THE FRENCH RETREAT.
Now we must learn what happened on the east side of the British line of
retreat. Look carefully at the map on page 130. On 22nd August von
Buelow crossed the Sambre, and defeated the French army No. 2. About the
same time the Saxon army under von Hausen crossed the Meuse above Namur,
and fell upon its right flank. Taken in front and in flank it was forced
to retreat to the south-west. Meanwhile von Hausen had also been engaged
with the left wing of No. 3. While he was driving in the left of this
army some of his other divisions had crossed the Meuse at Dinant, and
were attacking No. 3 in front. Thus No. 3 was forced to retreat. Von
Hausen now fought his way along the western bank of the Meuse, and at
the same time No. 4 Army was attacked in front by the Duke of
Würtemberg's forces and by those of the Crown Prince. No. 4 was also
forced to retreat; but by the 28th of August the three defeated French
armies had regained touch on a line roughly extending from near
Rethel[67] to the Meuse north of Verdun.
[Illustration: Map illustrating the Retreat of the French Armies from
the Sambre and the Meuse
(Aug. 22-28).]
Hard fighting followed, and on the 29th the French were driven out of
Rethel, and were forced to retreat once more. The town was set on fire
by bursting shells, and more than half of it was burned. A Saxon
officer, whose diary afterwards fell into the hands of the French,
blamed them for the destruction of the place. He said that the French
burned the town in order to prevent the Germans from pushing their
ammunition wagons across the river Aisne, on both sides of which Rethel
is built. We need not pause to apportion the blame. The inhabitants
fled, and then the Germans looted and destroyed to their hearts'
content. "The place is a disgrace to our army," wrote the Saxon
officer.
The Germans now crossed the Aisne, and the French fell back rapidly.
* * * * *
Now let us leave this main line of retreat for a few moments and follow
the fortunes of a French army which had been pushed into Lorraine as far
back as 14th August, in order to hold the Bavarians, who were operating
south of Metz. Up to the 20th of August this French army did very well,
but on that day it was badly beaten by the Bavarians at Château
Salins,[68] a place about twenty-five miles south-east of Metz. In this
battle the Bavarians claimed to have captured thousands of prisoners and
150 guns. No doubt they won an important victory.
The French now fell back to the Vosges mountains, not far from Nancy,
and on the 23rd and 24th the Germans, largely reinforced, advanced into
the region of Luneville. This forced the French to retire south. On the
25th, however, they made two successful counter-attacks, one from the
south to the north and the other from the west to the east, and forced
the enemy to fall back. For fifteen days they held up the Bavarians, and
by the end of that time the turn of the tide had come, and the French
were advancing all along the line.
* * * * *
All these operations involved much fierce fighting, and the Germans were
not always victors. Some of the French counter-attacks during the
retreat were very successful, and the Germans were checked again and
again. For example, on 24th August, near Spincourt, north-east of
Verdun, the French had a real success. They drove back the Germans,
pursued them with great effect, and captured a number of guns.
Nevertheless, by the evening of the 27th, all the strongholds in North
France, except Maubeuge, were in the hands of the enemy. Montmédy and
Mezières surrendered, almost without firing a shot; but Longwy,[69]
though it was an out-of-date fortress, and had but a small garrison,
made a heroic resistance, and held out for twenty-four days.
A tragic story connected with the capture of Longwy appeared in one of
the leading French newspapers at the end of March 1915. It may not be
true, but I think you would like to hear it.
The German Emperor, surrounded by his Staff, was dining at an hotel in
Luxembourg, and was awaiting the arrival of the general who had just
captured Longwy (27th August). As soon as he arrived the Emperor,
frantic with rage, addressed him as follows: "How is it that to capture
this fortress, defended only by a few battalions, you have uselessly
sacrificed thousands of our best soldiers?"
The general went livid, and knowing that a superior officer visited by
the wrath of the Emperor in the presence of his equals is condemned for
ever, drew himself up and made this daring reply: "Your Majesty, if my
soldiers advanced in close formation against Longwy, and were thus
uselessly massacred, it was by the command of your scamp of a son, who,
at a safe distance of twelve and a half miles behind the front, kept on
sending me telephone orders, 'To the assault,' always to the assault."
Having thus spoken, the general left the imperial presence amidst the
dumb amazement of the assembly, and on the pavement outside the hotel
shot himself. A week later a postcard was on sale throughout Germany,
bearing the portrait of the Crown Prince, with the words, "The victor of
Longwy."
[Illustration: The German Crown Prince.]
When Longwy fell the tricolour alone flew from the fortress of Maubeuge,
which was better able to stand a bombardment than almost any other
stronghold of France. Its outlying defences had been strengthened with
concrete and armour plates, and heavy guns had been mounted in steel
turrets. The Germans were very anxious to capture it, because it gave
them command of a good railway line from Aix right through the Meuse
valley.
The siege began soon after the British retreat from Mons. The French
commandant had thrown up lines of earthworks between the forts, and had
garrisoned them with soldiers. Just before the German guns began to
thunder at the forts, detachments of French from the No. 2 Army that had
been beaten at the Sambre came to reinforce the defenders, and further
assistance was rendered by a British field battery that had been cut off
when our line retired. The commandant had about 30,000 men to defend the
place, and right nobly was it held. Not until the 7th of September did
it yield. The outlying forts had then been battered down by 11-inch
guns, throwing a 760-pound shell.
[Illustration: A View in Krupp's Works, Essen, where the Big Guns are
made.
_Photo, L.N.A._]
A story went the round of the papers that, long before the war, a
Belgian had bought land near Maubeuge, and on it had begun to build a
factory for making railway engines. It was said that the real owner of
the land was Krupp, the great manufacturer of guns and armaments for the
German Government; and that while the factory was being built, concrete
gun platforms had been constructed, on which the Germans mounted their
siege guns as soon as they arrived. The story, however, had no
foundation. The guns which the Germans used in the siege of Maubeuge
were smaller than those which battered down Namur. They did not need
concrete foundations, but could be fired from an ordinary road or from a
platform of sleepers. The story, however, was widely believed, and
alleged gun platforms were actually discovered in innocent British
factories!
* * * * *
The French official account of the retreat tells us that, when the
defence of the Meuse collapsed, General Joffre decided on a general
retreat, but determined to make a series of counter-attacks whenever
opportunity offered, so that the enemy might be kept busy. He had to
choose a position where the retreat was to end, and this position had to
be so chosen that the different armies could reach it at the same time
and be ready without delay to advance. If, however, he found that he
could begin his forward movement before this point was reached, he was
prepared to alter his plans.
After the war of 1870-71, when the French began building fortresses to
guard their eastern frontier, they arranged that if the enemy should
capture Montmédy, Mezières, Hirson, Maubeuge, and Lille, as they had now
done, a stand was to be made for the defence of Paris along an
undulating plateau of chalk which rises gently from the valley of the
Marne, but falls steeply on the north-east to the plains of Northern
France. These uplands, as seen from the north, resemble the Surrey and
Sussex Downs, and are known as the Heights of Champagne. On them grow
the grapes which make the sparkling wine known as champagne. Several
streams, the largest of which is the Aisne,[70] cut their way through
the plateau; stumps of trees and belts of woodland are common, and on
the western side towards the Oise there are wide stretches of forest.
[Illustration: The French Army in the Champagne Country.
_Photo, Farringdon Photo Co._]
The little map on the opposite page will help you to understand the
defensive character of the Heights of Champagne. Notice the two towns
which were fortified to defend the scarp of the heights against attack
from the north and north-east--La Fère,[71] on the Oise, an entrenched
camp, with a circle of forts on both sides of the river; and Laon,[72]
an old city built on a long spur which encloses a remarkable V-shaped
valley, partly wooded and partly covered with gardens and vineyards. The
carriage road to the upper town of Laon ascends in curves from near the
station, but foot passengers may climb to it by means of a stairway of
260 steps and a series of inclined planes. On the highest part of the
hill stands the ancient citadel, and towering above its ramparts are the
bold and graceful towers of a beautiful cathedral. The forts erected
round this city were so placed that their fire crossed that of the forts
at La Fère. Lines of defence extended along the steep north-eastern face
of the plateau, and also along its eastern side to the valley of the
Aisne. Beyond the Aisne valley the eastern system of defences was
continued to the valley of the Marne. About midway between the two
rivers, but to the east of the plateau, is the fortress of Rheims,[73]
one of the most interesting cities of France, and the chief centre of
the trade in champagne. Rheims stands on the plain, and behind it rise
the vine-clad uplands. In front of it is the bold wooded hill known as
the Mountain of Rheims. This hill, at the time of which we are speaking,
was strongly fortified.
[Illustration: Sketch of Defensive Line of the Heights of Champagne.]
Such was the position chosen in 1874 as the great line of defence
against an army advancing on Paris. While the French retreat was in
progress, many persons in this country thought that a great stand would
be sure to be made in this region; but, to their surprise, the French
continued their southward march.
Now, why was not a stand made at the Heights of Champagne? The fact was,
that the German armies were advancing so rapidly that the French had no
time to pause and reorganize their line so that it could meet the enemy
with any chance of success. The French had reached the plateau by the
29th August; but they dared not halt their columns, because the enemy
was hard at their heels.
By this time von Kluck had passed the confluence of the Oise and the
Aisne, and a cavalry corps on his left had actually reached the Marne.
This movement threatened the left flank of the French, and they were
bound to continue their retreat to prevent themselves from being turned
in this direction. At the same time von Buelow was at Laon, on the edge
of the plateau, and farther east von Hausen had crossed the Aisne, while
other German armies were in contact with the French between Vouziers[74]
and Verdun.
Had the French accepted battle at the Heights of Champagne they would
have done so very recklessly. If they had suffered defeat, they would
have been cut off from the British on their left, and from a new army
which was being formed near Paris. General Joffre therefore decided to
continue his retreat until he could engage the enemy in a better
position. He did so, and on 5th September lay along the Seine and the
Aube, with the British gathered between the Seine and the Marne, and on
their flank the newly-created army. All the units of the Allied forces
were now linked up, and the moment had arrived when General Joffre could
order an attack. On the evening of the 5th he addressed the following
message to the commanders of his armies: "The hour has come to advance
at all costs, and to die where you stand rather than give way."
[Footnote 67: _Reh-tel´_, 23 miles south-west of Mezières.]
[Footnote 68: _Shah-tō´ Sa-lăn´_ (_n_ nasal).]
[Footnote 69: _Lon-vee´_ (_n_ nasal), 40 miles north-north-west of
Metz.]
[Footnote 70: _Ain_, joins the Oise (_Waz_) near Compiègne
(_Kom-pe-ain´_).]
[Footnote 71: _La Fair_.]
[Footnote 72: _Lon_ (_n_ nasal).]
[Footnote 73: _Reemz._]
[Footnote 74: _Voo-ze-ay´._]