THE PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

This war will kill the belief in progress, and it was high time.

Progress is often a fact: granted a definite end to be achieved, we may

sometimes observe a continuous approach towards achieving it, as for

instance towards cutting off a leg neatly when it has been smashed;

and such progress is to be desired in all human arts. But _belief_

in progress, like belief in fate or in the number three, is a sheer

superstition, a mad notion that because some idea--here the idea of

continuous change for the better--has been realized somewhere, that

idea was a power which realized itself there fatally, and which must

be secretly realizing itself everywhere else, even where the facts

contradict it. Nor is belief in progress identical with belief in

Providence, or even compatible with it. Providence would not have begun

wrong in order to correct itself; and in works which are essentially

progressive, like a story, the beginning is not worse than the end, if

the artist is competent.

What true progress is, and how it is usually qualified by all sorts

of backsliding and by incompatible movements in contrary directions,

is well illustrated by the history of philosophy. There has been

progress in it; if we start with the first birth of intelligence and

assume that the end pursued is to understand the world, the progress

has been immense. We do not understand the world yet; but we have

formed many hypotheses about it corroborated by experience, we are

in possession of many arts which involve true knowledge, and we have

collated and criticized--especially during the last century--a great

number of speculations which, though unverified or unverifiable,

reveal the problems and the possibilities in the case; so that I think

a philosopher in our day has no excuse for being so utterly deceived

in various important matters as the best philosophers formerly were

through no fault of theirs, because they were misled by a local

tradition, and inevitably cut off from the traditions of other ages and

races. Nevertheless the progress of philosophy has not been of such a

sort that the latest philosophers are the best: it is quite the other

way. Philosophy in this respect is like poetry. There is progress in

that new poets arise with new gifts, and the fund of transmitted poetry

is enriched; but Homer, the first poet amongst the Greeks, was also

the best, and so Dante in Italy, and Shakespeare in England. When a

civilization and a language take shape they have a wonderful vitality,

and their first-fruits are some love-child, some incomparable creature

in whom the whole genius of the young race bursts forth uncontaminated

and untrammelled. What follows is more valuable in this respect or

in that; it renders fitly the partial feelings and varying fashions

of a long decadence; but nothing, so long as that language and that

tradition last, can ever equal their first exuberance. Philosophy

is not so tightly bound as poetry is to language and to local

inspiration, but it has largely shared the same vicissitudes; and in

each school of philosophy only the inventors and founders are of any

consequence; the rest are hacks. Moreover, if we take each school as

a whole, and compare it with the others, I think we may repeat the

same observation: the first are the best. Those following have made

very real improvements; they have discovered truths and methods before

unknown; but instead of adding these (as they might have done) to the

essential wisdom of their predecessors, they have proceeded like poets,

each a new-born child in a magic world, abandoned to his fancy and his

personal experience. Bent on some specific reform or wrapped up in some

favourite notion, they have denied the obvious because other people had

pointed it out; and the later we come down in the history of philosophy

the less important philosophy becomes, and the less true in fundamental

matters.

Suppose I arrange the works of the essential philosophers--leaving

out secondary and transitional systems--in a bookcase of four shelves;

on the top shelf (out of reach, since I can't read the language) I

will place the Indians; on the next the Greek naturalists; and to

remedy the unfortunate paucity of their remains, I will add here those

free inquirers of the renaissance, leading to Spinoza, who after two

thousand years picked up the thread of scientific speculation; and

besides, all modern science: so that this shelf will run over into

a whole library of what is not ordinarily called philosophy. On the

third shelf I will put Platonism, including Aristotle, the Fathers,

the Scholastics, and all honestly Christian theology; and on the last,

modern or subjective philosophy in its entirety. I will leave lying on

the table, as of doubtful destination, the works of my contemporaries.

There is much life in some of them. I like their water-colour sketches

of self-consciousness, their rebellious egotisms, their fervid reforms

of phraseology, their peep-holes through which some very small part of

things may be seen very clearly: they have lively wits, but they seem

to me like children playing blind-man's-buff; they are keenly excited

at not knowing where they are. They are really here, in the common

natural world, where there is nothing in particular to threaten or to

allure them; and they have only to remove their philosophical bandages

in order to perceive it.

What sort of a world this is--I will not say in itself, but in respect

to us--can be perceived almost at once by any candid spirit, and the

Indians readily perceived it. They saw that substance is infinite, out

of _scale_ with our sensuous images and (except in the little vortex

that makes us up) out of sympathy with our endeavours; and that spirit

in us nevertheless can hold its own, because salvation lies in finding

joy in the truth, not in rendering fortune propitious, by some miracle,

to our animal interests. The spirit is at home in the infinite, and

morally independent of all the accidents of existence: nothing that

nature can produce outruns its potential scope, its desire to know the

truth; and its disinterestedness renders it free, free especially from

any concern about its own existence. It does not deem it the part of

piety to deny the fugitive, impotent, and fantastic nature of human

life. It knows that the thoughts of man and his works, however great

or delightful when measured by the human scale, are but the faintest

shimmer on the surface of being. On the ruin of humanistic illusions

(such as make up the religious philosophy of the West) it knows how to

establish a tender morality and a sublime religion.

Indian wisdom, intent on the infinity and unity of substance and on the

vanity of human life, neglected two inquiries which are nevertheless of

the greatest interest to the spirit, so long as this vain life endures.

The Indians did not study the movement and mechanism of nature: they

had no science. Their poets, in a sort of spectacular physics, were

content to paint vividly the images of sense, conscious of their

fugitive charm, and of their monstrous and delirious diversity.

They also neglected the art of rational conduct in this world; the

refinements of their moral discipline were all mystical; they were

determined by watching the movement of inner experience, and allowing

the fancy to distinguish its objects and its stages. They thought the

spirit could liberate itself by thinking, as by thinking it seemed

to have entangled itself in this mesh of dreams. But how could the

spirit, if it had been free originally, ever have attached its fortunes

to any lump of clay? Why should it be the sport of time and change

and the vicissitudes of affairs? From the point of view of the spirit

(which is that of the Indians) this question is absolutely insoluble;

a fact which drives them to say that this entanglement is not "real,"

but only an illusion of being entangled. Certainly substance is not

entangled, but persists and moves according to its nature; and if what

exists besides substance--its aspects and the spirit in us that notes

them--is not "real" because not substantial, then the unreal has the

privilege, as Democritus pointed out, of existing as well as the real,

and more obviously. But this subterfuge, of denying that appearance

exists, because its existence is only the seeming of its objects, was

inevitable in the Indian system, and dramatically right. The spirit,

left to its own fond logic, remains perfectly ignorant of its natural

ancestry and cannot imagine why it finds itself caught in the vice of

existence, and hanging like Prometheus on a crag of Caucasus, or like

Christ on the cross. The myth of reincarnation, whilst it meets certain

moral demands, leaves the problem essentially untouched. Why should

spirit have fallen in the first instance, or made any beginning in sin

and illusion?

It would have been better, for the moral and religious purposes of

these sages, to have observed and respected the prose facts, and

admitted that each little spirit falls for the first time when the

body is generated which it is to dwell in. It never, in fact, existed

before; it is the spirit of that body. Its transcendental prerogatives

and its impersonal aims are by no means inconsistent with that humble

fact: they seem inconsistent only to those who are ignorant of the

life and fertility of nature, which breeds spirit as naturally as the

lark sings. Aspiration to liberate spirit from absorption in finite

existence is in danger of missing its way if it is not enlightened by a

true theory of existence and of spirit; for it is utterly impossible

to free the spirit materially, since it is the voice of matter, but

by a proper hygiene it can be freed ideally, so that it ceases to be

troubled by its sluggish instrument, or conscious of it. In these

matters the Indians were the sport of the wildest fancy. They mistook

their early poetry for a metaphysical revelation, and their philosophy

was condemned to turn in the most dreary treadmill of commentaries

and homilies, without one ray of criticism, or any revision of first

principles. Nevertheless, all their mythology and scholasticism did

not invalidate (as they did not in the Catholic church afterwards) the

initial spiritual insight on which their system rested. The spirit,

viewed from within, is omnipresent and timeless, and must be spoken of

as falling, or coming down, or entering (as Aristotle puts it) through

the house-door. Spirit calls itself a stranger, because it finds the

world strange; and it finds the world strange because, being the spirit

of a very high-strung and perilously organized animal, it is sensitive

to many influences not harmonious with its own impulses, and has to beg

its daily bread. Yet it is rich in resource; and it gives itself out

for a traveller and tells marvellous lies about its supposed native

land, where it was a prince and an omnipotent poet. These boasts serve

the spirit as a declaration of independence, and a claim to immense

superiority above the world. This independence, however, is really only

the independence of ignorance, that must think and act at random; and

the spirit would add sanity to its spirituality if it recognized the

natural, precarious, and exquisite life of which it is the spirit.

Sanity, thy name is Greece. The Greek naturalists saw (what it needs

only sanity to see) that the infinite substance of things was instinct

with a perpetual motion and rhythmic order which were its life, and

that the spirit of man was a spark from that universal fire. They made

a magnificent beginning in understanding what the order of nature is,

and what is the relation of its substance to its spirit. They were much

nearer in their outlook and their wisdom to the Indians than we are

apt to imagine. The Indians meant to be naturalists too; all serious

philosophers must somehow make a naturalism of their chosen elements;

only the Indians were carried away by an untutored imagination. The

Greeks, for their part, also meant to be discerners of substance like

the Indians, and sharers in the divine life. The object which they

believed in and studied was precisely the same as that which the

Indians felt to be breathing deeply around and within them: it was the

infinite substance and life of things; all things not as they appear

but as they truly are. This is the object which animals envisage in

their perceptions from the beginning. The sciences, and all honest

speculation, only substitute more refined ideas for the images of

sense, to be descriptions of the same objects which the images of sense

reveal. The notion that the object of sense is the very image created

in sensation, or is an idea constructed afterwards by the intellect, is

an aberration of confused psychologists; the intellectual construction,

like the sensuous image, is and is meant to be only a symbol for the

substance, whatever it may be, which confronts the living being when

he eats or looks or frames a scientific hypothesis. Natural things, in

their undiscovered inner texture, are the only things-in-themselves,

and the object of every practical perception is the thing-in-itself,

whatever its nature may happen to be.

When we enlarge our thoughts, and take in the world, as it were, at

a glance, the object does not become more metaphysical than when we

take common things singly. The Greeks, too, looked up into the heavens

and cried, "The All is one." It was just what the Indians had said,

shutting their eyes and drinking in an infinite draught of nothing;

but the outward glance, the docility to fact, in the Greeks made a new

thought of it, and a true one. What was now discovered was the system

of nature; the spirit was naturalized in its source; it was set like

a young plant in its appropriate flower-pot, where it might wax and

bloom. It did grow there, but not to its primeval size. These knowing

Greeks were not saints and hermits, like the venerable Indians; they

were merchants, sniffing travellers, curiosity-hunters, who turned

pebbles over and culled herbs, breeders of animals, or wandering

sooth-sayers with a monkey on their shoulder; and in naturalizing the

spirit they stultified it. Why should knowledge of the world make

people worldly? It ought to do the exact opposite. The Indians had, in

their way, a most profound and mature knowledge of the world; they knew

perfectly what it could yield to the spirit, and what it was worth. But

lost in their inner experience they invented for nature what structure

they chose, fantastically attenuating and inflating it as in a dream.

Apparently there is not energy enough in the human intellect to look

both ways at once, and to study the world scientifically whilst living

in it spiritually.

The Greeks in their sanity discovered not only the natural world but

the art of living well in it. Besides physics they founded ethics

and politics. But here again progress was prevented by the rejection

or perversion of the greater thing in the interests of the lesser.

Speculatively at least some just conception of the world we live

in, and of our place and destiny there, is more important than the

choice of a definite way of life; for animals and man have, quite

legitimately, each his own habits and pleasures, but they all crawl

under the same heaven, and if they think of it at all, they should

not blaspheme against it. The Greek naturalists had conceived nature

rightly; and their sentiments and maxims, whilst very properly diverse,

had all of them a certain noble frankness in the presence of the

infinite world, of which they begged no favours. It was precisely these

personal sentiments and maxims, and policy in the government of cities,

that interested the Greeks most; and the Sophists and Socrates affected

to care nothing about natural science, unless it could make their pot

boil. This utilitarianism was humorous in Socrates, and in some of the

Sophists unprincipled; but the habit of treating opinions about nature

as rhetorical themes, or as more or less edifying myths, had disastrous

consequences for philosophy. It created metaphysics. Metaphysics is

not merely speculative physics, in which natural science is extended

imaginatively in congruous ways, anticipating what might some day be

discovered. This is what the naturalists had done, and their theories

were simply physical or cosmological. But after Socrates a theory

constructed by reasoning, in terms of logic, ethics, and a sort of

poetic propriety was put in the place of physics; the economy of the

human mind was projected into the universe; and nature, in the works

of the metaphysicians, held the mirror up to man. Human nature and the

human mind, which were thus made to rule the world, are in reality a

very small incident in it; they are proper to one animal; they are

things of yesterday and perhaps not of to-morrow. This is nothing

against them in their place, as it is nothing against the daisy that it

is humble, nor against the spray of the sea that its flight is violent

and brief. The Platonic, British, and German schools of philosophy

advance our knowledge of ourselves; what a pity that they were not

content to cultivate their own gardens, where so many moral fruits and

psychological flowers might be made to grow, but have insisted that

their domestic vegetables are the signs of the zodiac, and that the

universe was made to illustrate their horticulture!

Taken for what they really are, these humanistic philosophies express

different sides of human nature. The best (and earliest) is the

Platonic, because the side of human nature which it expresses and

fosters is the spiritual side. Platonic metaphysics projects into

the universe the moral progress of the soul. It is like a mountain

lake, in which the aspirations and passions of a civilized mind are

reflected upside down; and a certain tremor and intensity is added to

them in that narrower frame, which they would hardly have in the upper

air. This system renders the life of the soul more unified and more

beautiful than it would otherwise be. Everything becomes magical, and a

sort of perpetual miracle of grace; the forms which things wear to the

human mind are deputed to be their substance; the uses of life become

its protecting gods; the categories of logic and of morals become

celestial spheres enclosing the earth. A monstrous dream, if you take

it for a description of nature; but a suitable allegory by which to

illustrate the progress of the inner life: because those stages, or

something like them, are really the stages of moral progress for the

soul.

The British and German philosophies belong to an analytic phase of

reflection, without spiritual discipline, and their value is merely

psychological. Their subject matter is human knowledge; and the titles

of many of the chief works of this school confess that this is their

only theme. Not moral life, much less the natural world, but simply the

articulation of knowledge occupies them; and yet, by the hocus-pocus

of metaphysics, they substitute this human experience for the whole

universe in which it arises. The universe is to be nothing but a

flux of perceptions, or a will positing an object, or a tendency to

feign that there is a world. It would ill become me, a pupil of this

philosophy, to deny its profundity. These are the heart-searchings of

"a creature moving about in worlds not realized." It is a wonderful

thing to spin out in soliloquy, out of some unfathomed creative

instinct, the various phases of one's faith and sensibility, making

an inventory of one's intellectual possessions, with some notes on

their presumable or reported history. I love the lore of the moral

antiquary; I love rummaging in the psychological curiosity shop. The

charm of modern life is ambiguous; it lies in self-consciousness.

Egotism has its tender developments; there is a sort of engaging purity

in its perplexities and faithful labours. The German soul has a great

volume, and Hamlet is heroic even in his impotence. When in this little

glow-worm which we call man there is so much going on, what must not

all nature contain in its immensity? Yet all these advances in analysis

and in psychological self-knowledge, far from enriching the modern

philosopher and giving him fresh hints for the interpretation of the

great world, have been neutralized, under the guise of scepticism, by

a total intellectual cramp or by a colossal folly. This thoughtful

dog has dropped the substance he held in his mouth, to snatch at the

reflection of it which his own mind gave him. It is wonderful with

what a light heart, with what self-satisfaction and even boasts, the

youngest children of the philosophical family jettison all their

heirlooms. Fichte and Nietzsche, in their fervid arrogance, could

hardly outdo the mental impoverishment of Berkeley and Hume in their

levity: it had really been a sight for the gods to see one of these

undergraduates driving matter out of the universe, whilst the other

drove out spirit.

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