"The Rights of Man" by Thomas Paine (see RELIGION, Vol. XIII) was
an answer to Burke's attack on the French Revolution. It was
published in two parts in 1790 and 1792, and is an earnest and
courageous exposition of Paine's revolutionary opinions, and from
that day to this has played no small part in moulding public
thought. The extreme candour of his observations on monarchy led to
a prosecution, and he had to fly to France. There he pleaded for
the life of Louis XVI., and was imprisoned for ten months during
the Terror. He left France bitterly disappointed with the failure
of the republic, and passed the rest of his days in America.
"Paine's ignorance," says Sir Leslie Stephen, "was vast, and his
language brutal; but he had the gift of a true demagogue--the power
of wielding a fine, vigorous English."
_I.--Natural and Civil Rights_
Among the incivilities by which nations or individuals provoke or
irritate each other, Mr. Burke's pamphlet in the French revolution is an
extraordinary instance. There is scarcely an epithet of abuse in the
English language with which he has not loaded the French nation and the
National Assembly. Considered as an attempt at political argument, his
work is a pathless wilderness of rhapsodies, in which he asserts
whatever he pleases without offering either evidence or reasons for so
doing.
With his usual outrage, he abuses the Declaration of the Rights of Man
published by the National Assembly as the basis of the French
constitution. But does he mean to deny that _man_ has any rights? If he
does, then he must mean that there are no such things as rights
anywhere; for who is there in the world but man? But if Mr. Burke means
to admit that man has rights, the question then will be: What are those
rights and how came man by them originally?
The error of those who reason by precedents drawn from antiquity
respecting the rights of man is that they do not go far enough into
antiquity; they stop in some of the intermediate stages, and produce
what was then done as a rule for the present day. Mr. Burke, for
example, would have the English nation submit themselves to their
monarchs for ever, because an English Parliament did make such a
submission to William and Mary, not only on behalf of the people then
living, but on behalf of their heirs and posterities--as if any
parliament had the right of binding and controlling posterity, or of
commanding for ever how the world should be governed. If antiquity is to
be authority, a thousand such authorities may be produced, successively
contradicting each other; but if we proceed on, we shall at last come
out right; we shall come to the time when man came from the hand of his
Maker. What was he then? Man! Man was his high and only title, and a
higher cannot be given him.
All histories of creation agree in establishing one point, the unity of
man, by which I mean that men are all of one degree, and that all men
are born equal, and with equal natural rights. These natural rights are
the foundation of all their civil rights.
A few words will explain this: Natural rights are those which appertain
to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are the rights of the
mind, and also those rights of acting as an individual for his own
happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others.
Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a
member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation some natural
right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his
individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this
kind are all those which relate to security and protection.
It follows, then, that the power produced from the aggregate of natural
rights, imperfect in power in the individual, cannot be applied to
invade the natural rights which are retained in the individual, and in
which the power to execute is as perfect as the right itself.
Let us now apply these principles to governments. These may all be
comprehended under three heads: First, superstition; secondly, power;
thirdly, the common interest of society and the common rights of man.
When a set of artful men pretended to hold intercourse with the Deity,
as familiarly as they now march up the back stairs in European courts,
the world was completely under the government of superstition. This sort
of government lasted as long as this sort of superstition lasted.
After these, a race of conquerors arose, whose government, like that of
William the Conqueror, was founded in power. Governments thus
established last as long as the power to support them lasts; but, that
they might avail themselves of every engine in their favour, they united
fraud to force, and set up an idol which they called _Divine Right_, and
which twisted itself afterwards into an idol of another shape, called
_Church and State_. The key of St. Peter and the key of the treasury
became quartered on one another, and the wondering cheated multitude
worshipped the invention.
We have now to review the governments which arise out of society. If we
trace government to its origin, we discover that governments must have
arisen either _out_ of the people or over the people. In those which
have arisen out of the people, the individuals themselves, each in his
own personal and sovereign right, have entered into a compact with each
other to produce a government; and this is the only mode in which
governments have a right to arise.
This compact is the constitution, and a constitution is not a thing in
name only, but in fact. Wherever it cannot be produced in a visible
form, there is none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to government,
and a government is only its creature. The constitution of a country is
not the act of its government, but of the people constituting its
government.
Can, then, Mr. Burke produce the English constitution? He cannot, for no
such thing exists, nor ever did exist. The English government is one of
those which arose out of a conquest, and not out of society, and
consequently it arose over the people; and though it has been much
modified since the time of William the Conqueror, the country has never
yet regenerated itself, and is therefore without a constitution.
_II.--France and England Compared_
I now proceed to draw some comparisons between the French constitution
and the governmental usages in England.
The French constitution says that every man who pays a tax of sixty sous
per annum (2s. 6d., English) is an elector. What will Mr. Burke place
against this? Can anything be more limited, and at the same time more
capricious, than the qualifications of electors are in England?
The French constitution says that the National Assembly shall be elected
every two years. What will Mr. Burke place against this? Why, that the
nation has no right at all in the case, and that the government is
perfectly arbitrary with respect to this point.
The French constitution says there shall be no game laws, and no
monopolies of any kind. What will Mr. Burke say to this? In England,
game is made the property of those at whose expense it is not fed; and
with respect to monopolies, every chartered town is an aristocratical
monopoly in itself, and the qualification of electors proceeds out of
these monopolies. Is this freedom? Is this what Mr. Burke means by a
constitution?
The French constitution says that to preserve the national
representation from being corrupt no member of the National Assembly
shall be an officer of the government, a placeman, or a pensioner. What
will Mr. Burke place against this? I will whisper his answer: "Loaves
and Fishes." Ah! this government of loaves and fishes has more mischief
in it than people have yet reflected on. The English Parliament is
supposed to hold the national purse in trust for the nation. But if
those who vote the supplies are the same persons who receive the
supplies when voted, and are to account for the expenditure of those
supplies to those who voted them, it is themselves accountable to
themselves, and the comedy of errors concludes with the pantomime of
hush. Neither the ministerial party nor the opposition will touch upon
this case. The national purse is the common hack which each mounts upon.
They order these things better in France.
The French constitution says that the right of war and peace is in the
nation. Where else should it reside but in those who are to pay the
expense? In England this right is said to reside in a metaphor shown at
the Tower for sixpence or a shilling a head.
It may with reason be said that in the manner the English nation is
represented it signifies not where the right resides, whether in the
crown or in the parliament. War is the common harvest of all those who
participate in the division and expenditure of public money in all
countries. In reviewing the history of the English Government, an
impartial bystander would declare that taxes were not raised to carry on
wars, but that wars were raised to carry on taxes.
The French constitution says, "There shall be no titles"; and, of
consequence, "nobility" is done away, and the peer is exalted into man.
Titles are but nicknames, and every nickname is a title. The thing is
perfectly harmless in itself, but it marks a sort of foppery in the
human character which degrades it. If no mischief had annexed itself to
the folly of titles, they would not have been worth a serious and
formal destruction. Let us, then, examine the grounds upon which the
French constitution has resolved against having a house of peers in
France.
Because, in the first place, aristocracy is kept up by family tyranny
and injustice, due to the unnatural and iniquitous law of primogeniture.
Secondly, because the idea of hereditary legislators is as inconsistent
as that of hereditary judges or hereditary juries; and as absurd as an
hereditary mathematician, or an hereditary wise man; and as ridiculous
as an hereditary poet-laureate.
Thirdly, because a body of men, holding themselves accountable to
nobody, ought not to be trusted by anybody.
Fourthly, because it is continuing the uncivilised principle of
government founded in conquest, and the base idea of man having property
in man, and governing him by personal right.
The French constitution hath abolished or renounced toleration and
intolerance also, and hath established universal right of conscience.
Toleration is not the opposite of intolerance, but is the counterfeit of
it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of
withholding liberty of conscience, and the other of granting it. Who art
thou, vain dust and ashes! by whatever name thou art called, whether a
king, a bishop, a church, or a state, a parliament, or anything else,
that obtrudest thine insignificance between the soul of man and its
Maker? Mind thine own concerns. If he believes not as thou believest, it
is a proof that thou believest not as he believes, and there is no
earthly power can determine between you.
The opinions of men with respect to government are changing fast in all
countries. The revolutions of America and France have thrown a beam of
light over the world, which reaches into men. Ignorance is of a
peculiar nature; once dispelled, it is impossible to re-establish it.
It is not originally a thing of itself, but is only the absence of
knowledge; and though man may be kept ignorant, he cannot be made
ignorant.
When we survey the wretched condition of man, under the monarchical and
hereditary systems of government, dragged from his home by one power, or
driven by another, and impoverished by taxes more than by enemies, it
becomes evident that these systems are bad, and that a general
revolution in the principle and construction of governments is
necessary.
And it is not difficult to perceive, from the enlightened state of
mankind, that hereditary governments are verging to their decline, and
that revolutions on the broad basis of national sovereignty and
government by representation are making their way in Europe; it would be
an act of wisdom to anticipate their approach and produce revolutions by
reason and accommodation, rather than commit them to the issue of
convulsions.
_III.--The Old and New Systems_
The danger to which the success of revolutions is most exposed is in
attempting them before the principles on which they proceed, and the
advantages to result from them are sufficiently understood. Almost
everything appertaining to the circumstances of a nation has been
absorbed and confounded under the general and mysterious word
government. It may, therefore, be of use in this day of revolutions to
discriminate between those things which are the effect of government,
and those which are not.
Great part of that order which reigns among mankind is not the effect of
government. It has its origin in the principles of society and the
natural constitution of man. The mutual dependence and reciprocal
interest which man has upon man, and all the parts of civilised
community upon each other, create that great chain of connection which
holds it together. In fine, society performs for itself almost
everything which is ascribed to government, which is no farther
necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilisation
are not conveniently competent.
The more perfect civilisation is, the less occasion has it for
government, because the more does it regulate its own affairs, and
govern itself. All the great laws of society are laws of nature. They
are followed and obeyed because it is the interest of the parties to do
so, and not on account of any formal laws their governments may impose.
But how often is the natural propensity to society disturbed or
destroyed by the operations of government! When the latter, instead of
being ingrafted on the principles of the former, assumes to exist for
itself, and acts by partialities of favour and oppression, it becomes
the cause of the mischiefs it ought to prevent.
It is impossible that such governments as have hitherto existed in the
world would have commenced by any other means than a total violation of
every principle, sacred and moral. The obscurity in which the origin of
all the present old governments is buried implies the iniquity and
disgrace with which they began. What scenes of horror present themselves
in contemplating the character and reviewing the history of such
governments! If we would delineate human nature with a baseness of heart
and hypocrisy of countenance that reflection would shudder at and
humanity disown, they are kings, courts, and cabinets that must sit for
the portrait. Man, naturally as he is, with all his faults about him, is
not up to the character.
Government on the old system is an assumption of power, for the
aggrandisement of itself; on the new a delegation of power for the
common benefit of society. The one now called the old is hereditary,
either in whole or in part, and the new is entirely representative. It
rejects all hereditary government:
First, as being an imposition on mankind.
Secondly, as inadequate to the purposes for which government is
necessary.
All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny. To inherit a
government is to inherit the people, as if they were flocks and herds.
Kings succeed each other, not as rationals, but as animals. It signifies
not what their mental or moral characters are. Monarchical government
appears under all the various characters of childhood, decrepitude,
dotage; a thing at nurse, in leading-strings, or in crutches. In short,
we cannot conceive a more ridiculous figure of government than
hereditary succession. By continuing this absurdity, man is perpetually
in contradiction with himself; he may accept for a king, or a chief
magistrate, or a legislator a person whom he would not elect for a
constable.
The representative system takes society and civilisation for its basis;
nature, reason, and experience for its guide. The original simple
democracy was society governing itself without the aid of secondary
means. By ingrafting representation upon democracy we arrive at a system
of government capable of embracing and confederating all the various
interests and every extent of territory and population; and that also
with advantages as much inferior to hereditary government, as the
republic of letters is to hereditary literature.
Considering government in the only light in which it should be
considered, that of a national association, it ought to be constructed
as not to be disordered by any accident happening among the parts, and,
therefore, no extraordinary power should be lodged in the hands of any
individual. Monarchy would not have continued so many ages in the world
had it not been for the abuses it protects. It is the master-fraud which
shelters all others. By admitting a participation of the spoil, it makes
itself friends; and when it ceases to do this it will cease to be the
idol of courtiers.
One of the greatest improvements that have been made for the perpetual
security and progress of constitutional liberty, is the provision which
the new constitutions make for occasionally revising, altering, and
amending them. The best constitutions that could now be devised
consistently with the condition of the present moment, may be far short
of that excellence which a few years may afford. There is a morning of
reason rising upon man on the subject of governments that has not
appeared before. Just emerging from such a barbarous condition, it is
too soon to determine to what extent of improvement government may yet
be carried. For what we can foresee, all Europe may form but one great
republic, and man be free of the whole.
_IV.--The Reform of England_
As it is necessary to include England in the prospect of general
reformation, it is proper to inquire into the defects of its government.
It is only by each nation reforming its own, that the whole can be
improved and the full benefit of reformation enjoyed.
When in countries that are called civilised we see age going to the
workhouse and youth to the gallows something must be wrong in the system
of government. Why is it that scarcely any are executed but the poor?
The fact is a proof, among other things, of a wretchedness in their
condition. Bred up without morals, and cast upon the world without a
prospect, they are the exposed sacrifice of vice and legal barbarity.
The first defect of English government I shall mention is the evil of
those Gothic institutions, the corporation towns. As one of the houses
of the English Parliament is, in a great measure, made up of elections
from these corporations, and as it is unnatural that a pure stream
should flow from a foul fountain, its vices are but a continuation of
the vices of its origin. A man of moral honour and good political
principles cannot submit to the mean drudgery and disgraceful arts by
which such elections are carried.
I proceed in the next place to the aristocracy. The house of peers is
simply a combination of persons in one common interest. No better reason
can be given why a house of legislation should be composed entirely of
men whose occupation consists in letting landed property, than why it
should be composed of brewers, of bakers, or any other separate class of
men. What right has the landed interest to a distinct representation
from the general interest of the nation? The only use to be made of its
power is to ward off the taxes from itself, and to throw the burden upon
such articles of consumption by which itself would be least affected.
I proceed to what is called the crown. It signifies a nominal office of
a million sterling a year, the business of which consists in receiving
the money. Whether the person be wise or foolish, sane or insane, a
native or a foreigner, matters not. The hazard to which this office is
exposed in all countries is not from anything that can happen to the
man, but from what may happen to the nation--the danger of its coming to
its senses.
I shall now turn to the matter of lessening the burden of taxes. The
amount of taxation now levied may be taken in round numbers at
L17,000,000, nine millions of which are appropriated to the payment of
interest on the national debt, and eight millions to the current
expenses of each year.
All circumstances taken together, arising from the French revolution,
from the approaching harmony of the two nations, the abolition of court
intrigue on both sides, and the progress of knowledge in the science of
governing, the annual expenditure might be put back to one million and a
half--half a million each for Navy, Army, and expenses of government.
Three hundred representatives fairly elected are sufficient for all the
purposes to which legislation can apply. They may be divided into two
or three houses, or meet in one, as in France. If an allowance of L500
per annum were made to each representative, the yearly cost would be
L15,000. The expense of the official departments could not reasonably
exceed L425,000. All revenue officers are paid out of the monies they
collect, and therefore are not in this estimation.
Taking one million and a half as a sufficient peace establishment for
all the honest purposes of government, there will remain a surplus of
upwards of six millions out of the present current expenses. How is this
surplus to be disposed of?
The first step would be to abolish the poor rates entirely, and in lieu
thereof to make a remission of taxes to the poor of double the amount of
the present poor rates--_viz._, four millions annually out of the
surplus taxes. This money could be distributed so as to provide L4
annually per head for the support of children of poor families, and to
provide also for the cost of education of over a million children; to
give annuities of L10 each for the aged poor over sixty, and of L6 each
for the poor over fifty; to give donations of L1 each on occasions of
births in poor families, and marriages of the poor; to make allowances
for funeral expenses of persons travelling for work, and dying at a
distance from their friends; and to furnish employment for the casual
poor of the metropolis, where modes of relief are necessary that are not
required in the country.
Of the sum remaining after these deductions, half a million should be
spent in pensioning disbanded soldiers and in increasing the pay of the
soldiers who shall remain. The burdensome house and window tax,
amounting to over half a million annually, should be taken off. There
yet remains over a million surplus, which might be used for special
purposes, or applied to relief of taxation as circumstances require.
For the commutation tax there should be substituted an estate tax
rising from 3d. in the pound on the first L500 to 20s. in the pound on
the twenty-third L1,000. Every thousand beyond the twenty-third would
thus produce no profit but by dividing the estate, and thereby would be
extirpated the overgrown influence arising from the unnatural law of
primogeniture.
Of all nations in Europe there is none so much interested in the French
revolution as England. Enemies for ages, the opportunity now presents
itself of amicably closing the scene and joining their efforts to reform
the rest of Europe. Such an alliance, together with that of Holland,
could propose with effect a general dismantling of all the navies in
Europe, to a certain proportion to be agreed upon. This will save to
France and England at least two million sterling annually to each, and
their relative force would be in the same proportion as it is now.
Peace, which costs nothing, is attended with infinitely more advantage
than any victory with all its expense.
Never did so great an opportunity offer itself to England, and to all
Europe, as is produced by the two revolutions of America and France. By
the former, freedom has a national champion in the western world, and by
the latter in Europe. When another nation shall join France, despotism
and bad government will scarcely dare to appear. The present age will
hereafter merit to be called the Age of Reason, and the present
generation will appear to the future as the Adam of a new world.