Christ; "The Catholic Church teaches that
Jesus Christ is not a mere elect child or special creation of God, or
in any sense or manner a creature, but that he is the eternal and only
Son of God, God of God, Light of Light; the expression of the Eternal
Father, with whom he is one in nature and substance, and to whom he is
equal in all divine attributes, power and glory."--_Improvement Era_,
vol. i, p. 14.]
On the other hand, if it be contended that besides the Son of God,
Jesus, a personage of flesh and bone and spirit, there exists God,
a spirit, then there is likely to arise again the conception of the
"substance" being divided, and the existence of two individual Gods
instead of one. The one a spirit unembodied, and the other a spirit
enclosed in a body of flesh and bone--the glorified, exalted Man,
Christ. This danger is also increased by the part of the creed now
being considered, _viz_., "Such as the Father is, such is the Son;" for
it must follow, if this be true that such as the Son is, such is the
Father also. And this, must hold with reference to God, wholly; to his
substance, essence, personality, form, as well as to all attributes
possessed, or else it is not true at all. And if true, since we know
that Jesus is an immortal being of flesh and bone and spirit united
into one glorious personage (and Mr. V. admits that, and also that the
blessed in heaven shall see him as such a personage, literally "face to
face"), then God the Father must be the same, a personage of flesh and
bone and spirit united--a thing most abhorrent to Mr. V.'s principles.
At this point, I must complain of the gentleman's argument a little.
However able and fair his article may be considered on the whole, I
think, on the question of the "form of God," I am justified in charging
that he has not dealt at all with my strong scripture proofs relative
to that matter. He makes but the very slightest reference to the
passage:
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. * *
* So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created
he him; male and female created he them (Genesis 1:26, 27).
And he considered nowhere the very definite passage:
God * * hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son. * * *
who, being the brightness of his glory _and the express image of
his person_, and upholding all things by the word of his power,
when he hath by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand
of the Majesty on high (Heb. 1:3).
"Now," to use the solemn words of the Reverend gentleman himself, "we
must believe whatever God reveals to us upon one single word of his,
just as firmly as upon a thousand"--I shall hold that it was incumbent
upon Mr. V. to deal with these passages, and set forth in what way they
are to be understood, if _not_ to be understood as they read.[A] I can
think of no language that could express the truth more forcibly, that
man was created in the form of God and, therefore, that God in form is
like man, than the language of these two passages. When the word of God
says: "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he
him;" and then again, in speaking of Jesus, who certainly bore all the
semblance, figure and stature of a man--who was a man--when the divine
Spirit, I say, in speaking of him, says that _he was the express image
of God's person_--I shall despair of human language expressing any fact
whatsoever, if this language does not say that in form God and man are
alike. And what the word of God in plainness teaches--so plain that he
who "runs may read," so plain that "wayfaring men though fools need not
err therein"--"is not to be set aside by the gratuitous assertions" of
"religious innovators" of early Christian centuries who corrupted the
plain meaning of God's word by their vain philosophies, and oppositions
of science, falsely so called. Mr. Van Der Donckt makes no reference
to this plain passage in Hebrews 1:3; and I am under the necessity of
thinking that in respect of this passage and the one in Genesis, he had
no means at his command by which he could satisfactorily explain away
their force. They stand, therefore, with their strength unimpaired, in
proof of the doctrines taught in the discourse at which Mr V. leveled
his Reply.
[Footnote A: The meaning of this language from the 26th verse of the
first chapter of Genesis is made perfectly clear when compared with
the third verse of the 5th chapter of Genesis where it is written:
"And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his
own likeness, after his image; and called his name Seth." What do
these words imply but that Seth was like his father in features and
also doubtless in intellectual and moral qualities? And if when it
is said Adam begat a son in his "own likeness, after his image," it
simply means that Seth in form and features and intellectual and moral
qualities was like his father--then there can be no other conclusion
formed upon the passage that says God created man in his own image
and likeness than that man, in a general way, in form and feature and
intellectual and moral qualities was like God.]
Of God Being Invisible.
Mr. Van Der Donckt thinks he sees further proof of God's being a
"Spirit," and therefore immaterial or bodiless, in the fact that he
is spoken of in the Bible as being "invisible." Moses "was strong as
seeing him that is invisible," (Heb. 11:27;) "No man hath seen God at
any time" (I John 4:12;) "The King of kings--whom no man hath seen nor
can see," (I Tim. 6:16); are the passages he relies upon for the proof
of his contention.
Of course, Mr. V. is aware of the fact--for he mentions it--that these
passages are confronted with the explicit statement of scripture
that God has been seen by men. Moses saw him. At one stage of his
experience, the great Hebrew prophet was told that he could not see
God's face; "for," said the Lord, "there shall no man see me and live."
But even at that time, Moses was placed in a cleft of the rock, "and
thou shalt see my back parts," said the Lord to him; "but my face shall
not be seen" (Exodus 23:18-23). On another occasion, Moses, Aaron,
Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, saw God.
And they saw the God of Israel; and there was under his feet as it
were a paved work of sapphire stone, and as it were the body of
heaven in his clearness. And upon the nobles of the children of
Israel he laid not his hand: also they saw God, and did eat and
drink (Ex. 24:9-11).
Isaiah saw him: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted
up, and his train filled the temple." At the same time the seraphims
proclaimed his holiness, saying, "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of
hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory." Then said Isaiah: "Woe
is me! for lam undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell
in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the
King, the Lord of hosts" (Isaiah 6:1-5).
To harmonize these apparitions of God to men with his theory of the
invisibility of God, Mr. V. appeals to the writings of some of the
Christian fathers, and Cardinal Newman, from whose teachings he
concludes that God the Father is called "invisible" because "he never
appeared to bodily eyes; whereas the Son manifested himself as an
angel, and as a man after his incarnation. * * * Whenever the Eternal
Son of God, or angels at God's behest, showed themselves to man, they
became visible only through a body, _or a material garb assumed for the
occasion!_"
Surely Tertullian, Ambrose, Augustine, the great English Cardinal
of the Roman church, and Mr. V. are in sore straits when they must
needs take refuge in the belief of such jugglery with matter as this,
in order to reconcile apparently conflicting scriptures. And what a
shuffling off and on of material garbs there must have been, as from
time to time hosts of angels and spirits appeared unto men!
It is but the materialization of the spiritualist mediums on a little
larger scale. But there is a better way of harmonizing the seeming
contradictions; and better authority for the conclusion to be reached
than the Christian fathers and Cardinal Newman. I mean the scriptures
themselves.
Take this expression of the scripture, "No man hath seen God at any
time" (I John 4:12). Standing alone, it seems emphatic and conclusive.
And in the same connection this also, from the testimony of John:
"No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in
the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him" (St. John 1:18). But
consider these texts in connection with what the Master himself said
on the same subject: "It is written in the prophets, And they shall
be all taught of God. Every man, therefore, that hath heard, and hath
learned of the Father, cometh unto me. Not that any man hath seen the
Father, _save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father_" (St. John
6:45, 46). Now we have the key to the matter. "No man hath seen God
at any time, _save_ [except] _he which is of God, he hath seen the
Father._" If any one shall contend that this "_he which is of God_"
has reference to Jesus only, the complete answer to that will be found
in the account of the Martyr Stephen's glorious view of the Father and
the Son together and at one time: "But he [Stephen] being full of the
Holy Ghost, looked up steadfastly into heaven, _and saw the glory or
God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God, and said, "Behold,
I see the heavens opened, and the ton of Man standing on the right
hand of God_." (Acts 7:55-6). Undoubtedly, for reasons that are wise,
God the Father has been "invisible" to men except under very special
conditions; for the most part the "Only Begotten hath declared him,"
and stood as his representative; and in the absence of those special
conditions, no man hath seen God the Father; no man in the absence of
these conditions can see his face and live. He must be "_of God_,"
as Stephen was, then he may see God, even the Father, as that martyr
evidently did. Here, too, may be cited a passage from one of the
revelations of the Lord to Joseph the Prophet, which throws more light
upon the subject. Speaking of the Higher or Melchizedek Priesthood, the
Lord says:
This greater Priesthood administereth the gospel and holdeth the
key of the mysteries of the kingdom, even the knowledge of God;
therefore, in the ordinances thereof, the power of godliness is
manifest; and without the ordinances thereof, and the authority of
the Priesthood, the power of godliness is not manifest unto men in
the flesh; _for without this no man can see the face of God, even
the Father, and live_ (Doc. and Cov. sec. 84:19-22).
God, then, in the Bible, is called "invisible," not because he is
absolutely so by reason of his nature, because he is "immaterial or
bodiless," but because he is not to be seen by men except under very
special conditions. The special conditions complied with, however,
certain holy men have seen God; the Father, and have borne witness
of the fact. Of course, it follows that the "invisibility" of God as
here set forth does not carry with it the idea that God is immaterial
or bodiless; nor would it follow that God is immaterial, even if
absolutely invisible to human eyes in our present existence. Mr. V.
advances a strange doctrine when he says that "All _material_ beings
are visible. Absolutely invisible beings are _immaterial_ or bodiless."
I take it that his assertion is equivalent to saying that all material
things are visible; and that absolutely invisible things, like
"invisible beings," are immaterial or bodiless. Is that true? Is the
atmosphere visible? No. But it is material. "It is composed of atoms of
matter whose weight is such that the pressure upon every square inch
amounts to fifteen pounds; and upon the body of an ordinary-sized man
some fourteen tons; but notwithstanding this, man could not construct
a microscope sufficiently powerful to render these atoms visible."[A]
What of the ether extending throughout the universe, in which millions
of suns and their attendant planets move as motes in a sunbeam; is
that visible? No; but it is material nevertheless. So with many things
that, notwithstanding they are absolutely invisible, are material for
all that, and have some of the qualities in common with grosser matter.
We know but little of substances, as yet; less of their essence; but
since there are many material substances absolutely invisible to us,
is it unreasonable to believe that there are also beings consisting of
substances more refined, pure and glorious than the material that is
visible to our limited and imperfect vision?--beings invisible to us,
unless our eyes be quickened by the power of God, yet material, and
having form, and limitations and relations to other beings and things;
and also possessed of many other qualities common to matter. In view
of these facts, is not Mr. Van Der Donckt a little reckless, and too
dogmatic, in stating the _datum_ from which he argues for the absolute
invisibility of God, and hence also his supposed immateriality, or
bodiless state?
[Footnote A: Samuel Kinns' "Harmony of the Bible and Science," p. 338.]
Mr. Van Der Donckt argues that angels and spirits are also bodiless or
immaterial. Was it a bodiless or immaterial angel that wrestled with
Jacob until the breaking of the day; and who, when he could not prevail
against the patriarch, touched the sinew of his thigh that it forthwith
shrank? (Gen. 32:23-32). Were they immaterial or bodiless angels who
called at the tent-home of the patriarch Abraham, on the plains of
Mamre, for whom Sarah baked cakes, and Abraham's servant prepared a
roast of veal; and, when all things were made ready, the patriarch
stood by, and the three heavenly personages--one of them is called "the
Lord"--"did eat" (Gen. 18)--were they immaterial or bodiless? Perhaps
the Reverend gentleman will say, however, that these cases, and a score
of others of similar nature that might be quoted, are answered by his
statement--made on the authority of some Christian fathers and Cardinal
Newman--that when angels "showed themselves to man they became visible
[hence materialized, according to my friend's theory of visible and
invisible beings] only through a body, or material garb assumed for
the occasion!" For which theory, as whimsical as it is nonsensical, I
venture to tell the Reverend gentleman there is no warrant of divine
authority; nothing but the assumptions and speculations of churchmen
seeking to harmonize Christian doctrine with the vain speculations of
old pagan philosophers. I know nothing that equals this theory for
absurdity, except it be the idea of Epicurus, who, after affirming that
the gods were of human form, explained--"Yet that form is not body (i.
e. material), but something _like_ body; nor does it contain any blood,
but something _like_ blood!"[A] Or may I say that Mr. Van Der Donckt's
absurdity is really equalled by that of Heracleitus, who taught that
the sun was extinguished every evening and made new every morning?
[Footnote A: _Tuscul. Dispt._ Cicero, p. 227 (Younge's translation).]
As for the rest of Mr. V.'s theory of immateriality and invisibility of
angels and spirits, I shall trust to what I have said on these subjects
in dealing with the invisibility of God, to be a sufficient answer.
Of Anthropomorphism and understanding the Bible Literally.
I must say a word upon Mr. V.'s remarks respecting the plain
anthropomorphism of the Bible, and the matter of understanding that
sacred book literally. With reference to the first he says:
All men after the example of the inspired writings, make frequent
use of the figure called anthropomorphism, attributing to the Deity
a human body, human members, human passions, etc., and that is
done, not to imply that God is possessed of form, limbs, etc., but
simply to make spiritual things or certain truths more intelligible
to man.
I would like to know upon what authority Mr. V. adjudges the "inspired
writings" not to imply that God is really possessed of form, limbs,
passions, etc., after attributing them to him in the clearest manner.
The "inspired writings" plainly and most forcibly attribute to Deity
a form like man's, with limbs, organs, etc., but the Bible does not
teach that this ascription of form, limbs, organs and passions to God,
is unreal, and "simply to make spiritual things or certain truths
more intelligible to man." On the contrary, the Bible emphasizes the
doctrine of anthropomorphism by declaring in its very first chapter
that man was created in the image of God: "So God created man in his
own image, in the image of God created he him." The explanation is
offered that it was necessary to attribute human form, members and
passions, to God, in order to make spiritual things intelligible to
man; _but what is the reason for ascribing the divine form to man,_
as in the passage just quoted? Was that done to make human beings or
certain truths more intelligible to God? Or was it placed in the word
of God because it is simply true?
The truth that God in form is like man is further emphasized by the
fact that Jesus is declared to have been in "the express image" of
the Father's person (Heb. 1:3); and until Mr. V. or some other person
of his school of thought, can prove very clearly that the word of God
supports his theory of the unreality of the Bible's description of
form, organs, proportions, passions and feelings, to God and other
heavenly beings, the truth that God in form is like man will stand
secure on the foundation of the revelations it has pleased God to give
of his own being and nature.[A]
[Footnote A: Dean Mansel administers a scathing reproof to the German
philosophers Kant and Fichte (and also to Professor Jowett in his
note xxii in Lecture 1.) for what he calls "that morbid terror of
what they are pleased to call anthropomorphism, which poisons the
speculation of so many modern philosophers, when they attempt to be
wise above what is written, and seek for a metaphysical exposition of
God's nature and attributes." These philosophers, while holding in
abhorrence the idea that God has a form such as man's--or any form
whatsoever--parts, organs, affections, sympathies, passions or any
attributes seen in man's spirit, are, nevertheless, under the necessity
of representing God as conscious, as knowing, as determining; all of
which, as pointed out by Dean Mansel in the passage which follows,
are, after all, qualities of the human mind as well as attributes of
Deity; and hence the philosophers, after all their labor, have not
escaped from anthropomorphism, but have merely represented Deity to
our consciousness, shorn of some of the higher qualities of the human
mind, which God is represented in the scriptures as possessing in
their perfection--such as love, mercy, justice. As orthodox Christian
ministers, both Catholic and Protestant alike, including Mr. V., are
afflicted with the same madness, I see no reason why the Dean's reproof
should not be made to apply to them, and hence quote the passage _in
extenso_: "They may not forsooth, think of the unchangeable God as if
he were their fellow man, influenced by human motives, and moved by
human supplications. They want a truer, juster idea of the Deity as
he is, than that under which he has been pleased to reveal himself;
and they call on their reason to furnish it. Fools, to dream that man
can escape from himself, that human reason can draw aught but a human
portrait of God. They do but substitute a marred and mutilated humanity
for one exalted and entire: they add nothing to their conception of
God as he is, but only take away a part of their conception of man.
Sympathy, and love, and fatherly kindness, and forgiving mercy, have
evaporated in the crucible of their philosophy; and what is the _caput
mortuum_ that remains, but only the sterner features of humanity
exhibited in repulsive nakedness? The God who listens to prayer, we
are told, appears in the likeness of human mutability. Be it so. What
is the God who does not listen, but the likeness of human obstinacy?
Do we ascribe to him a fixed purpose? Our conception of a purpose is
human. Do we speak of him as continuing unchanged? Our conception of
continuance is human. Do we conceive him as knowing and determining?
What are knowledge and determination but modes of human consciousness?
and what know we of consciousness itself, but as the contrast between
successive mental states? But our rational philosopher stops short in
his reasoning. He strips off from humanity just so much as suits his
purpose; 'and the residue thereof he maketh a God less pious in his
idolatry than the carver of the graven image, in that he does not fall
down unto it and pray unto it, but is content to stand off and reason
concerning it. And why does he retain any conception of God at all, but
that he retains some portions of an imperfect humanity? Man is still
the residue that is left; deprived indeed of all that is amiable in
humanity, but in the darker features which remain, still man. Man in
his purposes; man in his inflexibility; man in that relation to time
from which no philosophy, whatever its pretensions, can wholly free
itself; pursuing with indomitable resolutions a preconceived design;
deaf to the yearning instincts which compel his creatures to call upon
him. Yet this, forsooth, is a philosophical conception of the Deity,
more worthy of an enlightened reason than the human imagery of the
Psalmist: 'The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, and his ears
are open unto their prayers.' Surely downright idolatry is better
than this rational worship of a fragment of humanity. Better is the
superstition which sees the image of God in the wonderful whole which
God has fashioned, than the philosophy which would carve for itself a
Deity out of the remnant which man has mutilated. Better to realize
the satire of the eleatic philosopher, (Xenophanes) to make God in the
likeness of man, even as the ox or the horse might conceive gods in the
form of oxen or horses, than to adorn some half-hewn Hermes, the head
of a man joined to a misshapen block. Better to fall down before that
marvelous compound of human consciousness whose elements God has joined
together, and no man can put asunder, than to strip reason of those
cognate elements which together furnish all that we can conceive or
imagine of conscious or personal existence, and to deify the emptiest
of all abstractions, a something or nothing, with just enough of its
human original left to form a theme for the disputation of philosophy,
but not enough to furnish a single ground of appeal to the human
feelings of love, of reverence, and of fear. Unmixed idolatry is more
religious than this. Undisguised atheism is more logical." (Limits of
Religious Thought, Mansel, pp. 56-58).
Notwithstanding this passage, however, it should be remarked that
Dean Mansel holds on the very next page of this treatise that there
is a principle of truth of which this philosophy is the perversion.
"Surely," he remarks, "there is a sense in which we may not think of
God as though he were a man; as there is also a sense in which we
cannot help so thinking of him. * * * * * We feel that there is a true
foundation for the system which denies human attributes to God; _though
the superstructure, which has been raised upon it, logically involves
the denial of his very existence_." The position of the Dean, as is
well known, is that such are the limitations of the human mind--such
the limitations of religious thought, that man may not hope to
understand the divine nature, but as an act of faith must accept what
is revealed concerning that nature.]
But the strangest part of the Reverend gentleman's contention on
the matter now in hand is that the Latter-day Saints understand the
anthropomorphic expressions in the scriptures as he explains them; and
cites our catechisms (chapter 5, question 9) in proof of it![A] I quote
the reference given:
[Footnote A: This is a thing so astonishing for Mr. Van Der Donckt to
say, that lest the reader should think I had misunderstood him. I place
before him in this note Mr. Van Der Donckt's statement at length. "It
is a well known fact that all men after the example of the inspired
writings, make frequent use of the figure called anthropomorphism,
attributing to the Deity a human body, human members, human passions,
etc.; and that is done, not to imply that God is possessed of form,
limbs, etc., but simply to make spiritual things or certain truths more
intelligible to man, who, while he tarries in this world, can perceive
things and even ideas only through his senses, or through bodily organs.
"That even the Latter-day Saints thus understand such expressions is
evident from their catechism (chapter 5: question 9), etc., etc."]
9. Q. If God is a person, how can he be everywhere present? A. His
person cannot be in more than one place at the same time, but he is
everywhere present by his Holy Spirit.
This is preceded by the following passages from the same book and
chapter:
1. Q. What kind of a being is God?
A. He is in the form of a man.
2. Q. How do you learn this?
A. The scriptures declare that man was made in the image of God. *
* *
3. Q. Have you any further proof of God's being in the form of a
man?
A. Yes, Jesus Christ was in the form of a man, and was at the same
time in the image of God's person. * * *
4. Q. Is it not said that God is a spirit?
A. Yes; the scriptures say so. (John 4:24.) * * *
5. Q. How, then, can God be like man?
A. Man has a spirit, though clothed with a body, and God is
similarly constituted.
6. Q. Has God a body then?
A. Yes; like unto man's body in figure.
7. Q. Is the person of God very glorious?
A. Yes; infinitely glorious.
8. Q. Is God everywhere present?
A. Yes; He is in all parts of the universe.
Then follows, of course, question nine and its answer, quoted above and
by Mr. V.; and yet the gentleman, in the very face of these explicit
statements concerning the reality of God's form in our faith, would
have it believed that the Latter-day Saints understand the expressions
of scripture ascribing human forms, limbs and organs to God as he
explains them--not to imply that God is possessed of form, limbs, etc.,
but simply to make spiritual things more intelligible to man! This is a
splendid illustration of Mr. V.'s ability to misunderstand.
Mr. V. next takes up the subject of understanding the language of the
Bible literally. He says it is from anthropomorphic passages of the
Bible that the Latter-day Saints conclude that God has a body--such
passages as speak of the face, hands feet and other limbs and organs of
God. He holds these passages to be figurative. "I contend," he remarks,
"that if we must understand the Bible literally in those passages
('God created man in his own image') from which they attempt to prove
that God has a body, we must interpret it literally in _other similar
passages_."[A] I assent to that. It is well known that the language of
the Bible is highly figurative, almost extravagantly so in places, and
much allowance must be made for the inclination to imagery of prophetic
natures, which, like poetic temperaments, are given to imagery; and
hyperbole is the vice of oriental speech. But Mr. V. is not true to
this canon of interpretation he lays down, _viz_., _the same rule
of interpretation must be applied to passages that are similar in
character_. After laying down this principle of interpretation, he
proceeds to depart from it by placing for comparison very _dissimilar
passages_. What similarity is there, for example, in the plain, matter
of fact statement, "God created man in his own image, in the image of
God created he him;" and the passage he quotes from Psalms: "If I take
my wings early in the morning, and dwell in the uttermost part of the
sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold
me"? And this also: "Whither shall I flee from thy face. If I ascend
into heaven, thou art there; If I descend into hell thou art there?"
Has not the Reverend gentleman placed for comparison here the most
dissimilar passages that perhaps could be found in the whole Bible?
Yet he insists that the prosy passage from Genesis must be regarded as
equally figurative with David's poetry, and insists that if "Mormons"
believe literally that God made man in his own image and likeness,
or that Moses and seventy elders saw the God of Israel, as plainly
declared by Moses, then "They must believe that God had such a very
long hand as to extend to the uttermost parts of the sea;" and "such an
extremely long face, reaching from heaven to hell;" and "conclude that
David had wings!" Further remarks on this head are not necessary. One
is under no obligation to seriously discuss nonsense.
[Footnote A: Italics are mine--R.]
Of the Incarnation or the Son or God.
Another case of misapprehension of "Mormon" ideas will be found in what
Mr. Van Der Donckt says with reference to the Latter-day Saints' sacred
books not teaching the Christian truth of the incarnation of Deity in
the person of Jesus Christ. The sacred books of the Latter-day Saints
may not contain the verbiage of so-called Christian literature on the
subject; but if full recognition of the fact that Jesus was in the
beginning with the Father--was the "Word," and, moreover, the "Word"
that "was God," and afterwards was made flesh and dwelt among men--is
to believe in the incarnation of the Son of God, then the sacred books
of the Latter-day Saints teach this doctrine, for over and over again
in our sacred books will passages to that effect be found (especially
section 93 of the Doctrine and Covenants). Moreover, the Reverend
gentleman should remember that "Mormons" include among their sacred
books the Holy Bible, and all the doctrine of incarnation taught in
that book is our doctrine. I think the main difference between the
Latter-day Saints and "Christians" on the subject of incarnation, is
that the Latter-day Saints believe that incarnation does not stop with
the Lord Jesus Christ. Our sacred books teach that not only was Jesus
Christ in the beginning with God, but that the spirits of all men were
also with him in the beginning, and that these sons of God, as well as
the Lord Jesus Christ, became incarnated in bodies of flesh and bone
(Doctrine and Covenants, section 93). But Mr. V. thinks he discovers
in this doctrine of incarnation a proof that "God has not a body and
therefore is not an exalted man," "It is plain," says he, "that the Son
of God became flesh only at the time of his sojourn on earth. Now had
he been flesh or man before, as the 'Mormons' hold, how could he become
what he was already from all eternity?" This is another instance of Mr.
V.'s misapprehension of what "Mormons" teach. We nowhere teach that
Jesus Christ, the Son of God, was flesh and bone from all eternity.
When seeking to make "Mormonism" appear inconsistent with itself, the
Reverend gentleman is in duty bound to keep in mind our whole doctrine
on any particular subject he is treating. He should remember that
our theology holds that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are distinct
and separate personages, in the sense that they are three distinct
individuals; and that the Father is a personage of flesh and bone, as
Jesus now is; but previous to Messiah's birth into the world, he was a
spirit, the First Born of the hosts of the spirits in heaven, and was
with the Father in the beginning of the creation of our earth and its
heavens. Indeed, under the direction of the Father, he was the creator
of them (Heb. 1:3; Col. 15:17; John 1:3); but he came to the earth
to receive a tabernacle, that in all things he might become as his
Father is--a divine spirit inseparably united to a sacred and glorified
body--one glorious spiritual personage. As much of Mr. V.'s argument on
this head is built on a misapprehension of our doctrine, it will not
be necessary for me to follow him through the interminable windings of
his argument with reference to it. "There is never a proper ending to
reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation" (Cicero).
Mr. V. next brings as proof against God's being an exalted man, what he
calls the direct statement of the Bible, that God is not man: "God is
not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should
be changed" (Numbers 23:19). "I am God and not man" (Psalm). These
passages simply present the contrast between man as he is now, and with
all his imperfections on his head, and God. The Latter-day Saints do
not teach that man in his present state and condition is God; on the
contrary, they hold that there is a very, very wide difference between
them, all the difference indicated by the Bible: but they do believe
that through the eternities that will pass over man's head, and with
God for guide and teacher, he may become as his Father in heaven is,
and that such is his destiny.[A] It follows that when man shall attain
to that destiny, the contrast now so striking between man and God
will not exist. The contrast noted in the scriptures by Mr. V. is not
between _perfected_ men and God, but between very imperfect men--men
who lie, and are changeable--and God; and since the Latter-day Saints
do not hold that man while imperfect is God, or like God, or God like
him, the argument of the gentleman, based on the passages quoted,
is of no force. It could be said of some grandly developed, noble,
high-minded man, such as a Gladstone, a Bismarck, or a Washington: He
is not a child that he should halt in reason, or falter in action, or
be frightened by phantoms of the dark. But such a contrast does not
include the idea that the child may not change his status, and finally
become all that the great man is with whom he is now contrasted.
Clearly, the contrast is one of conditions, more than of natures, and
at its very highest value is the contrast between a perfected nature
and one not yet perfected.
[Footnote A: In a discourse in which much of the "Mormon" doctrine
concerning the Deity is unfolded by the Prophet Joseph Smith--the King
Follett discourse (see chapter 5)--in a passage dealing with the time
in which man may attain to some of the contemplated exaltations in the
future, he remarks: "When you climb up a ladder, you must begin at the
bottom and ascend step by step, until you arrive at the top; and so it
is with the principles of the Gospel--you must begin with the first,
and go on until you learn all the principles of exaltation. _But it
will be a great while after you have passed through the vail [of death]
before you will have learned them. It is not all to be comprehended
in this world: it will be a great work to learn our salvation and
exaltation, even beyond the grave_."]
The same answer applies to the Reverend gentleman's contention based
on the passage, "Thou art always the selfsame;" "I am the Lord and
change not;" "The Father of lights, with whom there is no change
nor shadow of alteration." These passages teach what the Reverend
gentleman calls the "immutability of God," which he holds to preclude
the idea that God rose from a state of imperfection to that of
perfection--since he is always the "selfsame." Before answering at
length, I couple with this Mr. Van Der Donckt's final argument on this
division of the subject--the scriptural evidences and arguments on the
form and nature of God--namely, "The Latter day Saints' theory of the
Man-God supposes a past and present with God. The Bible excludes that
succession of time," says the Reverend gentleman, "and speaks of God
as the everlasting present; 'I Am Who am,' 'From eternity to eternity
thou art God.'" Against this argument, based upon God's reputed
unchangeableness, and being always as he now is, from all eternity to
eternity, I wish to say, first, that the _God-nature_ is doubtless
always the same, without reference to those who may attain unto it; and
speaking of the God-nature, it is always the "Selfsame," from eternity
to eternity; but after that statement, against the Reverend gentleman's
argument bottomed on God's immutability and eternity--and, in fact,
against all his arguments, from first to last, respecting the form and
nature of God, I place Jesus of Nazareth, the Messiah, the revelation
of God to man, I place him as my premises, and my argument against all
the reverend gentleman has said, or can say, on this division of the
subject. I call attention to the fact that neither in my discourse
which brought forth Mr. Van Der Donckt's Reply nor in this Rejoinder,
have I turned to those numerous passages of the Bible that speak of the
face, limbs or organs of God. Not that I mistrust the force of those
passages as evidence, but because I have thought it unnecessary to
appeal to them, so long as I had in Jesus, the Messiah, a full length
and complete representation of God, not only as to the _reality_ of
his being, but as to the _kind_ of being God is. And now I ask, as I
did in my discourse, _is Jesus God_? Is he a manifestation of God--a
revelation of him? If so, there must be in him an end of controversy;
for whatever Jesus Christ was and is God must be, or Jesus Christ is
no manifestation, no revelation of God. Is Jesus Christ in form like
man? Is he possessed of a body of flesh and bone which is eternally
united to him--and now an integral part of him? Does he possess body,
parts and passions? There can be but one answer to all these questions,
and that is, "Yes; he possessed and now possesses all these things."
Then God also possesses them; for even according to both Catholic and
orthodox Protestant Christian doctrine, Jesus Christ was and is God,
and the complete manifestation and revelation of God the Father.
Also the specific points of argument based upon God's unchangeability,
and there being no succession of time with God--that, too, is answered
in the person and experience of Jesus Christ. According to Catholic
teaching, Jesus was a spirit, identical with God the Father in
substance, before he became man; but at a certain time he became man,
was not that a change? By it, he became something he was not before.
His humanity, according to their teaching, was _added_ to the Son of
God when he received his tabernacle of flesh and bone; and he was
certainly changed from an unembodied state to an embodied one; and
there was a "before and after"--in reference to this great event, in
the God Jesus' experience. Is it thinkable that this change was a
deterioration? Was the Son of God's divinity debased to the human, or
was so much of humanity as he took on raised to the divine nature, and
henceforth made an integral part of it?
The orthodox doctrine of Christianity is--Catholic and Protestant
alike--that Jesus Christ is God; that he always was and is God,
according to both orthodox theology and Christian philosophy. Yet it
is said of this Jesus that he "_increased in wisdom and stature, and
in favor with God and man_" (Luke 2:52). Here is certainly a change in
condition; here is succession of time with God--a before and after;
here is being and becoming; for whereas, he was a spirit, he became
man; and in becoming man, he passed through all the phases in life from
infancy to manhood. It is significant also that it was not until Jesus
had arisen from the tomb and stood in the presence of his disciples,
a glorified personage, body and spirit united, that he exclaimed,
"_All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth_." If "_given_,"
there must have been a time when he did not possess all power in
heaven and in earth; and hence, a change from possessing some power
to the condition of possessing "all power," a fullness of power--"for
it pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell" (Col.
1:19). But more of this when I come to deal with Mr. Van Der Donckt's
philosophical proofs on the subject, I shall close this part of my
rejoinder with the following summary of the facts maintained thus far
in my argument:
_First:_--While the scriptures declare that God is a spirit, it
does not follow that he is necessarily an unembodied spirit; on the
contrary, it is clear that he is an embodied spirit; for Jesus Christ
is God, and he, we know, is a spirit and body united; and he is said to
be the express image of his Father's person; therefore, the Father of
Jesus Christ, or God the Father, must be just what Jesus is--a spirit
embodied in a tabernacle of flesh and bone.
_Second:_--Although the Bible says that God is a spirit, and speaks
of angels as spirits also, and points out some differences between
the nature of men and spirits, it does not follow that spirits are
immaterial beings, and therefore without form. On the contrary, the
evidence of scripture is to the effect that angels are very substantial
personages. One wrestled bodily with Jacob and lamed him; while three
others "did eat" of the substantial meal provided by Abraham; and there
are many other proofs of angels being substantial, material personages.
_Third:_--It is an assumption absolutely unwarranted by authority of
the word of God to say that when spirits, or angels, or Jesus--before
his incarnation--showed themselves to men, they merely assumed the
material garb for the occasion.
_Fourth:_--Although the Bible in sundry passages speaks of God the
Father as "invisible," it does not follow that he is absolutely so, nor
invisible from the nature of his being; on the contrary, it is clear
from what has been set forth that under certain special conditions,
God the Father as well as Jesus--before his incarnation--and certain
angels, have been seen; and hence, the invisibility of God the Father,
arises from his being invisible to men in their normal condition,
unquickened by, and unclothed with, the power of God.
_Fifth:_--The doctrine that all absolutely invisible beings are
immaterial is simply untrue, being contradicted by the fact that a
number of absolutely invisible things are known to be material, and yet
possess some of the properties of grosser matter; and it is reasonable
to believe that the same truth holds as to spiritual beings.
_Sixth:_--The Bible distinctly ascribes to God and angels the form,
limbs, organs, feelings and passions of men; and the Bible nowhere
leads us to believe that this ascription of bodily form and organs and
passions to God is simply to "make spiritual things, or certain truths
more intelligible to man;" nor does it follow because _some_ passages
of the Bible are figurative, and hence not to be taken literally, that
_all_ the passages ascribing human form, organs and feelings to God
are figurative, and hence not to be taken literally. It is only when
anthropomorphic passages and expressions are similarly used as other
clearly figurative passages and expressions are, that they are to be
adjudged as figurative and _not_ to be taken literally.
_Seventh:_--And lastly, beside all premises and arguments to the effect
that God is an unembodied spirit, without form, without limbs, organs,
features, human feelings, or passions, such as love, compassion, pity,
etc., etc,--beside all this, I place the Lord Jesus, the Image of God
the Father's person, the full length representation and revelation of
God to men, as an all sufficient answer, and say that whatsoever Jesus
Christ was and is, so, too, has been and is God, the Father; for such
is the teaching of holy scripture.
II.
MR. VAN DER DONCKT'S "PHILOSOPHICAL PROOFS" OF THE FORM AND
NATURE OF GOD.
Mr. Van Der Donckt, at the beginning of his argument under his
"philosophical proofs of God's simplicity or spirituality," again
exhibits the fact that he misapprehends the doctrines of the Latter-day
Saints. He says: "The Latter-day Saints believe that God created the
souls of men long before their conception." That is not the belief of
the Latter-day Saints; and his misapprehension of what their doctrine
is relative to man and God leads the gentleman to make statements,
and indulge in lines of argumentation he would not have followed had
he apprehended aright the teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints. Since his philosophical argument has proceeded from
a wrong basis, it becomes necessary to state what the "Mormon" doctrine
is relative to the subject in hand, and then consider so much of his
argument as may apply to the facts.
Latter-day Saints believe that the "soul of man" consists of both his
spirit and his body united. "The spirit and the body is the soul of
man; and the resurrection from the dead is the redemption of the soul"
(Doc. and Cov. sec. 88:15, 16). This, I am aware, is not the usually
accepted sense of the word "soul;" for it generally stands for what is
regarded as the incorporeal nature of man, or the principle of mental
and spiritual life of him. It is used variously in the scriptures. In
one place, the Savior uses it in contrast with the body: "Fear not them
which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear
him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. 10:28).
But the word as used in the passage above quoted from the Doctrine and
Covenants also has warrant of scriptural authority: "And the Lord God
formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils
the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). Here body
and "breath of life," the spirit, constitute the soul of man.
Of course, Mr. Van Der Donckt uses the phrase "souls of men" as we
perhaps would use the phrase "spirits of men," and evidently makes
reference to our doctrine of the pre-existence of spirits, that is,
the doctrine of the actual existence of the spirits of men long ages
before they tabernacled in the flesh, when he says: "The Latter-day
Saints believe that God creates the souls of men long before their
conception." But again explanation is necessary, as that statement does
not quite meet our belief. Our doctrine is that "Intelligences are
begotten spirits," which spirits are in form like men, and are really,
substance, that is, matter, but of a more subtle and finer nature than
the matter composing man's tabernacle of flesh and bone.[A] Christians
believe that "the Word," that is, Jesus Christ, was in the beginning
with God; and not only that "the Word" was with God, but also that "the
Word was God" (John 1:1, 2), Latter-day Saints not only believe Jesus
was in the beginning with God, but it is their doctrine that man was
"also in the beginning with the Father, that which is spirit" (Doc.
and Cov. sec. 93:23). And again: "Man was also in the beginning with
God. Intelligence, or the light of truth _was not created or made,
neither indeed can be._ * * * * Every man whose spirit receiveth not
the light is under condemnation _for man is spirit_. The elements are
eternal, and spirit and element, inseparably connected, receive a
fullness of joy; and when separated, man cannot receive a fullness of
joy. The elements are the tabernacle of God; yea man is the tabernacle
of God, even temples" (Doc and Cov. sec. 93:29, 32-35). The point to
be observed is that intelligences--whence the spirits of men--are not
created or made, nor indeed can they be, for they are eternal--eternal
as God the Father, and God the Son are. "The mind of man--the immortal
spirit--where did it come from?" asks the Prophet Joseph Smith, in a
discourse delivered at Nauvoo;[B] and then answers:
[Footnote A: The Prophet Joseph teaches that "all spirit is matter, but
it is more fine or pure [than the gross matter tangible to our senses]
and can only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it, but when our
bodies are purified, we shall see that it is all matter." (Doc. and
Cov. sec 137.)]
[Footnote B: April 7th, 1844, Mill. Star, vol. xxiii p. 245, et seq.]
All learned men, and doctors of divinity, say that God created
it in the beginning; but it is not so; the very idea lessens man
in my estimation. I do not believe the doctrine. I know better.
Hear it, all ye ends of the world, for God has told me so. If you
don't believe me it will not make the truth without effect. * * *
* We say that God himself is a self-existent being. Who told you
so? It is correct enough, but who told you that man did not exist
in like manner upon the same principle? God made a tabernacle and
put his [man's] spirit into it, and it became a living soul. How
does it read in Hebrew? It does not say in Hebrew that God created
the spirit of man. It says, "God made man out of earth and put in
him Adam's spirit, and so became a living body." The mind, or the
intelligence which man possesses is co-eternal with God himself.
* * * * * I am dwelling on the immortality of the spirit of man.
Is it logical to say that the intelligence of spirits is immortal,
and yet that it had a beginning? The intelligence of spirits had
no beginning, neither will it have an end. That is good logic.
That which has a beginning may have an end. There never was a time
when there were not spirits, for they are co-eternal with our
Father in heaven. I want to reason more on the spirit of man; for
I am dwelling on the body and spirit of man--on the subject of the
dead. I take my ring from my finger and liken it unto the mind
of man--the immortal part, because it has no beginning. Suppose
you cut it in two; then it has a beginning and an end; but join
it again, and it continues one eternal round. So with the spirit
of man. As the Lord liveth, if it has a beginning it will have an
end. All the fools and learned and wise men from the beginning of
creation, who say that the spirit of man had a beginning, prove
that it must have an end: and if that doctrine is true, then the
doctrine of annihilation would be true. But if I am right, I might
with boldness proclaim from the house tops that God never had
the power to create the spirit of man at all, God himself could
not create himself. Intelligence is eternal, and exists upon a
self-existent principle. It is a spirit from age to age, and there
is no creation about it. * * * * The spirit of man is not a created
being; it existed from eternity, and will exist to eternity.
Anything created cannot be eternal: and earth, water, etc., had
their existence in an elementary state, from eternity.
Mr. Van Der Donckt will recognize quite a difference between the
doctrine here stated as to the spirits of men, and the one he states
for us when he says, "Latter-day Saints believe that God creates the
souls of men long before their conception." There is that in man,
according to our doctrine, which is not created at all; there is in him
an "ego"--a "spirit" uncreated, never made, a self-existent entity,
eternal as God himself; and of the same kind of substance or essence
with him, and, indeed, part of him, when God is conceived of in the
generic sense.
With the doctrine of "Mormonism" relative to man and God thus stated,
the question is, what part of Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical
argument touches it?
Mr. Van Der Donckt, it must be remembered, bases his philosophical
argument upon the absolute "simplicity or spirituality" of God. "I Am
Who Am," is the definition of God about which circle all his arguments.
God is "the Necessary Being," is his contention; infinite, illimitable;
not limited by his own essence, by another, or by himself. From which I
understand him to mean, after the philosophers of his school, that God,
the very essence of him, is pure being-"Actual being or existence" are
his own words. (Page 53).
This his premise; and the part of his argument which affects our
doctrine is the following:
If God were an aggregation of parts, these parts would be either
necessary beings or contingent (that do not necessarily exist),
or some would be necessary and some contingent. None of these
suppositions are tenable, therefore God is not an aggregate of
parts. * * * * If the parts of God were necessary beings, there
would be several independent beings, which the infinity of God
precludes. God would not be infinite, if there were even one other
being independent of him, as his power, etc., would not reach that
being.
The infinite being is most simple, or not compound. Were he
compound, his parts would be either all finite, or all infinite, or
one infinite and the others finite. None of these suppositions are
possible, therefore he is not compound.
Several finite things cannot produce an infinite or an illimitable,
as there would always be a first and last.
Many infinite beings are inconceivable, for, if there were several
they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now,
from the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks,
the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a
compound of infinite parts.
If one is infinite, nothing can be added to it. Finite parts could
not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate
their limitations to God.
Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or
spiritual. Therefore he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a
composite being.
Of Mr. Van Der Donckt's Premise.
I have to do first of all with Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise--"the
simplicity or spirituality" of God.
So far as it is possible to make language do it, the gentleman teaches
that God is "pure being," "most [therefore absolutely] simple--not
compound." He is not only infinite, then, but infinity. It follows that
he is without quality, other than being--mere existence--"I Am Who Am;"
without attributes; not susceptible of division, or of relation; for
if he possessed quality or attribute or was susceptible of division
or of relation, his absolute simplicity--that tremulously precarious
thing on which, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy, his very existence
and all his excellence depends--would be destroyed. It was doubtless
these considerations that led the Church of England--which, by the way,
is at one with the Roman Catholic Church in the doctrine of God--to
say of the "one true and living God," that he is _without body, parts
or passions_.[A] With which also the Westminster Confession of Faith
agrees, by saying: "There is but one only living and true God, who
is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible,
_without body, parts or passions_, immutable, immense, eternal,
incomprehensible," etc.[B]
[Footnote A: Bk. Com. Prayer, Articles of Religion, Art. 1.]
[Footnote B: Westminster Confession, Art. 2, Sec. 1.]
The German school of philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, which ends in inevitable agnosticism, went but one step
further than these creeds; a step made inevitable by the creeds
themselves. The creeds postulate God as "pure being"--"existence"
"the one who could not _not_ exist," Mr. V.'s interpretation of "I
Am Who Am." But "existence," says Fichte, "implies origin," and "God
is beyond origin"--i. e. beyond "being," "existence." Schelling
reached substantially the same conclusion when, by a pathway but
little divergent from that followed by Fichte, he was led to regard
God as neither "real or ideal;" "neither thought nor being." While
Hegel, by similar subtleties, established the identity of "Being and
Non-Being." This German philosophy, which but extends the philosophy
of the orthodox creeds to its legitimate conclusion, leaves us with
the paradox on our hands of regarding God at once as the most real
existence, and as the most absolute non-existence. The conclusions from
the premise are just; and Mr. V.'s "most simple," "infinite being,"
he who is "pure existence itself," vanishes amid the metaphysical
subtleties of the learned Germans.[A]
[Footnote A: "Existence itself, that so-called highest category of
thought, is only conceivable in the form of existence modified in some
particular manner. Strip off its modification, and the apparent paradox
of the German philosopher becomes literally true;--_pure being is pure
nothing_. We have no conception of existence which is not existence in
some particular manner; and if we abstract from the manner, we have
nothing left to constitute the existence. Those who, in their horror of
what they call anthropomorphism, or anthropopathy, refuse to represent
the Deity under symbols borrowed from the limitations of human
consciousness, are bound in consistency, to deny that God exists; for
the conception of existence is as human and as limited as any other"
(Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel, pp. 95, 96).]
Let us examine the effect of this Deity-destroying postulate in
England. Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Infinite being," "most simple or not
compound," is identical with the "absolute," the "unconditioned;" the
"first cause," hence the "uncaused." These terms, it is well known, Mr.
Herbert Spencer seized upon, in his volume on "First Principles," and
ran them down to logical absurdity, showing them to be "unthinkable,"
and that ultimate religious ideas (arising from the postulates of
orthodox creeds) lead to the "Unknown!" In reaching this conclusion
he was wonderfully helped by Henry L. Mansel, some time Dean of St.
Paul's, who in his celebrated Bampton Lecture arrives at substantially
the same conclusion--with an exception to be noted later.[A] Indeed,
so nearly at one are the churchman and the philosopher, in their
methods of thought, in their deductions, that the latter reaches his
conclusions from the data and reasoning of the former, whom he quotes
with approval and at great length. I select from these writers a few
typical passages tending to show the absurdity of God's "simplicity,"
or "spirituality," as held by Mr. Van Der Donckt, reminding the reader
that Mr. V.'s "Infinite Being," "most simple or not compound," is
identical with the "absolute," "unconditioned," the "first cause," the
"uncaused" of both Mr. Mansel and Mr. Spencer.
[Footnote A: Page 109.]
Mr. Spencer, after showing that the First Cause cannot be finite,
nor dependent, reaches the conclusion that it must be infinite and
independent; and then proceeds:
But to think of the First Cause as totally independent is to think
of it as that which existed in the absence of all other existence;
seeing that if the presence of any other existence is necessary, it
must be partially dependent on that other existence, and so cannot
be the First Cause. Not only, however, must the First Cause be a
form of being which has no necessary relation to any other form of
being, but it can have no necessary relation within itself. There
can be nothing in it which determines change, and yet nothing which
prevents change. For if it contains something which imposes such
necessities or restraints, this something must be a cause higher
than the First Cause, which is absurd. Thus the First Cause must be
in every sense perfect, complete, total; including within itself
all power, and transcending all law. Or to use the established
word, it must be absolute.[A]
[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 29, 30; 1896 edition, D.
Appleton & Co., N. Y.]
Thus far the philosopher; and even Mr. Van Der Donckt, I think, could
not complain that he has not stated the "simplicity" of the First
Cause most clearly. But at this point the philosopher, Mr. Spencer,
introduces the churchman, Dean Mansel, to abolish the structure of the
"First Cause," the "simple" or "spiritual being," or "God," as held by
Mr. V. and all orthodox Christians. I quote Mr. Mansel:
But these three conceptions--the Cause, the Absolute, the
Infinite--all equally indispensable, do they not imply
contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as
attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be
absolute: _the Absolute cannot as such be a cause_. The cause,
as such, exists only in relation to its effect; the effect is an
effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the
Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We
attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction by introducing
the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by
itself, and afterwards becomes a cause. But here we are checked by
the third conception, that of the infinite. How can the infinite
become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a
possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is
not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its
former limits. * * Supposing the Absolute to be a cause, it will
follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness.
For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite.
If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited
by a superior power: and if necessitated by itself, it has in its
own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation
must therefore be voluntary, and volition is only possible in a
conscious being. But consciousness again is only conceivable as a
relation. There must be a conscious subject and an object of which
he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object
is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the
absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by
distinguishing between the absolute as related to another and the
absolute as related to itself. The absolute, it may be said, may
possibly be conscious provided it is only conscious of itself. But
this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive
than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of
the subject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act
of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the
former case the object depends upon the subject, and the subject
alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends
upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or,
if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists
independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only
a pair of relatives; for coexistence, whether in consciousness or
not, is itself a relation.
The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the
absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to
anything else, but it is also incapable of containing, by the
constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within
itself; as a whole, for instance composed of parts, or as a
substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in
antithesis to an object. For, if there is in the absolute any
principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts
or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If,
on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no
absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives. The almost
unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute
is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason
also, as far as reason has any voice in the matter. But this
absolute unity, as indifferent and containing no attributes, can
neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings
by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in
their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma.
The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it
be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex,
neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived
by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of
difference: it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can
it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the
beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible.
Let us, however, suppose, for an instance, that these difficulties
are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely
established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded
in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done
nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the
relative--the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal
activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the Absolute,
whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from
a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative
perfection; and, therefore, was not originally perfect. If the
state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the
Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection.
There remains only the supposition that the two states are
equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference.
But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, or
it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, and yet
indifferent, we must admit the possibility of two conceptions of
the absolute--the one as productive, the other as non-productive.
If the act is not real, the supposition itself vanishes. * * *
Again, how can the relative be conceived as coming into being? If
it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived
as passing from non-existence into existence. But to conceive an
object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for that
which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that
conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all;
but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It
is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at
another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in
the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into being, is
to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. * * *
To sum up briefly this portion of my argument:
The conception of the absolute and the infinite, from whatever side
we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions.
There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist,
whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a
contradiction in supposing it not to exist.
There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a
contradiction in conceiving it as many.
There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is
a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.
It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active, nor,
without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive.
It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it
be conceived as a part only of that sum.[A]
[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 40-44. Limits of Religions
Thoughts, lecture II, first American edition, 1875.]
After thus running to absurdity the prevalent conceptions of the
"Infinite," the "Absolute," the "Uncaused," Mr. V.'s "Most simple or
not compound" "Being," the churchman does what all orthodox Christians
do, he commits a violence against all human understanding and good
sense--he arbitrarily declares, in the face of his own inexorable logic
and its inevitable deductions, that, "_it is our duty to think of God
as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite_;" that
is, it is our duty to think of the infinite as at once limited and
unlimited; as finite and infinite--"which," to use a phrase dear to Mr.
Van Der Donckt, "is absurd," and therefore not to be entertained. At
this point, the philosopher and the churchman reach the parting of the
ways, and this is the exception, in the conclusion of the two, noted a
few pages back.[A]
[Footnote A: Page 105.]
Some do indeed allege [says Mr. Spencer] that though the Ultimate
Cause of things cannot really be thought of by us as having
specified attributes, it is yet incumbent upon us to assert these
attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the
Absolute cannot, in any manner or degree, be brought within them,
we are nevertheless told that we must represent the Absolute to
ourselves under these forms! * * * That this is not the conclusion
here adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the
foregoing arguments, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny
personality. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to
the established limits of our intelligence, and not perversely to
rebel against them. Let those who can, believe there is eternal
war between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations.
I, for one, admit no such radical vice in the constitution of
things.[A]
[Footnote A: First Principles, p. 110.]
Yet Mr. Mansel, in the inconsistent and illogical course he pursues, is
not more inconsistent, illogical, and unphilosophical than all orthodox
Christians. The postulates of their creeds concerning the nature of
God leads them to affirm what they call his "Spirituality," "Infinite
Being," "Simplicity," etc. (which are but the equivalents of the
philosopher's "absolute," "infinite," and the "uncaused"); and yet the
necessities of their faith in revelation make it imperative that they
regard him as existing in some relation to the universe and to man,
which destroys his alleged "simplicity." To ascribe to him attributes
is to destroy that simplicity[A] which orthodox creeds affirm, and for
which Mr. Van Der Donckt so stoutly argues. Nor does it help matters
when it is said that these attributes are existences--the attitude
of Mr. V., for he says: "Every perfection [goodness, mercy, justice,
etc.--attributes of God] is some existence, something that is." If
this be granted, then it follows that God must be the sum of all these
existences, therefore a compound, not "simple." And not only does
orthodox belief in revelation compel those who follow it to concede the
existence of attributes in God, but personality also. But if God be
conceived as a personality, his "simplicity" or "spirituality," as held
by Mr. V., vanishes, because, when recognized as personality, God is no
longer "being"--but _a_ being.
[Footnote A: "The rational conception of God is that _he is_,
nothing more. To give him an attribute is to make him a relative
God. * * * We cannot attribute to him any quality, for qualities are
inconceivable apart from matter." "_Origin and Development of Religious
Beliefs--Christianity_."--(S. Baring-Gould, p. 112.) It was held
by well nigh the whole medieval school of theologians that God was
unknowable because "the absolute simplicity of the divine essence was
incompatible with the existence of distinctions therein." (See art.
"Theism," _Ency. Brit._, and the references there given.)]
Mr. Van Der Donckt himself says: "Something is limited, not because it
_is_ [i. e. exists]: but because it is _this or that_; for instance,
a stone, a plant, a man"--_or a person_, I suggest. For if God has
personality, he is a person, a some-thing, and hence limited, according
to Mr. V.'s philosophy; if limited, as he must be when conceived of
as _this or that_, as a person, for instance, then of course not
infinite being; and thus my friend's doctrine of God's "simplicity"
is destroyed the moment he ascribes personality to Deity. Nor does
the difficulties of Mr. Van Der Donckt and all orthodox Christians
end here. Not only does revelation as they view it demand belief in
the personality of God, but it demands the belief that in God are
_three persons_--the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. This further
complicates the matter, and removes orthodox Christians still further
from the postulate of "simplicity" they affirm of God; for if there are
three persons in God, by no intellectual contortions whatsoever can
this conception of "three" be harmonized with the orthodox Christian
postulate of God's "simplicity." For the Son, if he exists at all, must
exist in virtue of some distinction from the Father; so also the Holy
Ghost must exist in virtue of some distinction from both the Father and
the Son. Each must have something distinct from the other; must be what
the other is not, in some particular;* and if each one has something
the other has not, and each lacks something which the other has, how
can it be said that each of these persons is God, and each infinite as
he must be in order to be God, under Mr. V.'s doctrine?
[Footnote A: "Distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object
is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of
existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form
which the other has." Dean Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thoughts."]
If the three be conceived as one God--yet each with that about him
which distinguishes him from the other--how can God be regarded as
"simple," "not compound?" The orthodox creeds of Christendom, moreover,
require us to believe that while the Father is a person, the Son a
person, and the Holy Ghost a person, yet there are not three persons,
but one person. So with each being eternal and almighty. So with
each being God: "The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost
is God: and yet there are not three Gods but one God"[A] No wonder
the whole conception is given up as "incomprehensible." "Their mode
of subsistence [i. e., the subsistence of the three persons] in the
one substance," says the _Commentary on the Confession of Faith_,
"_must ever continue to us a profound mystery, as it transcends all
analogy_."[B] So the Douay Catechism (Catholic), ch. i:
[Footnote A: See the creed of St. Athanasius, a copy is published in
the History of the Church, vol. I, Introduction, p. 87.]
[Footnote B: This Commentary is by Rev. A. A. Hodges, D.D., LL.D., p.
58.]
Q. In what do faith and law of Christ consist? A. In two principal
_mysteries_, namely, _the Unity and Trinity of God_, and the
incarnation and death of our Savior.
"To think that God _is_, as we _think_ him to be, is blasphemy," is
the lofty assertion behind which some of the orthodox hide when hard
pressed with the inconsistency of their creed; and if I mistake not, "A
God understood is a God dethroned," has long been an aphorism of the
Church of which Mr. Van Der Donckt is a priest.
But what is the sum of my argument thus far on Mr. Van Der Donckt's
premise of God's absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality?" Only this:
First, his premise is proven to be unphilosophical and untenable,
when coupled with his creed, which ascribes qualities, attributes and
personality to God. Either the gentleman must cease to think of God as
"infinite being," "most simple," "not compound," or he must surrender
the God of his creed, who is represented by it to be three persons
in one substance; and, moreover, persons possessed of attributes and
qualities which bring God into relations with men and the universe,
a mode of being which destroys "simplicity." Either one or the other
of these beliefs must be given up; they cannot consistently be held
simultaneously, as they destroy each other. If Mr. V. holds to the God
of his creed, what becomes of all his "philosophy?" If he holds to his
"philosophy," what becomes of the God of his creed.
Second, as affecting this discussion, the matter at this point stands
thus: Since the gentleman's premise of God's absolute simplicity is
proved to be illogical and unphilosophical, it affords no sound basis
of argument against the Latter-day Saints' views of Deity, wherein they
hold him to be something different from absolute "being"--more than
a mere, and, I may say, bare and barren "existence," a metaphysical
abstraction. Mr. V.'s premise of absolute simplicity affords no
consistent basis of argument against our view that God is a person in
the sense of being an individual, in form like man, and possessed of
attributes which bring him within the nearest and dearest relations to
men that it is possible to conceive.
Of the Doctrine of God's "Simplicity" Being of Pagan Rather than of
Christian Origin.
The next step in my argument is to prove that this doctrine of God
being "most simple," "not compound," "pure being"--without body (i. e.,
not material), parts or passions--hence, without attributes, is not
a doctrine of the Christian scriptures, but comes from the old Pagan
philosophies.
Clearly the data for this doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity"
did not come from the Old Testament, for that teaches the plainest
anthropomorphic ideas respecting God. It ascribes to him a human form,
and many qualities and attributes possessed by man, which, in the minds
of philosophers of Mr. V.'s school, limit him who must be, to their
thinking, without any limit whatsoever; and ascribes relativity to him
who must not be relative but absolute.
The data for the doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity"--contended
for by Mr. V.--does not come from the New Testament, for the writers
of that volume of scripture accept the doctrine of the Old Testament
respecting God, and even emphasize its anthropomorphic ideas, by
representing that the man Christ Jesus was in the "express image" of
God, the Father's, person; was, in fact, God manifest in the flesh
(I Tim. 3:16); "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:5); "God,
the Word, who was made flesh, and dwelt among men, who beheld his
glory" (St. John 1:1-14). Hence Mr. Van Der Donckt's doctrine of God's
"simplicity" cannot claim the warrant of New Testament authority.
Plato, in his _Timaeus_, (Jowett's translation, page 530,) incidentally
referring to God, in connection with the creation of the universe, says:
We say indeed that "he was," "he is," "he will be;" but the truth
is that "_he is_" alone truly expresses him, and that "was" and
"will be" are only to be spoken of generation in time.
Here, then, is Mr. V.'s "pure being," "most simple," "not compound."
Again:
We must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always
the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything
into itself from without, nor itself giving out to any other, but
invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the sight is
granted to intelligence only (Ibid. p. 454).
Here Mr. V. may find his God, "who cannot change with regard to his
existence, nor with regard to his mode of existence." Also his God who
can only be seen with the "soul's intellectual perception, elevated by
a supernatural influx from God." Dr. Mosheim, in his account of Plato's
idea of God, says: "He considered the Deity, to whom he gave the
supreme governance of the universe, as a being of the highest wisdom
and power, and _totally unconnected with any material substance_."[A]
[Footnote A: Mosheim's "Historical Commentaries on the State of
Christianity, During the First Three Hundred Years", vol. 1. p. 37.]
To the same effect, also, Justin Martyr (second Christian century)
generalizes and accepts as doctrine what may be gathered from the sixth
book of Plato's "Republic," with reference to God. To the Jew, Trypho,
Justin remarks:
The Deity, father, is not to be viewed by the organs of sight,
like other creatures, but he is to be comprehended by the mind
alone, as Plato declares, and I believe him. * * * * Plato tells
us that the eye of the mind is of such a nature, and was given Us
to such an end, as to enable us to see with it by itself, when
pure, that _Being_ who is the source of whatever is an object of
the mind itself, _who has neither color, nor shape, nor size, nor
anything which the eye can see_, but who is above all essence, who
is ineffable, and undefinable, who is alone beautiful and good, and
who is at once implanted into those souls who are naturally well
born, through their relationship to and desire of seeing him.
Athanasius (third Christian century) quotes the same definition (Contra
Gentes, ch. 2), almost _verbatim_. Turning again to the _Timaeus_ of
Plato, this question is asked:
What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that
which is always becoming and has never any being? That which is
apprehended by reflection and reason [God] always is; and is the
same; that on the other hand which is conceived by opinion, with
the help of sensation without reason [the material universe], is in
a process of becoming and perishing but never really is. * * * Was
the world [universe], always in existence and without beginning? or
created and having a beginning? Created, I reply.
In this, the orthodox Christians and Mr. V. may find their God of pure
"being," that never is "becoming," but _always is_; also the creation
of the universe out of nothing. The fact is that orthodox Christian
views of God are Pagan rather than Christian.
In his great work on the "History of Christian Doctrine," Mr. William
G. T. Shedd says:[A] "The early Fathers, in their defenses of
Christianity against their pagan opponents, contend that the better
pagan writers themselves agree with the new religion in teaching that
their is one Supreme Being. Lactantius (Institutiones, 1, 5), after
quoting the Orphic poets, Hesiod, Virgil, and Ovid, in proof that the
heathen poets taught the unity of the supreme deity, affirms that the
better pagan philosophers agree with them in this. 'Aristotle,' he
says, 'although he disagrees with himself, and says many things that
are self-contradictory, yet testifies that one supreme mind rules over
the world. Plato, who is regarded as the wisest philosopher of them
all, plainly and openly defends the doctrine of a divine monarchy, and
denominates the supreme being, not ether, nor reason, nor nature, but
as he is, _God_; and asserts that by him this perfect and admirable
world was made. And Cicero follows Plato, frequently confessing the
deity, and calls him the supreme being, in his Treatise on the Laws.'"
[Footnote A: Vol 1, p 56.]
It is conceded by Christian writers that the Christian doctrine of God
is not expressed in New Testament terms, but in the terms of Greek
and Roman metaphysics, as witness the following from the very able
article in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_ on Theism, by the Rev. Dr.
Flint, Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh: "The proposition
constitutive of the dogma of the Trinity--the propositions in the
symbols of Nice, Constantinople and Toledo, relative to the immanent
distinctions and relations in the Godhead--were not drawn directly
from the New Testament, and could not be expressed in New Testament
terms. _They were the product of reason speculating on a revelation to
faith_--the New Testament representation of God as a Father, a Redeemer
and a Sanctifier--with a view to conserve and vindicate, explain and
comprehend it. They were only formed through centuries of effort, _only
elaborated by the aid of the conceptions, and formulated in the terms
of Greek and Roman metaphysics_." The same authority says: "The massive
defense of theism, erected by the Cambridge school of philosophy,
against atheism, fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, was
avowedly built on a Platonic foundation."
In method of thought also, no less than in conclusions, the most
influential of the Christian fathers on these subjects followed the
Greek philosophers rather than the writers of the New Testament.[A]
"Platonism, and Aristotelianism," says the author of the _History of
Christian Doctrine_, "exerted more influence upon the intellectual
methods of men, taking in the whole time since their appearance, than
all other systems combined. They certainly influenced the Greek mind,
and Grecian culture, more than all the other philosophical systems.
They re-appear in Roman philosophy--so far as Rome had any philosophy.
We shall see that Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, exerted more influence
than all other philosophical minds united, upon the greatest of the
Christian Fathers: upon the greatest of the Schoolmen; and upon the
theologians of the Reformation, Calvin and Melanchthon. And if we look
at European philosophy as it has been unfolded in England, Germany
and France, we shall perceive that all the modern theistic schools
have discussed the standing problems of human reason, in very much the
same manner in which the reason of Plato and Aristotle discussed them
twenty-two centuries ago. Bacon, Des Cartes, Leibniz, and Kant, so
far as the first principles of intellectual and moral philosophy are
concerned, agree with their Grecian predecessors. A student who has
mastered the two systems of the Academy and Lyceum will find in modern
philosophy (with the exception of the department of natural science)
very little that is true, that may not be, found for substance, and
germinally, in the Greek theism."[B]