Thomas Hobbes was born at Malmesbury, Wiltshire, England, April 5,
1588, and died at Hardwick Dec. 4, 1679. When comparatively a young
man he was secretary to Francis Bacon. He spent many years abroad,
met Galileo, and corresponded with Descartes. But he did not begin
to produce until in advanced middle age. "Leviathan, or the Matter,
Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil,"
appeared in 1651. His special impulse to the construction of a
science of politics came from the Great Rebellion, his detestation
of the principles on which it was based, and his dissatisfaction
with the theory of "divine right" as a bafis for the absolutism
which he counted a necessity. The "Leviathan" is the commonwealth,
or state, conceived as an "artificial man," and this gives the
title to this famous work. But this essay towards a science of
politics was only a fragment of that complete and all-inclusive
structure which he contemplated. Although in this sense only a
fragment, it has largely influenced all political theorising since
his day: and it contains the most definite enunciation of the
doctrine of the social contract, which took so different and so
revolutionary a shape in the hands of Rousseau.
_I.--Of Man_
Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the
art of man so imitated that he can make an artificial animal. For by art
is created that great leviathan called a commonwealth or state, which is
but an artificial man; in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul,
as giving life and motion; the magistrates and other officers the
joints; reward and punishment the nerves; concord, health; discord,
sickness; lastly, the pacts or covenants by which the parts were first
set together resemble the "fiat" of God at the Creation.
To describe this artificial man, I will consider: First, the matter and
the artificer, both which is man; secondly, how it is made; thirdly,
what is a Christian commonwealth; lastly, what is the kingdom of
darkness.
And first, of man. The thoughts of man are, singly, every one a
representation of some quality or accident of a body without us, called
an object. There is no conception in the mind which has not first been
begotten upon the organs of sense. The cause of sense is the eternal
object which presseth upon the proper organ; not that, as hath been
taught in the schools, the thing, "sendeth forth a visible or audible
species."
Imagination is the continuity of an image after the object is removed.
When we would express that the image is decaying, we call it memory; in
sleep, we call it dreams. A train of thought is the succession in the
mind of images which have succeeded each other in experience.
Of all inventions the most notable is that of speech, names, the
register of thoughts; which are notes for remembrance, or signs, for
transference. Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our
affirmations. Words are wise men's counters, but the money of fools.
Reasoning is the reckoning, the addition and subtraction of the
sequences of words, the sum being the conclusion. Which conclusions may
be absurd, because men do not start--except in geometry--from the
definitions of the words. Reason, therefore, implies speech.
In animals there are two sorts of motions--vital and voluntary. The
beginnings of motion within man are called "endeavour." Appetite is a
motion towards; aversion a motion fromwards. Some are born in us, some
are products of experience. The object of a man's appetite he calls
"good"; of his aversion, "evil"; whether in promise (beautiful and
ugly), in effect (pleasant, painful), or as means (useful, hurtful).
Pleasures and pains arise from an object present, of the senses; or in
expectation, of the mind. Thus "pity" is the imagining of a like
calamity befalling oneself.
"Deliberation" is the sum of the successive appetites or aversions
which are concluded by the doing or not doing of the particular thing.
"Will" is the last appetite in deliberating. So, in the inquiry of the
truth, opinions correspond to appetites, and the final judgment, the
last opinion, to the will.
There are two kinds of knowledge; of "fact," and of "the consequence of
one affirmation to another." The former is nothing else but sense and
memory, and is absolute; the latter is called science, and is
conditional. The register of the first is called history, natural or
civil; that of the second is contained in books of philosophy, in
corresponding groups--natural philosophy, and civil philosophy, or
politics. Natural philosophy breaks up into a number of groups,
including mental and moral science.
Power is present means, whencesoever derived, to attain some future
apparent good. Value is the price that will be given for the use of a
man's power. To honour a man is to acknowledge his power; to dishonour
him is to depreciate it. The public worth of a man is the value set on
him by the commonwealth.
By manners, I mean those qualities of mankind which are concerned with
their living together in peace and unity. Desire of power tends to
produce strife; other desires, as for ease, or for knowledge, incline
men to obey a common power. To receive benefits, or to do injuries,
greater than can be repaid or expiated, tends to make us hate the
benefactor or the injured party.
_II.--Of Contract and Sovereignty_
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body and mind that
are born in them, that one man cannot in respect of these claim to
himself any benefit to which another may not pretend. From this equality
ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. Therefore, if
two men desire the same thing which they cannot both enjoy they become
enemies, and seek each the destruction of the other, each mistrusting
the other. So men invade each other, first for gain, second for safety,
and third for reputation.
Hence, while men live without a common power to keep them all in awe,
they are in a state of war, every man against every man. In this state,
notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place.
Probably there never was actually such a universal condition; but we see
it now among savage races and in the mutual relations of sovereigns. In
this state of war, reason suggesteth articles of peace upon which men
may agree; which articles are otherwise called the laws of nature.
The "right of nature" is the right of self-preservation. "Liberty" is
the absence of impediments to the exercise of power. A "law of nature"
is a precept of reason forbidding a man to do what is destructive of his
own life. In the state of nature every man has a "right" to everything.
Thus security comes only of the first fundamental law: "To seek peace
and follow it," and "by all means we can to defend ourselves."
The second law follows: "To lay down the right to everything, claiming
only so much against others as we concede to others against ourselves."
This right being renounced or transferred, injustice is the revocation
of that act. But since the object of a voluntary act is good to oneself,
such renunciation is not valid if not good for oneself; hence a man
cannot renounce the right of self-preservation.
The transferring of right, if not mutual, is free gift; if mutual, it is
contract. When this is not simultaneous there is a covenant or pact. The
covenant can become void only through some new fact arising after it was
made. A covenant not to defend oneself against force by force is void
_per se_.
The third law is: "That men perform their covenants made," without
which covenants are vain, and the state of war continues. The definition
of injustice is "the not-performance of a covenant." No covenant is
valid until there exists some power that can enforce the performance of
it by penalties; that is, until there is a commonwealth. What is done to
a man conformable to his own will signified to the doer is no injury to
him.
The fourth law is that of "gratitude"; that a man receiving a free gift
endeavour that the giver may not suffer thereby. A fifth is
"complaisance"--that every man strive to accommodate himself to the
rest. Others are pardon on repentance, and non-vindictiveness of
punishment; and the common enjoyment--or, failing that, distribution by
lot--of what cannot be equally divided. Observance of these laws is
virtue.
Persons are either natural and actual, or fictitious and artificial,
_i.e._, representing someone else, or even something else: as a church,
a hospital, a bridge. When the representative has authority from the
represented, we call the former the "actor," and the latter the
"author." One person may artificially represent a multitude.
Now, men being in the state of nature may agree together; but there is
no security, unless there be a power to enforce the covenant. Such a
power can be created only if they agree together to confer all their own
power on one man or one assembly; so that all the acts of such person or
assembly have authority as from each one of them, and each one of them
submits his individual will to that of such person or assembly. The
multitude so united in one person is a commonwealth. This is the
generation of that leviathan or mortal god to which, under the Immortal
God, we owe our peace and defence.
He that carrieth this person is called "sovereign," and everyone beside
is his "subject." This sovereign power may be attained either by natural
force, "acquisition," or by voluntary transference, "institution." And
first of a commonwealth by institution.
They that have instituted a commonwealth by covenant cannot make a new
covenant contrary thereto without permission of the sovereign, since
this is a breaking of their covenant with each other. On his part there
is no covenant, so that breach of covenant by him cannot be pleaded as
warranting abrogation of the covenant made. The sovereign cannot do the
subjects injustice because, since he has their authority, what he does
to them is done by their own will; so also they cannot punish him.
Since the sovereign was instituted for peace and defence, he controls
the means to war and peace, and judges of opinions as conducing to peace
or endangering it. He prescribes the rules of property, since in the
state of nature there is no property; he has the right of judicature; of
making war and peace with other commonwealths; of choosing all
counsellors in peace and war; of rewarding and punishing, according to
the law he has made, and of bestowing honour. Nay, if he grants away any
of these powers the grant is null.
The sovereignty may be in one man, or in a limited assembly, or in an
assembly of all--monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; these three forms
only, though when they are misliked they are called other names. In any
case, the power of the sovereign is absolute, whether a monarch or an
assembly. He is the representative of the commonwealth, not deputies who
may be chosen to tender petitions.
The three forms differ not in the power of the sovereign, but in their
advantageousness. In monarchy, the private interest of the sovereign
must coincide with that of the commonwealth as a whole; much more so
than in aristocracy or democracy. An assembly cannot receive counsel
secretly; a monarchy has the benefit of a single will instead of
conflicting wills. There is no government by a mixture of the types,
_e.g._, an elective "king" is not sovereign, but a minister; and within
his province a Roman pro-consul was an absolute monarch. Men submit
themselves to an instituted sovereign, for fear of each other; to an
acquired sovereignty, for fear of the sovereign. Acquired sovereignty or
dominion is either by generation (paternal) or by conquest. A family,
however, does not amount to a commonwealth, unless it be so great that
it may not be subdued but by war. Acquired sovereignty is absolute, for
the same reasons as instituted sovereignty.
_III.--The Natural Commonwealth_
Liberty is absence of impediments to motion. It is consistent with fear,
also with necessity; for a voluntary act is yet necessary as having a
cause which is a link in a chain of causes up to the First Cause, which
is God. But men have created artificial impediments or bonds called
laws. The liberty of the subject lies only in such things as the
sovereign has pretermitted, for he hath power to regulate all, even life
and death, at his own will. The liberty praised in Rome and Athens was
the liberty of the commonwealth as against other commonwealths.
The subject has liberty to disobey the sovereign's command if it
contravene the law that the right of self-preservation cannot be
abrogated, unless it be to endanger himself for the preservation of the
commonwealth, as with soldiers. The subjects' obligation of obedience
lasts so long as the sovereign's power of defending them, that being the
purpose of his being made sovereign. By systems I mean numbers of men
joined in one interest. These are political, constituted by law; and
private, permitted or forbidden by law. All, except a commonwealth, are
subordinate to the commonwealth, and have not the character of
sovereignty. The rights of governing bodies are only those expressly
conceded by law, either generally or to them specifically. Systems in
the commonwealth correspond to muscles in the natural body.
The nourishment of the commonwealth is its commodities or products, the
distribution of which must be lit the will of the sovereign, whether of
land or of commodities, exchanged internally or trafficked abroad. The
procreation, or children, of a commonwealth are its "plantations," or
"colonies," which may either be commonwealths themselves, as children
emancipated, or remain parts of the commonwealth.
By civil laws I mean those laws that men are bound to obey as members of
any commonwealth. The sovereign is the sole legislator, and is not
subject to the laws which he can repeal at pleasure. The civil laws are
the laws of nature expressed as commands of the commonwealth, or the
will of the sovereign so expressed; whatever is not the law of nature
must be expressly made known and published. Both the law of nature and
written law require interpretation, which is by sentence of the judge
constituted by sovereign authority.
An intention of breaking the law is a sin; issuing in a breach of the
law it is crime. Violation of the laws of nature is always and
everywhere sin; it is crime only when a violation of the laws of a
commonwealth. Unavoidable ignorance of a law is a complete excuse for
breaking it, but ignorance due to lack of diligence is not unavoidable.
Terror of present death, or the order of the sovereign, are a complete
excuse. And many circumstances may serve as extenuation.
A punishment is an evil inflicted by public authority on him that hath
done or omitted that which is said to be by the same authority a
transgression of the law, to the end that the will of men may thereby be
the better disposed to obedience. Now, this right of punishment is not
transferred by the subjects to the sovereign since they cannot
surrender their right of self-defence against violence. But as all
before had the natural right of hurting others, that right is left by
the covenant to the sovereign alone, strengthened by the resignation
thereof by the rest.
Punishments inflicted by man are "corporal," or "pecuniary," or
"ignominy," or "imprisonment," or "exile," or mixed of these. Corporal
are capital, with or without torment, and less than capital. Pecuniary
includes deprivation not only of money, but also of lands or other
salable goods; but such deprivation, if it is by way of compensation to
the person injured, is not really punishment. Imprisonment, when it is
only for the custody of a person accused, is not punishment. Exile is
not so much a punishment as a command or permission to escape
punishment, except when accompanied by deprivation of goods.
Infirmities of a commonwealth arise--from the first institution, when
the sovereign has not assumed sufficient power; from such doctrines as
that each man privately is the judge of good or evil actions, or sins if
he obey the commonwealth against his "conscience"; that the sovereign is
subject to the civil laws; that private property excludes sovereign
rights; that sovereign power may be divided, which is the worst of all;
and from other causes, as of money grudged for wars, monopolies,
over-potent subjects or corporations, insatiable desire of dominion. But
when a country is conquered, that is the dissolution of the
commonwealth.
Of the sovereign's duties the first is to surrender none of his powers,
and the second to see that they be known, to which end, and the
understanding of it, the people must be rightly instructed. Further,
that he administer justice equally to all people, and impose equal
taxes, and make good laws (I say good, not just, since no law can be
unjust), and choose good counsellors.
Subjects owe simple obedience to the sovereign in all things
whatsoever, except what is contrary to the laws of God. Therefore, it
remains here to speak of the kingdom of God, Whose subjects are they
that believe in Him. God declareth His laws either by natural reason, or
by revelation, or by the voice of prophets. He is necessarily sovereign,
for the one reason that He is omnipotent.
_IV.--Of a Christian Commonwealth and the Kingdom of Darkness_
Of God speaking by the voice of a prophet are two signs: that the
prophet worketh miracles, and that he teacheth no other religion than
that established. These two must go together. And since miracles have
ceased, it is clear that God no longer speaks by prophets. But He hath
revealed Himself in Scripture--that is, in those books which are in the
canon ordained. But whether their authority be derived from the civil
sovereignty or is of a universal church to which all sovereigns are
subordinate is another question. It may be seen, however, from Scripture
that the kingdom of God therein spoken of is a civil kingdom, for the
restoration whereof we pray daily, which is that kingdom of God by
Christ which was interrupted by the revolt of the Israelites and the
election of Saul.
A church is a term used in many senses, but in one only can it be
treated as a person having power to will, command, or do any action
whatever. And according to this sense I define a church to be "a company
of men professing Christian religion, united in the person of one
sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose
authority they ought not to assemble." It follows that a church that is
assembled in any commonwealth that hath forbidden them to assemble is an
unlawful assembly. There are Christians in the dominions of several
princes and states; but every one of them is subject to that
commonwealth of which he is himself a member, and consequently cannot be
subject to the commands of any other person. There is therefore no such
universal church as all are bound to obey.
The original covenant with Abraham gave him the sole right, which is the
inheritance of every sovereign, to punish any subject who should pretend
to a private vision for the countenancing of any doctrine which Abraham
should forbid. This covenant established that kingdom of God which was
interrupted by the secular kingdom of Saul. The coming of Christ was to
restore that kingdom by a new covenant; which kingdom was to be in
another world after the Resurrection. The power ecclesiastical was left
by Him to the apostles, but this is manifestly not a coercive power on
earth, as Christ's own power on earth was not.
Christ, therefore, by His coming did not withdraw any of the power from
civil sovereigns, and if they do commit the government of their subjects
in matter of religion to the Pope, he holdeth that charge not as being
above the civil sovereign, but by his authority. But as for disagreement
between the laws of God and the civil laws of the sovereign, the laws of
God, which must in no wise be disobeyed, are those which are necessary
to salvation; and these are summed up in the will to obey the law of God
and the belief that Jesus is the Christ. But the private man may not set
up to judge whether the ordinance of the sovereign be against the law of
God, or whether the doctrine which he imposeth consist with the belief
that Jesus is the Christ.
But in the Scripture there is mention also of another power, the kingdom
of Satan, "the prince of the powers of the air," which is a "confederacy
of deceivers that, to obtain dominion over men in this present world,
endeavours by dark and erroneous doctrines to extinguish in them the
light both of nature and of the Gospel, and so to disprepare them for
the kingdom of God to come." And such darkness is wrought first by
abusing the light of the Scriptures so that we know them not; secondly
by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets; thirdly, by mixing
with the Scripture divers relics of the religion and much of the vain
and erroneous philosophy of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle; and,
fourthly, by mingling with these false or uncertain traditions and
feigned or uncertain history.