III.--_Of Justice and Communism_

But now we have to look for justice. Find the other three cardinal

virtues first, and then justice will be distinguishable. Wisdom is in

the guardians; if they be wise, the whole state will be wise. Courage we

find in the soldiers; courage is the true estimate of danger, and that

has been ingrained in them by their education. Temperance, called

mastery of self, is really the mastery of the better over the baser

qualities; as in our state the better class controls the inferior.

Temperance would seem to lie in the harmonious inter-relation of the

different classes. Obviously, the remaining virtue of the state is the

constant performance of his own particular function in the state, and

not his neighbour's, by each member of the state. Let us see how that

works out in the individual.

Shall we not find that there are three several qualities in the

individual, each of which must in like manner do its own business, the

intellectual, the passionate or spirited, and the lustful? They must be

separate, because one part of a thing cannot be doing contradictory

things at the same time; your lusts bid you do what your intelligence

forbids; and the emotional quality is distinct from both desire and

reason, though in alliance with reason. Well, here you have wisdom and

courage in the intellectual and spiritual parts, temperance in their

mastery over desire; and justice is the virtue of the soul as a whole;

of each part never failing to perform its own function and that alone.

To ask, now, whether justice or injustice is the more profitable becomes

ridiculous.

Now we shall find that virtue is one, but that vice has several forms;

as there is but one form of perfect state--ours--whether it happens to

be called a monarchy if there be but one guardian, or an aristocracy if

there be more; and, as it has four principal imperfect forms, so there

are four main vices.

Here Glaucon and Adeimantus refused to let me go on; I had shirked a

serious difficulty. What about women and children? My saying that the

soldiers were to live in common might mean anything. What kind of

communism was I demanding? Well, there are two different questions: What

is desirable? And, What is possible? First, then, our defenders are our

watch-dogs. Glaucon knows all about dogs; we don't differentiate in the

case of males and females; the latter hunt with the pack. If women are

similarly to have the same employments as men, they must have the same

education in music and gymnastic. We must not mind ribald comments. But

should they share masculine employments? Do they differ from men in such

a way that they should not? Women bear children, and men beget them; but

apart from that the differences are really only in degrees of capacity,

not essential distinctions of quality; even as men differ among

themselves. The natures being the same, the education must be the same,

and the same careers must be open.

But a second and more alarming wave threatens us: Community of wives and

children. "You must prove both the possibility and desirability of

that." Men and women must be trained together and live together, but not

in licentiousness. They must be mated with the utmost care for

procreation, the best being paired at due seasons, nominally by lot, and

for the occasion. The offspring of the selected will have a common

nursery; the mothers will not know which were their own children.

Parentage will be permissible only between twenty-five and fifty-five,

and between twenty and forty. The children begotten in the same batch of

espousals will be brothers and sisters.

The absence of "mine" and "thine" will ensure unity, because it

abolishes the primary cause of discord; common maintenance by the state

removes all temptation either to meanness or cringing. Our guardians

will be uncommonly happy. As to practicability: communism is suitable

for war. The youngsters will be taken to watch any fighting; cowards

will be degraded; valour will be honoured, and death on the field, with

other supreme services to the state, will rank the hero among demigods.

Against Greeks war must be conducted as against our own kith and kin.

But as to the possibility of all this--this third threatening wave is

the most terrific of all.

_IV.--Of Philosophy in Rulers_

It will be possible then, and only then, when kings are philosophers or

philosophers kings. "You will be mobbed and pelted for such a

proposition." Still, it is the fact. The philosopher desires all

knowledge. You know that justice, beauty, good, and so on, are single,

though their presentation is multiplex and variable. Curiosity about the

multiplex particulars is not desire of knowledge, which is of the one

constant idea--of that which is, as ignorance is of that which is not.

What neither is nor is not, that which fluctuates and changes, is the

subject matter of opinion, a state between knowledge and ignorance.

Beauty is beauty always and everywhere; the things that look beautiful

may be ugly from another point of view. Experience of beautiful things,

curiosity about them, must be distinguished from knowledge of beauty;

the philosopher is not to be confounded with the connoisseur, not

knowledge with opinion. The philosopher is he who has in his mind the

perfect pattern of justice, beauty, truth; his is the knowledge of the

eternal; he contemplates all time and all existence; no praises are too

high for his character. "No doubt; still, if that is so, why do

professed philosophers always show themselves either fools or knaves in

ordinary affairs?" A ship's crew which does not understand that the art

of navigation demands a knowledge of the stars, will stigmatise a

properly qualified pilot as a star-gazing idiot, and will prevent him

from navigating. The world assumes that the philosopher's abstractions

are folly, and rejects his guidance. The philosopher is the best kind of

man; the corrupted philosopher is the worst; and the corrupted

influences brought to bear are irresistible to all but the very

strongest natures. The professional teachers of philosophy live not by

leading popular opinion, but by pandering to it; a bastard brood trick

themselves out as philosophers, while the true philosopher withdraws

himself from so gross a world. Small wonder that philosophy gets

discredited! Not in the soil of any existing state can philosophy grow

naturally; planted in a suitable state, her divinity will be apparent.

I need no longer hesitate to say that we must make our guardians

philosophers. The necessary combination of qualities is extremely rare.

Our test must be thorough, for the soul must be trained up by the

pursuit of all kinds of knowledge to the capacity for the pursuit of the

highest--higher than justice and wisdom--the idea of the good. "But what

is the good--pleasure, knowledge?" No. To see and distinguish material

things, the faculty of sight requires the medium of light, whose source

is the sun. The good is to the intellectual faculty what the sun is to

that of vision: it is the source and cause of truth, which is the light

whereby we perceive ideas; it is not truth nor the ideas, but above

them; their cause, as the sun is the source of light and the cause of

growth.

Again, as the material things with which the eye is concerned are in two

categories--the copies, reflections or shadows of things, and actual

things--correspondingly the things perceived by the intellect are in a

secondary region--as the mathematical--where everything is derived from

hypotheses which are assumed to be first principles; or in a supreme

region, in which hypotheses are orly the steps by which we ascend to the

real ultimate first principles themselves. And it will follow further

that the mind has four faculties appropriate to these four divisions,

which we call respectively pure reason (the highest), understanding,

conviction, and perception of shadows; the first pair being concerned

with being, the field of the intellect; the second pair with becoming,

the field of opinion.

_V.--Of Shadows and Realities_

Let me speak a parable. Humanity--ourselves--are as people dwelling ever

bound and fettered in a twilit cave, with our backs to the light. Behind

us is a parapet, and beyond the parapet a fire; all that we see is the

shadows thrown on the wall that faces us by figures passing along the

parapet behind us; all we hear is the echo of their voices. Now, if some

of us are turned round to face the light and look on the real figures,

they will be dazzled at first, and much more if they are taken out into

the light, and up to face the sun himself; but presently they will see

perfectly, and have all the joy thereof. Now send them back into the

cave, and they will be apparently much blinder than the folk who have

been there all the time, and their talk of what they have seen will be

taken for the babbling of fools, or worse. Small wonder that those who

have beheld the light have but little mind to return to the twilight

cave which is the common world. But remember--everyone in the cave

possesses the faculty of sight if only his eyes be turned to the light.

Loose the fetters of carnal desires which hold him with his back to the

light, and every man _may_ be converted and live. So we must select

those who are most capable of facing the light, and see to it that they

return to the cave, to give the cave-dwellers the benefit of their

knowledge. And if this be for them a hardship, we must bear in mind as

before, that the good of the whole is what matters, not whether one or

another may suffer hardship for the sake of the whole.

How, then, shall we train them to the passage from darkness to light?

For this, our education in music and gymnastic is wholly inadequate. We

must proceed first to the science of numbers, then of geometry, then of

astronomy. And after astronomy, there is the sister science of abstract

harmonics--not of audible sounds. All of which are but the prelude to

the ultimate supreme science of dialectic, which carries the

intelligence to the contemplation of the idea of the good, the ultimate

goal. And here to attempt further explanation would be vanity. This is

the science of the pure reason, the coping-stone of knowledge.

We saw long ago that our rulers must possess every endowment of mind and

body, all cultivated to the highest degree. From the select we must

again select, at twenty, those who are most fit for the next ten years'

course of education; and from them, at thirty, we shall choose those who

can, with confidence, be taken to face the light; who have been tested

and found absolutely steadfast, not shaken by having got beyond the

conventional view of things. We will give them five or six years of

philosophy; then fifteen years of responsible office in the state; and

at fifty they shall return to philosophy, subject to the call upon them

to take up the duties of rulership and of educating their successors.

_VI.--Of State Types and Individual Types_

Before this digression we were on the point of discussing the four

vitiated forms of the state, and the corresponding individual types. The

four types of state as we know them in Hellas, are: the Spartan, where

personal ambition and honour rule, which we call timocracy; the

oligarchical, where wealth rules; the democratic; and the arbitrary rule

of the individual, which we call tyranny. The comparison of this

last--the supremely unjust--with our own--the supremely just--will show

whether justice or injustice be the more desirable.

The perfect state degenerates to timocracy when the state's numerical

law of generation [an unsolved riddle] has not been properly observed,

and inferior offspring have entered in consequence into the ruling body.

The introduction of private property will cause them to assume towards

the commonalty the attitude, not of guardians, but of masters, and to be

at odds among themselves; also, in their education gymnastic will

acquire predominance over music. Ambition and party spirit become the

characteristic features. When, in an ill-ordered state a great man

withdraws from the corruption of politics into private life, we see the

corresponding individual type in the son of such a one, egged on by his

mother and flattering companions, to win back for himself at all costs

the prestige which his father had resigned; personal ambition becomes

his dominant characteristic.

Oligarchy is the next outcome of the introduction of private property;

riches outweigh virtue, love of money the love of honour, and the rich

procure for themselves the legal monopoly of political power. Here the

state becomes divided against itself--there is one state of the rich and

another of the poor--and the poor will be divided into the merely

incompetent and the actively dangerous or predatory. And your

corresponding individual is he whose father had won honours which had

not saved him from ultimate ruin; so that the son rejects ambition and

makes money his goal, till, for the sake of money, he will compass any

baseness, though still only under a cloak of respectability.

In the oligarchy the avaricious encourage and foster extravagance in

their neighbours. Men, ruined by money-lenders, turn on their moneyed

rulers, overthrow them, and give everyone a share in the government. The

result is that the state is not one, nor two, but diverse. Folk say what

they like and do what they like, and anyone is a statesman who will wave

the national flag. That is democracy. Such is the son of your miserly

oligarch; deprived of unnecessary pleasures, he is tempted to wild

dissipation. He has no education to help him to distinguish, and the

vices of dissipation assume the aspect and titles of virtue. He

fluctuates from one point of view to another--is one thing to-day and

another to-morrow.

And last we come to tyranny and the tyrannical man. Democratic license

develops into sheer anarchy. Jack is as good as his master. The

predatory population becomes demagogues; they squeeze the decent

citizens, and drive them to adopt oligarchical methods; then the friend

of the people appears; the protector, champion, and hero, by a familiar

process becomes a military autocrat, who himself battens, as must also

his mercenary soldiery, on the citizens; and our unhappy Demos finds

that it has jumped out of the reek into the fire. Now our democratical

man was swayed by the devices and moods of the moment; his son will be

swayed by the most irrational and most bestial of his appetites; be

bully and tyrant, while slave of his own lusts. Your thorough blackguard

of every species comes of this type, and the worst of all is he who

achieves the tyranny of a state. See, then, how, even as the tyrannic

state is the most utterly enslaved, so the tyrannic man is of all men

the least free; and, beyond all others, the tyrant of a state. He is

like a slave-owner, who is at the mercy of his slaves--the passions

which he must pamper, or die, yet cannot satisfy. Surely such an one is

the veriest slave--yea, the most wretched of men. It follows that he who

is the most complete opposite of the tyrant is the happiest--the

individual who corresponds to our state. Proclaim it, then, son of

Ariston, that the most just of men is he who is master of himself, and

is of all men the most miserable, whether gods and men recognise him or

no.

_VII.--Of the Happiness of the Just_

Now for a second proof. Three kinds of pleasure correspond to the three

elements of the soul--reason, spirit, desire. In each man one of the

three is in the ascendant. One counts knowledge vain in comparison with

the advantages of riches, another with those of honour; to the

philosopher only truth counts. But he is the only one of them who makes

his choice from experience of all three kinds. And he, the only

qualified judge, places the satisfaction of the spirit second, and of

desire lowest. And yet a third proof: I fancy the only quite real

pleasures are those of the philosopher. There is an intermediate state

between pleasure and pain. To pass into this from pleasure is painful,

and from pain is pleasurable. Now, the pleasures of the body are really

nothing more than reliefs from pains of one kind or another. And, next,

the pleasures of the soul, being of the eternal order, are necessarily

more real than those of the body, which are fleeting--in fact, mere

shadows of pleasure.

Much as I love and admire Homer, I think our regulations as to poetry

were particularly sound; but we must inquire further into the meaning of

imitation. We saw before that all particular things are the

presentations of some universal idea. There is one ultimate idea of bed,

or chair, or table. What the joiner makes is a copy of that. All ideas

are the creation of the master artificer, the demiurge; of his creations

all material things are copies. We can all create things in a way by

catching reflections of them in a mirror. But these are only copies of

particular things from one point of view, partial copies of copies of

the idea. Such precisely are the creations of the painter, and in like

manner of the poet. What they know and depict is not the realities, but

mere appearances. If the poets knew the realities they would have left

us something other than imitations of copies. Moreover, what they

imitate is not the highest but the lower; not the truth of reason, but

emotions of all sorts, which it should be our business not to excite but

to control and allay. So we continue to prohibit the poetry which is

imitation, however supreme, and allow only hymns to the gods, and

praises of great men. We must no more admit the allurements of poesy

than the attractions of ambition or of riches.

Greater far are the rewards of virtue than all we have yet shown; for an

immortal soul should heed nothing that is less than eternal. "What, is

the soul then immortal? Can you prove that?" Yes, of a surety. In all

things there is good and evil; a thing perishes of its own corruption,

not of the corruption of aught external to it. If disease or injury of

the body cannot corrupt the soul, _a fortiori_ they cannot slay it; but

injustice, the corruption of the soul, is not induced by injury to the

body. If, then, the soul be not destroyed by sin, nothing else can

destroy it, and it is immortal. The number of existing souls must then

be constant; none perish, none are added, for additional immortal souls

would have to come out of what is mortal, which is absurd. Now, hitherto

we have shown only that justice is in itself best for the soul, but now

we see that its rewards, too, are unspeakably great. The gods, to whom

the just are known, will reward them hereafter, if not here; and even in

this world they have the better lot in the long run. But of this nothing

is comparable to their rewards in the hereafter, revealed to us in the

mythos of Er, called the Armenian, whose body being slain in battle, his

soul was said to have returned to it from the under-world--renewing its

life--a messenger to men of what he had there beheld. For a thousand

years the souls, being judged, enjoyed or suffered a tenfold retribution

for all they had done of good or evil in this life, and some for a

second term, or it might be for terms without end. Then for the most

part they were given again, after the thousand years, a choice of

another lot on the earth, being guided therein by their experience in

their last life; and so, having drunk of the waters of forgetfulness,

came back to earth once more, unconscious of their past.

Let us, then, believing that the soul is indeed immortal, hold fast to

knowledge and justice, that it may be well with us both here and

hereafter.

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