The son of humble Polish Jews, Jean Bloch, who was born in 1836,
amassed a large fortune out of Russian railways. At the age of
fifty he retired from business, and devoted himself to an
exhaustive study of the conditions and possibilities of modern
warfare. To this labour he gave eight years, and, in 1898, the
fruits of it were published in a work of six volumes, in which he
sought to prove that, owing to the immensity of modern armies, the
deadliness of modern weapons, and the economic conditions that
prevailed in the larger states, a great European war was rapidly
becoming a physical impossibility. M. Bloch died on January 7,
1902, not before several of his theories had been tested by actual
campaigning. His main argument, however, concerns a war on European
frontiers between European powers, and such a war he did not live
to witness.
_I.--The Problem Stated_
In the public and private life of modern Europe a presentiment is felt
that the present incessant growth of armaments must either call forth a
war, ruinous both for conqueror and for conquered, and ending perhaps in
general anarchy; or must reduce the people to the most lamentable
condition. Is this unique state of mind justified by possible
contingencies?
It is true that the ruinousness of war under modern conditions is
apparent to all. But this gives no sufficient guarantee that war will
not break forth suddenly, even in opposition to the wishes of those who
take part in it. Involuntarily we call to mind the words of the great
Bacon, that "in the vanity of the world a greater field of action is
open for folly than for reason, and frivolity always enjoys more
influence than judgment."
War, it would appear from an analysis of the history of mankind, has in
the past been a normal attribute of human life. The position now has
changed in much, but still the new continues to contend with the old.
With the innumerable voices which are now bound up in our public
opinion, and the many different representatives of its interests,
naturally appear very different views on militarism and its object--war.
The propertied classes are inclined to confuse even the intellectual
movement against militarism with aspirations for the subversion of
social order; on the other hand, agitators, seeking influence on the
minds of the masses, deny all existing rights, and promise to the masses
more than the most perfect institutions could give them. And although
the masses are slow to surrender themselves to abstract reasoning, and
act usually only under the influence of passion, there can be no doubt
that this agitation penetrates the people more and more deeply.
With such a position of affairs, it is necessary that influential and
educated men should seriously attempt to give themselves a clear account
of the effect of war under modern conditions; whether it will be
possible to realise the aims of war, and whether the extermination of
millions of men will not be wholly without result.
If, after consideration of all circumstances, we answer ourselves: "War
with such conditions is impossible; armies could not sustain those
cataclysms which a future war would call forth; the civil population
could not bear the famine and interruption of industry"; then we might
ask the general question: "Why do the peoples more and more exhaust
their strength in accumulating means of destruction which are valueless
even to accomplish the ends for which they are prepared?"
In recent times war has become even more terrible than before in
consequence of perfected weapons of destruction and systems of equipment
and training utterly unknown in the past. Infantry and artillery fire
will have unprecedented force; smoke will no longer conceal from the
survivors the terrible consequences of the battle. From this, and from
the fact that the mass of soldiers will have but recently been called
from the field, the factory, and the workshop, it will appear that even
the psychical conditions of war have changed.
The thought of the convulsions which will be called forth by a war, and
of the terrible means prepared for it, will hinder military enterprise.
But, on the other hand, the present conditions cannot continue to exist
for ever. The peoples groan under the burdens of militarism. We are
compelled to ask: Can the present incessant demands for money for
armaments continue for ever without social outbreaks? The position of
the European world, the organic strength of which is wasted, on the one
hand, in the sacrifice of millions on preparations for war, and, on the
other, in a destructive agitation, which finds in militarism its apology
and a fit instrument for acting on the minds of the people, must be
admitted to be abnormal and even sickly. Is it possible that there can
be no recovery from this? We are deeply persuaded that a means of
recovery exists if the European states would but set themselves the
question--in what will result these armaments and this exhaustion? What
will be the nature of a future war? Can recourse be had to war even now
for the decision of questions in dispute, and is it possible to conceive
the settlement of such questions by means of the cataclysm which, with
modern means of destruction, a war between five great powers with ten
millions of soldiers would cause?
That war will become impossible in time is indicated by all. The more
apposite question is--when will the recognition of this inevitable truth
be spread among European governments and peoples? When the impossibility
of resorting to war for the decision of international quarrels is
evident to all, other means will be devised.
_II.--How War Will Be Waged on Land_
The bullet of the present day can kill at a vastly greater distance than
the bullets fired during the Franco-German and Russo-Turkish campaigns.
The powder now in use has not only far more explosive force than the
old-fashioned powder, but is almost smokeless. The introduction of the
magazine rifle has immensely increased the speed of firing. Moreover,
the rifle is undergoing constant improvement, and becoming a more and
more deadly weapon. It is easy, then, to see the following consequences
from these changes: (1) The opening of battles from much greater
distances than formerly; (2) the necessity of loose formation in attack;
(3) the strengthening of the defence; (4) the increase in the area of
the battlefield; and (5) the increase in casualties.
If we take rifle shooting alone into account, the length of range, the
speed of fire, the better training of troops in the use of the rifle,
and the invention of contrivances to aid markmanship, cause such
effectiveness of fire that it would be quite possible for rival armies
totally to annihilate each other. But a similar improvement has taken
place in artillery. The introduction of the quick-firing gun has
multiplied the speed of artillery fire many times over. The range has
been increased by the perfecting of the structure of the guns, the use
of nickel steel in the manufacture of projectiles, and the employment of
smokeless powder of immense explosive force.
Artillery fire will now not only be employed against attacking troops,
but even more against supporting bodies, which must necessarily advance
in closer order, and among whom, therefore, the action of artillery will
be even more deadly. We may well ask the question whether the nerves of
short-service soldiers will stand the terrible destructiveness of
artillery fire.
As a necessary consequence of the increase in the power of fire, we
find the more frequent and more extended adoption of defences, and of
cover for protection in attack and hampering the enemy. In addition,
every body of men appointed for defence, and even for attack--if it is
not to attack at once--must immediately entrench itself. The defenders,
thus sheltered, and only requiring to expose their heads and hands, have
an enormous advantage over the attacking party, which is exposed to an
uninterrupted fire to which it can hardly reply.
In the opinion of competent military writers, the war of the future will
consist primarily of a series of battles for the possession of fortified
positions, which will further be protected by wire obstructions,
pitfalls, etc., to overcome which great sacrifices must be made.
As infantry, even if weak in numbers, cannot be driven from an
entrenched position without artillery fire, armies in future must find
themselves mainly dependent upon artillery. If the defending artillery
be equal in strength to that of the attackers, then the attacking
artillery will be wiped out. If it be not equal in strength, then both
may be wiped out. The losses will be so great that the artillery of both
armies will be paralysed, or it might be that the artillery would
inflict such heavy losses on the troops that the war would become
impossible. Owing to smokeless powder, batteries of artillery are more
exposed to the fire both of the enemy's artillery and of sharpshooters.
A hundred sharpshooters at a distance of half a mile can, it is
estimated, put a battery out of action in less than two minutes and a
half. Let it be added that the high explosives used by modern artillery
are extremely liable to explode, owing to being struck by the enemy, or
owing to concussion caused by an enemy's shell, or to mishandling.
For these reasons, the prospect before an artillery battery entering
into a modern European battle is a prospect of demolition.
The European infantry of the future will be composed largely of
imperfectly trained short-service soldiers and of reserves who have
forgotten their training. Infantry soldiers are liable to be killed by
bullets from enemies whom they cannot see, whose rifles, owing to the
distance, they may not even be able to hear. Their officers will be
picked off in great numbers by sharpshooters, and they will be left
without leaders. It is calculated that an average army is composed
one-third of brave men, one-third of cowards, and one-third of men who
will be brave if properly led. The loss of the officers must tend to
cause this latter section to join the cowards.
Furthermore, the enormous area of modern battlefields involves great
demands upon the endurance of the foot soldiers, and troops mainly drawn
from industrial centres can hardly be expected to meet such demands.
Unless the attacking artillery is overwhelmingly stronger than the
defending artillery, defensive infantry in an entrenched position cannot
be ousted from its position unless the attackers outnumber their
opponents by six or seven to one, and are prepared to lose heavily. The
murderous zone of a thousand yards lying between the armies cannot be
crossed save at fearful sacrifice, and the bayonet as a weapon of attack
is now altogether obsolete.
Can any commander be found who will possess the extraordinary qualities
needed for the control of a modern European army--a whole people
possessed of weapons of tremendous power and deadliness, spread over an
area of vast extent, engaged upon battles that will necessarily last for
days, subjected to a nervous strain such as has never been experienced
in warfare? The responsibility of subordinate officers must, under such
circumstances, be far greater than it used to be; the commander cannot
keep everything under his eye. And, as already said, the officers will
be especially picked out for death. Under all these conditions, it is
likely that after battles with enormous slaughter, victory will be
claimed by both sides.
We must further take into account the influence of a modern war upon
populations. What will be the effect on the temper of modern armies if
war should be prolonged? How will the civil population receive the news
from the front? What convulsions must we expect when, after the
conclusion of peace, the soldiers return to their destroyed and
desolated homes?
A great European war of the future will, it may be assumed, be fought on
one or the other frontier of Germany--in the Franco-German area on the
western side; or the German-Austro-Russian area on the eastern--or on
both. Since it would be impossible under modern conditions for Germany,
with or without Austrian co-operation, to invade both France and Russia,
she would be obliged to defend one frontier while crossing the other. An
attack upon France would involve the traversing of a difficult stretch
of country in which elaborate arrangements have been made for defence;
and although the French army is not so strong as that of Germany, it
would have the enormous advantage of standing on the defensive. Even if
Germany were to gain initial successes through her superior swiftness in
mobilization, the difficulties of modern warfare are such that she could
not hope, even under abnormally favourable circumstances, to capture
Paris in less than two years, and long before then she would be reduced
to a state of entire economic exhaustion. It is to be borne in mind that
the invading army would constantly grow weaker, while the defenders
would be able to enforce the superiority now belonging to defence by
bringing up all their reserves.
Difficulties which would be, if possible, even harder to surmount would
attend a French attempt to invade Germany.
The elaborate plans that have been drawn up for an Austro-German
invasion of Russia would, in all probability, be doomed to failure. The
defensive system of Russian Poland is regarded as almost perfect. Even
if the German and Austrian forces could evade the Polish defences, they
would waste their strength against the second Russian fortified line;
and even if that were broken through, St. Petersburg and Moscow would
still be far distant, and Russia's immense resources in men would enable
her to bring up body after body of reserves against the dwindling
invading force.
A Russian invasion of Prussia would have to encounter an elaborately
scientific defensive system, and would be liable to all the other
difficulties to which an invasion is exposed--particularly, in this
case, the difficulty of feeding a vast host of men on hostile territory.
The weakness of Austria's Galician frontier seems tempting; but Russia
would have to strike at Germany--an invasion of Austria which left
Germany untouched would be mere waste of energy.
The general conclusion is that invasion of an enemy's country, in a
great European struggle, would, in all probability, lead to the
destruction of the invaders and the entire exhaustion of both
combatants.
_III.--Modern War at Sea_
The modern warship is a floating fortress equipped with complex
machinery, and the rivalry in naval invention has led to a terrible
expenditure upon which the powers have embarked in utter heedlessness of
the warnings of economists. So prodigious is the destructive power of
modern naval weapons that, in the opinion of most specialists, vessels
which take part in great battles will issue from them damaged to such an
extent that, during the rest of the war, they will not need to be taken
into account.
In war the strongest nation will be that which possesses the greatest
number of arsenals and ready stores of ammunition, and coal at points
selected in times of peace; and, in addition to these, a fleet in
reserve, even a fleet of old type, but equipped with modern artillery.
With such a fleet it will be possible to strike deadly blows at the
enemy when the fleets of the first line have been incapacitated.
To cruisers and torpedo-boats will be allotted the ferocious duty of
pursuing merchant ships, falling upon them at night, and sinking them,
with the object of cutting the communications and paralysing the trade
of the enemy. The effect of naval wars on trade will in future be
incomparably more disastrous than it has ever been before.
Calculations show that England alone in a prolonged war could gain the
mastery of the sea, forcing the other naval powers to give way
everywhere. But the interruption of communications at sea would cause
the English such losses that a prolonged war would be impossible for
them.
Thus, in continuing to increase their fleets and to perfect their
armaments at immense cost, the European powers are striving at aims
undefined and unattainable. But the financial and social difficulties
which yearly increase may result in such dangers that governments must
be compelled after immense sacrifices to do what it would be wiser to do
to-day--namely, to abandon a fruitless competition.
Such is a brief picture of what Europe may expect from a future war. But
over and above the direct sacrifices and material losses by slaughter,
fire, hunger, and disease, a war will cause to humanity a great moral
evil in consequence of the forms which a struggle on sea will assume,
and of the examples of savagery which it will present at a moment when
the civil order will be threatened by new theories of social revolution.
What wearisome labour will be needed to repair the losses, to cure the
wounds which a war of a single year will cause! How many flourishing
countries will be turned into wildernesses and rich cities into ruins!
How many tears will be shed, how many will be left in beggary! How long
will it be before the voices of the best men, after such a terrible
example, will preach to humanity a higher principle than "might is
right"?
_IV.--The Warnings of the Economists_
The conditions of modern war are bound to be the cause of huge
expenditure. First of all, military stores must be drawn by every
country from its own resources. Artillery, rifles, and ammunition are
all far more costly than they used to be, and the amount of ammunition
consumed in a modern European campaign will be prodigious. The vastness
of armies, and the deadliness of modern weapons, will add immensely to
the requirements of the sick and wounded. The demand for provisions must
vastly increase, and the increase will be followed by a great rise in
prices. That an immense army cannot exist on the resources of an enemy's
territory is plain, especially when the slowness of advance in a
struggle for fortified positions is taken into account. Communications
by sea will be interrupted at the very outbreak of war. In this respect
England is in incomparably the worst position.
There are serious reasons for doubting the proposition that a future war
would be short. Thanks to railways, the period of preparatory operations
would be considerably shortened; but in marches, manoeuvres, and
battles railways can be employed only in very rare cases, and as lines
of operation they cannot serve.
The question naturally arises: Will it be possible to raise for war
purposes revenues vastly exceeding the normal revenues of European
states? And what results must we expect from such extraordinary tension?
A careful and thorough inquiry shows that no great power is economically
capable of bearing the strain of a great war. Russia has in this
respect an important advantage in that her workers, who are her
fighters, are mostly agricultural; the members of their families can
continue their labours when the summons to war is issued. But, on the
other hand, the Russian rural population is extremely poor, and her
resources would quickly be exhausted.
As for England, the interruption of maritime communications would affect
disastrously, if not fatally, the industries of the country and the
feeding of her population. England depends to so great an extent upon
imported wheat that a war would threaten the whole population with
famine.
The very large industrial portion of the German community would be hit
most severely. The stoppage of work and the rise in prices would cause
intense suffering and violent discontent.
Although France survived the economic strain of the war of 1870, it does
not follow that she could endure the far greater strain of a campaign
under the new conditions. Her industrial population, like that of
Germany, would be ruined, and the resulting misery might well lead to
revolution.
A great European war, then, would bring about the economic prostration
of every nation engaged in it, and would be a cause of violent danger to
the fabric of society.
Another problem of modern war remains to be considered--the condition
and care of the wounded. Modern weapons of precision can not only kill
or wound more accurately and at greater distances than the older
weapons, but have more penetrative power. A rifle bullet of to-day will
pass through three or four bodies, shattering and splintering any bones
it may encounter in its course. Hence wounds will be more numerous than
they have ever been; and, owing to the unwieldly size of armies and the
poor physical condition of many of the men, sickness will be more common
as well.
Nevertheless, the assistance of the wounded and sick will be much more
difficult than it has been in the past. While the fighting organisation
of armies has been improved, their healing organisation has been
neglected. It will, besides, be almost impossible to give aid to the
wounded. Their removal will have to be conducted under fire, and both
the wounded man and his rescuer will run a constant risk of death. Many
wounded will have to lie on the field, exposed to a hail of bullets and
fragments of shells, until the end of the battle--and the battle may
last for days. This cannot but have an evil effect on the morale of an
army. If a soldier were convinced that he had a good chance of being
taken care of if wounded, he would fight with a better spirit than if he
feared that, if he fell, he would be left to prolonged hunger and agony.
It is evident that a vast difference exists between war as it has been
in the past and war as it will be in the future. Wars formerly were
carried on by standing armies consisting mainly of long-service
soldiers. Armies in future wars will be composed mainly of soldiers
taken direct from peaceful occupations; many of the older ones will be
heads of families torn from their homes, their families, and their work.
The economic life of whole peoples will stand still, communications will
be cut, and if war be prolonged over the greater part of a year, general
bankruptcy, with famine and all its worst consequences, will ensue. It
is to be expected, therefore, that popular discontent with militarism
will continue to grow. The immense expenditure on military aims, and the
consequent growth of taxation, are the favourite arguments of agitators,
who declare that the institutions of the Middle Ages were less
burdensome than modern preparations for war.
The question is naturally asked: What will be given to the people after
war as compensation for their immense losses? The conquered certainly
will be too exhausted to pay any money indemnity, and compensation must
be taken by the retention of frontier territories, which will be so
impoverished by war that their acquisition will be a loss rather than a
gain.
With such conditions, can we hope for good sense among millions of men
when but a handful of their officers remain? Will the armies of Western
Europe, where the socialist propaganda has already spread among the
masses, allow themselves to be disarmed; and, if not, must we not expect
even greater disasters than those which marked the short-lived triumph
of the Paris Commune? The longer the present position of affairs
continues, the greater is the probability of such convulsions after the
close of a great war. Thus, with the growth of military burdens rise
waves of popular discontent, threatening a social revolution.
Such are the consequences of the armed peace of Europe--slow destruction
in consequence of expenditure on preparations for war, or swift
destruction in the event of war--in both events convulsions in the
social order.