A view sometime held was that magic is religion, and religion magic.
With equal reason, or want of reason, it might be held that magic was
science, and science magic. {xiii} Even if we correct the definition,
and say that to us magic appears, in one aspect, as a spurious system
of science; and, in another, as a spurious system of religion; we still
have to note that, for those who believed in it, it could not have been
a spurious system, whether of science or religion. Primitive man acts
on the assumption that he can produce like by means of like; and about
that assumption there is no "magic" of any kind. It is only when an
effect thus produced is a thing not commonly done and not generally
approved of, that it is regarded as magic; and it is magic, because not
every one knows how to do it, or not every one has the power to do it,
or not every one cares to do it. About this belief, so long as every
one entertains it, there is nothing spurious. When however it begins
to be suspected that the magician has not the power to do what he
professes, his profession tends to become fraudulent and his belief
spurious. On the other hand, a thing commonly done and generally
approved of is not regarded as magical merely because the effect
resembles the cause, and like is in this instance produced by like.
Magic is a term of evil connotation; and the practice of using like to
produce like is condemned when and because it is employed for
anti-social purposes. Such practices are resented by the society,
amongst whom and on whom they are employed; and they are offensive to
the God who looks after the interests of the community. In fine, the
object and purpose of the practice determines the attitude of the
community towards the practice: if the object is anti-social, the
practice is nefarious; and the witch, if "smelled out," is killed. The
person who is willing to undertake such nefarious proceedings comes to
be credited with a nefarious personality, that is to say, with both the
power and the will to do what ordinary, decent members of the community
could not and would not do: personal power comes to be the most
important, because the most mysterious, characteristic of the man
believed to {xiv} be a magician. If we turn to things, such as
rain-making, which are socially beneficial, we find a similar growth in
the belief that some men have extraordinary power to work wonders on
behalf of the tribe. A further stage of development is reached when
the man who uses his personal power for nefarious purposes undertakes
by means of it to control spirits: magic then tends to pass into
fetichism. Similarly, when rain and other social benefits come to be
regarded as gifts of the gods, the power of the rainmaker comes to be
regarded as a power to procure from the gods the gifts that they have
to bestow: magic is displaced by religion. The opposition of principle
between magic and religion thus makes itself manifest. It makes itself
manifest in that the one promotes social and the other anti-social
purposes: the spirit worshipped by any community as its god is a spirit
who has the interests of the community at heart, and who _ex officio_
condemns and punishes those who by magic or otherwise work injury to
the members of the community. Finally, the decline of the belief in
magic is largely due to the discovery that it does not produce the
effects it professes to bring about. But the missionary will also
dwell on the fact that his hearers feel it to be anti-social and to be
condemned alike by their moral sentiments and their religious feeling .
. . 70-104