CHAPTER II

THE SCANDINAVIAN PEOPLES

Sec. 1

When the early history of Scandinavia is studied as a process of social

evolution rather than as a chronicle of feuds and of the exploits of

heroes of various grades,[638] it is found to constitute a miniature

norm of a simple and instructive sort. Taken as it emerges from the

stage of myth, about the time of Charlemagne, it presents a vivid phase

of barbarism, acted on by powerful conditions of change. The three

sections of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden stand in a certain natural

gradation as regards their possibilities of political development. All

alike were capable only of a secondary or tertiary civilisation, being

at once geographically disrupted and incapable, on primitive methods, of

feeding an abundant population. In their early piratical stage, the

Scandinavians are not greatly different from the pre-Homeric Greeks as

these were conceived by Thucydides; but whereas the Greeks came in

contact with the relatively high civilisations which had preceded them,

the Scandinavians of the Dark Ages had no contacts save with the

primitive life of the pre-Christian Slavs, the premature and arrested

cross-civilisations of Carlovingian France and Anglo-Saxon England, and,

in a fuller and more fruitful degree, with the similarly arrested

semi-Christian civilisation of Celtic Ireland, which latter counted for

so much in their literature.

But in barbarian conditions certain main laws of social evolution

operate no less clearly than in later stages; and we see sections of the

Norsemen passing from tribal anarchy to primitive monarchy, and thence

to military "empire," afterwards returning to their stable economic

basis, as every military empire sooner or later must. Of the

Scandinavian sections, Denmark and the southern parts of Sweden (round

the Maelar) are the least disrupted and most fertile; and these were

respectively the most readily reducible to a single rule. In all, given

to begin with the primordial bias to royalism in any of its forms,[639]

the establishment of a supreme and hereditary military rule was only a

question of time; every successive attempt, however undone by the forces

of barbaric independence, being a lead and stimulus to others. It is

important to note how the process was promoted by, and in its turn

promoted, the establishment of Christianity. The incomplex phenomena in

Scandinavia throw a new light on the more complex evolution of other

parts of Christendom. Primitive polytheism is obviously unpropitious to

monarchic rule; and in every ancient religion it can be seen to have

undergone adaptations where such rule arose. In the widely varying

systems of Homeric Greece, Babylonia, Egypt, and Rome, the same tendency

is visibly at work in different degrees, the ascendent principle of

earthly government being more or less directly duplicated in theological

theory. Under the Roman Empire, all cults were in a measure bent to the

imperial service, and it was only the primary exclusiveness of

Christianity that put it in conflict with the State. Once the emperor

accepted it, recognising its political use, and conceded its exclusive

claims, it became a trebly effective political instrument,[640]

centralising as it did the whole machinery of religion throughout the

Empire, and co-ordinating all to the political system. To use a modern

illustration, it "syndicated" the multifold irregular activities of

worship, and was thus the ideal system for a centralised and imperial

State.[641] This was as readily seen by Theodoric and Charlemagne as by

the rulers at Constantinople; and to such a perception, broadly

speaking, is to be attributed the forcing of Christianity on the

northern races by their kings.

Compare the explicit admissions of Mosheim, _Eccles. Hist._ 8

cent., pt. ii, ch. ii, Sec. 5 and note, following on the testimony of

William of Malmesbury as to Charlemagne. Other ecclesiastical

historians coincide. "Numbers of the earliest and most active

converts, both in Germany and England, were connected with the

royal households; and in this way it would naturally occur that

measures which related to the organising of the Church would

emanate directly from the King.... It is indeed remarkable that so

long as kings were esteemed the real patrons of the Church, she

felt no wish to define exactly her relations to the civil power;

the two authorities ... _laboured to enforce obedience to each

other_" (Hardwick, _Church History: Middle Age_, 1853, pp. 56-57).

The same historian (p. 127) describes the Wends of the eleventh

century as seeing in the missionary a means for their subjection to

Germany, and as "constantly attempting to regain their independence

and extinguish the few glimmerings of truth that had been forced

into their minds."

Northern paganism, more than the semi-cosmopolitan polytheism of the

south in the period of Augustus, was a local and domestic faith, lending

itself to separateness and independence, as did the civic and family

religions of early Greece and Rome. While there were communal assemblies

with specially solemn sacrifices, the popular beliefs were such that

every district could have its holy places, and every family or group its

special rites;[642] and in primitive Scandinavia a priesthood could

still less develop than even in primitive Germany, whose lack of any

system corresponding to the Druidism of Gaul is still empirically

ascribed to some anti-sacerdotal element in the "national character,"

whereas it is plainly a result of the nomadic life-conditions of the

scattered people. In germ the Teutonic priesthood was extremely

powerful, being the judiciary power from which there was no appeal.[643]

But an organised priestly system can arise only on the basis of some

measure of political levelling or centralisation, involving some

peaceful inter-communication. Romanised Christianity, coming ready-made

from its centre, permitted of no worship save that of the consecrated

church, and no ministry save that of the ordained priest.[644] Only the

most obstinately conservative kings or chieftains, therefore, could fail

to see their immediate advantage in adopting it.[645]

Naturally the early Christian records gloss the facts. Thus it is

told in the life of Anskar (Ancharius) that "the Swedes" sent

messengers to the Emperor Ludovic the Pious (_circa_ 825) telling

that "many" of them "longed to embrace the Christian faith"--a

story for which the only possible basis would be the longings and

perhaps the propaganda of Christian captives of some western

European nationality. (Cp. Hardwick, _Church History: Middle Age_,

1853, p. 110, _notes_, and p. 111.) Still it is admitted that the

king was avowedly willing to listen; and the tale of the first

acceptance of Christianity in Sweden, even if true in detail, would

plainly point to a carefully rehearsed plan under the king's

supervision. The admission that afterwards there was a return to

heathenism for nearly a century consists entirely with the view

that the first tentative was one of kingly policy. See Geijer, c.

iii, pp. 34, 35. It was the people who drove out the missionaries;

and Hardwick's statement that after seven years Anskar "was able to

regain his hold on the affections of the Swedes" is confuted by his

own narrative. All that Anskar obtained was a toleration of his

mission; and this was given after a trial by lots, on heathen

principles (Hardwick, pp. 112, 113; cp. p. 115). The account in

Crichton and Wheaton's _Scandinavia_, 1837, i, 122, brings the

king's initiative into prominence. (Cp. Otte, _Scandinavian

History_, 1874, p. 34.) They also note that Charlemagne, in

treating with the Danes, "did not attempt to impose his religion"

upon them; but they do not glimpse the true explanation, which is

that he could gain nothing by helping to organise a hostile

kingdom. In point of fact he refused to let Lindger pursue his

purpose of converting the Northmen. (Hardwick, p. 108, _note 2_,

citing _Vit. S. Lindger_.) He had not developed the devotion or the

subservience to the Church which in later ages led emperors to

force the acceptance of Christianity on a defeated State that

remained otherwise independent.

When in a later age Christianity was definitely established in

Sweden under Olaf the Lap (or Tribute) King (_circa_ 1000), whose

father Erik is said to have been murdered in a tumult for his

destruction of a pagan temple, the process was again strictly

monarchic, the Diet resisting; but Olaf's substantial success was

such as to permit of his annexing Gothland, temporarily conquering

Norway, and styling himself king of all Sweden; and his son, Anund

Jakob, continuing the profitable policy, earned the title of Most

Christian Majesty (Crichton and Wheaton, i, 111; Geijer, p. 39).

Even after this the attempt of a bishop (1067) to destroy the old

temple at Upsala, resisted by the Christian King Stenkil, but

supported by his rasher son Inge, caused the expulsion of the

latter by the pagan party under Svend. Only after Inge's

restoration by Danish help (1075) was the heathen worship

suppressed (Hardwick, p. 116).

As regards Denmark, the historians incidentally make it clear that

Harald Klak, usurping king of Jutland (_circa_ 820), wanted to

Christianise his turbulent subjects in order to subordinate them,

having learned the wisdom of the policy from Louis the Pious; and

it is no less clear that the same motive swayed Erik I, who, after

having in his days of piratical adventure, as usurper of the Jute

crown, destroyed the Christian settlement of Charlemagne at

Hamburg, entirely changed his attitude and favoured Christianity

when, on the death of King Horda-Knut, he became king of all

Denmark (Crichton and Wheaton, pp. 120-23).

So plain was the political tendency of the new creed that after the

Christianisation of Denmark by Erik I the nobility forced Erik II to

restore the pagan system; but the triumph of the Church, like that of

monarchy, was only a question of time. Even kings who, being caught late

in life, did not renounce their paganism, are found ready to favour the

missionaries; and in Denmark such tolerance on the part of Gorm the Old

(d. 941), successor of Erik II, is followed by the official Christianity

of his son Harald Bluetooth. Danish "empire" duly follows; and in the

next century we find Knut the Great (1014-1035) utterly reversing[646]

the pagan policy of his father, Svend[647] (who had been enabled to

dethrone _his_ Christian father, Harald, by the pagan malcontents), and

dying in the odour of sanctity, "lord" of six kingdoms--Denmark, Sweden,

Norway, England, Scotland, and Wales.

The principle is established from another side in the case of Norway.

There the first notable monarchic unification had been wrought by the

pagan Harold Fairhair (875), without the aid of Christianity; and the

pagan resistance was so irreducible that revolters sailed off in all

directions, finding footing in Scotland and Ireland, and in particular

in Northern France and Iceland.[648] In the next generation the monarchy

relapsed to the old position; and Harold's Christian son Hakon (educated

in England) had to cede to the determined demands of the pagan majority,

who forced him to join in the old heathen rites, and murdered the

leading Christians;[649] a course followed by the further weakening of

the power of the crown. The Danish Harald Bluetooth, son of Gorm, who

then conquered Norway, sought to re-establish the Church by the sword;

but Hakon Jarl, who followed, gave up Christianity in order to reign

and again put it down by violence.[650] The next king to restore it,

Olaf Tryggvason, who had met with Christianity in his wanderings in

Greece, Russia, England, and Germany,[651] established that creed by

brute force when he attained the throne (977), and again the spirit of

local independence, abnormally conserved in Norway by the special

separateness set up by the geographical conditions, fiercely resisted

the new system as it had done the rule of Harold Fairhair, many defeated

pagans withdrawing to remote glens and fastnesses, where to this day

their mythology thrives.[652] On Olaf's final defeat and death (1000),

his immediate successors, jarls supported by Denmark and Sweden, were

content to leave paganism alone, as representing a too dangerous spirit

of independence; and when St. Olaf, in turn, again undertook to crush

it, he found he had but beaten down and alienated the forces that would

have enabled him to resist Knut.[653] Danish "imperialism" had been

evolved while the Norwegian kings were striving towards it; and St. Olaf

was exiled, defeated, and slain (1030). His subsequent popularity is a

mere posthumous Church-made cult of the Christian period.

The spread of Christianity among the Franks; in England; in Saxony

by Charlemagne; in North Germany later; and among the Wends, Poles,

Hungarians, and Bohemians, constantly exhibits the same phenomena.

Always it is the duke or king who is "converted"; whereupon the

people are either baptised in mass or dragooned for generations. A

powerful king like Clovis could secure obedience; others, as in

Scandinavia, Bohemia, and Wendland, lost life and kingdom in the

attempt to crush at once paganism and local independence. Prussia

was almost depopulated by sixty years of war before the Order of

Teutonic Knights, who undertook to convert it on being awarded the

territory, could extinguish by savagery its staunch paganism. The

Christianisation of almost the whole of Northern Europe was thus a

purely political process, accomplished in great part by the sword.

See Hardwick, _passim_, and cp. the author's _Short History of

Christianity_, pp. 211-16.

Sec. 2

The ultimate arrest of all aggression by the Scandinavian peoples is to

be explained as a simple redressing of the balance between them and the

States they had formerly plundered. To begin with, all the Scandinavian

groups alike practised piracy[654] as against the more civilised States

of Northern Europe; and piracy showed them the way to conquest and

colonisation. At home their means of subsistence were pasturage,

fishing, the chase, and an agriculture which cannot have been easily

extensible beyond the most fertile soils; hence a constant pressure of

population, promoting piracy and aggressive emigration. How the pressure

was purposively met is not clear; but as the Scandinavian father, like

the Greek and Roman, was free either to expose or bring up a new-born

child,[655] there is a presumption that at some periods exposure was not

uncommon.[656] There is even testimony, going back to the eighth century

and recurring frequently as late as the twelfth, to the effect that a

certain number of men were periodically sent away by lot when the mouths

had visibly multiplied beyond the meat.

See, for instance, the _Roman de Rou_ (1160), ed. Andresen,

1877-79, i, 18, 19, verses 208-25 of prologue. Pluquet, in a note

on the passage in his edition (1827, i, 10), remarking that the

usage is often mentioned, not only by Norman but by English and

French annalists of the Middle Ages, adds that the oldest mention

of all, in the _Tractatus_ of Abbot Odo (d. 942), must be rejected,

the document being apocryphal. That, however, is not the oldest

mention by a long way. Paulus Diaconus (740-99) gives the statement

in a very circumstantial form (cited by Rydberg, _Teutonic

Mythology_, Eng. tr. p. 68) in his history of the Longobardians,

his own stock, who he says came from Scandinavia. He testifies that

he had actually talked with persons who had been in

Scandinavia--his descriptions pointing to Scania. M. Pluquet notes

(so also Crichton and Wheaton, i, 166-67) that no northern saga

mentions the usage in question. But it was likely to be

commemorated only by the stocks forced in that fashion to emigrate.

The saga-making Icelanders were not among these. The old statement,

finally, is in some measure corroborated by the testimony of

Geijer, p. 84, as to the long subsistence of the Swedish practice

of sending forth sons to seek their fortune by sea.

But without any such organised exodus there were adventurers

enough.[657] Hence colonisations and conquests in Scotland, the

Hebrides, Ireland, Iceland, Russia, England, and remote plundering

expeditions by land and river, some getting as far south as Italy; one

conquering expedition passing from Gaul through Arab Spain (827) and

along the Mediterranean coasts, north and south; another passing through

Russia to Constantinople. Thus the Norwegian and Danish stocks must have

rooted in nearly every part of the British Islands; and the settlement

in Gaul of a colony of revolters from Norway, in the reign of Harold

Fairhair, built up one of the great provinces of France. Only in Iceland

did the colonists preserve their language; hence, in terms of the

hallucination of race, the assumption that the others "failed," when in

reality they helped to constitute new races; no more "failing" in these

cases than did the British stock in its North American colonies. It may

be said, indeed, that the Teutonic stocks which overran Italy, Spain,

and North Africa did in large part physically disappear thence, their

physiological type having failed to survive as against the southern

types. Even on that view, however, the impermanent type must in some

degree have affected that which survived. In any case, the amalgamated

Norse stock in Normandy, grown French-speaking, in turn overran England

and part of Italy and Sicily, and, in the Crusades, formed new kingdoms

in the East; while in the case of England, turning English-speaking,

they again modified the stock of the nation. As against the notion that

in this case there was "failure" either for French or for Normans, we

might almost adopt the _mot_ of M. Clemenceau and call England "a French

colony gone wrong."[658] In terms of realities there has been no racial

decease; it is but names and languages that have changed with the

generations.

But there was an arrest of military exodus from Scandinavia; and

thenceforward the Norse-speaking stocks figure as more or less small and

retiring communities. They gave up piracy and conquest only because they

had to, Danish imperialism causing the arrest on a wide scale, as every

monarchic unification had done on a small.[659] When Knut reigned over

six kingdoms, piracy was necessarily checked as among these; and when

Knut's empire broke up after his death through the repulsive powers of

its component parts and the relative lack of resources in Denmark, the

various States of north-western Europe, in the terms of the case, were

more able than before to resist Norse attacks in general. In England,

William the Conqueror was fain to keep them off by bribery and intrigue;

but the States with the greater natural resources grew in strength,

while those of Scandinavia could not. When the pirates began to get the

worst of it, and when the Scandinavian kings had cause to dread

reprisals from those of the west, piracy began to dwindle. The last

regular practitioners were the pagan Wends, and the republican pagans of

the city of Jomsborg, who plundered the Scandinavians as they had of

yore plundered others; and after the Christianised Danish people had for

a time defended themselves by voluntary associations, both sets of

pirates were overthrown by an energetic Danish king. The suppression was

under Christian auspices; but it is a conventional fallacy to attribute

it to the influence of Christianity. It was simply an act of necessary

progressive polity, like the suppression of the Cilician pirates by

Pompeius.

Messrs. Crichton and Wheaton make the regulation statement that

when Christianity was introduced into Scandinavia, "it corrected

the abuses of an ill-regulated freedom; it banished vindictive

quarrels and bloody dissensions; it put a restraint upon robberies

and piracies; it humanised the public laws and softened the

ferocity of public manners; it emancipated the peasantry from a

miserable servitude, restored to them their natural rights, and

created a relish for the blessings of peace and the comforts of

life" (_Scandinavia_, i, 196). For the general and decisive

disproof of these assertions it is necessary only to follow Messrs.

Crichton and Wheaton's own narrative, pp. 201, 213, 216, 219, 230,

240, 244, 247, 275, 278, 280, 308, 312, 322, etc., and note their

contrary generalisation at pp. 324, 325. It was his "Most Christian

Majesty" Anund Jakob who got the nickname of Coal-burner for his

law that the houses and effects of malefactors should be burned to

the value of the harm they had done. The Swedes, polygamous before

Christianity, continued to be so for generations as Christians

(Crichton and Wheaton, i, 197, 198, citing Adam of Bremen. Cp.

Grimm, _Geschichte der deutschen Sprache_, i, 18, 188.) Civil wars

and ferocious feuds greatly multiplied in the early Christian

period, apart altogether from pagan insurrections. Geijer, while

erroneously attributing to Christianity the lessening of war

between Scandinavia and the rest of the world, admits that the

passions of strife, "hitherto turned in an external direction, now

spent themselves in a domestic field of action, generating civil

discord and war. Christianity, besides, dissolved the effective

bond of the old social institutions" (p. 40). In that case it

clearly cannot have been religious feeling that checked external

war. As to piracy, that was later practised by Elizabethan

Protestants and by the Huguenots of La Rochelle, when the

opportunities were tempting. As to popular misery, it is told in

the life of Anskar that the poor in ancient Sweden wore so few that

the first Christians could find a use for their alms only in

foreign countries (Geijer, p. 33). That difficulty has not

prevailed since. Messrs. Crichton and Wheaton later admit that the

Danish peasantry, free as pagans, "gradually sunk under the

increasing power and influence of the feudal chiefs and the Romish

hierarchy" (p. 227), and that the Crusades did not forward the

emancipation of the serfs in Denmark as elsewhere, the peasantry on

the contrary sinking into "a state of hopeless bondage" (pp. 251,

252).

Sec. 3

From the period of arrest of aggression, the economic and political

history of the Scandinavian States is that of slightly expansible

communities with comparatively small resources; and their high status

to-day is the illustration of what civilisation may come to under such

conditions. In the feudal period they made small material or

intellectual progress. It is not probable that the Norse population was

ever greater than in the eighteenth century, though Malthus had a

surmise that it might anciently have been so:[660] the old belief that

Scandinavia was the great _officina gentium_, the nursery of the races

which overran the Roman Empire, is a delusion; but it is certain that

the increase since the twelfth century has been even slower than the

European average. In the absence of emigration, this meant for past

centuries constant restraint of marriage through lack of houses and

livelihoods--the preventive check in its most stringent form. Emigration

there must have been; but the check must also have been strong. Thus,

while the lot of the common people, in so far as it remained free, was

likely to be comparatively comfortable, the land-owning classes, in the

absence of industry and commerce, tended to become nearly all-powerful;

and the Church, which inherits and does not squander, would engross most

of the power if not specially checked. The conditions were thus as

unfavourable to intellectual as to material progress.

Denmark was the first of the Scandinavian States to develop a

considerable commerce, beginning as did Holland on the footing of the

fishery;[661] and on that basis there was a certain renewal of Danish

empire. But this again could not hold out against the neighbouring

forces; and in the thirteenth century, the herring fishery in the

Baltic failing, it had to yield its hold on the mainland cities of

Hamburg and Luebeck, which began a new career of commercial power as the

nucleus of the great trading federation of the Hansa cities, while

Denmark itself was riven by the struggles of six claimants of the

throne. The result was a "feudal and sacerdotal oligarchy,"[662] leading

to an era of "the complete triumph of the Romish clergy over the

temporal power in Denmark," in which the peasantry were reduced to

absolute predial slavery.[663] Similar evolution took place in

Norway,[664] though with less depression of the peasantry,[665] by

reason of the small scope there for capitalistic agriculture; and there

too the now nascent commerce was appropriated by the Hansa.[666] In

Sweden, where industry remained so primitive that down till the

sixteenth century there was hardly any attempt to work up the native

iron,[667] Germans greatly predominated in the cities and controlled

trade,[668] even before the accession of Albert of Mecklenburg (1363),

who further depressed the native nobility in the German interest.[669]

On the other hand, the clergy were less plenipotent than in the sister

kingdoms, the people having retained more of their old power.

Cp. Schweitzer, _Geschichte der skandinavischen Literatur_, i, 129.

The Swedish peasantry, like the Norwegian, were less easy to

enslave than the Danish by reason of the natural conditions; those

of the remote mountain and mining districts in particular retaining

their independence (Crichton and Wheaton, i, 375, 376; Geijer, pp.

50, 81, 89, 97, 103), so that they ultimately enabled Gustavus Vasa

to throw off the Danish yoke. Yet they had at first refused to

recognise him, being satisfied with their own liberties; and

afterwards they gave him much serious trouble (Otte, _Scandinavian

History_, 1874, pp. 228, 235; Geijer, pp. 109, 112, 115, 116, 118,

120-24). Slavery, too, was definitely abolished in Sweden as early

as 1335 (Geijer, pp. 57, 86; Crichton and Wheaton, i, 316, 333). As

regards the regal power, the once dominant theory that the Swedish

kings in the thirteenth century obtained a grant of all the mines,

and of the province of the four great lakes (Crichton and Wheaton,

i, 332), appears to be an entire delusion (Geijer, pp. 51, 52).

Such claims were first enforced by Gustavus Vasa (_id._ p. 129). As

regards the clergy, they appear from the first, _qua_ churchmen, to

have been kept in check by the nobles, who kept the great Church

offices largely in the hands of their own order (Geijer, p. 109),

though Magnus Ladulas strove to strengthen the Church in his own

interest (_id._ pp. 52-53). Thus the nobles became specially

powerful (_id._ pp. 50, 56, 108); and when in the fifteenth century

Sweden was subject to Denmark, they specially resented the

sacerdotal tyranny (Crichton and Wheaton, i, 356).

In Sweden, as in the other Scandinavian States, however, physical strife

and mental stagnation were the ruling conditions. Down till the

sixteenth century her history is pronounced "a wretched detail of civil

wars, insurrections, and revolutions, arising principally from the

jealousies subsisting between the kings and the people, the one striving

to augment their power, the other to maintain their independence."[670]

The same may be said of the sister kingdoms, all alike being torn and

drained by innumerable strifes of faction and wars with each other. The

occasional forcible and dynastic unions of crowns came to nothing; and

the Union of Calmar (1397), an attempt to confederate the three kingdoms

under one crown, repeatedly collapsed. The marvel is that in such an age

even the attempt was made. The remarkable woman who planned and first

effected it, Queen Margaret of Norway, appealed in the first instance

with heavy bribes for the co-operation of the clergy,[671] who,

especially in Sweden, where they preferred the Danish rule to the

domination of the nobles,[672] were always in favour of it for

ecclesiastical reasons.

Had such a union permanently succeeded, it would have eliminated a

serious source of positive political evil; but to carry forward

Scandinavian civilisation under the drawbacks of the medieval difficulty

of inter-communication (involving lack of necessary culture-contacts),

the natural poverty of the soil, and the restrictive pressure of the

Catholic Church, would have been a task beyond the power of a monarchy

comprising three mutually jealous sections. As it was, the old strifes

recurred almost as frequently as before, and moral union was never

developed. If historical evidence is to count for anything, the

experience of the Scandinavian stocks should suffice to discredit once

for all the persistent pretence that the "Teutonic races" have a faculty

for union denied to the Celtic, inasmuch as they, apparently the most

purely Teutonic of all, were even more irreconcilable, less fusible,

than the Anglo-Saxons before the Norman Conquest and the Germans down

till our own day, and much more mutually jealous than the quasi-Teutonic

provinces of the Netherlands, which, after the severance of Belgium,

have latterly lost their extreme repulsions, while those of Scandinavia

are not yet dead.[673] The explanation, of course, is not racial in any

case; but it is for those who affirm that capacity for union is a

Teutonic gift to find a racial excuse.

With the Reformation, though that was nowhere more clearly than in

Scandinavia a revolution of plunder, there began a new progress, in

respect not of any friendliness of the Lutheran system to thought and

culture, but of the sheer break-up of the intellectual ice of the old

regimen. In Denmark the process is curiously instructive. Christian II,

personally a capable and reformative but cruel tyrant, aimed throughout

his life at reducing the power alike of the clergy and the nobles, and

to that end sought on the one hand to abolish serfdom and educate the

poor and the burghers,[674] and on the other to introduce Lutheranism

(1520). From the latter attempt he was induced to desist, doubtless

surmising that the remedy might for him be a new disease: but on his

enforcing the reform of slavery he was rebelled against and forced to

fly by the nobility, who thereupon oppressed the people more than

ever.[675] His uncle and successor, Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein,

accepted the mandate of the nobles to the extent of causing to be

publicly burned in his presence all the laws of the last reign in favour

of the peasants, closing the poor schools throughout the kingdom,

burning the new books,[676] and pledging himself to expel Lutheranism.

He seems, however, to have been secretly a Protestant, and to have

evaded his pledge; and the rapid spread of the new heresy, especially in

the cities, brought about a new birth of popular literature in the

vernacular, despite the suppression of the schools.[677] In a few years'

time, Frederick, recognising the obvious interest of the crown, and

finding the greater nobles in alliance with the clergy, made common

cause with the smaller nobility, and so was able (1527) to force on the

prelates, who could hope for no better terms from the exiled king, the

toleration of Protestantism, the permission of marriage to the clergy,

and a surrender of a moiety of the tithes.[678] A few years later (1530)

the monasteries were either stormed by the populace or abandoned by the

monks, their houses and lands being divided among the municipalities,

the king and his courtiers, and the secular clergy.[679] After a stormy

interregnum, in which the Catholic party made a strenuous reaction, the

next king, Christian III, taking the nobles and commons-deputies into

partnership, made with their help an end of the Catholic system; the

remaining lands, castles, and manors of the prelates going to the crown,

and the tithes being parcelled among the landowners, the king, and the

clergy. Naturally a large part of the lands, as before, was divided

among the nobles,[680] who were in this way converted to Protestantism.

Thus whereas heathen kings had originally embraced Christianity to

enable them to consolidate their power, Christian kings embraced

Protestantism to enable them to recover wealth and power from the

Catholic Church. Creed all along followed interest;[681] and the people

had small concern in the change.[682]

Norway, being under the same crown, followed the course of Denmark. In

Sweden the powerful Gustavus Vasa saw himself forced at the outset of

his reign to take power and wealth from the Church if he would have any

of his own; and after the dramatic scene in the Diet of Westeras (1527),

in which he broke out with a passionate vow to renounce the crown if he

were not better supported,[683] he carried his point. The nobles, being

"squared"[684] by permission to resume such of their ancestral lands as

had been given to churches and convents since 1454, and by promise of

further grants, forced the bishops to consent to surrender to the king

their castles and strongholds, and to let him fix their revenues; all

which was duly done. The monasteries were soon despoiled of nearly all

their lands, many of which were seized by or granted in fief to the

barons;[685] and the king became head of the Church in as full a degree

as Henry VIII in England;[686] sagaciously, and in part unscrupulously,

creating for the first time in Scandinavia a strong yet not wholly

despotic monarchy, with such revenues from many sources[687] as made

possible the military power and activity of Gustavus Adolphus, and

later the effort of Charles XII to create an "empire"--an effort which,

necessarily failing, reduced Sweden permanently to her true economic

basis.

Apart from those remarkable episodes, the development of the

Scandinavian States since the sixteenth century has been, on their

relatively small scale, that of the normal monarchic community with a

variously vigorous democratic element; shaken frequently by civil

strife; wasting much strength in insensate wars; losing much through bad

kings and gaining somewhat from the good; passing painfully from bigotry

to tolerance; getting rid of their old aristocracies and developing new;

exhibiting in the mass the northern vice of alcoholism, yet maintaining

racial vigour; disproportionately taxing their producers as compared

with their non-producers; aiming, nevertheless, at industry and

commerce, and suffering from the divisive social influences they entail;

meddling in international strifes, till latterly the surrounding powers

preponderated too heavily; disunited and normally jealous of each other,

even when dynastically united, through stress of crude patriotic

prejudice and lack of political science; frequently retrograding, yet in

the end steadily progressing in such science as well as in general

culture and well-being. Losses of territory--as Finland and

Schleswig-Holstein--at the hands of stronger rivals, and the violent

experiences and transitions of the Napoleonic period, have left them on

a relatively stable and safe basis, albeit still mutually jealous and

unable to pass beyond the normal monarchic stage. To-day their culture

is that of all the higher civilisations, as are their social problems.

Sec. 4

In the history of Scandinavian culture, however, lie some special

illustrations of sociological law. The remarkable fact that the first

great development of old Norse literature occurred in the poor and

remote colonial settlement of Iceland is significant of much. To the

retrospective yearning of an exiled people, the desire to preserve every

memory of the old life in the fatherland, is to be attributed the

grounding of the saga-cult in Iceland; and the natural conditions,

enforcing long spells of winter leisure, greatly furthered the movement.

But the finest growth of the new literature, it turns out, is due to

culture-contacts--an unexpected confirmation, in a most unlikely

quarter, of a general principle arrived at on other data. The vigilant

study of our own day has detected, standing out from the early

Icelandic literature, "a group of poems which possess the very qualities

of high imagination, deep pathos, fresh love of nature, passionate

dramatic power, and noble simplicity of language, which [other] Icelandic

poetry lacks. The solution is that these poems do not belong to Iceland at

all. They are the poetry of the 'Western Islands'"[688]--that is, the

poetry of the meeting and mixing of the "Celtic" and Scandinavian stocks

in Ireland and the Hebrides--the former already much mixed, and

proportionally rich in intellectual variations. It was in this area that

"a magnificent school of poetry arose, to which we owe works that for

power and beauty can be paralleled in no Teutonic language till centuries

after their date.... This school, which is totally distinct from the

Icelandic, ran its own course apart and perished before the thirteenth

century."[689]

Compare Messrs. Vigfusson and Powell's _Corpus Poeticum Boreale_,

1883, vol. i, Introd. pp. lxii, lxiii; and, as regards the old

Irish civilisation, the author's _Saxon and Celt_, pp. 127, 128,

131-33.

The theory of Celtic influence, though established in its

essentials, is not perfectly consistent as set forth in the

_Britannica_ article. Thus, while the Celticised literature is

remarked for "noble simplicity of language," the true Icelandic,

primarily like the Old English, is said to develop a "complexity of

structure and ornament, an elaborate mythological and enigmatical

phraseology, and a regularity of rhyme, assonance, luxuriance,

quantity, and syllabification which it caught up from the Latin and

_Celtic_ poets." Further, while the Celticised school is described

as "totally distinct from the Icelandic," Celtic influence is also

specified as affecting Norse literature in general. The first

generations of Icelandic poets were men of good birth, "nearly

always, too, of Celtic blood on one side at least"; and they went

to Norway or Denmark, where they lived as kings' or chiefs'

henchmen. The immigration of Norse settlers from Ireland, too,

affected the Iceland stock very early. "It is to the west that the

best sagas belong: it is to the west that nearly every classic

writer whose name we know belongs; and it is precisely in the west

that the admixture of Irish blood is greatest" (_ib._). The facts

seem decisive, and the statements above cited appear the more

clearly to need modification. It is to be noted that Schweitzer's

_Geschichte der skandinavischen Literatur_ gives no hint of the

Celtic influence.

But the Icelandic civilisation as a whole could not indefinitely

progress on its own basis any more than the Irish. Beyond a certain

point both needed new light and leading; for the primeval spirit of

strife never spontaneously weakened; the original Icelandic stock being,

to begin with, a selection of revolters from over-rule. So continual

domestic feuds checked mental evolution in Iceland as in old

Scandinavia; and the reduction of the island to Norwegian rule in the

thirteenth century could not do more for it than monarchy was doing for

Norway. Mere Christianity without progressive conditions of culture

availed less for imaginative art than free paganism had done; and when

higher culture-contacts became possible, the extreme poverty of Iceland

tended more than ever to send the enterprising people where the culture

and comfort were. It is in fact not a possible seat for a relatively

flourishing civilisation in the period of peaceful development. The

Reformation seems there to have availed for very little indeed. It was

vehemently resisted,[690] but carried by the preponderant acquisitive

forces: "nearly all who took part in it were men of low type, moved by

personal motives rather than religious zeal."[691] "The glebes and

hospital lands were a fresh power in the hands of the crown, and the

subservient Lutheran clergy became the most powerful class in the

island; while the bad system of underleasing at rack-rent and short

lease with unsecured tenant-right extended in this way over at least a

quarter of the better land, stopping any possible progress." For the

rest, "the Reformation had produced a real poet [Hallgrim Petersen], but

the material rise of Iceland"--that is, the recent improvements in the

condition of the people--"has not yet done so,"[692] though poetry is

still cultivated in Iceland very much as music is elsewhere.

Thus this one little community may be said to have reached the limits of

its evolution, as compared with others, simply because of the strait

natural conditions in which its lot was cast. But to think of it as a

tragically moribund organism is merely to proceed upon the old

hallucinations of race-consciousness. Men reared in Iceland have done

their part in making European civilisation, entering the more southerly

Scandinavian stocks as these entered the stocks of western Europe; and

the present population, who are a remnant, have no more cause to hang

their heads than any family that happens to have few members or to have

missed wealth. Failure is relative only to pretension or purpose.

The modern revival of Scandinavian culture, as must needs be, is the

outcome of all the European influences. At the close of the sixteenth

century, in more or less friendly intercourse with the other Protestant

countries of north Europe, Denmark began effectively to develop a

literature such as theirs, imaginative and scientific, in the vernacular

as well as in Latin; and so the development went on while Sweden was

gaining military glory with little enlightenment. Then a rash attack

upon Sweden ended in a loss of some of the richest Danish provinces

(1658); whereafter a sudden parliamentary revolution, wrought by a

league of king and people against the aristocracy, created not a

constitutional but an absolute and hereditary monarchy (1660),

enthroning divine right at the same instant in Denmark and Norway as in

England. Thereafter, deprived of their old posts and subjected to

ruinous taxes, the nobility fell rapidly into poverty;[693] and the

merchant class, equally overtaxed, withdrew their capital; the peasantry

all the while remaining in a state of serfdom.[694] Then came a new

series of wars with Sweden, recurring through generations, arresting, it

is said, literature, law, philosophy, and medicine,[695] but not the

natural sciences, then so much in evidence elsewhere: Tycho Brahe being

followed in astronomy by Horrebow, while chemistry, mathematics, and

even anatomy made progress. But to this period belongs the brilliant

dramatist and historian Holberg, the first great man of letters in

modern Scandinavia (d. 1754); and in the latter half of the eighteenth

century the two years of ascendency of the freethinking physician

Struensee as queen's favourite (1770-72) served partially to emancipate

the peasants, establish religious toleration, abolish torture, and

reform the administration. Nor did his speedy overthrow and execution

wholly undo his main work,[696] which outdid that of many generations of

the old regime. Still, the history of his rise and fall, his vehement

speed of reconstruction and the ruinous resistance it set up, is one of

the most dramatic of the many warnings of history against thinking

suddenly to elevate a nation by reforms imposed wholly from

without.[697]

Thenceforward, with such fluctuations as mark all culture-history, the

Scandinavian world has progressed mentally nearly step for step with

the rest of Europe, producing scholars, historians, men of science,

artists, and imaginative writers in more than due proportion. Many names

which stand for solid achievement in the little-read Scandinavian

tongues are unknown save to specialists elsewhere; but those of Holberg,

Linnaeus, Malte-Brun, Rask, Niebuhr, Madvig, Oehlenschlaeger,

Thorwaldsen, and Swedenborg tell of a comprehensive influence on the

thought and culture of Europe during a hundred years in which Europe was

being reborn; and in our own day some of the greatest imaginative

literature of the modern world comes from Norway, long the most backward

of the group. Ibsen, one of a notable company of masters, stood at the

head of the drama of the nineteenth century; and the society which

sustained him, however he may have satirised it, is certificated abreast

of its age.

Sec. 5

In one aspect the Scandinavian polities have a special lesson for the

larger nations. They have perforce been specially exercised latterly, as

of old, by the problem of population; and in Norway there was formerly

made one of the notable, if not one of the best, approaches to a

practical solution of it. Malthus long ago[698] noted the Norwegian

marriage-rate as the lowest in Europe save that of Switzerland; and he

expressed the belief that in his day Norway was "almost the only country

in Europe where a traveller will hear any apprehension expressed of a

redundant population, and where the danger to the happiness of the lower

classes of people is in some degree seen and understood."[699] This

state of things having long subsisted, there is a presumption that it

persists uninterruptedly from pagan times, when, as we have seen, there

existed a deliberate population-policy; for Christian habits of mind can

nowhere be seen to have set up such a tendency, and it would be hard to

show in the history of Norway any great political change which might

effect a rapid revolution in the domestic habits of the peasantry, such

as occurred in France after the Revolution. Broadly speaking, the mass

of the Norwegian people had till the last century continued to live

under those external or domiciliary restraints on multiplication which

were normal in rural Europe in the Middle Ages, and which elsewhere have

been removed by industrialism; yet without suffering latterly from a

continuance of the severer medieval destructive checks. They must,

therefore, have put a high degree of restraint on marriage, and probably

observed parental prudence in addition.

When it is found that in Sweden, where the conditions and usages were

once similar, there was latterly at once less prudential restraint on

marriage and population, and a lower standard of material well-being,

the two cases are seen to furnish a kind of _experimentum crucis_. The

comparatively late maintenance of a powerful military system in Sweden

having there prolonged the methods of aristocratic and bureaucratic

control while they were being modified in Denmark-Norway, Swedish

population in the eighteenth century was subject to artificial stimulus.

From about the year 1748, the Government set itself, on the ordinary

empirical principle of militarism, to encourage population.[700] Among

its measures were the variously wise ones of establishing medical

colleges and lying-in and foundling hospitals, the absolute freeing of

the internal trade in grain, and the withdrawal in 1748 of an old law

limiting the number of persons allowed to each farm. The purpose of that

law had been to stimulate population by spreading tillage; but the spare

soil being too unattractive, the young people emigrated. On the law

being abolished, population did increase considerably, rising between

1751 and 1800 from 1,785,727 to 2,347,308,[701] though some severe

famines had occurred within the period. But in the year 1799, when

Malthus visited the country, the increased population suffered from

famine very severely indeed, living mainly and miserably on bark

bread.[702] It was one of Malthus's great object-lessons in his science.

On one side a poor country was artificially over-populated; on the

other, the people of Norway, an even poorer country, directly and

indirectly[703] restrained their rate of increase, while the Government

during a long period wrought to the same end by the adjustment of its

military system and by making a certificate of earning power or income

necessary for all marriages.[704] The result was that, save in the

fishing districts, where speculative conditions encouraged early

marriages and large families, the Norwegian population were better off

than the Swedish.[705]

Already in Malthus' youth the Norwegian-Danish policy had been altered,

all legal and military restrictions on marriage having been withdrawn;

and he notes that fears were expressed as to the probable results. It is

one of his shortcomings to have entirely abstained from subsequent

investigation of the subject; and in his late addendum as to the state

of Sweden in 1826 he further fails to note that as a result of a

creation there after 1803 of 6,000 new farms from land formerly waste,

the country ceased to need to import corn and was able to export a

surplus.[706] It still held good, however, that the Norwegian

population, being from persistence of prudential habit[707] much the

slower in its rate of increase, had the higher standard of comfort,

despite much spread of education in Sweden.

Within the past half-century the general development of commerce and of

industry has tended broadly to equalise the condition of the

Scandinavian peoples. As late as 1835 a scarcity would suffice to drive

the Norwegian peasantry to the old subsistence of bark bread, a ruinous

resort, seeing that it destroyed multitudes of trees of which the value,

could the timber have found a market, would have far exceeded that of a

quantity of flour yielding much more and better food. At that period the

British market was closed by duties imposed in the interest of the

Canadian timber trade.[708] Since the establishment of British free

trade, Norwegian timber has become a new source of wealth; and through

this and other and earlier commercial developments prudential family

habits were affected. Thus, whereas the population of Sweden had all but

doubled between 1800 and 1880, the population of Norway had grown even

faster.[709] And whereas in 1834 the proportion of illegitimate to

legitimate births in Stockholm was 1 to 2.26[710] (one of the results of

foundling hospitals, apparently), in 1890 the total Swedish rate was

slightly below 1 to 10, while in Norway it was 1 to 14. The modern

facilities for emigration have further affected conjugal habits.

Latterly, however, there are evidences of a new growth of intelligent

control.

In recent years the statistics of emigration and population tell a

fairly plain story. In Norway and Sweden alike the excess of births over

deaths reached nearly its highest in 1887, the figures being 63,942 for

Sweden and 29,233 for Norway. In 1887, however, emigration was about its

maximum in both countries, 50,786 leaving Sweden and 20,706 leaving

Norway. Thereafter the birth-rate rapidly fell, and the emigration,

though fluctuating, has never again risen in Sweden to the volume of

1887-88, though it has in Norway. But when, after falling to 43,728 in

1892, the excess of Swedish births over deaths rises to 60,231 in 1895,

while the emigration falls from 45,000 in 1892 to 13,000 in 1894, it is

clear that the lesson of regulation is still very imperfectly learned.

Norway shows the same fluctuations, the excess of births rising from

23,600 in 1892 to nearly 32,000 in 1896, and again from 27,685 in 1908

to 29,804 in 1909, doubtless because of ups and downs in the harvests,

as shown in the increase of marriages from 12,742 in 1892 to 13,962 in

1896.

In Denmark the progression has been similar. There the excess of births

over deaths was so far at its maximum in 1886, the figures being 29,986

in a population of a little over 2,000,000; whereafter they slowly

decreased, till in 1893 the excess was only 26,235. All the while

emigration was active, gradually rising from 4,346 in 1885 to 10,382 in

1891; then again falling to 2,876 in 1896, when the surplus of births

over deaths was 34,181--a development sure to force more emigration. In

1911 the population was 2,775,076--a rapid rise; and in 1910 the surplus

of births over deaths was 40,110. The Scandinavians are thus still in

the unstable progressive stage of popular well-being, though probably

suffering less from it than either Germany or England.

Here, then, is a group of kindred peoples apparently at least as capable

of reaching a solution of the social problem as any other, and visibly

prospering materially and morally in proportion as they bring reason to

bear on the vital lines of conduct, though still in the stage of curing

over-population by emigration. Given continued peaceful political

evolution in the direction first of democratic federation, and further

of socialisation of wealth, they may reach and keep the front rank in

civilisation, while the more unmanageably large communities face risks

of dire vicissitude.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 638: As in Carlyle's _Early Kings of Norway_, the _caput

mortuum_ of his historical method. Much more instructive works on

Scandinavian history are available to the English reader. The two

volumes on _Scandinavia_ by Crichton and Wheaton (1837) are not yet

superseded, though savouring strongly of the conservatism of their

period. Dunham, who rapidly produced, for Gardner's Cabinet Cyclopaedia

series, histories of _Spain and Portugal_ (5 vols.), _Europe during the

Middle Ages_ (4 vols.), and the _Germanic Empire_ (3 vols.), compiled

also one of _Denmark, Sweden, and Norway_ (3 vols. 1839-40), of inferior

quality. But Geijer's _History of Sweden_, one of the standard modern

national histories of Europe, is translated into English as far as the

period of Gustavus Vasa (3 vols. of orig. in one of trans. 1845); and

the competent _History of Denmark_ by C.-F. Allen is available in a

French translation (Copenhagen, 2 tom. 1878). Otte's _Scandinavian

History_, 1874, is an unpretending and unliterary but well-informed

work, which may be used to check Crichton and Wheaton. The more recent

work of Mr. R. Nisbet Bain, _Scandinavia: a Political History of

Denmark, Norway, and Sweden from 1513 to 1900_ (Camb. Univ. Press,

1905), is useful for the period covered, but has little sociological

value. For the history of ancient Scandinavian literature, the

introduction to Vigfusson and Powell's _Corpus Poeticum Boreale_ (1883),

and Prof. Powell's article on Icelandic Literature in the 10th ed. of

the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_, are preferable to Schweitzer's

_Geschichte der skandinavischen Literatur_ (1886, 2 Bde.), which,

however, is useful for the modern period.]

[Footnote 639: See Geijer's _History of the Swedes_, Eng. tr. of pt. i,

1-vol. ed. p. 30, as to the special persistence in Scandinavia of the

early religious conception of kingship. Cp. Crichton and Wheaton's

_Scandinavia_, 1837, i, 157.]

[Footnote 640: Such New Testament passages as _Rom._ xiii, 1-7, and

_Titus_ iii, 1, seem to have been penned or interpolated expressly to

propitiate the Roman government.]

[Footnote 641: It was by entirely overlooking this historic fact that M.

Fustel de Coulanges, in the last chapter of his _Cite antique_, was able

to propound a theory of historic Christianity as something

extra-political. He there renounced the inductive method for a pure

ecclesiastical apriorism, and the result is a very comprehensive

sociological misconception.]

[Footnote 642: Geijer, pp. 31, 33; Crichton and Wheaton, i, 102, 104,

183, 184.]

[Footnote 643: Tacitus, _Germania_, cc. 7, 11.]

[Footnote 644: Cp. Zschokke, _Des Schweizerlands Geschichte_, c. 7, as

to the psychological effect of an organised worship in a great building

on heathens without any such centre. And see the frank admission of J.R.

Green, _Short History_, p. 54, that among the Anglo-Saxons "religion had

told against political independence."]

[Footnote 645: Cp. C.F. Allen, _History of Denmark_, French tr.,

Copenhagen, 1878, i, 55, 56.]

[Footnote 646: Crichton and Wheaton, _Scandinavia_, i, 129-32; Hardwick,

_Church History: Middle Age_, 1853, p. 115. Knut was a great supporter

of missionaries. Hardwick attributes to Gorm a "bitter hatred" of the

Church, and also "violence," but gives no details.]

[Footnote 647: Even Svend is said to have laboured for Christianity in

his latter years--another suggestion that it was found to answer

monarchic purposes. See Hardwick, p. 115, _note 9_.]

[Footnote 648: Cp. Dasent, Introd. to _The Burnt Njal_, p. ix.]

[Footnote 649: Hardwick, as cited, p. 117.]

[Footnote 650: Hardwick, as cited.]

[Footnote 651: A warlike priest of Bremen is said to have converted him

in Germany; and he was baptised in the Scilly Islands, which he had

visited on a piratical expedition. Finally he was confirmed in England,

which he promised to treat in future as a friendly State. (_Id._ _ib._)]

[Footnote 652: Crichton and Wheaton, i, 151.]

[Footnote 653: Cp. Hardwick. p. 118, _note 3_.]

[Footnote 654: Though this was often of the most brutal description,

there were some comparatively "mild-mannered" pirates, who rarely "cut a

throat or scuttled ship." See C.-F. Allen, _Histoire de Danemark_, i,

21.]

[Footnote 655: Geijer, _History of Sweden_, Eng. tr. p. 31.]

[Footnote 656: It is actually on record that the practice long subsisted

in Iceland, despite the efforts of St. Olaf to suppress it. Hardwick,

_Church History: Middle Age_, p. 119, _note_, citing Torfaens, _Hist.

Norveg._ ii, 2, and Neander. Among the Slavonic Pomeranians in the

twelfth century it was still common to destroy female children at birth.

_Id._ p. 224, _note_.]

[Footnote 657: Cp. C.-F. Allen, _Histoire de Danemark_, Fr. tr. 1878, i,

20.]

[Footnote 658: "Qu'est-ce que c'est que l'Angleterre? Une colonie

francais mal tournee."]

[Footnote 659: Thus Rolf the Ganger fared forth to France because Harold

Fairhair would not suffer piracy on any territory acquired by him.]

[Footnote 660: _Essay on the Principle of Population_, 7th ed. p. 139.]

[Footnote 661: Crichton and Wheaton, i, 254. Dr. Ph. Schweitzer

(_Geschichte der skandinavischen Literatur_, Sec. 19), makes the surprising

statement that the quantity of old coins found in Scandinavia (over

100,000 within the last century) proves that the ancient Scandinavian

commerce was very great (_ein ganz grossartiger_). His own account of

the occasional barter of the Vikings shows that there was nothing

"grossartig" about it, and the coins prove nothing beyond piracy.]

[Footnote 662: Crichton and Wheaton, i, 263, 287.]

[Footnote 663: _Id._ pp. 251, 252, 277, 377.]

[Footnote 664: _Id._ pp. 304, 305, 311.]

[Footnote 665: _Id._ ii, 350. Cp. Laing, _Journal of a Residence in

Norway_ (1834-36), ed. 1851, p. 135. Bain, however, pronounces that in

Norway in the latter part of the fifteenth century "the peasantry were

mostly thralls" (_Scandinavia_, 1905, p. 10).]

[Footnote 666: Crichton and Wheaton, i, 305, 310.]

[Footnote 667: _Id._ p. 332; Geijer, p. 135.]

[Footnote 668: Geijer, pp. 88, 91; Crichton and Wheaton, i, 331.]

[Footnote 669: Crichton and Wheaton, i, 324.]

[Footnote 670: Crichton and Wheaton, i, 331.]

[Footnote 671: _Id._ p. 336.]

[Footnote 672: Geijer, pp. 100, 109; Otte, _Scandinavian History_, 1874,

p. 252.]

[Footnote 673: Cp. Milman, _Latin Christianity_, 4th ed. ii, 225, on

Anglo-Saxon separatism. Since this was written there has taken place the

decisive separation between Norway and Sweden.]

[Footnote 674: Otte, _Scandinavian History_, 1874, pp. 214-18. Himself

an excellent Latinist, he sought to raise the learned professions, and

compelled the burghers to give their children schooling under penalty of

heavy fines. He further caused new and better books to be prepared for

the public schools, and stopped witch-burning. Cp. Allen, _Histoire de

Danemark_, i, 281.]

[Footnote 675: Crichton and Wheaton, i, 377-79, 383; Allen, as cited, i,

286, 310.]

[Footnote 676: Otte, p. 222; Allen, i, 287, 290.]

[Footnote 677: Crichton and Wheaton, i, 384-86; Allen, pp. 287-90.]

[Footnote 678: Allen, i, 299, 300.]

[Footnote 679: Crichton and Wheaton, pp. 386, 387. These writers

suppress the details as to Frederick's anti-popular action; and Otte's

history, giving these, omits all mention of his act of toleration.

Allen's is the best account, i, 293, 299, 301, 305.]

[Footnote 680: Crichton and Wheaton, pp. 394-96; Otte, pp. 222-24.

According to some accounts, the great bulk of the spoils went to the

nobility. Villers, _Essay on the Reformation_, Eng. tr. 1836, p. 105.]

[Footnote 681: It is notable that even in the thirteenth century there

was a Norwegian king (Erik) called the Priest-hater, because of his

efforts to make the clergy pay taxes.]

[Footnote 682: "The bulk of the people, at least in the first instance,

and especially in Sweden and Norway, were by no means disposed to look

to Wittenberg rather than to Rome for spiritual guidance" (Bain,

_Scandinavia_, p. 86; cp. pp. 60, 64).]

[Footnote 683: Geijer, p. 177; Otte, p. 234.]

[Footnote 684: As the king wrote later to an acquisitive noble: "To

strip churches, convents, and prebends of estates, manors, and chattels,

thereto are all full willing and ready; and after such a fashion is

every man a Christian and evangelical"--_i.e._ Lutheran. Geijer, p. 126.

Cp. p. 129 as to the practice of spoliation.]

[Footnote 685: Geijer, pp. 119, 129.]

[Footnote 686: _Id._ p. 125; Otte, p. 236. The prelates were no longer

admitted to any political offices, though the bishops and pastors sat

together in the Diet.]

[Footnote 687: See Geijer, pp. 129-36.]

[Footnote 688: Prof. York Powell, article on Icelandic Literature, in

_Encyclopaedia Britannica_, 10th ed. xii, 621; 11th ed. xiv, 233.]

[Footnote 689: _Id._ (11th ed. xiv, 234).]

[Footnote 690: Bain, _Scandinavia_, pp. 100-1.]

[Footnote 691: Powell, article on Icelandic Literature, _Ency. Brit._

10th ed. xii, 621.]

[Footnote 692: _Id._ p. 623.]

[Footnote 693: Shaftesbury (_Characteristics_, ed. 1900, ii, 262) writes

in 1713 of "that forlorn troop of begging gentry extant in Denmark or

Sweden, since the time that those nations lost their liberties."]

[Footnote 694: Crichton and Wheaton, ii, 104.]

[Footnote 695: _Id._ ii, 321-22.]

[Footnote 696: Laing in 1839 (_Tour in Sweden_, p. 13) thought the Danes

as backward as they had been in 1660, quoting the ambassador Molesworth

as to the effect of Lutheran Protestantism in destroying Danish

liberties (pp. 10, 11). But it is hard to see that there were any

popular liberties to destroy, save in so far as the party which set up

the Reformation undid the popular laws of Christian II. The greatest

social reforms in Denmark are certainly the work of the last

half-century.]

[Footnote 697: It will be remembered that the Marquis of Pombal, in

Portugal, at the same period, was similarly overthrown after a much

longer and non-scandalous reformatory rule, the queen being his enemy.]

[Footnote 698: His particulars were gathered during a tour he made in

1799. Thus the Norse practice he notes had been independent of any

effect produced by his own essay.]

[Footnote 699: _Essay on the Principle of Population_, 7th ed. pp. 126,

133.]

[Footnote 700: This was doubtless owing to the loss of Finland (1742), a

circumstance not considered by Malthus.]

[Footnote 701: Malthus (p. 141) gives higher and clearly erroneous

figures for both periods, and contradicts them later (p. 143) with

figures which he erroneously applies to Sweden _and Finland_. He seems

to have introduced the latter words in the wrong passage.]

[Footnote 702: _Id._ p. 141.]

[Footnote 703: See p. 131 as to the restrictions on subdivision of farms

by way of safeguarding the forests.]

[Footnote 704: _Id._ p. 126. A priest would often refuse to marry a

couple who had no good prospect of a livelihood: so far could rational

custom affect even ecclesiastical practice.]

[Footnote 705: Cp. Crichton and Wheaton, ii, 339-50; Laing, _Journal of

a Residence in Norway_ (1834-36), ed. 1851, pp. 22, 23, 34, 35, 191,

214.]

[Footnote 706: Crichton and Wheaton, ii, 345. Laing (_Tour in Sweden_,

pp. 277-82) thought the Swedish peasants better off than the Scotch,

though morally inferior to the Norwegian.]

[Footnote 707: Laing, _Norway_, p. 213.]

[Footnote 708: Laing, as cited, p. 220; Crichton and Wheaton, ii, 368.]

[Footnote 709: Sweden in 1800 stood at 2,347,303; in 1880, at 4,565,668;

in 1900, at 5,136,441. Estimate for 1910, 5,521,943. Norway in 1815

stood at 886,656; in 1910 at 2,391,782.]

[Footnote 710: Laing, as cited, p. 103, _note_.]

The Evolution of States · 第 2 / 9 章