The Work of the Presidents
The war ended slavery, but it left the problem of the freed slave; it
preserved the Union in theory, but it left unsolved many delicate
problems of readjustment. Were the seceded States in or out of the
Union? If in the Union, what rights had they? If they were not in the
Union, what was their status? What was the status of the Southern
Unionist, of the ex-Confederate? What punishments should be inflicted
upon the Southern people? What authority, executive or legislative,
should carry out the work of reconstruction? The end of the war brought
with it, in spite of much discussion, no clear answer to these
perplexing questions.
Unfortunately, American political life, with its controversies over
colonial government, its conflicting interpretations of written
constitutions, and its legally trained statesmen, had by the middle of
the nineteenth century produced a habit of political thought which
demanded the settlement of most governmental matters upon a theoretical
basis. And now in 1865 each prominent leader had his own plan of
reconstruction fundamentally irreconcilable with all the others, because
rigidly theoretical. During the war the powers of the Executive had been
greatly expanded and a legislative reaction was to be expected. The
Constitution called for fresh interpretation in the light of the Civil
War and its results.
The first theory of reconstruction may be found in the
Crittenden-Johnson resolutions of July, 1861, which declared that the
war was being waged to maintain the Union under the Constitution and
that it should cease when these objects were obtained. This would have
been subscribed to in 1861 by the Union Democrats and by most of the
Republicans, and in 1865 the conquered Southerners would have been glad
to reënter the Union upon this basis; but though in 1865 the resolution
still expressed the views of many Democrats, the majority of Northern
people had moved away from this position.
The attitude of Lincoln, which in 1865 met the views of a majority of
the Northern people though not of the political leaders, was that "no
State can upon its mere motion get out of the Union," that the States
survived though there might be some doubt about state governments, and
that "loyal" state organizations might be established by a population
consisting largely of ex-Confederates who had been pardoned by the
President and made "loyal" for the future by an oath of allegiance.
Reconstruction was, Lincoln thought, a matter for the Executive to
handle. But that he was not inflexibly committed to any one plan is
indicated by his proclamation after the pocket veto of the Wade-Davis
Bill and by his last speech, in which he declared that the question of
whether the seceded States were in the Union or out of it was "merely a
pernicious abstraction." In addition, Lincoln said:
We are all agreed that the seceded States, so called, are out of their
proper practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object of
the government, civil and military, in regard to those States is to
again get them into that proper practical relation. I believe that it is
not only possible, but in fact easier, to do this without deciding or
even considering whether these States have ever been out of the Union,
than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly
immaterial whether they had ever been abroad. Let us all join in doing
the acts necessary to restore the proper practical relations between
these States and the Union, and each forever after innocently indulge
his own opinion whether in doing the acts he brought the States from
without into the Union, or only gave them proper assistance, they never
having been out of it.
President Johnson's position was essentially that of Lincoln, but his
attitude toward the working out of the several problems was different.
He maintained that the States survived and that it was the duty of the
Executive to restore them to their proper relations. "The true theory,"
said he, "is that all pretended acts of secession were from the
beginning null and void. The States cannot commit treason nor screen
individual citizens who may have committed treason any more than they
can make valid treaties or engage in lawful commerce with any foreign
power. The States attempting to secede placed themselves in a condition
where their vitality was impaired, but not extinguished; their functions
suspended, but not destroyed." Lincoln would have had no severe
punishments inflicted even on leaders, but Johnson wanted to destroy the
"slavocracy," root and branch. Confiscation of estates would, he
thought, be a proper measure. He said on one occasion: "Traitors should
take a back seat in the work of restoration.... My judgment is that he
[a rebel] should be subjected to a severe ordeal before he is restored
to citizenship. Treason should be made odious, and traitors must be
punished and impoverished. Their great plantations must be seized, and
divided into small farms and sold to honest, industrious men." The
violence of Johnson's views subsequently underwent considerable
modification but to the last he held to the plan of executive
restoration based upon state perdurance. Neither Lincoln nor Johnson
favored a change of Southern institutions other than the abolition of
slavery, though each recommended a qualified negro suffrage.
There were, however, other theories in the field, notably those of the
radical Republican leaders. According to the state-suicide theory of
Charles Sumner, "any vote of secession or other act by which any State
may undertake to put an end to the supremacy of the Constitution within
its territory is inoperative and void against the Constitution, and when
sustained by force it becomes a practical abdication by the State of all
rights under the Constitution, while the treason it involves still
further works an instant forfeiture of all those functions and powers
essential to the continued existence of the State as a body politic, so
that from that time forward the territory falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress as other territory, and the State, being
according to the language of the law felo de se, ceases to exist."
Congress should punish the "rebels" by abolishing slavery, by giving
civil and political rights to negroes, and by educating them with the
whites.
Not essentially different, but harsher, was Thaddeus Stevens's plans for
treating the South as a conquered foreign province. Let the victors
treat the seceded States "as conquered provinces and settle them with
new men and exterminate or drive out the present rebels as exiles."
Congress in dealing with these provinces was not bound even by the
Constitution, "a bit of worthless parchment," but might legislate as it
pleased in regard to slavery, the ballot, and confiscation. With regard
to the white population he said: "I have never desired bloody
punishments to any great extent. But there are punishments quite as
appalling, and longer remembered, than death. They are more advisable,
because they would reach a greater number. Strip a proud nobility of
their bloated estates; reduce them to a level with plain republicans;
send them forth to labor, and teach their children to enter the
workshops or handle a plow, and you will thus humble the proud
traitors." Stevens and Sumner agreed in reducing the Southern States to
a territorial status. Sumner would then take the principles of the
Declaration of Independence as a guide for Congress, while Stevens would
leave Congress absolute. Neither considered the Constitution as of any
validity in this crisis.
As a rule the former abolitionists were in 1865 advocates of votes and
lands for the negro, in whose capacity for self-rule they had complete
confidence. The view of Gerrit Smith may be regarded as typical of the
abolitionist position:
Let the first condition of peace with them be that no people in the
rebel States shall ever lose or gain civil or political rights by reason
of their race or origin. The next condition of peace be that our black
allies in the South--those saviours of our nation--shall share with
their poor white neighbors in the subdivisions of the large landed
estates of the South. Let the only other condition be that the rebel
masses shall not, for say, a dozen years, be allowed access to the
ballot-box, or be eligible to office; and that the like restrictions be
for life on their political and military leaders.... The mass of the
Southern blacks fall, in point of intelligence, but little, if any,
behind the mass of the Southern whites.... In reference to the
qualifications of the voter, men make too much account of the head and
too little of the heart. The ballot-box, like God, says: "Give me your
heart." The best-hearted men are the best qualified to vote; and, in
this light, the blacks, with their characteristic gentleness, patience,
and affectionateness, are peculiarly entitled to vote. We cannot wonder
at Swedenborg's belief that the celestial people will be found in the
interior of Africa; nor hardly can we wonder at the legend that the gods
came down every year to sup with their favorite Africans.
One of the most statesmanlike proposals was made by Governor John A.
Andrew of Massachusetts. If, forgetting their theories, the
conservatives could have united in support of a restoration conceived in
his spirit, the goal might have been speedily achieved. Andrew demanded
a reorganization, based upon acceptance of the results of the war, but
carried through with the aid of "those who are by their intelligence and
character the natural leaders of their people and who surely will lead
them by and by." These men cannot be kept out forever, said he, for
the capacity of leadership is a gift, not a device. They whose courage,
talents, and will entitle them to lead, will lead.... If we cannot gain
their support of the just measures needful for the work of safe
reorganization, reorganization will be delusive and full of danger. They
are the most hopeful subjects to deal with. They have the brain and the
experience and the education to enable them to understand ... the
present situation. They have the courage as well as the skill to lead
the people in the direction their judgments point.... Is it consistent
with reason and our knowledge of human nature, to believe the masses of
Southern men able to face about, to turn their backs on those they have
trusted and followed, and to adopt the lead of those who have no
magnetic hold on their hearts or minds? It would be idle to reorganize
by the colored vote. If the popular vote of the white race is not to be
had in favor of the guarantees justly required, then I am in favor of
holding on--just where we are now. I am not in favor of a surrender of
the present rights of the Union to a struggle between a white minority
aided by the freedmen on one hand, against the majority of the white
race on the other. I would not consent, having rescued those states by
arms from Secession and rebellion, to turn them over to anarchy and
chaos.
The Southerners, Unionists as well as Confederates, had their views as
well, but at Washington these carried little influence. The former
Confederates would naturally favor the plan which promised best for the
white South, and their views were most nearly met by those of President
Lincoln. Although he held that in principle a new Union had arisen out
of the war, as a matter of immediate political expediency he was
prepared to build on the assumption that the old Union still existed.
The Southern Unionists cared little for theories; they wanted the
Confederates punished, themselves promoted to high offices, and the
negro kept from the ballot box.
Even at the beginning of 1866, it was not too much to hope that the
majority of former Republicans would accept conservative methods,
provided the so-called "fruits of the war" were assured--that is,
equality of civil rights, the guarantee of the United States war debt,
the repudiation of the Confederate debt, the temporary disfranchisement
of the leading Confederates, and some arrangement which would keep the
South from profiting by representation based on the non-voting negro
population. But amid many conflicting policies, none attained to
continuous and compelling authority.
The plan first put to trial was that of President Lincoln. It was a
definite plan designed to meet actual conditions and, had he lived, he
might have been able to carry it through successfully. Not a theorist,
but an opportunist of the highest type, sobered by years of
responsibility in war time, and fully understanding the precarious
situation in 1865, Lincoln was most anxious to secure an early
restoration of solidarity with as little friction as possible. Better
than most Union leaders he appreciated conditions in the South, the
problem of the races, the weakness of the Southern Unionists, and the
advantage of calling in the old Southern leaders. He was generous and
considerate; he wanted no executions or imprisonments; he wished the
leaders to escape; and he was anxious that the mass of Southerners be
welcomed back without loss of rights. "There is," he declared, "too
little respect for their rights," an unwillingness, in short, to treat
them as fellow citizens.
This executive policy had been applied from the beginning of the war as
pportunity offered. The President used the army to hold the Border
States in the Union, to aid in "reorganizing" Unionist Virginia and in
establishing West Virginia. The army, used to preserve the Union might
be used also to restore disturbed parts of it to normal condition.
Assuming that the "States" still existed, "loyal" state governments were
the first necessity. By his proclamation of December 8, 1863, Lincoln
suggested a method of beginning the reconstruction: he would pardon any
Confederate, except specified classes of leaders, who took an oath of
loyalty for the future; if as many as ten per cent of the voting
population of 1860, thus made loyal, should establish a state government
the Executive would recognize it. The matter of slavery must, indeed, be
left to the laws and proclamations as interpreted by the courts, but
other institutions should continue as in 1861.
This plan was inaugurated in four States which had been in part
controlled by the Federal army from nearly the beginning of the war:
Tennessee (1862), Louisiana (1862), Arkansas (1862), and Virginia after
the formation of West Virginia (1863). For each State, Lincoln appointed
a military governor: for Tennessee, Andrew Johnson; for Arkansas, John
S. Phelps; for Louisiana, General Shepley. In Virginia he recognized the
"reorganized" government, which had been transferred to Alexandria when
the new State of West Virginia was formed. The military governors
undertook the slow and difficult work of reorganization, however, with
but slight success owing to the small numbers of Unionists and of
Confederates who would take the oath. But by 1864 "ten per cent" state
governments were established in Arkansas and Louisiana, and progress was
being made in Tennessee.
Congress was impatient of Lincoln's claim to executive precedence in the
matter of reconstruction, and in 1864 both Houses passed the Wade-Davis
Bill, a plan which asserted the right of Congress to control
reconstruction and foreshadowed a radical settlement of the question.
Lincoln disposed of the bill by a pocket veto and, in a proclamation
dated July 8, 1864, stated that he was unprepared "to be inflexibly
committed to any single plan of restoration," or to discourage loyal
citizens by setting aside the governments already established in
Louisiana and Arkansas, or to recognize the authority of Congress to
abolish slavery. He was ready, however, to coöperate with the people of
any State who wished to accept the plan prepared by Congress and he
hoped that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery would be
adopted.
Lincoln early came to the conclusion that slavery must be destroyed, and
he had urgently advocated deportation of the freedmen, for he believed
that the two races could not live in harmony after emancipation. The
nearest he came to recommending the vote for the negro was in a
communication to Governor Hahn of Louisiana in March, 1864: "I barely
suggest, for your private consideration, whether some of the colored
people may not be let in, as for instance, the very intelligent, and
especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks. They would
probably help, in some trying time to come, to keep the jewel of liberty
within the family of freedom. But this is only a suggestion, not to the
public, but to you alone."
Throughout the war President Lincoln assumed that the state
organizations in the South were illegal because disloyal and that new
governments must be established. But just at the close of the war,
probably carried away by feeling, he all but recognized the Virginia
Confederate Government as competent to bring the State back into the
Union. While in Richmond on April 5, 1865, he gave to Judge Campbell a
statement of terms: the national authority to be restored; no recession
on slavery by the Executive; hostile forces to disband. The next day he
notified General Weitzel, in command at Richmond, that he might permit
the Virginia Legislature to meet and withdraw military and other support
from the Confederacy. But these measures met strong opposition in
Washington, especially from Secretary Stanton and Senator Wade and other
congressional leaders, and on the 11th of April Lincoln withdrew his
permission for the Legislature to meet. "I cannot go forward," he said,
"with everybody opposed to me." It was on the same day that he made his
last public speech, and Sumner, who was strongly opposed to his policy,
remarked that "the President's speech and other things augur confusion
and uncertainty in the future, with hot contumacy." At a cabinet meeting
on the 14th of April, Lincoln made his last statement on the subject. It
was fortunate, he said, that Congress had adjourned, for "we shall
reanimate the States" before Congress meets; there should be no killing,
no persecutions; there was too much disposition to treat the Southern
people "not as fellow citizens."
The possibility of a conciliatory restoration ended when Lincoln was
assassinated. Moderate, firm, tactful, of great personal influence, not
a doctrinaire, and not a Southerner like Johnson, Lincoln might have
"prosecuted peace" successfully. His policy was very unlike that
proposed by the radical leaders. They would base the new governments
upon the loyalty of the past plus the aid of enfranchised slaves; he
would establish the new régime upon the loyalty of the future. Like
Governor Andrew he thought that restoration must be effected by the
willing efforts of the South. He would aid and guide but not force the
people. If the latter did not wish restoration, they might remain under
military rule. There should be no forced negro suffrage, no sweeping
disfranchisement of whites, no "carpetbaggism."
The work of President Johnson demands for its proper understanding some
consideration of the condition of the political parties at the close of
the war, for politics had much to do with reconstruction. The Democratic
party, divided and defeated in the election of 1860, lost its Southern
members in 1861 by the secession and remained a minority party during
the remainder of the war. It retained its organization, however, and in
1864 polled a large vote. Discredited by its policy of opposition to
Lincoln's Administration, its ablest leaders joined the Republicans in
support of the war. Until 1869 the party was poorly represented in
Congress although, as soon as hostilities ended, the War Democrats
showed a tendency to return to the old party. As to reconstruction, the
party stood on the Crittenden-Johnson resolutions of 1861, though most
Democrats were now willing to have slavery abolished.
The Republican party--frankly sectional and going into power on the
single issue of opposition to the extension of slavery--was forced by
the secession movement to take up the task of preserving the Union by
war. Consequently, the party developed new principles, welcomed the aid
of the War Democrats, and found it advisable to drop its name and with
its allies to form the Union or National Union party. It was this
National Union party which in 1864 nominated Abraham Lincoln, a
Republican, and Andrew Johnson, a Democrat, on the same ticket.
Lincoln's second Cabinet was composed of both Republicans and War
Democrats. When the war ended, the conservative leaders were anxious to
hold the Union party together in order to be in a better position to
settle the problems of reconstruction, but the movement of the War
Democrats back to their old party tended to leave in the Union party
only its Republican members, with the radical leaders dominating.
In the South the pressure of war so united the people that party
divisions disappeared for a time, but the causes of division continued
to exist and two parties, at least, would have developed had the
pressure been removed. Though all factions supported the war after it
began, the former Whigs and Douglas Democrats, when it was over, liked
to remember that they had been "Union" men in 1860 and expected to
organize in opposition to the extreme Democrats, who were now charged
with being responsible for the misfortunes of the South. They were in a
position to affiliate with the National Union party of the North if
proper inducements were offered, while the regular Democrats were ready
to rejoin their old party. But the embittered feelings resulting from
the murder of Lincoln and the rapid development of the struggle between
President Johnson and Congress caused the radicals "to lump the old
Union Democrats and Whigs together with the secessionists--and many were
driven where they did not want to go, into temporary affiliation with
the Democratic party." Thousands went very reluctantly; the old Whigs,
indeed, were not firmly committed to the Democrats until radical
reconstruction had actually begun. Still other "loyalists" in the South
were prepared to join the Northern radicals in advocating the
disfranchisement of Confederates and in opposing the granting of
suffrage to the negroes.
The man upon whom fell the task of leading these opposing factions,
radical and conservative, along a definite line of action looking to
reunion had few qualifications for the task. Johnson was ill-educated,
narrow, and vindictive and was positive that those who did not agree
with him were dishonest. Himself a Southerner, picked up by the National
Union Convention of 1864, as Thaddeus Stevens said, from "one of those
damned rebel provinces," he loved the Union, worshiped the Constitution,
and held to the strict construction views of the State Rights Democrats.
Rising from humble beginnings, he was animated by the most intense
dislike of the "slavocracy," as he called the political aristocracy of
the South. Like many other American leaders he was proud of his humble
origin, but unlike many others he never sloughed off his backwoods
crudeness. He continually boasted of himself and vilified the
aristocrats, who in return treated him badly. His dislike of them was so
marked that Isham G. Harris, a rival politician, remarked that "if
Johnson were a snake, he would lie in the grass to bite the heels of
rich men's children." His primitive notions of punishment were evident
in 1865 when he advocated imprisonment, execution, and confiscation; but
like other reckless talkers he often said more than he meant.
When Johnson succeeded to the presidency, the feeling was nearly
universal among the radicals, according to Julian, that he would prove a
godsend to the country, for "aside from Mr. Lincoln's known policy of
tenderness to the rebels, which now so jarred upon the feelings of the
hour, his well known views on the subject of reconstruction were as
distasteful as possible to radical Republicans." Senator Wade declared
to the President: "Johnson, we have faith in you. By the gods, there
will be no trouble now in running the Government!" To which Johnson
replied: "Treason is a crime and crime must be punished. Treason must be
made infamous and traitors must be impoverished." These words are an
index to the speeches of Johnson during 1863-65. Even his radical
friends feared that he would be too vindictive. For a few weeks he was
much inclined to the radical plans, and some of the leaders certainly
understood that he was in favor of negro suffrage, the supreme test of
radicalism. But when the excitement caused by the assassination of
Lincoln and the break-up of the Confederacy had moderated somewhat,
Johnson saw before him a task so great that his desire for violent
measures was chilled. He must disband the great armies and bring all war
work to an end; he must restore intercourse with the South, which had
been blockaded for years; he must for a time police the country, look
after the negroes, and set up a temporary civil government; and finally
he must work out a restoration of the Union. Sobered by responsibility
and by the influence of moderate advisers, he rather quickly adopted
Lincoln's policy.
Johnson at first set his face against the movements toward
reconstruction by the state governments already organized and by those
people who wished to organize new governments on Lincoln's ten per cent
plan. As soon as possible the War Department notified the Union
commanders to stop all attempts at reconstruction and to pursue and
arrest all Confederate governors and other prominent civil leaders. The
President was even anxious to arrest the military leaders who had been
paroled but was checked in this desire by General Grant's firm protest.
His cabinet advisers supported Johnson in refusing to recognize the
Southern state governments; but three of them--Seward, Welles, and
McCulloch--were influential in moderating his zeal for inflicting
punishments. Nevertheless he soon had in prison the most prominent of
the Confederate civilians and several general officers. The soldiers,
however, were sent home, trade with the South was permitted, and the
Freedmen's Bureau was rapidly extended.
Previous to this Johnson had brought himself to recognize, early in May,
the Lincoln "ten per cent" governments of Louisiana, Tennessee, and
Arkansas, and the reconstructed Alexandria government of Virginia. Thus
only seven States were left without legal governments, and to bring
those States back into the Union, Johnson inaugurated on May 29, 1865, a
plan which was like that of Lincoln but not quite so liberal. In his
Amnesty Proclamation, Johnson made a longer list of exceptions aimed
especially at the once wealthy slave owners. On the same day he
proclaimed the restoration of North Carolina. A provisional governor, W.
W. Holden, was appointed and directed to reorganize the civil government
and to call a constitutional convention elected by those who had taken
the amnesty oath. This convention was to make necessary amendments to
the constitution and to "restore said State to its constitutional
relations to the Federal Government." It is to be noted that Johnson
fixed the qualifications of delegates and of those who elected them,
but, this stage once passed, the convention or the legislature would
"prescribe the qualifications of electors ... a power the people of the
several States composing the Federal Union have rightfully exercised
from the origin of the government to the present time." The President
also directed the various cabinet officers to extend the work of their
departments over the Confederate States and ordered the army officers to
assist the civil authorities. During the next six weeks similar measures
were undertaken for the remaining six States of the Confederacy.
To set up the new order army officers were first sent into every county
to administer the amnesty oath and thus to secure a "loyal" electorate.
In each State the provisional governor organized out of the remains of
the Confederate local régime a new civil government. Confederate local
officials who could and would take the amnesty oath were directed to
resume office until relieved; the laws of 1861, except those relating to
slavery, were declared to be in force; the courts were directed to use
special efforts to crush lawlessness; and the old jury lists were
destroyed and new ones were drawn up containing only the names of those
who had taken the amnesty oath. Since there was no money in any state
treasury, small sums were now raised by license taxes. A full staff of
department heads was appointed, and by July, 1865, the provisional
governments were in fair working order.
To the constitutional conventions, which met in the fall, it was made
clear, through the governors, that the President would insist upon three
conditions: the formal abolition of slavery, the repudiation of the
ordinance of secession, and the repudiation of the Confederate war debt.
To Governor Holden he telegraphed: "Every dollar of the debt created to
aid the rebellion against the United States should be repudiated finally
and forever. The great mass of the people should not be taxed to pay a
debt to aid in carrying on a rebellion which they in fact, if left to
themselves, were opposed to. Let those who had given their means for the
obligations of the state look to that power they tried to establish in
violation of law, constitution, and will of the people. They must meet
their fate." With little opposition these conditions were fulfilled,
though there was a strong feeling against the repudiation of the debt,
much discussion as to whether the ordinance of secession should be
"repealed" or declared "now and always null and void," and some
quibbling as to whether slavery was being destroyed by state action or
had already been destroyed by war.
In the old state constitutions, very slight changes were made. Of these
the chief were concerned with the abolition of slavery and the
arrangement of representation and direct taxation on the basis of white
population. Little effort was made to settle any of the negro problems,
and in all States the conventions left it to the legislatures to make
laws for the freedmen. There was no discussion of negro suffrage in the
conventions, but President Johnson sent what was for him a remarkable
communication to Governor Sharkey of Mississippi:
If you could extend the elective franchise to all persons of color who
can read the Constitution of the United States in English and write
their names, and to all persons of color who own real estate valued at
not less than two hundred and fifty dollars and pay taxes thereon, you
would completely disarm the adversary and set an example the other
States will follow. This you can do with perfect safety, and you would
thus place Southern States in reference to free persons of color upon
the same basis with the free States.... And as a consequence the
radicals, who are wild upon negro franchise, will be completely foiled
in their attempts to keep the Southern States from renewing their
relations to the Union by not accepting their senators and
representatives.
In deciding upon a basis of representation it was clear that the
majority of delegates desired to lessen the influence of the Black Belt
and place the control of the government with the "up country." In the
Alabama convention Robert M. Patton, then a delegate and later governor,
frankly avowed this object, and in South Carolina Governor Perry urged
the convention to give no consideration to negro suffrage, "because this
is a white man's government," and if the negroes should vote they would
be controlled by a few whites. A kindly disposition toward the negroes
was general except on the part of extreme Unionists, who opposed any
favors to the race. "This is a white man's country" was a doctrine to
which all the conventions subscribed.
The conventions held brief sessions, completed their work, and
adjourned, after directing that elections be held for state and local
officers and for members of Congress. Before December the appointed
local officials had been succeeded by elected officers; members of
Congress were on their way to Washington; the state legislatures were
assembling or already in session; and the elected governors were ready
to take office. It was understood that as soon as enough state
legislatures ratified the Thirteenth Amendment to make it a part of the
Constitution, the President would permit the transfer of authority to
the new governors. The Legislature of Mississippi alone was recalcitrant
about the amendment, and before January, 1866, the elected officials
were everywhere installed except in Texas, where the work was not
completed until March. When Congress met in December, 1865, the
President reported that all former Confederate States except Texas were
ready to be readmitted. Congress, however, refused to admit their
senators and representatives, and thus began the struggle which ended
over a year later with the victory of the radicals and the undoing of
the work of the two Presidents.
The plan of the Presidents was at best only imperfectly realized. It was
found impossible to reorganize the Federal Administration in the South
with men who could subscribe to the "ironclad oath," for nearly all who
were competent to hold office had favored or aided the Confederacy. It
was two years before more than a third of the post offices could be
opened. The other Federal departments were in similar difficulties, and
at last women and "carpetbaggers" were appointed. The Freedmen's Bureau,
which had been established coincidently with the provisional
governments, assumed jurisdiction over the negroes, while the army
authorities very early took the position that any man who claimed to be
a Unionist should not be tried in the local courts but must be given a
better chance in a provost court. Thus a third or more of the population
was withdrawn from the control of the state government. In several
States the head of the Bureau made arrangements for local magistrates
and officials to act as Bureau officials, and in such cases the two
authorities acted in coöperation. The army of occupation, too, exerted
an authority which not infrequently interfered with the workings of the
new state government. Nearly everywhere there was a lack of certainty
and efficiency due to the concurrent and sometimes conflicting
jurisdictions of state government, army commanders, Bureau authorities,
and even the President acting upon or through any of the others.
The standing of the Southern state organizations was in doubt after the
refusal of Congress to recognize them. Nevertheless, in spite of this
uncertainty they continued to function as States during the year of
controversy which followed; the courts were opened and steadily grew in
influence; here and there militia and patrols were reorganized;
officials who refused to "accept the situation" were dismissed;
elections were held; the legislatures revised the laws to fit new
conditions and enacted new laws for the emancipated blacks. To all this
progress in reorganization the action of Congress was a severe blow,
since it gave notice that none of the problems of reconstruction were
yet solved. An increasing spirit of irritation and independence was
observed throughout the States in question, and at the elections the
former Confederates gained more and more offices. The year was marked in
the South by the tendency toward the formation of parties, by the
development of the "Southern outrages" issue, by an attempt to frustrate
radical action, and finally by a line-up of the great mass of the whites
in opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment and other radical plans of
Congress.
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, appointed when Congress refused
to accept the work of President Johnson, proceeded during several months
to take testimony and to consider measures. The testimony, which was
taken chiefly to support opinions already formed, appeared to prove that
the negroes and the Unionists were so badly treated that the Freedmen's
Bureau and the army must be kept in the South to protect them; that free
negro labor was a success but that the whites were hostile to it; that
the whites were disloyal and would, if given control of the Southern
governments and admitted to Congress, constitute a danger to the nation
and especially to the party in power.
To convince the voters of the North of the necessity of dealing
drastically with the South a campaign of misrepresentation was begun in
the summer of 1865, which became more and more systematic and
unscrupulous as the political struggle at Washington grew fiercer.
Newspapers regularly ran columns headed "Southern Outrages" and every
conceivable mistreatment of blacks by whites was represented as taking
place on a large scale. As General Richard Taylor said, it would seem
that about 1866 every white man, woman, and child in the South began
killing and maltreating negroes. In truth, there was less and less
ground for objection to the treatment of the blacks as time went on and
as the several agencies of government secured firmer control over the
lawless elements. But fortunately for the radicals their contention
seemed to be established by riots on a large scale in Memphis and New
Orleans where negroes were killed and injured in much greater number
than whites.
The rapid development of the radical plans of Congress checked the
tendency toward political division in the South. Only a small party of
rabid Unionists would now affiliate with the radicals, while all the
others reluctantly held together, endorsed Johnson's policy, and
attempted to affiliate with the disintegrating National Union party. But
the defeat of the President's policies in the elections of 1866, the
increasing radicalism of Congress as shown by the Civil Rights Act, the
expansion of the Freedmen's Bureau, the report of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, and the proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment led
farsighted Southerners to see that the President was likely to lose in
his fight with Congress.
Now began, in the latter half of 1866, with some coöperation in the
North and probably with the approval of the President, a movement in the
South to forestall the radicals by means of a settlement which, although
less severe than the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, might yet be
acceptable to Congress. One feature of the settlement was to be some
form of negro suffrage, either by local action or by constitutional
amendment. Those behind this scheme were mainly of the former governing
class. Negro suffrage, they thought, would take the wind out of the
radical sails, the Southern whites would soon be able to control the
blacks, representation in Congress would be increased, and the Black
Belt would perhaps regain its former political hegemony. It is hardly
necessary to say that the majority of the whites were solidly opposed to
such a measure. But it was hoped to carry it under pressure through the
Legislature or to bring it about indirectly through rulings of the
Freedmen's Bureau.
Coincident with this scheme of partial negro suffrage an attempt was
made by the conservative leaders in Washington, working with the
Southerners, to propose a revised Fourteenth Amendment which would give
the vote to competent negroes and not disfranchise the whites. A
conference of Southern governors met in Washington early in 1867 and
drafted such an amendment. But it was too late.
Meanwhile the Fourteenth Amendment submitted by Congress had been
brought before the Southern legislatures and during the winter of
1866-67 it was rejected by all of them. There was strong opposition to
it because it disfranchised the leading whites, but perhaps the
principal reason for its rejection was that the Southern people were not
sure that still more severe conditions might not be imposed later.
While the President was "restoring" the States which had seceded and
struggling with Congress, the Border States of the South, including
Tennessee (which was admitted in 1866 by reason of its radical state
government), were also in the throes of reconstruction. Though there was
less military interference in these than in the other States, many of
the problems were similar. All had the Freedmen's Bureau, the negro
race, the Unionists, and the Confederates; in every State, except
Kentucky, Confederates were persecuted, the minority was in control, and
"ring" rule was the order of the day; but in each State there were signs
of the political revolution which a few years later was to put the
radicals out of power.
The executive plan for the restoration of the Union, begun by Lincoln
and adopted by Johnson, was, as we have seen, at first applied in all
the States which had seceded. A military governor was appointed in each
State by the President by virtue of his authority as commander in chief.
This official, aided by a civilian staff of his own choice and supported
by the United States army and other Federal agencies, reorganized the
state administration and after a few months turned the state and local
governments over to regularly elected officials. Restoration should now
have been completed, but Congress refused to admit the senators and
representatives of these States, and entered upon a fifteen months'
struggle with the President over details of the methods of the
reconstruction. Meanwhile the Southern States, though unrepresented in
Congress, continued their activities, with some interference from
Federal authorities, until Congress in 1867 declared their governments
non-existent.
The work begun by Lincoln and Johnson deserved better success. The
original plan restored to political rights only a small number of
Unionists, the lukewarm Confederates, and the unimportant. But in spite
of the threatening speeches of Johnson he used his power of pardon until
none except the most prominent leaders were excluded. The personnel of
the Johnson governments was fair. The officials were, in the main,
former Douglas Democrats and Whigs, respectable and conservative, but
not admired or loved by the people. The conventions and the legislatures
were orderly and dignified and manifested a desire to accept the
situation.
There were no political parties at first, but material for several
existed. If things had been allowed to take their course there would
have arisen a normal cleavage between former Whigs and Democrats,
between the up-country and the low country, between the slaveholders and
the nonslaveholders. The average white man in these governments was
willing to be fair to the negro but was not greatly concerned about his
future. In the view of most white people it was the white man who was
emancipated. The white districts had no desire to let the power return
to the Black Belt by giving the negro the ballot, for the vote of the
negroes, they believed, would be controlled by their former masters.
Johnson's adoption of Lincoln's plan gave notice to all that the
radicals had failed to control him. He and they had little in common;
they wished to uproot a civilization, while he wished to punish
individuals; they were not troubled by constitutional scruples, while he
was the strictest of State Rights Democrats; they thought principally of
the negro and his potentialities, while Johnson was thinking of the
emancipated white man. It is possible that Lincoln might have succeeded,
but for Johnson the task proved too great.