A distinction is usually made between what is immediately known and what
is only inferred. It is immediately known that in a figure bounded by
three straight lines there are three angles, but that these angles
together are equal to two right angles is only inferred. In every
syllogism is first a fundamental proposition; secondly, another deduced
from it; and, thirdly, the consequence.
In the use of pure reason its concepts, or transcendental ideas, aim at
unity of all conditions of thought. So all transcendental ideas may be
arranged in three classes; the first containing the unity of the
thinking subject; the second, the unity of the conditions of phenomena
observed; the third, the unity of the objective conditions of thought.
This classification becomes clear if we note that the thinking subject
is the object-matter of psychology; while the system of all phenomena
(the world) is the object-matter of cosmology; and the Being of all
Beings (God) is the object-matter of theology.
Hence we perceive that pure reason supplies three transcendental ideas,
namely, the idea of a transcendental science of the soul (_psychologia
rationalis_); of a transcendental science of the world (_cosmologia
rationalis_); and, lastly, of a transcendental science of God
(_theologia transcendentalis_). It is the glory of transcendental
idealism that by it the mind ascends in the series of conditions till
it reaches the unconditioned, that is, the principles. We thus progress
from our knowledge of self to a knowledge of the world, and through it
to a knowledge of the Supreme Being.
_III.--The Antinomies of Pure Reason_
Transcendental reason attempts to reconcile conflicting assertions.
There are four of these antinomies, or conflicts.
FIRST ANTINOMY. Thesis. The world has a beginning in time, and is also
limited in regard to space. Proof. Were the world without a
time-beginning we should have to ascribe a present limit to that which
can have no limit, which is absurd. Again, were the world not limited in
regard to space, it must be conceived as an infinite whole, yet it is
impossible thus to conceive it.
Antithesis. The world has neither beginning in time, nor limit in space,
but in both regards is infinite. Proof. The world must have existed from
eternity, or it could never exist at all. If we imagine it had a
beginning, we must imagine an anterior time when nothing was. But in
such time the origin of anything is impossible. At no moment could any
cause for such a beginning exist.
SECOND ANTINOMY. Thesis. Every composite substance in the world is
composed of simple parts. This thesis seems scarcely to require proof.
No one can deny that a composite substance consists of parts, and that
these parts, if themselves composite, must consist of others less
composite, till at length we come, by compulsion of thought, to the
conception of the absolutely simple as that wherein the substantial
consists.
Antithesis. No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts,
and nothing simple exists anywhere in the world. Proof. Each simple part
implied in the thesis must be in space. But this condition is a
positive disproof of their possibility. A simple substance would have
to occupy a simple portion of space; but space has no simple parts. The
supposition of such a part is the supposition, not of space, but of the
negation of space. A simple substance, in existing and occupying any
portion of space, must contain a real multiplicity of parts external to
each other, _i.e._, it must contradict its own nature, which is absurd.
THIRD ANTINOMY. Thesis. The causality of natural law is insufficient for
the explanation of all the phenomena of the universe. For this end
another kind of causality must be assumed, whose attribute is freedom.
Proof. All so-called natural causes are effects of preceding causes,
forming a regressive series of indefinite extent, with no first
beginning. So we never arrive at an adequate cause of any phenomenon.
Yet natural law has for its central demand that nothing shall happen
without such a cause.
Antithesis. All events in the universe occur under the exclusive
operation of natural laws, and there is no such thing as freedom. Proof.
The idea of a free cause is an absurdity. For it contradicts the very
law of causation itself, which demands that every event shall be in
orderly sequence with some preceding event. Now, free causation is such
an event, being the active beginning of a series of phenomena. Yet the
action of the supposed free cause must be imagined as independent of all
connection with any previous event. It is without law or reason, and
would be the blind realisation of confusion and lawlessness. Therefore
transcendental freedom is a violation of the law of causation, and is in
conflict with all experience. We must of necessity acquiesce in the
explanation of all phenomena by the operation of natural law, and thus
transcendental freedom must be pronounced a fallacy.
FOURTH ANTINOMY. Thesis. Some form of absolutely necessary existence
belongs to the world, whether as its part or as its cause. Proof.
Phenomenal existence is serial, mutable, consistent. Every event is
contingent upon a preceding condition. The conditioned pre-supposes, for
its complete explanation, the unconditioned. The whole of past time,
since it contains the whole of all past conditions, must of necessity
contain the unconditioned or also "absolutely necessary."
Antithesis. There is no absolutely necessary existence, whether in the
world as its part, or outside of it as its cause. Proof. Of
unconditionally necessary existence within the world there can be none.
The assumption of a first unconditioned link in the chain of cosmical
conditions is self-contradictory. For such link or cause, being in time,
must be subject to the law of all temporal existence, and so be
determined--contrary to the original assumption--by another link or
cause before it.
The supposition of an absolutely necessary cause of the world, existing
without the world, also destroys itself. For, being outside the world,
it is not in time. And yet, to act as a cause, it must be in time. This
supposition is therefore absurd.
The theses in these four antinomies constitute the teaching of
philosophical dogmatism. The antitheses constitute doctrines of
philosophical empiricism.
_IV.--Criticism of the Chief Arguments for the Existence of God_
The ontological argument aims at asserting the possibility of conceiving
the idea of an _ens realissimum_, of being possessed of all reality. But
the idea of existence and the fact of existence are two very different
things. Whatever I conceive, or sensibly imagine, I necessarily conceive
as though it were existing. Though my pocket be empty, I may conceive it
to contain a "hundred thalers." If I conceive them there, I can only
conceive them as actually existing there. But, alas, the fact that I am
under this necessity of so conceiving by no means carries with it a
necessity that the coins should really be in my pocket. That can only be
determined by experience.
The cosmological argument contends that if anything exists, there must
also exist an absolutely necessary being. Now, at least I myself exist.
Hence there exists an absolutely necessary being. The argument coincides
with that by which the thesis of the fourth antinomy is supposed. The
objections to it are summed up in the proof of the antithesis of the
fourth antimony. As soon as we have recognised the true conception of
causality, we have already transcended the sensible world.
The physico-theological or teleological argument is what is often styled
the argument from design. It proceeds not from general, but particular
experience. Nature discloses manifold signs of wise intention and
harmonious order, and these are held to betoken a divine designer. This
argument deserves always to be treated with respect. It is the oldest
and clearest of all proofs, and best adapted to convince the reason of
the mass of mankind. It animates us in our study of nature. And it were
not only a cheerless, but an altogether vain task to attempt to detract
from the persuasive authority of this proof. There is nought to urge
against its rationality and its utility.
All arguments, however, to prove the existence of God must, in order to
be theoretically valid, start from specifically and exclusively sensible
or phenomenal data, must employ only the conceptions of pure physical
science, and must end with demonstrating in sensible experience an
object congruous with, or corresponding to, the idea of God. But this
requirement cannot be met, for, scientifically speaking, the existence
of an absolutely necessary God cannot be either proved or disproved.
Hence room is left for faith in any moral proofs that may present
themselves to us, apart from science. With this subject ethics, the
science of practice or of practical reason, will have to deal.