The second fact is the high standard of patriotism and honour which we

may, I think, truly say has nearly always prevailed among English

public servants. It is not an easy thing to secure honest and faithful

administration in remote countries, far from the supervision and

practical control of the central government. I think we may boast with

truth that England has attained this end, not indeed perfectly, but at

least to a greater degree than most other nations. The history of

Indian and colonial governors has never been written as a whole, but

it is well worthy of study. In the appointment of these men party has

always counted for something, and family has counted for something;

but they have never been the only considerations, and, on the whole, I

believe it will be found, if we consider the three elements of

character, capacity and experience, that our Indian and colonial

governors represent a higher level of ruling qualities than has been

attained by any line of hereditary sovereigns, or by any line of

elected presidents. In the period of the foundation of our Indian

Empire much was done that was violent and rapacious, but the best

modern research seems to show that the picture which a few years ago

was generally accepted had been greatly overcharged. The history of

Warren Hastings and his companions has been recently studied with

great knowledge and ability, and with the result that the more serious

opinions on the subject have been considerably modified. Much

exaggeration undoubtedly grew up in the last century, partly through

ignorance of Oriental affairs, and partly also through the eloquence

of Burke. There is no figure in English political history for which I

at least entertain a greater reverence than Edmund Burke. I believe

him to have been a man of transparent honesty, as well as of

transcendent genius; but his politics were too apt to be steeped in

passion, and he was often carried away by the irresistible force of

his own imagination and feelings. Misrepresentations were greatly

consolidated by the Indian History of James Mill, which was for a long

time the main, and indeed almost the only, source from which

Englishmen obtained their knowledge of Indian history. It was written,

as might be expected, with the strongest bias of hostility to the

English in India, yet I suspect that many superficial readers imagined

that a history which was so unquestionably dull must be at least

impartial and philosophical. Unfortunately, Macaulay relied greatly on

it, and, without having made any serious independent studies on the

subject, he invested some of its misrepresentations with all the

splendour of his eloquence. I believe all competent authorities are

now agreed that his essay on Warren Hastings, though it is one of the

most brilliant of his writings, is also one of the most seriously

misleading.

I am not prepared to say that the reaction of opinion produced by the

new school of Indian historians has not been sometimes carried too

far, but these writers have certainly dispelled much exaggeration and

some positive falsehood. They have shown that, although under

circumstances of extreme difficulty and extraordinary temptation, some

very bad things were done by Englishmen in India, these things were

neither as numerous nor as grave as has been alleged.

On the whole, too, it may be truly said that English colonial policy

in its broad lines has to a remarkable degree avoided grave errors.

The chief exception is to be found in the series of mistakes which

produced the American Revolution, and ended in the loss of our chief

American colonies. Yet even in this instance it is, I believe, coming

to be perceived that there is much more to be said for the English

case than the historians of the last generation were apt to imagine.

In imposing commercial restrictions on the colonies and endeavouring

to secure for the mother-country the monopoly of their trade, we

merely acted upon ideas that were then almost universally received,

and our commercial code was on the whole less illiberal than that of

other nations. Both Spain and France imposed restrictions on their

colonies which were far more severe, and the English restrictions were

at least mitigated by frequent partial relaxations and exceptions, by

some important monopolies granted in favour of the colonies in the

English market and by bounties encouraging several branches of

colonial produce. It is at least certain that under the large measure

of political liberty granted by the English Government to the English

colonies their material prosperity, even in the worst period of

commercial restriction, steadily and rapidly advanced. This has been

clearly shown by more than one writer on our side of the Atlantic, but

the subject has never been treated with more exhaustive knowledge and

more perfect impartiality than by an American writer--Mr. George

Beer--whose work on the Commercial Policy of England has recently been

published by Columbia College, in New York. No one will now altogether

defend Grenville's policy of taxing America by the Imperial

Parliament, but it ought not to be forgotten that it was expressly

provided that every farthing of this taxation was to be expended in

America, and devoted to colonial defence. England had just terminated

a great war, which, by expelling the French from Canada, had been of

inestimable advantage to her colonies, but which had left the

mother-country almost crushed by debt. All that Grenville desired was,

that the American colonies should provide a portion of the cost of

their own defence, as our great colonies are doing at the present

time, and he only resorted to Imperial taxation because he despaired

of achieving this end by any other means. The step which he took was

no doubt a false one. As is so often the case in England, it was made

worse by party changes and by party recriminations, and many later

mistakes aggravated and embittered the original dispute; but I think

an impartial reader of this melancholy chapter of English history will

come to the conclusion that these mistakes were by no means all on one

side.

It is a story which is certainly not without its lesson to our own

time. It is very improbable that any future statesman will follow the

example of George Grenville, and endeavour by Act of Parliament to

impose taxation on a self-governing colony; but it would be a grave

error to suppose that the danger of unwise parliamentary interference

in Indian and colonial affairs has diminished. Great as are the

advantages of telegraphs and newspapers in the government of the

Empire, they are not without their drawbacks. Government by telegraph

is a very dangerous thing, and there is, I fear, an increasing

tendency to override local knowledge, and to apply English standards

and methods of government to wholly un-English conditions.

Ill-considered resolutions of the House of Commons, often passed in

obedience to some popular fad, and without any real intention of

carrying them into effect; language used in Parliament which is often

due to no deeper motive than a desire to win the favour of some class

of voters in an English constituency, may do as much as serious

misgovernment to alienate great masses of British subjects beyond the

sea. All really competent judges are agreed that one of the first

conditions of successful government in India has been that Indian

questions have for the most part been kept out of the range of English

party politics, and that Indian government has been conducted on

principles essentially different from democratic government at home.

On the whole, however, it is impossible to review the colonial history

of England without being struck with the many serious dangers that

might easily have shattered the Empire, which were averted by wise

statesmanship and timely--or at least not fatally tardy--concession.

There was the question of the criminal population which we once

transported to Australia. In the early stage of the colony, when the

population was very sparse and the need for labour very imperative,

this was not regarded as in any degree a grievance; but the time came

when it became a grievance of the gravest kind, and the Imperial power

had at length the wisdom to abandon it. There was the question of the

different and hostile religious bodies existing in different portions

of the Empire, at a time when the monopoly of political power by the

members of a single Established Church, the exclusive endowment of its

clergy, and the maintenance of the purely Protestant character of the

English Government were cherished as religious duties by politicians

at home. Yet at this very time an established and endowed Roman

Catholic Church was flourishing in Canada, and there were numerous

examples throughout the British dominions of the concurrent endowment

of different forms of religious belief by the State,[5] while in India

it abstained, with an extreme, and sometimes even an exaggerated,

scrupulousness, from all measures that could by any possibility offend

the native religious prejudices. There was the question of

Slavery--though we were freed from the most difficult part of this

problem by the secession of America. In addition, however, to its

moral aspects, it affected most vitally the material prosperity of

some of our richest colonies; it raised the very dangerous

constitutional question of the right of the Imperial Parliament to

interfere with the internal affairs of a self-governing colony, and it

brought the Home Government into more serious collision with the local

Governments than any question since the American Revolution. Whatever

may be thought of the wisdom of the measures by which we abolished

slavery in our West Indian colonies, no one at least can deny the

liberality of a Parliament which voted from Imperial resources twenty

millions for the accomplishment of the work. There was the conflict of

race and creed which between 1830 and 1840 had brought Canada to

absolute rebellion, and threatened a complete alienation of Canadian

feeling from the mother-country. This discontent was effectually

allayed and dispelled by the union of Upper and Lower Canada under a

system of constitutional government of the most liberal character,

which gave the colonists on all subjects of internal legislation a

legislative independence that was in practice almost complete.

Considered as a measure of conciliation this has proved one of the

most successful of the nineteenth century, and in spite of a few

discordant notes it may be truly said that there are few greater

contrasts in the present reign than are presented between Canadian

feeling towards the mother-country when Queen Victoria ascended the

throne and Canadian feeling at the present hour. There was also the

great and dangerous task to be accomplished of adapting the system of

colonial government to the different stages of colonial development.

There was a time when the colonies were so weak that they depended

mainly on England for their protection; but, unlike some of the great

colonising Powers of ancient and modern times, England never drew a

direct tribute from her colonies, and, in spite of much unwise and

some unjust legislation, I believe there was never a time when they

were not on the whole benefited by the connection. Soon, however, the

colonies grew to the strength and maturity of nationhood, and the

mother-country speedily recognised the fact, and allowed no unworthy

or ungenerous fears to restrain her from granting them the fullest

powers, both of self-government and of federation. It is true that she

still sends out a governor--usually drawn from the ranks of

experienced and considerable English public men--to preside over

colonial affairs. It is true that she retains a right of veto which is

scarcely ever exercised except to prevent some intercolonial or

international dispute, some act of violence, or some grave anomaly in

the legislation of the Empire. It is true that colonial cases may be

carried, on appeal, to an English tribunal, representing the very

highest judicial capacity of the mother-country, and free from all

possibility and suspicion of partiality; but I do not believe that any

of these light ties are unpopular with any considerable section of the

colonists. On the other hand, though it would be idle to suppose that

our great colonies depend largely upon the mother-country, I believe

that most colonists recognise that there is something in the weight

and dignity attaching to fellow-membership and fellow-citizenship in

a great Empire--something in the protection of the greatest navy in

the world--something in the improved credit which connection with a

very rich centre undoubtedly gives to colonial finance.

It is the custom of our friends and neighbours on the Continent to

bestow much scornful remark on the egotism of English policy, which

attends mainly to the interests of the British Empire, and is not

ready to make war for an idea and in support of the interests of

others. I think, if it were necessary, we might fairly defend

ourselves by showing that in the past we have meddled with the affairs

of other nations quite as much as is reasonable. For my own part, I

confess that I distrust greatly these explosions of military

benevolence. They always begin by killing a great many men. They

usually end in ways that are not those of a disinterested

philanthropy. After all, an egotism that mainly confines itself to the

well-being of about a fifth part of the globe cannot be said to be of

a very narrow type, and it is essentially by her conduct to her own

Empire that the part of England in promoting the happiness of mankind

must be ultimately judged. It is indeed but too true that many of the

political causes which have played a great part on platforms, in

parties, and in Parliaments are of such a nature that their full

attainment would not bring relief to one suffering human heart, or

staunch one tear of pain, or add in any appreciable degree to the real

happiness of a single home. But most assuredly Imperial questions are

not of this order. Remember what India had been for countless ages

before the establishment of British rule. Think of its endless wars of

race and creed, its savage oppressions, its fierce anarchies, its

barbarous customs; and then consider what it is to have established

for so many years over the vast space from the Himalayas to Cape

Comorin a reign of perfect peace; to have conferred upon more than two

hundred and fifty millions of the human race perfect religious

freedom, perfect security of life, liberty, and property; to have

planted in the midst of these teeming multitudes a strong central

government, enlightened by the best knowledge of Western Europe, and

steadily occupied in preventing famine, alleviating disease,

extirpating savage customs, multiplying the agencies of civilisation

and progress. This is the true meaning of that system of government on

which Mr. Cobden looked with 'an eye of despair.' What work of human

policy--I would even say what form of human philanthropy--has ever

contributed more largely to reduce the great sum of human misery and

to add to the possibilities of human happiness?

And if we turn to the other side of our Empire, although it is quite

true that our great free colonies are fully capable of shaping their

destinies for themselves, may we not truly say that these noble

flowers have sprung from British and from Irish seeds? May we not say

that the laws, the Constitutions, the habits of thought and character

that have so largely made them what they are, are mainly of English

origin? May we not even add that it is in no small part due to their

place in the British Empire that these vast sections of the globe,

with their diverse and sometimes jarring interests, have remained at

perfect peace with us and with each other, and have escaped the curse

of an exaggerated militarism, which is fast eating like a canker into

the prosperity of the great nations of Europe?

When responsible government was conceded by the British Government to

her more important colonies, it was done in the fullest and largest

measure. Although the mother-country remained burdened with the task

of defending them she made no reservation securing for herself free

trade with her colonies or even preferential treatment, and she

surrendered unconditionally to the local legislatures the waste and

unoccupied lands which had long been regarded in England as held in

trust for the benefit of the Empire as a whole. The growing belief

that the connection with the colonies was likely to be a very

transitory one, and also the belief that free-trade doctrines were

likely speedily to prevail, no doubt influenced English statesmen, and

it is not probable that any of them foresaw that both Canada and

Australia would speedily make use of their newly acquired power to

impose heavy duties on English goods. The strongly protectionist

character which the English colonies assumed at a time when England

had committed herself to the most extreme free-trade policy tended no

doubt to separation, and when the English Government adopted the

policy of withdrawing its garrisons from the colonies, when the North

American colonies, with the full assent of the mother-country, formed

themselves into a great federation, and when a movement in the same

direction sprang up in Australia, it was the opinion of some of the

most sagacious statesmen and thinkers in England that the time of

separation was very near.[6]

On the whole, however, these predictions have hitherto been falsified.

The federation of North America and, at a later period, the federation

of Australia have been followed by an increased and not a diminished

disposition on the side of the colonists to draw closer the ties with

the mother-country, while in England the popular imagination has been

more and more impressed with the growing magnitude and importance of

her colonial dominions. The tendency towards great political

agglomerations based upon an affinity of race, language and creed,

which has produced the Pan-Slavonic movement and the Pan-Germanic

movement, and which chiefly made the unity of Italy, has not been

without its influence in the English-speaking world, and it is felt

that a close union between its several parts is essential if it is

fully to maintain its relative position under the new conditions of

the world. The English-speaking nations comprise the most rapidly

increasing, the most progressive, the most happily situated nations of

the earth, and if their power and influence are not wasted by internal

quarrels their type of civilisation must one day become dominant in

the world.

Whether their harmony and unity are likely to be attained is one of

the great problems of the future, but the ideal is one which every

patriotic Englishman should at least set before him. It is not one

which can be called an assured destiny, and to many the chances seem

on the whole against it. Unexpected collisions of interest or passion

or ambition may at any time mar the prospects, and in great

democracies largely influenced by demagogues and by an irresponsible

and anonymous Press there are always powerful agencies that do not

make for peace. Immediate party interests both at home and in the

colonies too frequently blind men to distant and ulterior

consequences, and the many ill-wishers to the British Empire are sure

to direct their policy largely to its disruption. The natural bond of

union of a great Empire is economical unity, binding its several parts

together by a common system of free trade and by a common commercial

policy towards other Powers. Unfortunately the profoundly different

policy adopted on these matters in England and her colonies has made

such a Union almost impracticable, and it is quite possible for the

English colonies to be united by closer commercial ties with foreign

countries than with the mother-country. The question of the common

defence of the Empire and the question of the representation of the

colonies in Imperial politics are also questions of great difficulty

and of pressing importance.

Something has been done showing at least a disposition to meet them.

The concession of preferential duties in favour of England by some of

our most important colonies, the small subsidies made to the

maintenance of the British navy, and the far more important military

assistance given by the colonies to the mother-country in the Egyptian

and the South African wars are indicative of the feeling of closer

unity which has grown up between England and her colonies, and in

addition to the appointment of Agents-General, the introduction of a

few eminent colonial judges into the Judicial Committee of the Privy

Council, which is the Supreme Court of Appeal of the Empire, has given

the colonies some real representation in Imperial affairs. Much more,

however, in this direction may be done. There have been several

instances of eminent colonials obtaining seats in the English House of

Commons to the great advantage of the Empire, but a regular

representation of the colonies in this assembly may, I think, be

dismissed as altogether impracticable. The mere distance is a

sufficient objection, and at least nine-tenths of the business of the

House of Commons deals with purely English questions depending for

their wise solution on inherited English habits and on compromises

with existing institutions, and a large proportion of them are

problems which have been already dealt with in the colonies on other

grounds and without any of the complexities of an old country. What

reason could there be for calling in the colonists to adjudicate,

perhaps even to turn the balance, on questions relating to English

education, English licensing laws, English taxation, English

dispositions of property? The difficulty of distinguishing between

Imperial and local questions would be insuperable. The division of the

House into two categories of members with distinct spheres of voting

power would prove unworkable, and the colonial representatives would

during most of their time in Parliament have nothing to do. An

increase in the number of peers drawn from the colonies would be less

impracticable, but there would be much that is invidious in the

choice; much danger that the colonial peers living in England would

get out of touch with the colonies and become an object of envy and

jealousy; and English lawyers do not think that a large infusion of

colonial law peers would raise the competence of the Supreme Judicial

Tribunal of the Empire, which represents at present the highest legal

talent and attainments in England and deals mainly with English legal

questions. A Consultative Council, however, consisting of the

Agents-General and perhaps reinforced by additional colonial

representatives and dealing exclusively with Imperial questions, does

not seem wholly impracticable, and many competent judges believe that

a supreme legal tribunal for dealing with inter-colonial and

international conflicts might be constructed which would be both more

efficient and more representative than any that now exists.

It is probable, however, that the true tie that must unite the

different portions of the Empire must be mainly a moral one. In the

conditions of modern life no power is likely to maintain long a vast,

scattered, heterogeneous Empire if the central governing power within

it has declined; if through want of efficiency, or moral energy, or

moral purity, it ceases to win the respect of its several parts. It is

no less true that the cohesion can only be permanently maintained by

the wide diffusion of a larger and Imperial patriotism, pervading the

whole like a vital principle; binding men by the ties of pride and of

affection to the great Empire to which they belong, and subordinating

to its maintenance local and party and class interests. If this spirit

dies out, the movement of disintegration is sure to begin. No

political machinery, no utilitarian calculation, will in the long run

be powerful enough to arrest it.

What may be the future place of these islands in the government of the

world no human being can foretell. Nations, as history but too plainly

shows, have their periods of decay as well as their periods of growth.

The balance of power in the world is constantly shifting. Maxims and

influences very different from those which made England what she is

are in the ascendant, and the clouds upon the horizon are neither few

nor slight. But, whatever fate may be in store for these islands, and

for the political unity we so justly prize, we may at least

confidently predict that no revolution in human affairs can now

destroy the future ascendancy of the English language and of the

Imperial race. Whatever misfortunes, whatever humiliations the future

may reserve to us, they cannot deprive England of the glory of having

created this mighty Empire.

Not Heaven itself upon the Past has power.

But what has been, has been--and we have had our hour.

FOOTNOTES:

[3] _Autobiography_, ii. pp. 234, 235.

[4] Mr. Bayard.

[5] See the enumeration of these endowments in Gladstone's _State and

Church_, Ch. IX.

[6] See Cairnes' _Political Essays_, 49-50, 56.

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