Ethics

Baruch (_Lat._ Benedict) Spinoza, or de Spinoza, as he afterwards

signed himself, son of a wealthy Portuguese Jew, was born at

Amsterdam, November 24, 1632, and died at the early age of

forty-four, on February 21, 1677. He was educated to the highest

pitch of attainment in Hebrew and Talmudist learning, and through

delicacy of physical constitution devoted himself entirely to

study, cultivating assiduously philosophy as well as theology,

while not neglecting the physical sciences. Imbibing unorthodox

views he was formally excommunicated from the synagogue, and

philosophy henceforth became the sole pursuit of his mind. He was

able, however, through his great scientific accomplishments and

mechanical skill, to gain a sufficiency for his subsistence by

polishing lenses. This accomplished man was also no mean artist,

especially in designing. He was one of the finest Latinists of his

time. He was filled with the spirit of religion, and lived the

simplest life, on a few pence a day, in a period of voluptuous

epicureanism. The philosophical system of Spinoza was evolved from

that of Descartes, who had sought to inaugurate a new era in

thought. But he sought more clearly to demonstrate the existence of

God than did his great French master. No philosopher has been more

maligned on the one hand, or more adulated on the other, than this

great Jewish genius. Spinoza has been by some nicknamed Pantheist

or Atheist; while Schleiermacher and other theologians have not

hesitated to describe him as "pious, virtuous, God-intoxicated."

_I.--Concerning God_

By God I understand absolutely infinite Being, that is, substance

consisting of infinite attributes, each expressing eternal and definite

essence. If this be denied, conceive, if it be possible, that God does

not exist. Then it follows that His essence does not involve existence,

which is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

God is absolutely the first cause. He acts from the laws of His own

nature only, and is compelled by no one. For outside of Himself there

can be nothing by which He may be determined to act. Therefore He acts

solely from the laws of His own nature. And therefore also God alone is

a free cause.

The omnipotence of God has been actual from eternity and will be actual

from eternity. The Divine intellect is the cause of things, both of

their essence and of their existence. Thus it is the cause both of the

essence and of the existence of the human intellect, but it differs from

our intellect both in essence and in existence. The same may be said of

the Divine will and the human will.

The will cannot be called a free cause, but can only be termed

necessary. The will is only a certain mode of thought, like the

intellect. It requires a cause to determine it to action, and therefore

cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause. Hence it

follows that God does not act from freedom of the will. For the will,

like all other things, needs a cause to determine it to act in a certain

manner. Things could have been produced by God in no other manner or

order than that in which they have been. Things have been created by God

in absolute perfection, because they have necessarily followed from His

absolutely perfect nature.

_The Divine Power and Decree_

Since in eternity there is no _when_, nor _before_, nor _after_, God

cannot decree nor could He have ever decreed anything other than He has

decreed in the perfection of His nature. For if He had decreed something

else about creation, He would necessarily have had an intellect and a

will different from those He now has. Could such a supposition be

allowed, why cannot He now change His decree about creation yet remain

perfect?

All things depend on the Divine power; but God's will, because of his

perfection, cannot be other than it is, and therefore things cannot be

differently constituted. For to suppose otherwise is to subject God to

fate, an absurdity which is not worth waste of time to refute.

The sum of the matter is that God necessarily exists; that He is one

God; that He acts from the necessity of His nature; that He is the free

cause of all things; that all things depend on Him; and that all things

have been predestined by Him.

_II.--Concerning Mind_

I pass on to those things which must necessarily follow from the essence

of the eternal and infinite God.

Thought is the attribute of God. Individual thoughts are modes

expressing the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner. The

order and connection of these ideas coincides with the order and

connection of things, therefore God's power of thinking is equal to His

power of acting. The circle existing in nature and the idea of an

existing circle which is also in God, are one and the same thing,

exhibited through different attributes. God is truly the cause of things

as they are in themselves, in so far as He consists of infinite

attributes.

The first thing which forms the actual Being of the human mind is

nothing else than the idea of an individual actually existing. The

essence of man is formed by certain modes of the Divine attributes, that

is to say, modes of thought. The idea is the first thing which forms the

Being of the human mind. It must be an idea of an individual thing

actually existing. Hence the human mind is part of the infinite

intellect of God.

The knowledge of everything which happens necessarily exists in God, in

so far as He forms the nature of the human mind. Man thinks. Modes of

thought, such as love, desire, or affections of the mind under whatever

designation, do not exist, unless in the same individual exists an idea

of a thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea may exist though no other

mode of thinking exists. Therefore the essence of man does not

necessarily involve existence.

We perceive that a body is affected in certain ways. No individual

things are felt or perceived by us except bodies and modes of thought.

The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a

certain mode of actually existing extension, and nothing else. For if

the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the

affections of the body would not be in God, in so far as He has created

our mind, but would be in Him in so far as He has formed the mind of

another thing.

But we have ideas of the affections of the body; therefore the object of

the idea constituting the human mind is the body actually existing. It

follows that man consists of mind and body, and that the human body

exists as we perceive it.

_Mind and Body_

Hence we perceive not only that the human mind is united to the body,

but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body. But no

one can adequately comprehend it without previously possessing adequate

knowledge of the body. In proportion as one body is better adapted than

another to act or suffer, the mind will at the same time be better

adapted for perception. And the more independent a body may be of other

bodies, the stronger will be the understanding of the mind. Thus we can

determine the superiority of one mind over another.

All bodies are either moving or resting. Every body moves sometimes

slowly, sometimes quickly. Bodies are distinguished from each other by

degrees of motion and quiescence, not with regard to substance. All

bodies agree in some aspects. Bodies affect each other in motion and

rest. Each individual thing must necessarily be determined as to motion

or rest by some other thing.

The human body needs for its preservation many other bodies by which it

is, as it were, regenerated. The human mind increases its aptitude in

proportion to the number of ways in which the body can be disposed. The

idea constituting a formal being of the human mind is not simple, but is

highly complex. An idea of each component part of the body must

necessarily exist in God.

The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know

that the human body exists, except through the ideas and affections by

which the body is affected. Indeed, the human mind is the very idea or

knowledge of the human body. These ideas are in God. Thought is an

attribute of God, and so the thought of the mind originates of necessity

in Him. All the ideas which are in God always agree with those things of

which they are ideas, and therefore they are all true.

Falsity consists in privation of knowledge, involved in confusion and

mutilation of ideas. For instance, because they think themselves to be

free, and the sole reason for this opinion is that they are conscious of

their own actions, and ignorant of the causes determining those actions.

Nobody knows what the will is and how it moves to-day. Those who pretend

otherwise and invent locations of the soul, usually excite derision and

disgust.

When we look at the sun and imagine it to be immensely nearer to us than

it really is, the error arises from the manner in which the essence of

the sun affects the body, not merely from the exercise of the

imagination.

_Mutual Influences_

The more things the body possesses in common with other bodies, the more

things will the mind be adapted to perceive. The human mind possesses

an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. But

the reason why men have not a knowledge of God as clear as that which

they have of common notions is that they cannot imagine God as they can

imagine bodies, and because they have attached the name of God to the

images of things they are accustomed to see. This they can hardly avoid,

because they are constantly affected by external bodies. And, indeed

most errors arise from our application to the wrong names of things.

For if some one says that the lines drawn from the centre to the

circumference of a circle are unequal, it is because he understands by a

circle something different from what we understand by the

mathematicians. I did not reckon a man to be in error whom I recently

heard complaining that his court has flown into one of his neighbour's

fowls for I understand what he meant.

In the mind there is no absolutely free will. The mind is determined to

this or that volition by a cause, which is determined by another cause,

and so on _ad infinitum_. The will and intellect are one and the same.

We are partakers of the divine nature in proportion as we more and more

understand God and conform our actions to his will. Our highest

happiness consists in this conformity, by which alone the soul finds

repose. Those greatly err from the true estimate of virtue who expect to

be rewarded for it, as though virtue and the service of God were our

felicity itself and the highest liberty.

_III.--Concerning Mental Affections_

The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; but the

passions depend on those alone which are inadequate. The essence of the

mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas. Joy is a passion by

which the mind passes to a greater degree of perfection; sorrow is a

passion by which it passes to a lesser degree.

Accidentally anything may be the cause of joy, sorrow, or desire. We

love or hate certain things not from any known cause, but merely from

sympathy or antipathy. If we hate a thing, we seek to affirm concerning

it everything that we think can affect it with sorrow, while we deny

everything that we think can affect it with joy. From this we see how

easily a man may think too much of himself, and of the object which he

loves, and on the other hand, may think too little of what he hates.

When a man thinks too much of himself this imagination is termed pride,

and is a species of delirium, because he dreams with his eyes open, that

he can do all those things to which he attains in imagination alone,

regarding them thus as realities, and rejoicing in them so long as he

cannot imagine anything to exclude their existence and limit his power

of action.

If we imagine that a person loves, desires, or hates a thing which we

love, desire, or hate, we shall on that account love, desire, or hate

the thing more intensely. If, on the other hand, we imagine that he is

averse to the thing we love, or loves the thing to which we are averse,

then we shall suffer vacillation of mind. Hence every one strives to the

utmost to induce others to love what he loves and to hate what he hates.

This effort is called ambition, which prompts each person to desire that

others should live according to his way of thinking. But if all thus

act, then all hinder each other. And if all wish to be praised or loved

by all, then all hate one another.

Joy is a man's passage from a less to a greater perfection; sorrow is a

man's passage from a greater to a less perfection. I say passage, for

joy is not perfection itself. If a man were born with the perfection to

which he passes, he would possess it without the affection of joy--a

truth the more vividly apparent from the affection of sorrow which is

the contrary of joy.

For, that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection, but not

in the less perfection itself, no one can deny, since in so far as a

man partakes of any perfection, he cannot be sad.

Nor can we say that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection,

for privation is nothing. But the affection of sorrow is actual, and so

can be nothing else than the passage to a lesser perfection, that is,

the reality by which the power of acting is limited or diminished. As

for the definitions of cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy,

or grief, I omit these, because they are related rather to the body than

to the mind, and are merely different species of joy and sorrow.

Love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause. Hatred is

sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause. Devotion is love

towards an object which we admire and wonder at. Derision is joy arising

from the imagination that something we despise is present in the object

we hate. Hope is a joy not constant, arising from the idea of something

future or past, about the issue of which we are doubtful. Fear is sorrow

not constant, arising in like manner.

Confidence is joy arising from the idea of a past or future object from

which the cause for doubting has been removed. Despair is sorrow arising

from a like cause. Confidence springs from hope, despair from fear.

Pride is thinking too highly of ourselves from self-love. Despondency is

thinking too little of ourselves through sorrow.

_IV.--Concerning Human Bondage and Human Liberty_

Good is that which is useful to us; evil, that which impedes the

possession of good. But the terms good and evil are not positive, but

are only modes of thought, by which we compare one thing with another.

Thus, music is good to a melancholy mind, bad to a mourning mind, but

neither bad nor good to a deaf man. We suffer because we form a part of

nature. The power by which we preserve our being is the power of God,

that is part of His essence. But man is subject to passions because he

follows the order of nature.

An affection can only be overcome by a stronger affection. That which

tends to conserve our existence we denominate good. That which hinders

this conservation we style evil. Desire springing from the knowledge of

good and evil can be restrained by desires originating in the affections

by which we are agitated. Thus the effect of external causes on the mind

may be far greater than that of the knowledge of good and evil. The

desire springing from a knowledge of good and evil may be easily

restrained by the desire of present objects. Opinion exercises a more

potent influence than reason. Hence the saying of the poet, "I approve

the better, but follow the worse." And hence also the preacher says "He

that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." We ought to know both the

strength and the weakness of our nature, that we may judge what reason

can and cannot do in controlling our affections.

Desire springing from joy preponderates over that springing from sorrow.

Man is useful to man because two individuals of the same nature when in

sympathy are stronger than one. Nothing could be so good for men as that

all should so agree in everything as to form as it were a single body

and mind, all seeking the good of all. Hence, men acting in accord with

the dictates of reason desire nothing for themselves but what they

desire for all. This renders them just, faithful, and honourable.

The knowledge of God is the supreme mental good, and to know God is the

supreme mental virtue. For God is the supreme subject of the

understanding, and therefore to know or understand God is the supreme

virtue of the mind. But to us nothing can be either good or evil unless

it has something in common with us. An object whose nature is absolutely

foreign to our own cannot be either good or evil to us, for this

reason, that we only call a thing good or evil when it is the cause of

joy or sorrow, this is to say, when it increases or diminishes our power

to act.

Nothing can be reckoned good except that which is in harmony with our

nature, and nothing can be reckoned evil expect what is contrary to our

nature, but men cannot be said to agree in nature when they are subject

to passion. We only act in harmony with the dictates of reason when we

agree in nature with others. Men are most useful to each other who are

mutually ruled by the laws of reason. But rarely do men live thus in

harmony with reason, and thus it comes to pass that they are commonly

envious of each other.

Yet men are seldom disposed to solitude, but answer generally to the

familiar description of man as a social animal, for they know that the

advantages preponderate over the advantages of social life. They find by

experience that by mutual aid and co-operation they can, on the one hand

the more easily secure what they need, and on the other hand the better

defend themselves from danger.

A man who seeks after virtue will desire others to do so, and this

desire will increase in proportion to this increase of his knowledge of

God. The good that a man seeks by the quest of virtue he will wish

others to obtain also. This is in accordance with reason, which is the

operation of the mind according to the essence of the mind, that essence

of the mind being knowledge, which involves the knowledge of God. The

greater the knowledge of God involved in the essence of the mind, the

greater will be the desire that others may seek after the same virtue

which the man seeks for himself.

_Economics_