Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli was born at Florence, in Italy,
May 3, 1469, and died June 22, 1527. At any early age he took an
active part in Florentine politics, and was employed on numerous
diplomatic missions. A keen student of the politics of his time, he
was also an ardent patriot. The exigencies of party warfare drove
him into temporary retirement, during which he produced a number of
brilliant plays and historical studies; but the most notable of his
achievements is "The Prince." "The Prince" may be regarded as the
first modern work treating of politics as a science. The one
question to which the author devotes himself is: How a prince may
establish and maintain the strongest possible government. Moral
principles, therefore, must yield entirely to the dictates of pure
expediency. It follows that the ruler who acts on the doctrines
laid down will pay no respect to right and wrong as such. Hence the
book has been mercilessly condemned. It was written probably about
1514, and not published till 1532.
_I.--Of Princedoms Won by Merit_
All states and governments are either republics or princedoms.
Princedoms are either hereditary or new. Hereditary states are
maintained with far less difficulty than new states, but in new
princedoms difficulties abound.
And first if the princedom be joined on to ancient dominions of the
prince, so as to form a mixed princedom, rebellion is a danger; for men
are always ready to change masters. When a state rebels and is again got
under it will not afterwards be lost so easily; for the prince will use
the rebellion as a pretext to make himself more secure.
Such new states when they are of the same province and tongue as the
ancient dominions of the prince are easily retained. It is enough to
have rooted out the line of the reigning prince. But where the language
and usages differ the difficulty is multiplied. One expedient is for the
prince himself to dwell in the new state, as the Turk has done in
Greece. Another is to send colonies into one or two places which may
become keys to the province; for the cost of troops is far greater. In
such provinces, moreover, the prince should always make himself the
protector of his weaker neighbours, without adding to their strength;
but should humble the great, and never suffer a formidable stranger to
acquire influence, as was the rule with the Romans. Whereas King Louis
of France has in Italy done the direct opposite in every single respect.
In especial we may draw from the French king's actions the general
axiom, which never or rarely errs, that "he who is the cause of
another's greatness is himself undone."
Now, all princedoms are governed in one or two ways: either by a sole
prince served by ministers, or by a prince with barons who hold their
rank not by favour but by right of descent. The Turk is an example of
the first, the French king of the second. A state of the first kind is
difficult to win, but when won is easily held, since the prince's family
may be easily rooted out; but in such a state as France you may gain an
entry, but to hold your ground afterwards is difficult, since you cannot
root out the barons.
Hence we need not wonder at the ease wherewith Alexander was able to lay
a firm hold on Asia, albeit he died before he had well entered on
possession; since the dominion of Darius was of the same character as
that of the Turk.
When the newly acquired state has hitherto lived under its own laws and
in freedom there are three ways of holding it. The first is to destroy
it; the second to reside in it; the third to leave it under its own
laws, choosing for its governors from the inhabitants such as will be
friendly to you. But the safest course is either to destroy it or to go
and live in it.
Where the prince himself is new, either merit or good fortune is
implied, and if we consider the most excellent examples, such as Moses,
Cyrus, Romulus, and the like, we shall see that they owed to fortune
nothing beyond the opportunity which they seized. Those who, like these,
come to the princedom by virtuous paths acquire with difficulty, but
keep with ease. Their difficulties arise because they are of necessity
innovators. If, then, they have force of their own to employ they seldom
fail. Hence it comes that all armed prophets have been victorious and
all unarmed prophets have been destroyed; as was the case with
Savonarola.
_II.--Of Princedoms Won Otherwise than by Merit_
Those who rise to princedom by mere good fortune have much trouble to
maintain themselves; some lack both the knowledge and the power to do
so. Yet even if such a one be of great parts, he may lose what he has
won, like Cesare Borgia.
It was impossible for the duke to aggrandise himself unless the states
of Italy were thrown into confusion so that he might safely make himself
master of some part of them. This was made easy for him as concerned
Romagna by the conduct of the French and Venetians. The next step was to
weaken the factions of the Orsini and the Colonnesi. Having scattered
the Colonnesi, the Orsini were so won over as to be drawn in their
simplicity into his hands at Sinigaglia. Having thus disposed of the
leaders, he set about ingratiating himself with the population of
Romagna and Urbino. He first set over the country a stern ruler to
restore order. This end being accomplished, that stern but unpopular
ruler was beheaded.
Next, as a new pope might be dangerous, he set himself to exterminate
the kindred of those lords whom he had despoiled of their possessions,
to win over the Roman nobility, and to secure a majority among the
cardinals. But before the duke had completely consolidated his power his
father, Pope Alexander VI., died. Even so, the skill with which he had
laid the foundations of his power must have resulted in success had he
not himself been almost at death's door at that critical moment. The one
mistake he made was in the choice of the new pope, Julius II., and this
error was the cause of his ultimate downfall.
A man may rise, however, to a princedom by paths of wickedness and
crime; that is, not precisely by either merit or fortune. We may take as
example first Agathocles the Sicilian. To slaughter fellow citizens, to
betray friends, to be devoid of honour, pity, and religion cannot be
counted as merit. But the achievements of Agathocles can certainly not
be ascribed to fortune. We cannot, therefore, attribute either to
fortune or to merit what he accomplished without either. For a modern
instance we may consider Oliverotto of Fermo, who seized upon that town
by a piece of monstrous treachery and merciless butchery; yet he
established himself so firmly and so formidably that he could not have
been unseated had he not let himself be over-reached by Cesare Borgia.
Our lesson from these examples is that on seizing a state the usurper
should make haste to inflict what injuries he must at one stroke, and
afterwards win men over by benefits.
Next is the case of those who are made princes by the favour of their
countrymen, which they owe to what may be termed a fortunate astuteness.
If he be established by the favour of the people, to secure them against
the oppression of the nobles his position is stronger than if he owe it
to the nobles; but in either case it is the people whom he must
conciliate, and this I affirm in spite of the old saw, "He who builds
on the people builds on mire."
A prince who cannot get together an army fit to take the field against
any assailant should keep his city strongly fortified, taking no heed of
the country outside, for then he will not be readily attacked, and if he
be it will be difficult to maintain a siege longer than it may be
resisted.
Merit, or good fortune, are needed to acquire ecclesiastical princedoms,
but not to maintain them, for they are upheld by the authority of
religion. It is due to the policy of the Popes Alexander VI. and Julius
II. that the temporal power of the pope has become so great; and from
his holiness Pope Leo we may hope that as his predecessors made the
papacy great with arms he will render it still greater and more
venerable by his benignity and other countless virtues.
_III.--Of Maintaining a Princedom_
A prince must defend his state with either his own subjects or
mercenaries, or auxiliaries. Mercenaries are utterly untrustworthy; if
their captain be not an able man the prince will probably be ruined,
whereas if he be an able man he will be seeking a goal of his own. This
has been perpetually exemplified among the cities and states of Italy
which have sought to maintain themselves by taking foreigners into their
pay.
But he who would deprive himself of every chance of success should have
recourse to auxiliaries; that is, to the troops of a foreign potentate.
For these are far more dangerous than mercenary arms, bringing ruin with
them ready made. The better such troops are the more dangerous they are.
From Hiero of Syracuse to Cesare Borgia, princes have become powerful in
proportion as they could dispense with such aid and place their
dependence upon national troops.
A prince, then, who would be powerful should have no care or thought
but for war, lest he lose his dominions If he be ignorant of military
affairs he can neither be respected by the soldiers nor trust them.
Therefore, he must both practise and study this art. For the practise,
the chase in many respects provides an excellent training both in
knowledge of the country and in vigour of the body. As to study, a
prince should read histories, note the actions of great men, and examine
the causes of their victories and defeats; seeking to imitate those who
have been renowned.
Anyone who would act up to a perfect standard of goodness in everything
must be ruined among so many who are not good. It is essential therefore
for a prince to have learnt how to be other than good, and to use, or
not to use, his goodness as necessity requires.
It may be a good thing to be reputed liberal, but liberality without the
reputation of it is hurtful. Display necessitates the imposition of
taxes, whereby the prince becomes hateful; whereas through parsimony his
revenue will be sufficient. Hence we have seen no princes accomplish
great results save those who have been accounted miserly.
Every prince should desire to be accounted merciful, not cruel; but a
new prince cannot escape a name for cruelty, for he who quells disorder
by a few signal examples will, in the end, be the more merciful.
Men are less careful how they offend him who makes himself loved than
him who makes himself feared; yet should a prince inspire fear in such a
fashion that, if he do not win love, he may escape hate; remembering
that men will sooner forget the slaying of their father than the loss of
their patrimony.
Princes who set little store by their word, but have known how to
overreach men by their cunning, have accomplished great things, and in
the end got the better of those who trusted to honest dealing. The
prince must be a lion, but he must also know how to play the fox. He
who wishes to deceive will never fail to find willing dupes. The prince,
in short, ought not to quit good courses if he can help it, but should
know how to follow evil courses if he must.
A prince must avoid being despised as well as being hated; therefore
courage, wisdom, and strength must be apparent in all his actions.
Against such a one conspiracy is difficult. That prince is wise who
devolves on others those matters that entail responsibility, and may
therefore make him odious either to the nobles or to the commons, but
reserves to himself the matters that relate to grace and favour.
What I have said is not contradicted by the history of the Roman
emperors; for they had to choose between satisfying the soldiers and
satisfying the people. It was imperative that at any cost they should
maintain control of the soldiery, which scarce any of them could do
without injustice to the people. If we examine their histories in detail
we shall find that they fully bear out the principles I have laid down.
But in our time the standing armies of princes have not the same power
as the armies of the Roman empire, and except under the Turk and the
Soldan it is more needful to satisfy the people than the soldiery.
_IV.--Of Artifices_
A new prince will never disarm his subjects, but will rather arm them,
at least in part. For thus they become his partisans, whereas without
them he must depend on mercenaries.
But a prince who adds a new state to his old possessions should disarm
its inhabitants, relying on the soldiers of his own ancient dominions.
Some have fostered feuds among their new subjects in order to keep them
weak, but such a policy rarely proves useful in the end. The prince who
acquires a new state will gain more strength by winning over and
trusting those who were at first opposed to him than by relying on those
who were at first his friends. The prince who is more afraid of his
subjects than of strangers ought to build fortresses, while he who is
more afraid of strangers than of his subjects should leave them alone.
On the whole, the best fortress you can have is in not being hated by
your subjects.
Nothing makes a prince so well thought of as to undertake great
enterprises and give striking proofs of his capacity. Ferdinand of
Aragon, in our own time, has become the foremost king in Christendom. If
you consider his achievements, you will find them all great and some
extraordinary. First he made war on Grenada, and this was the foundation
of his power. Under the cloak of religion, with what may be called pious
cruelty, he cleared his kingdom of the Moors; under the same pretext he
made war on Africa, invaded Italy, and finally attacked France; while
his subjects, occupied with these great actions, had neither time nor
opportunity to oppose them.
The prince whose ministers are at once capable and faithful may always
be accounted wise, since he must be one who can discern the merits and
demerits of his servant. For which discernment this unfailing rule may
be laid down: When you see a minister thinking more of himself than of
you, and in all his actions seeking his own ends, that man can never be
a minister you can trust. To retain a good minister the prince will bind
him to himself by benefits. Above all, he will avoid being deceived by
flatterers, and while he consults his counsellors should reflect and
judge for himself. A prince who is not wise himself cannot be well
advised by others.
The Italian princes who in our own times have lost their dominions have
either been deficient in respect of arms, or have had the people against
them, or have not known how to secure themselves against the nobles. As
to the influence of fortune, it may be the case that she is the mistress
of one half of our actions, but leaves the control of the other half to
ourselves. That prince will prosper most whose mode of acting best
adapts itself to the character of the times; so that at one time a
cautious temperament, and at another an impetuous temperament, will be
the more successful.
Now, at this time the whole land of Italy is without a head, without
order, beaten, spoiled, torn in pieces, overrun, and abandoned to
destruction in every shape. She prays God to send someone to rescue her
from these barbarous cruelties; she is eager to follow anyone who could
undertake the part of a deliverer; nor does this seem too hard a task
for you, the Magnificent Lorenzo of the illustrious house of Medici. The
cause is just; we have before us unexampled proofs of Divine favour.
Everything has concurred to promote your greatness. What remains to be
done must be done by you, for God will not do everything Himself.