Russian interests—Russia and Japan—Ma-san-po—Ching-kai-wan—Yong-an-po
Russian industrial activity in Korea may be regarded as a cloak for
political schemes. Since the time that the Emperor became the protected
guest of the Russian Legation, the influence of Russia in Korea has
been more definite in quality. Assisted by French capital, a Russian
company has started recently a cattle ranch and sheep-run at A-ya-chin,
on the coast of Kang-won Province, with a view to the establishment of
a canning factory, which is now in process of construction. In addition
to this, she has set up a glass factory at Seoul, a proceeding which
throws no light upon her motives. She has promoted the Pacific Whale
Fishing Company, which, plying its trade off the coast of Korea, collects
very valuable information of unsurveyed bays and unsounded anchorages,
water-holes, coal-deposits, and currents—and occasionally catches a
whale. It possesses twelve vessels. Russia controls no railway line
in Korea, although she is interested in the line which the French are
building; no gold mine, but a geographical exploration party of naval
officers has been topographically examining the region of the Yalu River
for some years. She has been accorded certain rights in Ma-san-po; she
is endeavouring to secure the concession of a site suitable for a naval
station, and through virtue of a lumber felling concession on the Yalu,
she has located herself at Yong-an-po. In May 1903, too, a commercial
commission travelled from Seoul to Wi-ju, overland.
As rapidly as circumstances permit, Russia is connecting her Manchurian
telegraphic system with the trunk lines of Korea, and telegraphic
communication is in course of construction between Mukden and Wi-ju,
Vladivostock and Won-san. The action of Russia in this respect has
encountered very great opposition from Korea. When the Korean Cabinet
declined to grant permission for the erection of the poles, for which
the Russian engineers had not waited, M. Pavloff, the Russian Minister,
delicately hinted that the removal of the poles would be regarded as an
unfriendly act, and one liable to create unpleasantness between the two
Governments. The Korean Government, however, were not frightened into
drawing back, and for some months past the local officials have been
occupied in cutting down whatever poles the Russians might erect. Russia,
also, proposes to rebuild the telegraph line from Pekin to Seoul _viâ_
Wi-ju, while further, it is her avowed intention to construct from Mukden
a branch of her railway to An-tung on the Yalu River.
Russia has been associated, also, with the Korean army, the Russian
military authorities having lent a number of drill-instructors to
the Korean service. They have now been withdrawn. The management of
the residence, in which apartments are found for the guests of the
Imperial Court, has been entrusted to a Russian lady. There are very few
Russian residents in Seoul. Those who live there comprise the immediate
_personnel_ of the Legation, the Legation guards, priests of the Greek
Church, and some sprinkling of the shop-keeping element. The colony is
small, but contrives, with the aid of a port guardship at Chemulpo and
constant visits from the Pacific Squadron, when performances are given
by the band from the guard-ship for the delectation of the Imperial
Court, to support the majesty and dignity of the Russian Government with
much impressive display. Proposals have been recently made to establish
consulates in the open ports of the Empire—the Consulate from the capital
is now established at Chemulpo; to increase the services of the steamers
of the Manchurian Railway between the open ports of Korea and Manchuria,
and to found a branch of the Russo-Chinese Bank at Chemulpo. It is
intended, too, that the Russian Pacific Squadron shall use the Korean
harbours more frequently as ports of call.
For some years Russia has been gradually feeling her way in Korea.
Prior to 1885 there were over twenty thousand Koreans settled in her
Far Eastern possessions, while in 1888 Russia concluded a Commercial
Convention with Korea, which opened the Korean land frontier to Russian
traders. In 1893 telegraphic communication between Russia and Korea was
arranged, when, just as the Russian policy towards Korea perhaps was
beginning to shape itself, war between China and Japan was declared.
Whatever conclusions may have been anticipated as the results of such
a war, there can be no doubt that its effect upon the actual destinies
of Russia and Japan in the Far East was far-reaching. The policy of
Russia towards China underwent a change, while the ultimate possession
of Korea became equally the objective of Japan as of the greater Power.
Russia, however, could not afford to profit at the moment by the downfall
of China, and Japan was not strong enough to hold the Liao-tung
Peninsula nor bold enough to seize Korea. Nevertheless, driven out of
the Liao-tung by the action of Russia, France and Germany, Japan might
still have secured for herself complete material and political ascendency
over Korea. In time, if such had been her policy, she could have made
manifest, too, her occupation of the kingdom and equipped herself with
an argument, the parallel of that possessed by Great Britain in Egypt,
and by Russia in Manchuria. Unhappily, while Russia with masterly
deliberation was moving steadily forward in her subjugation of Manchuria,
Japan, whole-hearted but ignorant of the pitfalls of colonial expansion,
was creating endless difficulties for herself in Korea, besides serious
complications with the Powers outside the scenes of her activities.
Before she had realised the potentialities of her position, she had
committed herself to a design by which she hoped to secure the King
and Queen and to direct herself the reins of government. But her _coup
d’état_ was to recoil disastrously, and at once, upon her own head. The
Queen fell a victim to the plot, and although the King was imprisoned,
he, together with the Crown Prince, contrived in a little time to find
refuge in the Russian Legation. The escape of the King only emphasised
the failure of Japan, and despite her subsequent treaties with Russia,
in respect of Korea, the balance of power in the Far East as between
Russia and Japan has never quite recovered from the blow which Japan
administered herself to her own prestige upon this occasion.
Japan still wields material influence of a high order in Korea. But,
within the paramount position which she fills, there is the rift caused
by the spread of the antagonistic and insidious influence of her great
opponent. Curiously enough, the position which Russia holds to-day is
not nearly as assertive as that which she occupied in 1896, yet there is
little doubt that her influence is more commanding, if less conspicuously
aggressive. Japan has turned aside upon occasion from the political
issues to develop her commercial interests. Russia, again, has pursued
unswerving the policy which revealed with the fall of China the fact that
Manchuria was within her grasp and that Korea was its entail.
[Illustration: ON THE YALU RIVER]
The action of Russia upon the Yalu River at the present time, her action
in respect of Won-san in the past, are each animated by this _motiv_.
Russia regards Korea as the completion of her dominions in the Far East,
while Japan looks upon the little kingdom as the corollary to that
expansion which is essential to the existence of the Island Empire.
Russia in Manchuria and Korea, with her shadow projected over China,
would mean a sentence of perpetual restriction and shrinkage for Japan.
But, similarly, Russia from her position at Vladivostock and Port Arthur
must regard the occupation of Korea by Japan as a wedge with its point
projected towards the centre of her Manchurian communications. Just as,
therefore, the fear of a Russian descent upon Korea has excited Japan,
the necessity for such action has brought the crisis in the relations
between Japan and Russia so perceptibly nearer. Private agreements and
secret overtures have paved the way for the _denouement_ which long since
was disclosed. When Russia endeavoured to requisition the harbour of
Ma-san-po for the requirements of her Pacific Squadron, an indication was
afforded that Russian activity in Korea would be concealed no longer.
Ma-san-po has since become an open port, the Government of Japan at once
formulating ingenious objections to the Russian scheme at the same time
that they threatened the Government of Korea with threats of immediate
reprisals. But prior to the conditions laid down by Russia in the
Ma-san-po Convention of 1900 with the Korean Government, this magnificent
harbour had already attracted the attention of the Japanese and Chinese
settlers. By force of circumstances, therefore, the place became an
open port, the local authorities being powerless to check the influx of
foreigners and the creation of a foreign zone around the harbour. That M.
Pavloff, the clever Russian diplomatic representative in Seoul, succeeded
in bringing about any agreement at all is remarkable, taking into account
the panic-stricken state to which the Imperial Government was reduced
by Japanese intimidation. The secret convention between the Russian and
Korean Governments, entered into during 1900, preserved the independence
of the harbour, and, failing to confirm Russia in the definite occupation
of Ma-san-po, provided that none of the land about Ma-san-po harbour
or its approaches should be permanently ceded or sold to any foreign
Power. The same conditions applied to the island of Keu-chai, situated in
the mouth of the harbour. This curtailment of the ambitions of Russian
policy, in this particular direction, due, of course, to the energetic
action of Japan, did not make the position of Russia in Ma-san-po in any
sense secure. Japan, even then upon the eve of her declaration, would
have gone to war with Russia, if that Power had attempted to maintain
an isolated and complete domination of this harbour and its approaches
against her wishes.
There is nothing in the present condition of Ma-san-po which suggests
that it may become a centre of Russian influence in Southern Korea. The
Japanese demanded, even before the incident had quite blown over, a large
tract of land at Ma-san-po for the purposes of making a settlement
there. In addition to this, the quarter, marked off for foreign
settlements, has been almost wholly appropriated by the Japanese, who
have erected shops and houses of some importance to the extent of several
hundred, upon the more suitable sites. Japanese postal and telegraphic
offices have been opened in Ma-san-po, and an uncomfortable hostelry
disturbs the rest of the weary. A large permanent staff of Japanese
police has been detached for duty in Ma-san-po, and the next feature in
the development of affairs will be the detailing of a port guardship
and the usual infantry garrison to protect the Japanese settlement.
These acts imply a permanent lease and constitute the methods by which
the Japanese propose to invalidate the Russo-Korean Convention. The aim
of Japanese policy in Ma-san-po is to discount as far as possible the
rights of the Russians, and to deprive their existence in the harbour of
any special significance. The Russians accept the position with extreme
philosophy and indifference. If they wished to do so, they might raise
protest after protest against the intrusive character of Japanese action
in the areas affected by the clauses of the Agreement of 1900.
Twelve months ago the foreign population of Ma-san-po consisted of two
hundred and thirty Japanese, forty-one Chinese, eighteen Russians, and
two Germans. These figures include male and female heads of population,
but no children. The actual strength of the Russian colony in this
harbour was eight men, ten women, three children; of the Japanese only
seventy-eight were females. There is little import and export traffic.
The nearness of Fusan, which is only six hours distant, makes it
unnecessary to trade direct with the settlement. Japanese steamers from
Fusan call daily, local produce being brought round by native junks.
There is a large fishing industry off the harbour; it is, however, quite
controlled by Japanese fishermen from Fusan. The principal industry on
shore is the construction of the settlement, some little agriculture, and
no little gossip.
Since the failure of her efforts to secure Ma-san-po, Russia has
endeavoured to obtain the lease of Ching-kai-wan, sometimes called
Chin-hai or Shin-hai, a bay situated in the extreme south of the Korean
peninsula, as a naval station. The position of this harbour is exactly
midway between Vladivostock and Port Arthur. Owing to its geographical
situation, the presence of Russia in sole possession of Ching-kai-wan
would be certain to give rise to even greater demonstrations of
hostility from the people and Government of Japan than did the Ma-san-po
incident. Nam-pu, which it was then Russia’s object to secure, is about
twenty miles outside the limits of the treaty port of Ma-san-po. While
the Japanese Government could not prevent Russia from obtaining a
coaling-station for the Russian Steamship Company within the boundaries
of the foreign settlement of Ma-san-po, she most strenuously protested
against a grant of land for Russian naval purposes twenty miles away.
Japan likewise resists the establishment of a Russian naval depôt at
Ching-kai-wan, where there is no treaty port, and to which, were the
“lease” confirmed, only Russia would have a right of access.
Ching-kai-wan is within a few hours’ steam of that Port Hamilton which
Great Britain was induced to relinquish, upon the understanding between
Russia and China that Russia would not seek to acquire territory
in Korea. The excuse, since put forward by Russia for the flagrant
violation of this compact, is that it was a bargain made with China, and
not with us. There is another, and still more extraordinary feature in
connection with this affair, which Li Hung Chang confided to a diplomatic
representative of a foreign Power, at Pekin, some years ago. The Chinese
statesman admitted that the contract between China and Russia contained
a private stipulation that it should be good for ten years only. In
other words, Great Britain was led to withdraw from Port Hamilton on the
pretence that Russia would never trespass on Korean soil, although there
was a secret understanding between China and Russia at the time, that
this arrangement should only be in force for one decade.
Although the position of affairs in regard to the action of Russia at
Yong-an-po is of recent prominence, the question goes back in reality to
the autumn of 1896, when a Russian merchant in Vladivostock, M. Brünner
by name, obtained from the Korean Government the right of felling lumber
and planting trees on the banks of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, as well
as on the island of Ul-lyang, for twenty years. The concession was to
be forfeited unless work was begun in five years. As the close of the
period drew near, the Russian agent in Seoul applied for an extension
of three years. At the moment it was reported in Seoul that this
request of M. Pavloff had been refused, but it transpired subsequently
that an agreement had been drawn up to the following effect between
the superintendent, appointed by the Korean Government to oversee the
matters, and the inspector in charge of the interests of the company in
Yong-an-po:
1. The said district in Yong-an-po shall be rented to the Russian
company.
2. The boundaries of the said district shall be defined by the Russian
Minister and the Minister in charge of the Foreign Office of the Korean
Government.
3. The Russian company shall pay a land-tax to the Korean Government.
4. If the owners of tombs within this district wish to remove them, the
expense of removal shall be borne by the Russian company.
5. If the company wish to utilise wood which Koreans have cut and are
bringing down the river, it must reimburse the owners with a fair and
proper price.
6. The Russian company shall not raise any stock within this district
except what is to be used therein.
7. Korean offenders within this district shall be dealt with by the
Korean courts. Russian offenders shall be dealt with by Russian civil
officers.
These contracts were signed on July 20th, 1903, by the Korean official
Cho Sung-hyup and the Russian Inspector Bojisco.
[Illustration: A CHINESE ENCAMPMENT]
Meanwhile, however, in May 1903, prior to the decision of the Korean
Government in the matter, the prefect of Wi-ju reported the concentration
of Russian troops at An-tung for the purpose of crossing the Yalu. A few
days later, a detached party of forty of these men crossed the stream,
halting on a small island in mid-river to discard their uniforms, so
that they might enter Yong-an-po in private clothes. From Yong-an-po
they moved to Yong-chyön, near Wi-ju, where, accompanied by one hundred
Chinese and eighty Koreans, they founded a lumber settlement, buying
seventeen houses, with twelve acres of land attached, in the name of
two of their Korean _employés_. The presence of the colony was at once
objected to by the Korean Government, who threatened M. Pavloff with the
rupture of relations if the settlement were not at once withdrawn. M.
Pavloff, however, defended the existence of the lumber camp under powers
obtained from the Forest Concession of 1896, which, in actuality, had
not been re-affirmed at the moment. Early in the next month, June, the
magistrate at Yong-chyön reported that another party of Russians had
arrived at Yong-an-po, including in all three Russian women, thirty-six
men, two hundred Chinese, and many horses. These were reinforced in July
by three women and sixty men, for the most part carrying rifles and
swords, and who, also, at once bought houses and land.
The action of these people has assumed a specific direction. A few, as
though anxious to give colour to their existence as a lumber settlement
and in defiance of orders from the Korean local officials, while quite
exceeding the clauses of the concession proper, persisted in felling
trees on the areas of a prohibited reserve. Meantime the remainder of the
party, by no means idle, began the construction of a bund on the Yalu
extending over a distance of twenty-one miles, a light railway being
laid down for the purpose. In addition to this work developments of a
more permanent character were taken in hand; stone buildings appeared,
a factory was constructed, and extensive defensive measures adopted. To
confirm these indications of Russian occupation of the Yalu reaches, a
body of seventy soldiers crossed the river at Cho-san, a second party of
eighty men coming over at Pyök-tong. The Russians then proceeded to bring
these various scattered “lumber” settlements, into communication, for
this purpose erecting a telegraph line between Wi-ju and Yong-an-po. This
line, however, the Koreans at once cut down, whereupon the Russians began
to lay a submarine cable from Yong-an-po round the coast and up the Yalu
River to An-tung in place of the line across country from Yong-an-po to
Manchuria. Since the cable projects were important and, together with the
settlement at Yong-an-po, much in need of protection, Russia proposed to
draft a force of three hundred soldiers into the place. At this date,
towards the end of August, the settlement at Yong-an-po had grown into
sixty houses with a civil Russian population of seventy citizens. By this
time, however, the Japanese Minister at Seoul, Mr. Hayashi, had received
the text of the proposed contract between the Korean Government and
the Russian Lumber Company. Thereupon, on August 25th, he delivered an
ultimatum to the Korean Government. On the same day the Russian Minister
went to the Foreign Office and urged that the lease of Yong-an-po be
granted. In spite of his urgent appeal, the Minister declared it to be
impossible. On the 27th the Russian Minister went again to the Foreign
Office at noon, and remained till seven in the evening, but the Minister
was ill and did not put in an appearance. The Russian Minister then
stated that he would have nothing more to do with the Foreign Minister,
but would appeal directly to the Emperor. In his despatch Mr. Hayashi
wrote that if the Korean Government were to sign such a lease with
the Russian Government, Japan would consider such an act as a direct
violation of the treaty between herself and Korea. In this event Japan
would consider that diplomatic relations between the two countries were
suspended, and she would regard herself free to act for herself in her
own interests on the assumption that the whole of the Korean territories
had been opened to the world.
The spirited action of the Japanese Minister was not lost upon the Korean
Government, who at once issued orders to the prefect of Yong-an-po to
restrain the Russians from further encroachment. The efforts of the
local officials were, however, of little avail, and by the middle of
September, in addition to the colony at Yong-an-po, the settlement at
Yong-chyön had increased to one hundred and twenty-eight Chinese huts,
with thirteen hundred Chinese, seventy Russians, and twenty tents.
Complaints of the high-handed action of the Russians in appropriating
the property of the Koreans to their own needs began to arrive in Seoul,
and on September 13th came the information that a telegraph line had
again been laid between Yong-an-po and the lumber concession on the Yalu.
Coupled with the intelligence of this renewed activity was additional,
and much more disquieting, information. The Russians had constructed on
the elevated ground about the Tu-ryu Harbour a high watch-tower, and were
preparing emplacements for three batteries of field artillery. Meanwhile,
however, as a counter demonstration to the movement of a company of five
hundred Russians under two officers, on October 23rd, who had crossed the
Tumen River into Korean territory by night, a Japanese warship dropped
anchor in the estuary of the Yalu, in close proximity to Yong-an-po.
I make no apology to my readers for giving in this detailed fashion the
history of this little Russian concession. As a chapter of contemporary
history I cannot think that my words are of any value, but there are
doubtless many who, like myself, prefer to begin in the beginning, and
so slowly trace through the developments of any question. In respect of
Russian action on the Yalu, therefore, I have endeavoured to do this.
NOTE.—An-tung is known also as Sha-ho; the Yalu River is known
also as the Am-nok River.