Isidore Auguste Marie Francois Xavier Comte, the founder of the
Positive philosophy, was born at Montpellier, in France, Jan. 19,
1798. Entering the Ecole Polytechnique at Paris in his seventeenth
year, he showed mathematical talent, but was expelled for
insubordination. In 1818 he met St. Simon, and for six years he
remained under the influence of that philosopher; but in 1824 he
broke away and entered on an independent philosophical career. In
1826 he expounded to a distinguished audience his system of
Positive philosophy, but during the course had an attack of
insanity which lasted for a few months. Between 1830 and 1842 he
published his "Cours de Philosophie Positive." From 1835 to 1845 he
acted as examiner at the Ecole Polytechnique, but after 1845 he was
supported by a "subsidy" from his admirers. Comte married in 1825,
but his marriage was not happy, and ended in a separation in 1842.
He died on September 5, 1857. His other important works are "The
System of Positive Politics" and the "Positivist Catechism."
_I.--Positive Classification of the Sciences_
On studying the development of human intelligence, it is found that it
passes through three stages: (1) The theological, (2) the metaphysical,
(3) the scientific or positive. In the theological stage it seeks to
account for the world by supernatural beings. In the metaphysical stage
it seeks an explanation in abstract forces. In the scientific, or
positive, stage it applies itself to the study of the relation of
phenomena to each other.
Different sciences have passed through these stages at different rates.
Astronomy reached the positive stage first, then terrestrial physics,
then chemistry, then physiology, while sociology has not even yet
reached it. To put social phenomena upon a positive basis is the main
object of this work; its secondary object is to show that all branches
of knowledge spring from the same trunk. An integration of the sciences
on a positive basis should lead to the discovery of the laws which rule
the intellect in the investigation of facts, should regenerate science
and reorganise society. At present the theological, the metaphysical,
and the positive conflict, and cause intellectual disorder and
confusion.
The first step to be taken in forming a positive philosophy is to
classify the sciences. The first great division we notice in natural
phenomena is the division into inorganic and organic phenomena. Under
the inorganic we may include the sciences astronomy, physics, chemistry;
and under the organic we include the sciences physiology and sociology.
These five sciences, astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and
sociology, we may consider the five fundamental sciences. This
classification follows the order of the development of the sciences, and
indicates their social relation and relative perfection. In order to
reach effective knowledge, the sciences must be studied in the order
named; sociology cannot be understood without knowledge of the anterior
sciences.
Behind and before all these sciences, however, lies the great science of
mathematics--the most powerful instrument the mind can employ in the
investigation of natural law--and the science of mathematics must be
divided into abstract mathematics or the calculus, and concrete
mathematics embracing general geometry and rational mechanics. We have
thus really six great sciences.
MATHEMATICS. Mathematics may be defined briefly as the indirect
measurement of magnitudes and the determination of magnitudes by each
other. It is the business of concrete mathematics to discover the
_equations_ of phenomena; it is the business of abstract mathematics to
educe results from the equations. Thus concrete mathematics discovers by
actual experiment the acceleration which takes place per second in a
falling body, and abstract mathematics educes results from the
equations so discovered, and obtains unknown quantities from known.
ASTRONOMY. Astronomy may be defined as the science by which we discover
the laws of the geometrical and mechanical phenomena presented by
heavenly bodies. To discover these laws we can use only our sense of
sight and our reasoning power, and reasoning bears a greater proportion
to observation here than in any other science. Sight alone would never
teach us the figure of the earth or the path of a planet, and only by
the measurement of angles and computation of times can we discover
astronomical laws. The observation of these invariable laws frees man
from servitude to the theological and metaphysical conceptions of the
universe.
PHYSICS. Physics may be defined briefly as the study of the laws which
regulate the general properties of bodies regarded _en masse_, their
molecules remaining unaltered and usually in a state of aggregation. In
the observations of physics all the senses are employed, and
mathematical analysis and experiment assist observation. In the
phenomena of astronomy human intervention was impossible; in the
phenomena of physics man begins to modify natural phenomena.
Physics includes the subdivisions statics, dynamics, thermology,
acoustics, optics, and electrology. Physics is still handicapped by
metaphysical conceptions of the primary causes of phenomena.
CHEMISTRY. Chemistry may be briefly defined as the study of the laws of
the phenomena of composition and decomposition, which result from the
molecular and specific mutual action of different substances, natural or
artificial. In the observations of chemistry the senses are still more
employed, and experiment is of still more utility. Even in chemistry
metaphysical conceptions, such as "affinity," linger.
PHYSIOLOGY. Physiology may be defined as the study of the laws of
organic dynamics in relation to structure and environment. Placed in a
given environment, a definite organism must always act in a definite
way, and physiology investigates the reciprocal relations between
organism, environment, and function. In physiology observation and
experiment are of the greatest value, and apparatus of all kinds is used
to assist both observation and experiment. Physiology is most closely
connected with chemistry, since all the phenomena of life are associated
with compositions and decompositions of a chemical character.
_II.--Social Physics_
To place social physics on a scientific basis is a task of great
difficulty, since social theories are still perverted by theological and
metaphysical doctrines. All I can hope to do is to point out general
principles which may serve to correct the intellectual anarchy which is
the cause of the moral and political anarchy of the present day. I
propose to state first how the institution of a science of social
physics bears upon the principal needs and grievances of society, so
that men worthy of the name of statesmen may realise that such labours
are of real utility. So far, positive philosophy has worked timidly and
tentatively, and has not been bold and broad and general enough to cope
with intellectual anarchy in social questions; but it is necessary now
that it play a more dominant part in life, and lead society out of the
turmoil in which it has tossed for three centuries.
At present, society is distracted by two conflicting influences, which
may be called the theological polity and the metaphysical polity.
The theological polity at one time exercised a beneficent influence on
society; but for three centuries past its influence has been essentially
retrograde, and has gradually, but radically, decayed. The causes of its
decline are various; but the chief present-day antagonist to the
theological polity is the scientific spirit, and the scientific spirit
can now never be repressed.
The metaphysical polity is progressive, but progressive mainly in a
negative way. So far, it has made for progress; but it has made for
progress chiefly by removing impediments to progress, by destroying the
theological conceptions which retarded the development of human
intelligence and human society. Though dangerous and revolutionary, it
has been necessary; for much required to be demolished to permit
permanent reconstruction.
The metaphysical polity was required to combat the theological; but now
it has served its destructive purpose, and tends to become obstructive,
for, having destroyed the old, it will not permit the new. Its chief
dogma has always been liberty of conscience with the liberty of press
and speech which that implies; but liberty of conscience really means
little more than absence of intellectual regulation; and even as liberty
of conscience is out of the question in astronomy and chemistry, so it
is out of the question in social physics. Liberty of conscience and
inquiry can only be temporary and transitional, and must be followed by
positive decision on the part of those qualified to decide. It cannot be
held that every man is competent to form opinions in social and
political questions; it cannot be maintained that intellects of weak
capacity can judge obscure and complex questions, and that all opinions
are equally valuable. All society is based on faith in the opinion of
others and in reciprocal confidence. Continual discussion of the
foundations of society must render it impossible to lay sure foundations
firm, and the disorder produced by free opinions on all points by all
people is seen in the fierce and feeble sectarianism of Protestantism.
What are the limits of free inquiry we shall see later; meantime, we may
note that fine motto of the Catholic Church: "In necessary things,
unity; in doubtful things, liberty; and in all things, charity."
The second dogma of the metaphysical polity is equality, and, like the
other dogma, it must be considered the temporary expression of a
temporary need. It is indeed a corollary of the dogma of liberty of
conscience; for to assume liberty of conscience without equality of
intelligence would be to stultify the assumption. Having achieved its
purpose, it also became an obstacle in the path of progress. Equality
sufficient to permit a man to use his faculties aright is allowed by
all; but men cannot be made equal physically, and much less can they be
made equal intellectually and morally.
The dogma of liberty of conscience and equality resulted naturally in a
third dogma, the sovereignty of the people. This also was provisionally
useful, in that it permitted a series of political experiments; but it
is in essence revolutionary, condemning the superior to be ruled by the
inferior. A fourth dogma, the dogma of national independence, has also
been serviceable in separating the nations in preparation for a new
union.
The metaphysical polity fails utterly in constructive capacity. During
the first French revolution it successfully destroyed the old social
system; but its attempts to reorganise society were retrogressive.
Instead of Catholicism it proposed polytheism; and in the name of virtue
and simplicity it condemned industry and art. Even science was condemned
as aristocracy of knowledge. Nor can these blunders be considered
accidental; they were inherent in the polity. It is evident that a
polity that admits on the one hand the need for a theological
foundation, and on the other hand destroys the foundations of theology
must end in intellectual anarchy.
Satisfied with neither the theological nor the metaphysical polities,
society has wavered between them, and the one tendency has served
chiefly to counteract the other. Out of these oscillations a third
school of political opinion, which we may call the "stationary school,"
has arisen.
This school would fix society in a contradictory position between
retrogression and progress, such as is seen in the parliamentary
monarchy of England. This is a last phase of the metaphysical polity,
and is only a kind of _placebo_.
The result of all this is to produce a most unfortunate position. The
theological polity would revert to old, worn-out principles; the
metaphysical polity has no definite principles at all; and the
stationary school merely offers temporary compromises. Everywhere there
is intellectual anarchy, and in Protestant countries the disorder is
increased by sectarian discord. So complex are all social questions that
few are able to see them steadily, and see them whole, and where
individual opinion is unhampered, individual prejudice and individual
ignorance must be rampant.
Intellectual anarchy and unsettled convictions, moreover, tend to
political corruption. If there are no convictions and no principles to
which to appeal, appeal must be made to self-interest or to fear.
A growing tendency to take a shortsighted and material view of political
questions is also a disturbing sign of the times. This is due to the
fact that when, three centuries ago, spiritual power was abolished, all
social questions were given over to men occupied with practical affairs
and influenced chiefly by material considerations.
Material views of political questions not only impede progress, but are
also dangerous to order, for the view that disorders have a material
cause leads to constant interference with institutions and with
property. Granted there are abuses in connection both with property and
institutions, what is required is not material changes but general moral
and intellectual reform.
An inadequate and material view of social physics naturally favours
mediocrity, attracts political charlatans, while the most eminent minds
devote their attention to science.
The theological and metaphysical philosophies having failed, what
remains? Nothing remains but the positive philosophy, which is the only
agent able to reorganise society. The positive philosophy will regard
social phenomena as it regards other phenomena, and will apply to the
renovation of society the same scientific spirit found effective in
other departments of human knowledge. It will bring to politics the
conception of natural laws, and deal with delicate social questions on
impartial scientific principles. It will show that certain wrongs are
inevitable, and others curable; and that it is as foolish to try to cure
the incurable in social as in biological and chemical matters. A spirit
of this kind will encourage reform, and yet obviate vain attempts to
redress necessary evils.
It will thus make for intellectual order. It will likewise make for
progress and for true liberty by substituting genuine convictions
founded on scientific principles for constitutional artifices and the
laws of arbitrary wills; it will reconcile the antagonism of class
interests by moral and scientific considerations. Revolutionary
outbursts there still will be, but they will merely clear the ground for
positive reconstruction on a moral and intellectual basis.
Strangely enough, the scientific class are not likely to assist in the
positive reconstruction of society. They shrink from the irrational
methods of modern polities, and, further, they are so restricted in
their narrow horizons that they are unable to grasp the wide
generalisations of positive philosophy.
_III.--Social Statics_
There can be no doubt that society originated in social instincts, and
was not merely the result of utilitarian considerations. Indeed, the
social state could manifest its ability only when well developed, and in
the early ages of humanity the advantages to the individual of
association would not be obvious.
What, then, are the human instincts and requirements which give society
its fundamental characters? In the first place, it must be noted that in
man the intellectual is subordinate to the affective. In most men the
intellectual faculties are easily fatigued, and require a strong and
constant stimulus to keep them at work. In the majority of cases the
stimulus is derived from the needs of organic life; but in more highly
endowed individuals the incitement may proceed from higher affective
impulses. This subordination of the intellectual to the affective
faculties is beneficent in that it gives a permanent end and aim to the
intellectual activity.
In the second place it must be noted that the personal affections are
stronger than the social affections, and that personal affections give
aim and direction to our social actions. This is necessary, for all
ideas of public good must be inferred from the ideas of private
advantage, and if it were possible to repress our personal affections,
our social affections, deprived of necessary inspiration and direction,
would become vague and ineffective. In the precept that bids us love our
neighbours as ourselves the personal instinct is suggested as the
pattern for the social. The only thing to be regretted is that the
personal affections are apt to override, instead of stimulating, the
social affections.
Increase of intelligence must mean greater capacity for social
affection, because of the discipline it imposes on the personal
affections; and for the same reason increase of the social instinct is
favourable to intelligence. To strengthen this reciprocal action of the
intellect and the social affections is the first task of universal
morals. And the double opposition between man's moral and material need
of intellectual toil and his dislike of it, and again between man's
moral and material need of the social affections, and the subjection of
these to his personal instincts, discloses the scientific germ of the
struggle which we shall have to review, between the conservative and the
reforming spirit; the first of which is animated by purely personal
instincts, and the other by the spontaneous combination of intellectual
activity with the various social instincts.
Society, however, cannot be regarded as composed of individuals. The
true social unit is the _family_; it is essentially on the plan of the
family that society is constructed. In a family the social and the
personal instincts are blended and reconciled; in a family, too, the
principle of subordination and mutual co-operation is exemplified. The
domestic is the basis of all social life. The modern tendency,
therefore, to attack the institution of the family is an alarming
symptom of social disorganisation.
The sociological basis of the family depends on subordination of sexes
and of ages.
Marriage at once satisfies, disciplines, and harmonises the strongest
and most disorderly instinct of our animal nature; and though it may be
attacked by the revolutionary spirit because of its theological
implications, yet the institution is based on true principles, and must
survive. No doubt marriage has been modified, but to modify is not to
overthrow, and its fundamental principle remains intact.
The fundamental principle of the institution of marriage is the natural
subordination of the woman--a principle which has reappeared under all
forms of marriage. Biology teaches that radical differences, physical
and moral, distinguish the sexes, and sociology will prove that the
much-advertised equality of sexes is a fiction, and that equality of the
sexes would be incompatible with all social existence. Each sex has
special functions it must perform in the family, and the necessary
subordination of one sex is in no wise injurious, since the happiness of
every being depends on the wise development of its proper nature.
Our social system depends on intellectual activity under affective
stimulus, and in power of mental labour the woman is incontestably
inferior to the man, either because her mental powers are weaker, or
because her lively moral and physical sensibility is unfavourable to
mental concentration.
Besides the bond of marriage, which holds together society, there is the
bond between parents and children. Here again we find the principle of
subordination in force, and even as we find wild revolutionaries who
challenge the principle of subordination in women, so there are some who
would challenge the same principle in the case of children. Fortunately,
popular good sense and the primary instincts resist such absurdities.
The spontaneous subordination in the human family is the best model for
society. On the other hand, we see obedience and due subordination
allied to gratitude, and unassociated with shame; and, on the other
hand, we see absolute authority combined with affection and geniality.
There are those who would take children from their parents' care, and
hand them over to society, and there are those who would prevent the
transmission of property from parents to children; but such
extravagances need not be examined here.
Coming now to the consideration of society as constructed out of the
family units, we see unity of aim associated with diversity of
functions. It is a marvellous spectacle to see how in a society the
individuals pursuing each their own end yet unconsciously co-operate;
and this co-operation is the mainspring of society. In the family,
co-operation is much less marked; for the family is founded chiefly on
affection, and in affection finds its justification, quite apart from
co-operation towards any end. In society the instinct of co-operation
preponderates, and the instinct of affection plays only a secondary
part. There are exceptional men in whom the affective side of the social
instinct is dominant; but such men in most cases give their affection
to the race at large simply from lack of domestic sympathy.
The principle of co-operation, spontaneous or concerted, is the basis of
society, and the object of society must ever be to find the right place
for its individual members in its great co-operative scheme. There is,
however, a danger of exaggerated specialism; it concentrates the
attention of individuals on small parts of the social machine, and thus
narrows their sense of the social community, and produces an
indifference to the larger interests of humanity. It is lamentable to
find an artisan spending his life making pin-heads, and it is equally
lamentable to find a man with mind employing his mind only in the
solution of equations.
To guard against such social and intellectual disintegration must be the
duty of government. It must foster the feeling of interconnection
between individuals; and such a bond of feeling must be intellectual and
moral rather than material, and will always imply subordination. The
social instinct of man spontaneously produces government, and there is a
much stronger instinct of obedience in man than is commonly supposed.
Who has not felt it good to resign the responsibility of conduct to wise
and trustworthy guidance? Even in revolutionary times the people feel
the need of preponderant authority, and political subordination is as
inevitable as it is indispensable.
_IV.--Social Dynamics_
Human progress consists essentially in the evolution of the moral and
intellectual qualities proper to man. Most of the occupations of
civilisation which deal with material things relieve man from material
cares and discomforts, and permit him to use his higher faculties.
Death, too, may be considered a promoter of human progress. Youth is
essentially progressive, age essentially conservative and opposed to
progress, and death it is that prevents old age from too seriously
impeding the progress of the world. If life were ten times as long,
progress would be greatly retarded. On the other hand, death interferes
with continuity of work, and by interrupting a man's work often delays
its fruition. It is probable that if life were twice or thrice as long,
progress would be more rapid.
Human progress is directed by the reason, and the history of the
progress of society is largely the history of the human mind in its
progress through its three stages--the theological, metaphysical, and
positive. The necessity of these stages can be shown.
At first man knows nothing but himself, and it was inevitable that he
should explain things as produced by a being like himself. The
theological philosophy gave a basis for observation by its hypotheses
that phenomena were products of actions like human acts, and that all
bodies had life like human life, and that there was an invisible world
with invisible agents. These hypotheses were not only intellectually
necessary; they were also morally necessary, for they gave man
confidence to act, and hope that he could modify anything unsatisfactory
in the universe by appeals to its maker. Not only did the theological
philosophy sustain man's courage, and kindle his hope, and increase his
sense of power, but it gave an intellectual unanimity of great social
and political value; and, producing a special speculative class, made
the first effective division between things of matter and things of
mind. Except for the theological speculative class, man might have
remained merely a superior monkey.
Still, the theological philosophy was obviously only temporary, and
could not satisfy the needs of more highly developed intelligence, and
it soon came into conflict with positive philosophy. Indeed, at all
times there had been glimmerings of positive belief, for at all times
the simplest phenomena had been considered subject to natural laws, and
all had been compelled to act in everyday affairs on the assumption of
the invariability of natural law. The positive philosophy, therefore,
was inevitable from the first, and its open antagonism to the
theological philosophy was merely a question of time.
Between the theological and positive philosophy naturally and
necessarily has intervened the metaphysical, which has substituted
entities for a deity. This philosophy has never had the social power or
the consistency of the theological philosophy; its entities have been
mere abstractions. It has and has had such political power simply
because so elusive.
Material progress has gone through similar stages. The primitive
tendency of mankind was to a military life. At first the military life
afforded man, apart from cannibalism, the easy means of making a living;
and in no other school in these days could order have been taught, and
in no other way could political consolidation be so quickly effected.
Necessary as the military stage was, it was merely provisional, it must
be succeeded by the industrial stage. Meantime, we are in the
transitional stage between the two, for we have defensive instead of
offensive military organisation, which is becoming more and more
subordinate to industrial production.
The military stage corresponded with the theological stage, belonged to
the same _regime_, had common antipathies and sympathies as well as
general interests, and could not have worked without the aid of
theological convictions to give blind confidence in military superiors.
The industrial stage corresponds with the positive stage; it is akin in
spirit, in origin, and in destination. The transitional stage, again,
corresponds with the metaphysical stage. Only on these three dualisms
which I have established can a sound historical philosophy be based.