CHAPTER XVII

EQUITABLE RESPONSIBILITY

If gold reserves alone are to be the test of sound banking, and if

gold reserves alone are to save banks in the hour of crisis or panic,

then the obligations of banks towards the highest interests of the

community are weakened. If their wealth, their investments are to be

valueless in a time of crisis, to be so ignored, that is, as to be

worthless, to be taken no account of, are not to keep them solvent and

safe, then on what grounds of reason and justice should the community

demand that banks should confine their trading to the highest class of

wealth? On what grounds can the community demand that they should in

all seasons and in all times do that great work for trade and commerce

which neither the Government nor any other institution does? Why should

the banks be asked to do all the sacrificing within the limitations

imposed by the community and the community not come to their help,

sacrifice nothing at all, in the hour of the community’s troubles?

For the crisis, when it comes, is the nation’s and not solely the

banks’ crisis. If the crisis be none of the nation’s seeking, it will

certainly be none of the banks’ seeking. If, however, the crisis be the

effect of over-speculation on the part of the community, it would be

mean action on the part of the community to appeal to the banks to save

it from the consequences of its own folly.

I urge that, in a time of national crisis, which has taken the

nation by surprise, which is no consequence of its own folly, the

responsibility should be shared by the nation and the banks. It is

possible that it was this high sense of justice, this high sense of

equity, that inspired the measures that were taken last August, and

that brought the country safely through the crisis. Had it not been for

this higher inspiration and deeper vision, and had we trusted alone to

narrow instinct and lack of insight, confusion might have reigned, and

the consequences might have been as serious as those foretold by the

prophets.

If we are to lay it down as a rigid, unwritten law, a law existing

only in the conscience of an irresponsible community, that banks must

save themselves only by their gold reserves, then by what divine

or earthly sense of justice shall we demand that banks shall not

speculate? Are the banks to be the keepers of our consciences, as well

as of our purses? The banks must live. And if instead of building up

their deposits on sound wealth, they build them up on unsound wealth,

and keep that proportion of reserves which critics demand they shall

keep, then they will have fulfilled their duty from the standpoint of

this narrow conception. Suppose they speculated and kept even higher

reserves than those laid down by the mathematicians, content with the

higher profits made from speculation, by whose standards of equity are

they to be judged?

If high gold reserves alone can save them, or should save them, and

they possess these high reserves, then they can be saved even if they

speculated. If the oracles say so, it must be so. If sound wealth be

useless to them, then unsound wealth could not be more useless. If they

could not get legal tender for sound wealth, for gilt-edged securities,

they would be no worse off with brass-edged securities.

As I have already insisted, it is something beyond lack of reason

to ask banks in the same moment to lend freely and to save their

gold reserves. It is as unreasonable as asking an ordinary man to be

generous and prodigal and at the same time close-fisted and thrifty.

Take that measure of the Government whereby it arranged with the Bank

of England to discount, without recourse to the holder, all approved

bills accepted before the declaration of the moratorium, guaranteeing

the Bank against any loss it might incur. This was, of course, placing

a burden on the shoulders of the community which was a perfectly

equitable burden. But quite apart from its equity, it was, in its

lowest aspect, an expedient burden. That is to say, if the nation had

refused to shoulder this burden, it would have had a far greater burden

to bear in the dislocation of trade and its incalculable losses.

It would not have been just to place this burden entirely on the

shoulders of the banks. In such a crisis the entire community had to

face the perils as a whole, and sink or swim as a whole.

When in the end the gains and losses are weighed, perhaps we shall find

that the gains, moral and material, greatly outweigh the losses.

What was the duty of the banks, when this measure was proclaimed,

towards the nation and towards themselves? Looking at it from the low

standpoint of self-preservation, what was their duty? From a low and a

high standpoint alike it was their duty to help the Government, help

the nation, through the Bank of England. They could not give that

effective help by hoarding their gold, by getting it from the Bank of

England, by sending borrowers to the Bank of England, by refusing help

to legitimate needs. Yet this is what some critics counselled them to

do--counselled them to increase and not ease the difficulties of the

Bank of England.

If the country could depend calmly and securely on the Bank of England,

with the Government behind it, then the banks also could depend upon

it. The Bank of England was the bulwark of England. That bulwark

could be weakened and not strengthened by the hoarding of gold. If the

Press and others admonished, and wisely admonished, the citizens not

to hoard gold, then it was illogical to ask the banks to hoard it, for

they would be hoarding the citizens’ gold. These contrary counsels were

opposed to all reason, and yet to this hour I see them advocated in

some quarters in the Press.

The Bank of England needed all the gold it could get as a basis

for the discounting of this huge mass of pre-moratorium paper.

Gold subsequently poured in from the gold mines and elsewhere, yet

notwithstanding this mighty inflow, the proportion of the Bank’s

reserve to the ever-growing deposits kept comparatively low, far below

the normal proportion. It was in the interests of the country that

the Bank should get this gold from any quarters to enable it to make

a success of the remedial measure and to ease the country’s financial

burdens. How, then, could it at the same time be in the interests of

the nation for the joint stock banks to take gold from the Bank, to

hoard it and not to send it there?

Such action as this would have been inconsistent with the fervent

gratitude the bank chairmen and the country have felt towards the

Government and its advisers.

Furthermore, what made it additionally ill-advised on the part of the

banks to hoard gold and pile up their reserves, was the subsequent

proclamation by the Government to the effect that the Bank of England,

on the authority of the Government, would advance the necessary funds

to meet acceptances for which cover was not duly forthcoming from

clients, until one year after the close of the war. This removed all

necessity to hoard gold and to pile up reserves, and it justified the

rebuke of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to those banks that refused

necessary accommodation to legitimate business. It was also a rebuke

to those critics who have seen no refuge for the country in the dark

hour of trouble except in hoarding by the banks and parting by the

public. That is to say, they counsel the public not to demand gold, and

they counsel the banks to keep it. If, therefore, the public are not

to demand gold, and if the banks are to accumulate it in their vaults,

then it means that in a crisis we can do without gold, and that, after

all, the credit which the banks are said to create will alone save us.

They are told that if they will only go on creating this credit they

will enable us to pass safely through the crisis. It comes to this,

that the advice given places us in mental confusion. Actual experience,

therefore, seems to be trustier than illogical advice.

What has been the direct consequence of this discounting of

pre-moratorium bills and this great inflow of gold, despite the issue

of a War Loan to the prodigious amount of £350,000,000? In the words

of the money article, day by day and week by week, money has been a

glut on the market, and has been lent on nominal terms, while discount

rates have also fallen to nominal quotations. In other words, the

great joint stock banks, in spite of themselves, have seen their gold

reserves rising to an unprecedented extent. Of what benefit to the

country is this great mass of idle gold? It is unproductive. It serves

no useful purpose if it cannot be employed. It is like the grain in the

barns perishing because it cannot be consumed. Yet in spite of this

state of things, due to the supply of liquid capital exceeding the

output of wealth, there have been those who have lamented the fall in

discount rates lest this should turn the exchanges against us, and gold

should be taken to New York or elsewhere. Would it not be beneficial if

some of the gold did go? If it went in payment of wealth received, the

gold would then become productive. The right service of gold is to help

to produce wealth, and if it does this it performs the services deputed

to it by the community. When gold passes from one nation to another

in exchange for wealth it never passes permanently. I might just as

reasonably urge that when I pay gold to my tailor for my dress suit I

part with the gold for ever. I should part with it only in the event of

my immediate decease, or if I became a non-producer, or in other ways

were deprived of all claims on the general wealth of the community. An

idle man, with pockets filled with gold, is a burden on the community.

He is no helper, no benefactor. So a nation, idle, with mighty safes

filled with gold, will become stagnant if this gold is not scattered

broadcast in the shape of capital that energizes the productive and

consumptive capacity of man and the land.

The value of gold will ever inhere in its wise use, not in its non-use.

“It has been well said,” remarked Sir Felix Schuster, in his recent

annual address, “that it is one of the paradoxes of finance, that at

the moment when the world’s capital is being squandered in war the

value of loanable capital in Lombard Street has actually depreciated.”

Sir Felix meant, of course, that there was no great demand for capital,

that it was greatly in excess of needs, that loans consequently were

cheap, and that banks could hardly lend profitably. I see no paradox in

this. If the creation of bank money is to be regulated by the supply

of gold only, it is an orthodox consequence. Since the outbreak of

the war the inflow of gold has been greater than ever experienced.

This has given the banks power to lend more, to liquefy more wealth,

because their reserves have increased, and the proportion of these to

the liabilities has correspondingly risen. But though a great deal of

wealth has come into existence, it must not be overlooked that a great

portion of it is not the kind of wealth banks lend on. This was partly

due to the closing of the Stock Exchange, the subsequent restrictions

on business there, and the destruction of trade between the belligerent

and other countries. Securities of a high class were scarce, and

bills of exchange became scarce, and while many industries, notably

the cotton industry, severely suffered, other industries, especially

war-provisioning industries, became abnormally busy. There was deadlock

for months in some of the foreign exchanges, especially the New York

and Russian exchanges. While the kind of wealth on which banks lend

fell off, the mines continued to produce gold, thus showing again how

independent this output is of real wealth production. Had the gold

mines also ceased working at the beginning of the war, have suspended

operations for many months, we should not have seen, perhaps, loanable

capital in Lombard Street so excessive and so depreciated as it was.

Sir Felix saw a great danger in this great mass of money and its

cheapness: the danger of its turning the exchanges against us. But this

danger could have done no more harm than the stoppage of the gold mines

had the rebellion spread in South Africa. The danger can be easily

exaggerated, especially at a moment when we can see far ahead, and see

the gold still coming to us in an uninterrupted stream from the mines.

Even had the New York exchange turned against us, it would turn round

again in due course, as it always has done and always will do so long

as international commerce proceeds.

By no jugglery can we, in the existing system, make cheap money

dear, any more than we can make cheap apples dear. It can be done by

cornering; but no cornering of money is possible. If banks cannot lend

at 1 per cent., they certainly cannot lend at 2 per cent. Human nature

must be re-created first. If men will not part with bills of discount

at 1½ per cent., they will not part with them at 1¾ per cent., and

there is no law, written or unwritten, that will compel them to do

this. The law of supply and demand operates as irresistibly in this

case as when we buy apples at an old lady’s stall.

If there be great danger in a great abundance and cheapness of money,

then there must be a great danger in an abundance of gold, which is

the source of the cheap money. Logic teaches us this. Reduce the gold,

hoard it or throw it in the ocean, then the supply of Lombard Street

money will decrease and loanable rates will rise.

The war and our financial fabric · 第 17 / 23 章