4
_The Arrival of the Bulgars in the Balkan Peninsula,_ 600–700
The progress of the Bulgars towards the Balkan peninsula, and indeed
all their movements until their final establishment there in the
seventh century, are involved in obscurity. They are first mentioned by
name in classical and Armenian sources in 482 as living in the steppes
to the north of the Black Sea amongst other Asiatic tribes, and it has
been assumed by some that at the end of the fifth and throughout the
sixth century they were associated first with the Huns and later with
the Avars and Slavs in the various incursions into and invasions of the
eastern empire which have already been enumerated. It is the tendency
of Bulgarian historians, who scornfully point to the fact that the
history of Russia only dates from the ninth century, to exaggerate the
antiquity of their own and to claim as early a date as possible for the
authentic appearance of their ancestors on the kaleidoscopic stage of
the Balkan theatre. They are also unwilling to admit that they were
anticipated by the Slavs; they prefer to think that the Slavs only
insinuated themselves there thanks to the energy of the Bulgars’
offensive against the Greeks, and that as soon as the Bulgars had
leisure to look about them they found all the best places already
occupied by the anarchic Slavs.
Of course it is very difficult to say positively whether Bulgars were
or were not present in the welter of Asiatic nations which swept
westwards into Europe with little intermission throughout the fifth and
sixth centuries, but even if they were, they do not seem to have
settled down as early as that anywhere south of the Danube; it seems
certain that they did not do so until the seventh century, and
therefore that the Slavs were definitely installed in the Balkan
peninsula a whole century before the Bulgars crossed the Danube for
good.
The Bulgars, like the Huns and the Avars who preceded them, and like
the Magyars and the Turks who followed them, were a tribe from eastern
Asia, of the stock known as Mongol or Tartar. The tendency of all these
peoples was to move westwards from Asia into Europe, and this they did
at considerable and irregular intervals, though in alarming and
apparently inexhaustible numbers, roughly from the fourth till the
fourteenth centuries. The distance was great, but the journey, thanks
to the flat, grassy, treeless, and well-watered character of the
steppes of southern Russia which they had to cross, was easy. They
often halted for considerable periods by the way, and some never moved
further westwards than Russia. Thus at one time the Bulgars settled in
large numbers on the Volga, near its confluence with the Kama, and it
is presumed that they were well established there in the fifth century.
They formed a community of considerable strength and importance, known
as Great or White Bulgaria. These Bulgars fused with later Tartar
immigrants from Asia and eventually were consolidated into the powerful
kingdom of Kazan, which was only crushed by the Tsar Ivan IV in 1552.
According to Bulgarian historians, the basins of the rivers Volga and
Don and the steppes of eastern Russia proved too confined a space for
the legitimate development of Bulgarian energy, and expansion to the
west was decided on. A large number of Bulgars therefore detached
themselves and began to move south-westwards. During the sixth century
they seem to have been settled in the country to the north of the Black
Sea, forming a colony known as Black Bulgaria. It is very doubtful
whether the Bulgars did take part, as they are supposed to have done,
in the ambitious but unsuccessful attack on Constantinople in 559 under
Zabergan, chief of another Tartar tribe; but it is fairly certain that
they did in the equally formidable but equally unsuccessful attacks by
the Slavs and Avars against Salonika in 609 and Constantinople in 626.
During the last quarter of the sixth and the first of the seventh
century the various branches of the Bulgar nation, stretching from the
Volga to the Danube, were consolidated and kept in control by their
prince Kubrat, who eventually fought on behalf of the Greeks against
the Avars, and was actually baptized in Constantinople. The power of
the Bulgars grew as that of the Avars declined, but at the death of
Kubrat, in 638, his realm was divided amongst his sons. One of these
established himself in Pannonia, where he joined forces with what was
left of the Avars, and there the Bulgars maintained themselves till
they were obliterated by the irruption of the Magyars in 893. Another
son, Asparukh, or Isperikh, settled in Bessarabia, between the rivers
Prut and Dniester, in 640, and some years later passed southwards.
After desultory warfare with Constantinople, from 660 onwards, his
successor finally overcame the Greeks, who were at that time at war
with the Arabs, captured Varna, and definitely established himself
between the Danube and the Balkan range in the year 679. From that year
the Danube ceased to be the frontier of the eastern empire.
The numbers of the Bulgars who settled south of the Danube are not
known, but what happened to them is notorious. The well-known process,
by which the Franks in Gaul were absorbed by the far more numerous
indigenous population which they had conquered, was repeated, and the
Bulgars became fused with the Slavs. So complete was the fusion, and so
preponderating the influence of the subject nationality, that beyond a
few personal names no traces of the language of the Bulgars have
survived. Modern Bulgarian, except for the Turkish words introduced
into it later during the Ottoman rule, is purely Slavonic. Not so the
Bulgarian nationality; as is so often the case with mongrel products,
this race, compared with the Serbs, who are purely Slav, has shown
considerably greater virility, cohesion, and driving-power, though it
must be conceded that its problems have been infinitely simpler.
5
_The Early Years of Bulgaria and the Introduction of Christianity_,
700–893
From the time of their establishment in the country to which they have
given their name the Bulgars became a thorn in the side of the Greeks,
and ever since both peoples have looked on one another as natural and
hereditary enemies. The Bulgars, like all the barbarians who had
preceded them, were fascinated by the honey-pot of Constantinople, and,
though they never succeeded in taking it, they never grew tired of
making the attempt.
For two hundred years after the death of Asparukh, in 661, the Bulgars
were perpetually fighting either against the Greeks or else amongst
themselves. At times a diversion was caused by the Bulgars taking the
part of the Greeks, as in 718, when they ‘delivered’ Constantinople, at
the invocation of the Emperor Leo, from the Arabs, who were besieging
it. From about this time the Bulgarian monarchy, which had been
hereditary, became elective, and the anarchy of the many, which the
Bulgars found when they arrived, and which their first few autocratic
rulers had been able to control, was replaced by an anarchy of the few.
Prince succeeded prince, war followed war, at the will of the feudal
nobles. This internal strife was naturally profitable to the Greeks,
who lavishly subsidized the rival factions.
At the end of the eighth century the Bulgars south of the Danube joined
forces with those to the north in the efforts of the latter against the
Avars, who, beaten by Charlemagne, were again pressing south-eastwards
towards the Danube. In this the Bulgars were completely successful
under the leadership of one Krum, whom, in the elation of victory, they
promptly elected to the throne. Krum was a far more capable ruler than
they had bargained for, and he not only united all the Bulgars north
and south of the Danube into one dominion, but also forcibly repressed
the whims of the nobles and re-established the autocracy and the
hereditary monarchy. Having finished with his enemies in the north, he
turned his attention to the Greeks, with no less success. In 809 he
captured from them the important city of Sofia (the Roman Sardica,
known to the Slavs as Sredets), which is to-day the capital of
Bulgaria. The loss of this city was a blow to the Greeks, because it
was a great centre of commerce and also the point at which the
commercial and strategic highways of the peninsula met and crossed. The
Emperor Nikiphóros, who wished to take his revenge and recover his lost
property, was totally defeated by the Bulgars and lost his life in the
Balkan passes in 811. After further victories, at Mesembria (the modern
Misivria) in 812 and Adrianople in 813, Krum appeared before the
capital, where he nearly lost his life in an ambush while negotiating
for peace. During preparations for a final assault on Constantinople he
died suddenly in 815. Though Krum cannot be said to have introduced
civilisation into Bulgaria, he at any rate increased its power and gave
it some of the more essential organs of government. He framed a code of
laws remarkable for their rigour, which was undoubtedly necessary in
such a community and beneficial in its effect. He repressed civil
strife, and by this means made possible the reawakening of commerce and
agriculture. His successor, of uncertain identity, founded in 822 the
city of Preslav (known to the Russians as Pereyaslav), situated in
eastern Bulgaria, between Varna and Silistria, which was the capital
until 972.
The reign of Prince Boris (852-88) is remarkable because it witnessed
the definitive conversion to Christianity of Bulgaria and her ruler. It
is within this period also that fell the activities of the two great
‘Slavonic’ missionaries and apostles, the brothers Cyril and Methodius,
who are looked upon by all Slavs of the orthodox faith as the founders
of their civilisation. Christianity had of course penetrated into
Bulgaria (or Moesia, as it was then) long before the arrival of the
Slavs and Bulgars, but the influx of one horde of barbarians after
another was naturally not propitious to its growth. The conversion of
Boris in 865, which was brought about largely by the influence of his
sister, who had spent many years in Constantinople as a captive, was a
triumph for Greek influence and for Byzantium. Though the Church was at
this time still nominally one, yet the rivalry between Rome and
Constantinople had already become acute, and the struggle for spheres
of spiritual influence had begun. It was in the year 863 that the
Prince of Moravia, anxious to introduce Christianity into his country
in a form intelligible to his subjects, addressed himself to the
Emperor Michael III for help. Rome could not provide any suitable
missionaries with knowledge of Slavonic languages, and the German, or
more exactly the Bavarian, hierarchy with which Rome entrusted the
spiritual welfare of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia used its greater
local knowledge for political and not religious ends. The Germans
exploited their ecclesiastical influence in order completely to
dominate the Slavs politically, and as a result the latter were only
allowed to see the Church through Teutonic glasses.
In answer to this appeal the emperor sent the two brothers Cyril and
Methodius, who were Greeks of Salonika and had considerable knowledge
of Slavonic languages. They composed the Slavonic alphabet which is
to-day used throughout Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, and in
many parts of Austria-Hungary and translated the gospels into Slavonic;
it is for this reason that they are regarded with such veneration by
all members of the Eastern Church. Their mission proved the greatest
success (it must be remembered that at this time the various Slavonic
tongues were probably less dissimilar than they are now), and the two
brothers were warmly welcomed in Rome by Pope Adrian II, who formally
consented to the use, for the benefit of the Slavs, of the Slavonic
liturgy (a remarkable concession, confirmed by Pope John VIII). This
triumph, however, was short-lived; St. Cyril died in 869 and St.
Methodius in 885; subsequent Popes, notably Stephen V, were not so
benevolent to the Slavonic cause; the machinations of the German
hierarchy (which included, even in those days, the falsification of
documents) were irresistible, and finally the invasion of the Magyars,
in 893, destroyed what was left of the Slavonic Church in Moravia. The
missionary brothers had probably passed through Bulgaria on their way
north in 863, but without halting. Many of their disciples, driven from
the Moravian kingdom by the Germans, came south and took refuge in
Bulgaria in 886, and there carried on in more favourable circumstances
the teachings of their masters. Prince Boris had found it easier to
adopt Christianity himself than to induce all his subjects to do the
same. Even when he had enforced his will on them at the price of
numerous executions of recalcitrant nobles, he found himself only at
the beginning of his difficulties. The Greeks had been glad enough to
welcome Bulgaria into the fold, but they had no wish to set up an
independent Church and hierarchy to rival their own. Boris, on the
other hand, though no doubt full of genuine spiritual ardour, was above
all impressed with the authority and prestige which the basileus
derived from the Church of Constantinople; he also admired the pomp of
ecclesiastical ceremony, and wished to have a patriarch of his own to
crown him and a hierarchy of his own to serve him. Finding the Greeks
unresponsive, he turned to Rome, and Pope Nicholas I sent him two
bishops to superintend the ecclesiastical affairs of Bulgaria till the
investiture of Boris at the hands of the Holy See could be arranged.
These bishops set to work with a will, substituted the Latin for the
Greek rite, and brought Bulgaria completely under Roman influence. But
when it was discovered that Boris was aiming at the erection of an
independent Church their enthusiasm abated and they were recalled to
Rome in 867.
Adrian II proved no more sympathetic, and in 870, during the reign of
the Emperor Basil I, it was decided without more ado that the Bulgarian
Church should be directly under the Bishop of Constantinople, on the
ground that the kingdom of Boris was a vassal-state of the basileus,
and that from the Byzantine point of view, as opposed to that of Rome,
the State came first and the Church next. The Moravian Gorazd, a
disciple of Methodius, was appointed Metropolitan, and at his death he
was succeeded by his fellow countryman and co-disciple Clement, who by
means of the construction of numerous churches and monasteries did a
great deal for the propagation of light and learning in Bulgaria. The
definite subjection of the Bulgarian Church to that of Byzantium was an
important and far-reaching event. Boris has been reproached with
submitting himself and his country to Greek influence, but in those
days it was either Constantinople or Rome (there was no third way); and
in view of the proximity of Constantinople and the glamour which its
civilization cast all over the Balkans, it is not surprising that the
Greeks carried the day.
6
_The Rise and Fall of the First Bulgarian Empire_, 893–972
During the reign of Simeon, second son of Boris, which lasted from 893
to 927, Bulgaria reached a very high level of power and prosperity.
Simeon, called the Great, is looked on by Bulgarians as their most
capable monarch and his reign as the most brilliant period of their
history. He had spent his childhood at Constantinople and been educated
there, and he became such an admirer of Greek civilization that he was
nicknamed _Hèmiargos_. His instructors had done their work so well that
Simeon remained spellbound by the glamour of Constantinople throughout
his life, and, although he might have laid the foundations of a solid
empire in the Balkans, his one ambition was to conquer Byzantium and to
be recognized as basileus—an ambition which was not to be fulfilled.
His first campaign against the Greeks was not very fruitful, because
the latter summoned the Magyars, already settled in Hungary, to their
aid and they attacked Simeon from the north. Simeon in return called
the Pechenegs, another fierce Tartar tribe, to his aid, but this merely
resulted in their definite establishment in Rumania. During the twenty
years of peace, which strange to say filled the middle of his reign
(894-913), the internal development of Bulgaria made great strides. The
administration was properly organized, commerce was encouraged, and
agriculture flourished. In the wars against the Greeks which occupied
his last years he was more successful, and inflicted a severe defeat on
them at Anchialo (the modern Ahiolu) in 917; but he was still unable to
get from them what he wanted, and at last, in 921, he was obliged to
proclaim himself _basileus_ and _autocratōr_ of all Bulgars and Greeks,
a title which nobody else recognized. He reappeared before
Constantinople the same year, but effected nothing more than the
customary devastation of the suburbs. The year 923 witnessed a solemn
reconciliation between Rome and Constantinople; the Greeks were clever
enough to prevent the Roman legates visiting Bulgaria on their return
journey, and thereby administered a rebuff to Simeon, who was anxious
to see them and enter into direct relations with Rome. In the same year
Simeon tried to make an alliance with the Arabs, but the ambassadors of
the latter were intercepted by the Greeks, who made it worth their
while not to continue the journey to Bulgaria.
In 924 Simeon determined on a supreme effort against Constantinople and
as a preliminary he ravaged Macedonia and Thrace. When, however, he
arrived before the city the walls and the catapults made him hesitate,
and he entered into negotiations, which, as usual, petered out and
brought him no adequate reward for all his hopes and preparations. In
the west his arms were more successful, and he subjected most of the
eastern part of Serbia to his rule. From all this it can be seen that
he was no diplomat, though not lacking in enterprise and ambition. The
fact was that while he made his kingdom too powerful for the Greeks to
subdue (indeed they were compelled to pay him tribute), yet
Constantinople with its impregnable walls, well-organized army,
powerful fleet, and cunning and experienced statesmen, was too hard a
nut for him to crack.
Simeon extended the boundaries of his country considerably, and his
dominion included most of the interior of the Balkan peninsula south of
the Danube and east of the rivers Morava and Ibar in Serbia and of the
Drin in Albania. The Byzantine Church greatly increased its influence
in Bulgaria during his reign, and works of theology grew like
mushrooms. This was the only kind of literature that was ever popular
in Bulgaria, and although it is usual to throw contempt on the literary
achievements of Constantinople, we should know but little of Bulgaria
were it not for the Greek historians.
Simeon died in 927, and his son Peter, who succeeded him, was a lover
of peace and comfort; he married a Byzantine princess, and during his
reign (927-69) Greek influence grew ever stronger, in spite of several
revolts on the part of the Bulgar nobles, while the capital Preslav
became a miniature Constantinople. In 927 Rome recognized the kingdom
and patriarchate of Bulgaria, and Peter was duly crowned by the Papal
legate. This was viewed with disfavour by the Greeks, and they still
called Peter only _archōn_ or prince (_knyaz_ in Bulgarian), which was
the utmost title allowed to any foreign sovereign. It was not until 945
that they recognized Peter as _basileus_, the unique title possessed by
their own emperors and till then never granted to any one else. Peter’s
reign was one of misfortune for his country both at home and abroad. In
931 the Serbs broke loose under their leader Časlav, whom Simeon had
captured but who effected his escape, and asserted their independence.
In 963 a formidable revolt under one Shishman undermined the whole
state fabric. He managed to subtract Macedonia and all western
Bulgaria, including Sofia and Vidin, from Peter’s rule, and proclaimed
himself independent _tsar (tsar_ or _caesar_ was a title often accorded
by Byzantium to relatives of the emperor or to distinguished men of
Greek or other nationality, and though it was originally the equivalent
of the highest title, it had long since ceased to be so: the emperor’s
designations were _basileus_ and _autocratōr_). From this time there
were two Bulgarias—eastern and western. The eastern half was now little
more than a Byzantine province, and the western became the centre of
national life and the focus of national aspirations.
Another factor which militated against the internal progress of
Bulgaria was the spread of the Bogomil heresy in the tenth century.
This remarkable doctrine, founded on the dualism of the Paulicians, who
had become an important political force in the eastern empire, was
preached in the Balkan peninsula by one Jeremiah Bogomil, for the rest
a man of uncertain identity, who made Philippopolis the centre of his
activity. Its principal features were of a negative character, and
consequently it was very difficult successfully to apply force against
them. The Bogomils recognized the authority neither of Church nor of
State; the validity neither of oaths nor of human laws. They refused to
pay taxes, to fight, or to obey; they sanctioned theft, but looked upon
any kind of punishment as unjustifiable; they discountenanced marriage
and were strict vegetarians. Naturally a heresy so alarming in its
individualism shook to its foundations the not very firmly established
Bulgarian society. Nevertheless it spread with rapidity in spite of all
persecutions, and its popularity amongst the Bulgarians, and indeed
amongst all the Slavs of the peninsula, is without doubt partly
explained by political reasons. The hierarchy of the Greek Church,
which supported the ruling classes of the country and lent them
authority at the same time that it increased its own, was antipathetic
to the Slavs, and the Bogomil heresy drew much strength from its
nationalistic colouring and from the appeal which it made to the
character of the Balkan Slavs, who have always been intolerant of
government by the Church. But neither the civil nor the ecclesiastical
authorities were able to cope with the problem; indeed they were apt to
minimize its importance, and the heresy was never eradicated till the
arrival on the scene of Islam, which proved as attractive to the
schismatics as the well-regulated Orthodox Church had been the reverse.
The third quarter of the tenth century witnessed a great recrudescence
of the power of Constantinople under the Emperor Nikiphóros Phokas, who
wrested Cyprus and Crete from the Arabs and inaugurated an era of
prosperity for the eastern empire, giving it a new lease of vigorous
and combative life. Wishing to reassert the Greek supremacy in the
Balkan peninsula his first act was to refuse any further payment of
tribute to the Bulgarians as from 966; his next was to initiate a
campaign against them, but in order to make his own success in this
enterprise less costly and more assured he secured the co-operation of
the Russians under Svyatoslav, Prince of Kiev; this potentate’s mother
Olga had visited Constantinople in 957 and been baptized (though her
son and the bulk of the population were still ardent heathens), and
commercial intercourse between Russia and Constantinople by means of
the Dnieper and the Black Sea was at that time lively. Svyatoslav did
not want pressing, and arriving with an army of 10,000 men in boats,
overcame northern Bulgaria in a few days (967); they were helped by
Shishman and the western Bulgars, who did not mind at what price Peter
and the eastern Bulgars were crushed. Svyatoslav was recalled to Russia
in 968 to defend his home from attacks by the Tartar Pechenegs, but
that done, he made up his mind to return to Bulgaria, lured by its
riches and by the hope of the eventual possession of Constantinople.
The Emperor Nikiphóros was by now aware of the danger he had
imprudently conjured up, and made a futile alliance with eastern
Bulgaria; but in January 969 Peter of Bulgaria died, and in December of
the same year Nikiphóros was murdered by the ambitious Armenian John
Tzimisces,[1] who thereupon became emperor. Svyatoslav, seeing the
field clear of his enemies, returned in 970, and in March of that year
sacked and occupied Philippopolis. The Emperor John Tzimisces, who was
even abler both as general and as diplomat than his predecessor,
quietly pushed forward his warlike preparations, and did not meet the
Russians till the autumn, when he completely defeated them at
Arcadiopolis (the modern Lule-Burgas). The Russians retired north of
the Balkan range, but the Greeks followed them. John Tzimisces besieged
them in the capital Preslav, which he stormed, massacring many of the
garrison, in April 972. Svyatoslav and his remaining troops escaped to
Silistria (the Durostorum of Trajan) on the Danube, where again,
however, they were besieged and defeated by the indefatigable emperor.
At last peace was made in July 972, the Russians being allowed to go
free on condition of the complete evacuation of Bulgaria and a gift of
corn; the adventurous Svyatoslav lost his life at the hands of the
Pechenegs while making his way back to Kiev. The triumph of the Greeks
was complete, and it can be imagined that there was not much left of
the earthenware Bulgaria after the violent collision of these two
mighty iron vessels on the top of it. Eastern Bulgaria (i.e. Moesia and
Thrace) ceased to exist, becoming a purely Greek province; John
Tzimisces made his triumphal entry into Constantinople, followed by the
two sons of Peter of Bulgaria on foot; the elder was deprived of his
regal attributes and created _magistros_, the younger was made a
eunuch.
[Footnote 1: John the Little.]
7
_The Rise and Fall of ‘Western Bulgaria’ and the Greek Supremacy_,
963–1186
Meanwhile western Bulgaria had not been touched, and it was thither
that the Bulgarian patriarch Damian removed from Silistria after the
victory of the Greeks, settling first in Sofia and then in Okhrida in
Macedonia, where the apostate Shishman had eventually made his capital.
Western Bulgaria included Macedonia and parts of Thessaly, Albania,
southern and eastern Serbia, and the westernmost parts of modern
Bulgaria. It was from this district that numerous anti-Hellenic revolts
were directed after the death of the Emperor John Tzimisces in 976.
These culminated during the reign of Samuel (977-1014), one of the sons
of Shishman. He was as capable and energetic, as unscrupulous and
inhuman, as the situation he was called upon to fill demanded. He began
by assassinating all his relations and nobles who resented his desire
to re-establish the absolute monarchy, was recognized as _tsar_ by the
Holy See of Rome in 981, and then began to fight the Greeks, the only
possible occupation for any self-respecting Bulgarian ruler. The
emperor at that time was Basil II (976-1025), who was brave and
patriotic but young and inexperienced. In his early campaigns Samuel
carried all before him; he reconquered northern Bulgaria in 985,
Thessaly in 986, and defeated Basil II near Sofia the same year. Later
he conquered Albania and the southern parts of Serbia and what is now
Montenegro and Hercegovina. In 996 he threatened Salonika, but first of
all embarked on an expedition against the Peloponnese; here he was
followed by the Greek general, who managed to surprise and completely
overwhelm him, he and his son barely escaping with their lives.
From that year (996) his fortune changed; the Greeks reoccupied
northern Bulgaria, in 999, and also recovered Thessaly and parts of
Macedonia. The Bulgars were subjected to almost annual attacks on the
part of Basil II; the country was ruined and could not long hold out.
The final disaster occurred in 1014, when Basil II utterly defeated his
inveterate foe in a pass near Seres in Macedonia. Samuel escaped to
Prilip, but when he beheld the return of 15,000 of his troops who had
been captured and blinded by the Greeks he died of syncope. Basil II,
known as Bulgaroctonus, or Bulgar-killer, went from victory to victory,
and finally occupied the Bulgarian capital of Okhrida in 1016. Western
Bulgaria came to an end, as had eastern Bulgaria in 972, the remaining
members of the royal family followed the emperor to the Bosphorus to
enjoy comfortable captivity, and the triumph of Constantinople was
complete.
From 1018 to 1186 Bulgaria had no existence as an independent state;
Basil II, although cruel, was far from tyrannical in his general
treatment of the Bulgars, and treated the conquered territory more as a
protectorate than as a possession. But after his death Greek rule
became much more oppressive. The Bulgarian patriarchate (since 972
established at Okhrida) was reduced to an archbishopric, and in 1025
the see was given to a Greek, who lost no time in eliminating the
Bulgarian element from positions of importance throughout his diocese.
Many of the nobles were transplanted to Constantinople, where their
opposition was numbed by the bestowal of honours. During the eleventh
century the peninsula was invaded frequently by the Tartar Pechenegs
and Kumans, whose aid was invoked both by Greeks and Bulgars; the
result of these incursions was not always favourable to those who had
promoted them; the barbarians invariably stayed longer and did more
damage than had been bargained for, and usually left some of their
number behind as unwelcome settlers.
In this way the ethnological map of the Balkan peninsula became ever
more variegated. To the Tartar settlers were added colonies of
Armenians and Vlakhs by various emperors. The last touch was given by
the arrival of the Normans in 1081 and the passage of the crusaders in
1096. The wholesale depredations of the latter naturally made the
inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula anything but sympathetically
disposed towards their cause. One of the results of all this turmoil
and of the heavy hand of the Greeks was a great increase in the
vitality of the Bogomil heresy already referred to; it became a refuge
for patriotism and an outlet for its expression. The Emperor Alexis
Comnenus instituted a bitter persecution of it, which only led to its
growth and rapid propagation westwards into Serbia from its centre
Philippopolis.
The reason of the complete overthrow of the Bulgarian monarchy by the
Greeks was of course that the nation itself was totally lacking in
cohesion and organization, and could only achieve any lasting success
when an exceptionally gifted ruler managed to discount the centrifugal
tendencies of the feudal nobles, as Simeon and Samuel had done. Other
discouraging factors wore the permeation of the Church and State by
Byzantine influence, the lack of a large standing army, the spread of
the anarchic Bogomil heresy, and the fact that the bulk of the Slav
population had no desire for foreign adventure or national
aggrandizement.
8
_The Rise and Fall of the Second Bulgarian Empire,_ 1186–1258
From 1186 to 1258 Bulgaria experienced temporary resuscitation, the
brevity of which was more than compensated for by the stirring nature
of the events that crowded it. The exactions and oppressions of the
Greeks culminated in a revolt on the part of the Bulgars, which had its
centre in Tirnovo on the river Yantra in northern Bulgaria—a position
of great natural strength and strategic importance, commanding the
outlets of several of the most important passes over the Balkan range.
This revolt coincided with the growing weakness of the eastern empire,
which, surrounded on all sides by aggressive enemies—Kumans, Saracens,
Turks, and Normans—was sickening for one of the severe illnesses which
preceded its dissolution. The revolt was headed by two brothers who
were Vlakh or Rumanian shepherds, and was blessed by the archbishop
Basil, who crowned one of them, called John Asen, as _tsar_ in Tirnovo
in 1186. Their first efforts against the Greeks were not successful,
but securing the support of the Serbs under Stephen Nemanja in 1188 and
of the Crusaders in 1189 they became more so; but there was life in the
Greeks yet, and victory alternated with defeat. John Asen I was
assassinated in 1196 and was succeeded after many internal discords and
murders by his relative Kaloian or Pretty John. This cruel and
unscrupulous though determined ruler soon made an end of all his
enemies at home, and in eight years achieved such success abroad that
Bulgaria almost regained its former proportions. Moreover, he
re-established relations with Rome, to the great discomfiture of the
Greeks, and after some negotiations Pope Innocent III recognized
Kaloian as _tsar_ of the Bulgars and Vlakhs (roi de Blaquie et de
Bougrie, in the words of Villehardouin), with Basil as primate, and
they were both duly consecrated and crowned by the papal legate at
Tirnovo in 1204. The French, who had just established themselves in
Constantinople during the fourth crusade, imprudently made an enemy of
Kaloian instead of a friend, and with the aid of the Tartar Kumans he
defeated them several times, capturing and brutally murdering Baldwin
I. But in 1207 his career was cut short; he was murdered while
besieging Salonika by one of his generals who was a friend of his wife.
After eleven years of further anarchy he was succeeded by John Asen II.
During the reign of this monarch, which lasted from 1218 till 1241,
Bulgaria reached the zenith of its power. He was the most enlightened
ruler the country had had, and he not only waged war successfully
abroad but also put an end to the internal confusion, restored the
possibility of carrying on agriculture and commerce, and encouraged the
foundation of numerous schools and monasteries. He maintained the
tradition of his family by making his capital at Tirnovo, which city he
considerably embellished and enlarged.
Constantinople at this time boasted three Greek emperors and one
French. The first act of John Asen II was to get rid of one of them,
named Theodore, who had proclaimed himself _basileus_ at Okhrida in
1223. Thereupon he annexed the whole of Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly,
and Epirus to his dominions, and made Theodore’s brother Manuel, who
had married one of his daughters, viceroy, established at Salonika.
Another of his daughters had married Stephen Vladislav, who was King of
Serbia from 1233-43, and a third married Theodore, son of the Emperor
John III, who reigned at Nicaea, in 1235. This daughter, after being
sought in marriage by the French barons at Constantinople as a wife for
the Emperor Baldwin II, a minor, was then summarily rejected in favour
of the daughter of the King of Jerusalem; this affront rankled in the
mind of John Asen II and threw him into the arms of the Greeks, with
whom he concluded an alliance in 1234. John Asen II and his ally, the
Emperor John III, were, however, utterly defeated by the French under
the walls of Constantinople in 1236, and the Bulgarian ruler, who had
no wish to see the Greeks re-established there, began to doubt the
wisdom of his alliance. Other Bulgarian tsars had been unscrupulous,
but the whole foreign policy of this one pivoted on treachery. He
deserted the Greeks and made an alliance with the French in 1237, the
Pope Gregory IX, a great Hellenophobe, having threatened him with
excommunication; he went so far as to force his daughter to relinquish
her Greek husband. The following year, however, he again changed over
to the Greeks; then again fear of the Pope and of his brother-in-law
the King of Hungary brought him back to the side of Baldwin II, to
whose help against the Greeks he went with a large army into Thrace in
1239. While besieging the Greeks with indifferent success, he learned
of the death of his wife and his eldest son from plague, and
incontinently returned to Tirnovo, giving up the war and restoring his
daughter to her lonely husband. This adaptable monarch died a natural
death in 1241, and the three rulers of his family who succeeded him,
whose reigns filled the period 1241-58, managed to undo all the
constructive work of their immediate predecessors. Province after
province was lost and internal anarchy increased. This remarkable
dynasty came to an inglorious end in 1258, when its last representative
was murdered by his own nobles, and from this time onwards Bulgaria was
only a shadow of its former self.
9
_The Serbian Supremacy and the Final Collapse,_ 1258–1393
From 1258 onwards Bulgaria may be said to have continued flickering
until its final extinction as a state in 1393, but during this period
it never had any voice in controlling the destinies of the Balkan
peninsula. Owing to the fact that no ruler emerged capable of keeping
the distracted country in order, there was a regular _chassé-croisé_ of
rival princelets, an unceasing tale of political marriages and murders,
conspiracies and revolts of feudal nobles all over the country, and
perpetual ebb and flow of the boundaries of the warring principalities
which tore the fabric of Bulgaria to pieces amongst them. From the
point of view of foreign politics this period is characterized
generally by the virtual disappearance of Bulgarian independence to the
profit of the surrounding states, who enjoyed a sort of rotativist
supremacy. It is especially remarkable for the complete ascendancy
which Serbia gained in the Balkan peninsula.
A Serb, Constantine, grandson of Stephen Nemanja, occupied the
Bulgarian throne from 1258 to 1277, and married the granddaughter of
John Asen II. After the fall of the Latin Empire of Constantinople in
1261, the Hungarians, already masters of Transylvania, combined with
the Greeks against Constantine; the latter called the Tartars of
southern Russia, at this time at the height of their power, to his help
and was victorious, but as a result of his diplomacy the Tartars
henceforward played an important part in the Bulgarian welter. Then
Constantine married, as his second wife, the daughter of the Greek
emperor, and thus again gave Constantinople a voice in his country’s
affairs. Constantine was followed by a series of upstart rulers, whose
activities were cut short by the victories of King Uroš II of Serbia
(1282-1321), who conquered all Macedonia and wrested it from the
Bulgars. In 1285 the Tartars of the Golden Horde swept over Hungary and
Bulgaria, but it was from the south that the clouds were rolling up
which not much later were to burst over the peninsula. In 1308 the
Turks appeared on the Sea of Marmora, and in 1326 established
themselves at Brussa. From 1295 to 1322 Bulgaria was presided over by a
nobleman of Vidin, Svetoslav, who, unmolested by the Greeks, grown
thoughtful in view of the approach of the Turks, was able to maintain
rather more order than his subjects were accustomed to. After his death
in 1322 chaos again supervened. One of his successors had married the
daughter of Uroš II of Serbia, but suddenly made an alliance with the
Greeks against his brother-in-law Stephen Uroš III and dispatched his
wife to her home. During the war which ensued the unwonted allies were
utterly routed by the Serbs at Kustendil in Macedonia in 1330.
From 1331 to 1365 Bulgaria was under one John Alexander, a noble of
Tartar origin, whose sister became the wife of Serbia’s greatest ruler,
Stephen Dušan; John Alexander, moreover, recognized Stephen as his
suzerain, and from thenceforward Bulgaria was a vassal-state of Serbia.
Meanwhile the Turkish storm was gathering fast; Suleiman crossed the
Hellespont in 1356, and Murad I made Adrianople his capital in 1366.
After the death of John Alexander in 1365 the Hungarians invaded
northern Bulgaria, and his successor invoked the help of the Turks
against them and also against the Greeks. This was the beginning of the
end. The Serbs, during an absence of the Sultan in Asia, undertook an
offensive, but were defeated by the Turks near Adrianople in 1371, who
captured Sofia in 1382. After this the Serbs formed a huge southern
Slav alliance, in which the Bulgarians refused to join, but, after a
temporary success against the Turks in 1387, they were vanquished by
them as the result of treachery at the famous battle of Kosovo in 1389.
Meanwhile the Turks occupied Nikopolis on the Danube in 1388 and
destroyed the Bulgarian capital Tirnovo in 1393, exiling the Patriarch
Euthymus to Macedonia. Thus the state of Bulgaria passed into the hands
of the Turks, and its church into those of the Greeks. Many Bulgars
adopted Islam, and their descendants are the Pomaks or Bulgarian
Mohammedans of the present day. With the subjection of Rumania in 1394
and the defeat of an improvised anti-Turkish crusade from western
Europe under Sigismund, King of Hungary, at Nikopolis in 1396 the
Turkish conquest was complete, though the battle of Varna was not
fought till 1444, nor Constantinople entered till 1453.
10
_The Turkish Dominion and the Emancipation,_ 1393–1878
From 1393 until 1877 Bulgaria may truthfully be said to have had no
history, but nevertheless it could scarcely have been called happy.
National life was completely paralysed, and what stood in those days
for national consciousness was obliterated. It is common knowledge, and
most people are now reasonable enough to admit, that the Turks have
many excellent qualities, religious fervour and military ardour amongst
others; it is also undeniable that from an aesthetic point of view too
much cannot be said in praise of Mohammedan civilization. Who does not
prefer the minarets of Stambul and Edirne[1] to the architecture of
Budapest, notoriously the ideal of Christian south-eastern Europe? On
the other hand, it cannot be contended that the Pax Ottomana brought
prosperity or happiness to those on whom it was imposed (unless indeed
they submerged their identity in the religion of their conquerors), or
that its Influence was either vivifying or generally popular.
[Footnote 1: The Turkish names for Constantinople and Adrianople.]
To the races they conquered the Turks offered two alternatives—serfdom
or Turkdom; those who could not bring themselves to accept either of
these had either to emigrate or take to brigandage and outlawry in the
mountains. The Turks literally overlaid the European nationalities of
the Balkan peninsula for five hundred years, and from their own point
of view and from that of military history this was undoubtedly a very
splendid achievement; it was more than the Greeks or Romans had ever
done. From the point of view of humanitarianism also it is beyond a
doubt that much less human blood was spilt in the Balkan peninsula
during the five hundred years of Turkish rule than during the five
hundred years of Christian rule which preceded them; indeed it would
have been difficult to spill more. It is also a pure illusion to think
of the Turks as exceptionally brutal or cruel; they are just as
good-natured and good-humoured as anybody else; it is only when their
military or religious passions are aroused that they become more
reckless and ferocious than other people. It was not the Turks who
taught cruelty to the Christians of the Balkan peninsula; the latter
had nothing to learn in this respect.
In spite of all this, however, from the point of view of the Slavs of
Bulgaria and Serbia, Turkish rule was synonymous with suffocation. If
the Turks were all that their greatest admirers think them the history
of the Balkan peninsula in the nineteenth century would have been very
different from what it has been, namely, one perpetual series of
anti-Turkish revolts.
Of all the Balkan peoples the Bulgarians were the most completely
crushed and effaced. The Greeks by their ubiquity, their brains, and
their money were soon able to make the Turkish storm drive their own
windmill; the Rumanians were somewhat sheltered by the Danube and also
by their distance from Constantinople; the Serbs also were not so
exposed to the full blast of the Turkish wrath, and the inaccessibility
of much of their country afforded them some protection. Bulgaria was
simply annihilated, and its population, already far from homogeneous,
was still further varied by numerous Turkish and other Tartar colonies.
For the same reasons already mentioned Bulgaria was the last Balkan
state to emancipate itself; for these reasons also it is the least
trammelled by prejudices and by what are considered national
predilections and racial affinities, while its heterogeneous
composition makes it vigorous and enterprising. The treatment of the
Christians by the Turks was by no means always the same; generally
speaking, it grew worse as the power of the Sultan grew less. During
the fifteenth century they were allowed to practise their religion and
all their vocations in comparative liberty and peace. But from the
sixteenth century onwards the control of the Sultan declined, power
became decentralized, the Ottoman Empire grew ever more anarchic and
the rule of the provincial governors more despotic.
But the Mohammedan conquerors were not the only enemies and oppressors
of the Bulgars. The rôle played by the Greeks in Bulgaria during the
Turkish dominion was almost as important as that of the Turks
themselves. The contempt of the Turks for the Christians, and
especially for their religion, was so great that they prudently left
the management of it to them, knowing that it would keep them occupied
in mutual altercation. From 1393 till 1767 the Bulgarians were under
the Greco-Bulgarian Patriarchate of Okhrida, an organization in which
all posts, from the highest to the lowest, had to be bought from the
Turkish administration at exorbitant and ever-rising prices; the
Phanariote Greeks (so called because they originated in the Phanar
quarter at Constantinople) were the only ones who could afford those of
the higher posts, with the result that the Church was controlled from
Constantinople. In 1767 the independent patriarchates were abolished,
and from that date the religious control of the Greeks was as complete
as the political control of the Turks. The Greeks did all they could to
obliterate the last traces of Bulgarian nationality which had survived
in the Church, and this explains a fact which must never be forgotten,
which had its origin in the remote past, but grew more pronounced at
this period, that the individual hatred of Greeks and Bulgars of each
other has always been far more intense than their collective hatred of
the Turks.
Ever since the marriage of the Tsar Ivan III with the niece of the last
Greek Emperor, in 1472, Russia had considered itself the trustee of the
eastern Christians, the defender of the Orthodox Church, and the direct
heir of the glory and prestige of Constantinople; it was not until the
eighteenth century, however, after the consolidation of the Russian
state, that the Balkan Christians were championed and the eventual
possession of Constantinople was seriously considered. Russian
influence was first asserted in Rumania after the Treaty of
Kuchuk-Kainardji, in 1774. It was only the Napoleonic war in 1812 that
prevented the Russians from extending their territory south of the
Danube, whither it already stretched. Serbia was partially free by
1826, and Greece achieved complete independence in 1830, when the
Russian troops, in order to coerce the Turks, occupied part of Bulgaria
and advanced as far as Adrianople. Bulgaria, being nearer to and more
easily repressed by Constantinople, had to wait, and tentative revolts
made about this time were put down with much bloodshed and were
followed by wholesale emigrations of Bulgars into Bessarabia and
importations of Tartars and Kurds into the vacated districts. The
Crimean War and the short-sighted championship of Turkey by the western
European powers checked considerably the development at which Russia
aimed. Moldavia and Wallachia were in 1856 withdrawn from the
semi-protectorate which Russia had long exercised over them, and in
1861 formed themselves into the united state of Rumania. In 1866 a
German prince, Charles of Hohenzollern, came to rule over the country,
the first sign of German influence in the Near East; at this time
Rumania still acknowledged the supremacy of the Sultan.
During the first half of the nineteenth century there took place a
considerable intellectual renascence in Bulgaria, a movement fostered
by wealthy Bulgarian merchants of Bucarest and Odessa. In 1829 a
history of Bulgaria was published by a native of that country in
Moscow; in 1835 the first school was established in Bulgaria, and many
others soon followed. It must be remembered that not only was nothing
known at that time about Bulgaria and its inhabitants in other
countries, but the Bulgars had themselves to be taught who they were.
The Bulgarian people in Bulgaria consisted entirely of peasants; there
was no Bulgarian upper or middle or ‘intelligent’ or professional
class; those enlightened Bulgars who existed were domiciled in other
countries; the Church was in the hands of the Greeks, who vied with the
Turks in suppressing Bulgarian nationality.
The two committees of Odessa and Bucarest which promoted the
enlightenment and emancipation of Bulgaria were dissimilar in
composition and in aim; the members of the former were more intent on
educational and religious reform, and aimed at the gradual and peaceful
regeneration of their country by these means; the latter wished to
effect the immediate political emancipation of Bulgaria by violent and,
if necessary, warlike means.
It was the ecclesiastical question which was solved first. In 1856 the
Porte had promised religious reforms tending to the appointment of
Bulgarian bishops and the recognition of the Bulgarian language in
Church and school. But these not being carried through, the Bulgarians
took the matter into their own hands, and in 1860 refused any longer to
recognize the Patriarch of Constantinople. The same year an attempt was
made to bring the Church of Bulgaria under that of Rome, but, owing to
Russian opposition, proved abortive. In 1870, the growing agitation
having at last alarmed the Turks, the Bulgarian Exarchate was
established. The Bulgarian Church was made free and national and was to
be under an Exarch who should reside at Constantinople (Bulgaria being
still a Turkish province). The Greeks, conscious what a blow this would
be to their supremacy, managed for a short while to stave off the evil
day, but in 1872 the Exarch was triumphantly installed in
Constantinople, where he resided till 1908.
Meanwhile revolutionary outbreaks began to increase, but were always
put down with great rigour. The most notable was that of 1875,
instigated by Stambulóv, the future dictator, in sympathy with the
outbreak in Montenegro, Hercegovina, and Bosnia of that year; the
result of this and of similar movements in 1876 was the series of
notorious Bulgarian massacres in that year. The indignation of Europe
was aroused and concerted representations were urgently made at
Constantinople. Midhat Pasha disarmed his opponents by summarily
introducing the British constitution into Turkey, but, needless to say,
Bulgaria’s lot was not improved by this specious device. Russia had,
however, steadily been making her preparations, and, Turkey having
refused to discontinue hostilities against Montenegro, on April 24,
1877, war was declared by the Emperor Alexander II, whose patience had
become exhausted; he was joined by Prince Charles of Rumania, who saw
that by doing so he would be rewarded by the complete emancipation of
his country, then still a vassal-state of Turkey, and its erection into
a kingdom. At the beginning of the war all went well for the Russians
and Rumanians, who were soon joined by large numbers of Bulgarian
insurgents; the Turkish forces were scattered all over the peninsula.
The committee of Bucarest transformed itself into a provisional
government, but the Russians, who had undertaken to liberate the
country, naturally had to keep its administration temporarily in their
own hands, and refused their recognition. The Turks, alarmed at the
early victories of the Russians, brought up better generals and troops,
and defeated the Russians at Plevna in July. They failed, however, to
dislodge them from the important and famous Shipka Pass in August, and
after this they became demoralized and their resistance rapidly
weakened. The Russians, helped by the Bulgarians and Rumanians, fought
throughout the summer with the greatest gallantry; they took Plevna,
after a three months’ siege, in December, occupied Sofia and
Philippopolis in January 1878, and pushed forward to the walls of
Constantinople.
The Turks were at their last gasp, and at Adrianople, in March 1878,
Ignatiyev dictated the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, by which a
principality of Bulgaria, under the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan,
was created, stretching from the Danube to the Aegean, and from the
Black Sea to Albania, including all Macedonia and leaving to the Turks
only the district between Constantinople and Adrianople, Chalcidice,
and the town of Salonika; Bulgaria would thus have regained the
dimensions it possessed under Tsar Simeon nine hundred and fifty years
previously.
This treaty, which on ethnological grounds was tolerably just, alarmed
the other powers, especially Great Britain and Germany, who thought
they perceived in it the foundations of Russian hegemony in the
Balkans, while it would, if put into execution, have blighted the
aspirations of Greece and Serbia. The Treaty of Berlin, inspired by
Bismarck and Lord Salisbury, anxious to defend, the former, the
interests of (ostensibly) Austria-Hungary, the latter (shortsightedly)
those of Turkey, replaced it in July 1878. By its terms Bulgaria was
cut into three parts; northern Bulgaria, between the Danube and the
Balkans, was made an autonomous province, tributary to Turkey; southern
Bulgaria, fancifully termed Eastern Rumelia (Rumili was the name always
given by the Turks to the whole Balkan peninsula), was to have
autonomous administration under a Christian governor appointed by the
Porte; Macedonia was left to Turkey; and the Dobrudja, between the
Danube and the Black Sea, was adjudged to Rumania.
11
_The Aftermath, and Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 1878–86_
The relations between the Russians and the Bulgarians were better
before the liberation of the latter by the former than after; this may
seem unjust, because Bulgaria could never have freed herself so
decisively and rapidly alone, and Russia was the only power in whose
interest it was to free her from the Turks, and who could translate
that interest so promptly into action; nevertheless, the laws
controlling the relationships of states and nationalities being much
the same as those which control the relationships of individuals, it
was only to be expected.
What so often happens in the relationships of individuals happened in
those between Russia and Bulgaria. Russia naturally enough expected
Bulgaria to be grateful for the really large amount of blood and
treasure which its liberation had cost Russia, and, moreover, expected
its gratitude to take the form of docility and a general acquiescence
in all the suggestions and wishes expressed by its liberator. Bulgaria
was no doubt deeply grateful, but never had the slightest intention of
expressing its gratitude in the desired way; on the contrary, like most
people who have regained a long-lost and unaccustomed freedom of action
or been put under an obligation, it appeared touchy and jealous of its
right to an independent judgement. It is often assumed by Russophobe
writers that Russia wished and intended to make a Russian province of
Bulgaria, but this is very unlikely; the geographical configuration of
the Balkan peninsula would not lend itself to its incorporation in the
Russian Empire, the existence between the two of the compact and
vigorous national block of Rumania, a Latin race and then already an
independent state, was an insurmountable obstacle, and, finally, it is
quite possible for Russia to obtain possession or control of
Constantinople without owning all the intervening littoral.
That Russia should wish to have a controlling voice in the destinies of
Bulgaria and in those of the whole peninsula was natural, and it was
just as natural that Bulgaria should resent its pretensions. The
eventual result of this, however, was that Bulgaria inevitably entered
the sphere of Austrian and ultimately of German influence or rather
calculation, a contingency probably not foreseen by its statesmen at
the time, and whose full meaning, even if it had, would not have been
grasped by them.
The Bulgarians, whatever the origin and the ingredients of their
nationality, are by language a purely Slavonic people; their ancestors
were the pioneers of Slavonic civilization as expressed in its
monuments of theological literature. Nevertheless, they have never been
enthusiastic Pan-Slavists, any more than the Dutch have ever been
ardent Pan-Germans; it is as unreasonable to expect such a thing of the
one people as it is of the other. The Bulgarians indeed think
themselves superior to the Slavs by reason of the warlike and glorious
traditions of the Tartar tribe that gave them their name and infused
the Asiatic element into their race, thus endowing them with greater
stability, energy, and consistency than is possessed by purely Slav
peoples. These latter, on the other hand, and notably the Serbians, for
the same reason affect contempt for the mixture of blood and for what
they consider the Mongol characteristics of the Bulgarians. What is
certain is that between Bulgarians and Germans (including German
Austrians and Magyars) there has never existed that elemental,
ineradicable, and insurmountable antipathy which exists between German
(and Magyar) and Slav wherever the two races are contiguous, from the
Baltic to the Adriatic; nothing is more remarkable than the way in
which the Bulgarian people has been flattered, studied, and courted in
Austria-Hungary and Germany, during the last decade, to the detriment
of the purely Slav Serb race with whom it is always compared. The
reason is that with the growth of the Serb national movement, from 1903
onwards, Austria-Hungary and Germany felt an instinctive and perfectly
well-justified fear of the Serb race, and sought to neutralize the
possible effect of its growing power by any possible means.
It is not too much to say, in summing up, that Russian influence, which
had been growing stronger in Bulgaria up till 1877-8, has since been
steadily on the decline; Germany and Austria-Hungary, who reduced
Bulgaria to half the size that Count Ignatiyev had made it by the
Treaty of San Stefano, reaped the benefit, especially the commercial
benefit, of the war which Russia had waged. Intellectually, and
especially as regards the replenishment and renovation of the Bulgarian
language, which, in spite of numerous Turkish words introduced during
the Ottoman rule, is essentially Slavonic both in substance and form,
Russian influence was especially powerful, and has to a certain extent
maintained itself. Economically, owing partly to geographical
conditions, both the Danube and the main oriental railway linking
Bulgaria directly with Budapest and Vienna, partly to the fact that
Bulgaria’s best customers for its cereals are in central and western
Europe, the connexion between Bulgaria and Russia is infinitesimal.
Politically, both Russia and Bulgaria aiming at the same thing, the
possession of Constantinople and the hegemony of the Balkan peninsula,
their relations were bound to be difficult.
The first Bulgarian Parliament met in 1879 under trying conditions.
Both Russian and Bulgarian hopes had been dashed by the Treaty of
Berlin. Russian influence was still paramount, however, and the viceroy
controlled the organization of the administration. An ultra-democratic
constitution was arranged for, a fact obviously not conducive to the
successful government of their country by the quite inexperienced
Bulgarians. For a ruler recourse had inevitably to be had to the
rabbit-warren of Germanic princes, who were still ingenuously
considered neutral both in religion and in politics. The choice fell on
Prince Alexander of Battenberg, nephew of the Empress of Russia, who
had taken part in the campaign of the Russian army. Prince Alexander
was conscientious, energetic, and enthusiastic, but he was no diplomat,
and from the outset his honesty precluded his success. From the very
first he failed to keep on good terms with Russia or its
representatives, who at that time were still numerous in Bulgaria,
while he was helpless to stem the ravages of parliamentary government.
The Emperor Alexander III, who succeeded his father Alexander II in
1881, recommended him to insist on being made dictator, which he
successfully did. But when he found that this only meant an increase of
Russian influence he reverted to parliamentary government (in September
1883); this procedure discomfited the representatives of Russia,
discredited him with the Emperor, and threw him back into the vortex of
party warfare, from which he never extricated himself.
Meanwhile the question of eastern Rumelia, or rather southern Bulgaria,
still a Turkish province, began to loom. A vigorous agitation for the
reunion of the two parts of the country had been going on for some
time, and on September 18, 1885, the inhabitants of Philippopolis
suddenly proclaimed the union under Prince Alexander, who solemnly
announced his approval at Tirnovo and triumphantly entered their city
on September 21. Russia frowned on this independence of spirit. Serbia,
under King Milan, and instigated by Austria, inaugurated the policy
which has so often been followed since, and claimed territorial
compensation for Bulgaria’s aggrandisement; it must be remembered that
it was Bismarck who, by the Treaty of Berlin, had arbitrarily confined
Serbia to its inadequate limits of those day.
On November 13 King Milan declared war, and began to march on Sofia,
which is not far from the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. Prince Alexander,
the bulk of whose army was on the Turkish frontier, boldly took up the
challenge. On November 18 took place the battle of Slivnitsa, a small
town about twenty miles north-west of Sofia, in which the Bulgarians
were completely victorious. Prince Alexander, after hard fighting, took
Pirot in Serbia on November 27, having refused King Milan’s request for
an armistice, and was marching on Nish, when Austria intervened, and
threatened to send troops into Serbia unless fighting ceased. Bulgaria
had to obey, and on March 3, 1886, a barren treaty of peace was imposed
on the belligerents at Bucarest. Prince Alexander’s position did not
improve after this, indeed it would have needed a much more skilful
navigator to steer through the many currents which eddied round him. A
strong Russophile party formed itself in the army; on the night of
August 21, 1886, some officers of this party, who were the most capable
in the Bulgarian army, appeared at Sofia, forced Alexander to resign,
and abducted him; they put him on board his yacht on the Danube and
escorted him to the Russian town of Reni, in Bessarabia; telegraphic
orders came from St. Petersburg, in answer to inquiries, that he could
proceed with haste to western Europe, and on August 26 he found himself
at Lemberg. But those who had carried out this _coup d’état_ found that
it was not at all popular in the country. A counter-revolution, headed
by the statesman Stambulóv, was immediately initiated, and on September
3 Prince Alexander reappeared in Sofia amidst tumultuous applause.
Nevertheless his position was hopeless; the Emperor Alexander III
forced him to abdicate, and on September 7, 1886, he left Bulgaria for
good, to the regret of the majority of the people. He died in Austria,
in 1893, in his thirty-seventh year. At his departure a regency was
constituted, at the head of which was Stambulóv.
12
_The Regeneration under Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg,_ 1886–1908
Stambulóv was born at Tirnovo in 1854 and was of humble origin. He took
part in the insurrection of 1876 and in the war of liberation, and in
1884 became president of the Sóbraniye (Parliament). From 1886 till
1894 he was virtually dictator of Bulgaria. He was intensely patriotic
and also personally ambitious, determined, energetic, ruthlessly cruel
and unscrupulous, but incapable of deceit; these qualities were
apparent in his powerful and grim expression of face, while his manner
inspired the weak with terror and the strongest with respect. His
policy in general was directed against Russia. At the general election
held in October 1886 he had all his important opponents imprisoned
beforehand, while armed sentries discouraged ill-disposed voters from
approaching the ballot-boxes. Out of 522 elected deputies, there were
470 supporters of Stambulóv. This implied the complete suppression of
the Russophile party and led to a rupture with St. Petersburg.
Whatever were Stambulóv’s methods, and few would deny that they were
harsh, there is no doubt that something of the sort was necessary to
restore order in the country. But once having started on this path he
found it difficult to stop, and his tyrannical bearing, combined with
the delay in finding a prince, soon made him unpopular. There were
several revolutionary outbreaks directed against him, but these were
all crushed. At length the, at that time not particularly alluring,
throne of Bulgaria was filled by Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who
was born in 1861 and was the son of the gifted Princess Clémentine of
Bourbon-Orleans, daughter of Louis-Philippe. This young man combined
great ambition and tenacity of purpose with extreme prudence,
astuteness, and patience; he was a consummate diplomat. The election of
this prince was viewed with great disfavour by Russia, and for fear of
offending the Emperor Alexander III none of the European powers
recognized him.
Ferdinand, unabashed, cheerfully installed himself in Sofia with his
mother in July 1886, and took care to make the peace with his suzerain,
the Sultan Abdul Hamid. He wisely left all power in the hands of the
unattractive and to him, unsympathetic prime minister, Stambulóv, till
he himself felt secure in his position, and till the dictator should
have made himself thoroughly hated. Ferdinand’s clever and wealthy
mother cast a beneficent and civilizing glow around him, smoothing away
many difficulties by her womanly tact and philanthropic activity, and,
thanks to his influential connexions in the courts of Europe and his
attitude of calm expectancy, his prestige in his own country rapidly
increased. In 1893 he married Princess Marie-Louise of Bourbon-Parma.
In May 1894, as a result of a social misadventure in which he became
involved, Stambulóv sent in his resignation, confidently expecting a
refusal. To his mortification it was accepted; thereupon he initiated a
violent press campaign, but his halo had faded, and on July 15 he was
savagely attacked in the street by unknown men, who afterwards escaped,
and he died three days later. So intense were the emotions of the
people that his grave had to be guarded by the military for two months.
In November 1894 followed the death of the Emperor Alexander III, and
as a result of this double event the road to a reconciliation with
Russia was opened. Meanwhile the German Emperor, who was on good terms
with Princess Clémentine, had paved the way for Ferdinand at Vienna,
and when, in March 1896, the Sultan recognized him as Prince of
Bulgaria and Governor-General of eastern Rumelia, his international
position was assured. Relations with Russia were still further improved
by the rebaptism of the infant Crown Prince Boris according to the
rites of the eastern Church, in February 1896, and a couple of years
later Ferdinand and his wife and child paid a highly successful state
visit to Peterhof. In September 1902 a memorial church was erected by
the Emperor Nicholas II at the Shipka Pass, and later an equestrian
statue of the Tsar-Liberator Alexander II was placed opposite the House
of Parliament in Sofia.
Bulgaria meanwhile had been making rapid and astonishing material
progress. Railways were built, exports increased, and the general
condition of the country greatly improved. It is the fashion to compare
the wonderful advance made by Bulgaria during the thirty-five years of
its new existence with the very much slower progress made by Serbia
during a much longer period. This is insisted on especially by
publicists in Austria-Hungary and Germany, but it is forgotten that
even before the last Balkan war the geographical position of Bulgaria
with its seaboard was much more favourable to its economic development
than that of Serbia, which the Treaty of Berlin had hemmed in by
Turkish and Austro-Hungarian territory; moreover, Bulgaria being double
the size of the Serbia of those days, had far greater resources upon
which to draw.
From 1894 onwards Ferdinand’s power in his own country and his
influence abroad had been steadily growing. He always appreciated the
value of railways, and became almost as great a traveller as the German
Emperor. His estates in the south of Hungary constantly required his
attention, and he was a frequent visitor in Vienna. The German Emperor,
though he could not help admiring Ferdinand’s success, was always a
little afraid of him; he felt that Ferdinand’s gifts were so similar to
his own that he would be unable to count on him in an emergency.
Moreover, it was difficult to reconcile Ferdinand’s ambitions in
extreme south-eastern Europe with his own. Ferdinand’s relations with
Vienna, on the other hand, and especially with the late Archduke
Francis Ferdinand, were both cordial and intimate.
The gradual aggravation of the condition of the Turkish Empire, notably
in Macedonia, the unredeemed Bulgaria, where since the insurrection of
1902-3 anarchy, always endemic, had deteriorated into a reign of
terror, and, also the unmistakably growing power and spirit of Serbia
since the accession of the Karageorgevich dynasty in 1903, caused
uneasiness in Sofia, no less than in Vienna and Budapest. The Young
Turkish revolution of July 1908, and the triumph of the Committee of
Union and Progress, disarmed the critics of Turkey who wished to make
the forcible introduction of reforms a pretext for their interference;
but the potential rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire which it
foreshadowed indicated the desirability of rapid and decisive action.
In September, after fomenting a strike on the Oriental Railway in
eastern Roumelia (which railway was Turkish property), the Sofia
Cabinet seized the line with a military force on the plea of political
necessity. At the same time Ferdinand, with his second wife, the
Protestant Princess Eleonora of Reuss, whom he had married in March of
that year, was received with regal honours by the Emperor of Austria at
Budapest. On October 5, 1908, at Tirnovo, the ancient capital,
Ferdinand proclaimed the complete independence of Bulgaria and eastern
Rumelia under himself as King (_Tsar_ in Bulgarian), and on October 7
Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the
two Turkish provinces administered by it since 1879, nominally under
Turkish suzerainty.
13
_The Kingdom_, 1908–13
(cf. Chaps. 14, 20)
The events which have taken place in Bulgaria since 1908 hinge on the
Macedonian question, which has not till now been mentioned. The
Macedonian question was extremely complicated; it started on the
assumption that the disintegration of Turkey, which had been proceeding
throughout the nineteenth century, would eventually be completed, and
the question was how in this eventuality to satisfy the territorial
claims of the three neighbouring countries, Bulgaria, Serbia, and
Greece, claims both historical and ethnological, based on the numbers
and distribution of their ‘unredeemed’ compatriots in Macedonia, and at
the same time avoid causing the armed interference of Europe.
The beginnings of the Macedonian question in its modern form do not go
farther back than 1885, when the ease with which eastern Rumelia (i.e.
southern Bulgaria) threw off the Turkish yoke and was spontaneously
united with the semi-independent principality of northern Bulgaria
affected the imagination of the Balkan statesmen. From that time Sofia
began to cast longing eyes on Macedonia, the whole of which was claimed
as ‘unredeemed Bulgaria’, and Stambulóv’s last success in 1894 was to
obtain from Turkey the consent to the establishment of two bishops of
the Bulgarian (Exarchist) Church in Macedonia, which was a heavy blow
for the Greek Patriarchate at Constantinople.
Macedonia had been envisaged by the Treaty of Berlin, article 23 of
which stipulated for reforms in that province; but in those days the
Balkan States were too young and weak to worry themselves or the
European powers over the troubles of their co-religionists in Turkey;
their hands were more than full setting their own houses in some sort
of order, and it was in nobody’s interest to reform Macedonia, so
article 23 remained the expression of a philanthropic sentiment. This
indifference on the part of Europe left the door open for the Balkan
States, as soon as they had energy to spare, to initiate their campaign
for extending their spheres of influence in Macedonia.
From 1894 onwards Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia increased, and the
Bulgarians were soon followed by Greeks and Serbians. The reason for
this passionate pegging out of claims and the bitter rivalry of the
three nations which it engendered was the following: The population of
Macedonia was nowhere, except in the immediate vicinity of the borders
of these three countries, either purely Bulgar or purely Greek or
purely Serb; most of the towns contained a percentage of at least two
of these nationalities, not to mention the Turks (who after all were
still the owners of the country by right of conquest), Albanians,
Tartars, Rumanians (Vlakhs), and others; the city of Salonika was and
is almost purely Jewish, while in the country districts Turkish,
Albanian, Greek, Bulgar, and Serb villages were inextricably confused.
Generally speaking, the coastal strip was mainly Greek (the coast
itself purely so), the interior mainly Slav. The problem was for each
country to peg out as large a claim as possible, and so effectively, by
any means in their power, to make the majority of the population
contained in that claim acknowledge itself to be Bulgar, or Serb, or
Greek, that when the agony of the Ottoman Empire was over, each part of
Macedonia would automatically fall into the arms of its respective
deliverers. The game was played through the appropriate media of
churches and schools, for the unfortunate Macedonian peasants had first
of all to be enlightened as to who they were, or rather as to who they
were told they had got to consider themselves, while the Church, as
always, conveniently covered a multitude of political aims; when those
methods flagged, a bomb would be thrown at, let us say, a Turkish
official by an _agent provocateur_ of one of the three players,
inevitably resulting in the necessary massacre of innocent Christians
by the ostensibly brutal but really equally innocent Turks, and an
outcry in the European press.
Bulgaria was first in the field and had a considerable start of the
other two rivals. The Bulgars claimed the whole of Macedonia, including
Salonika and all the Aegean coast (except Chalcidice), Okhrida, and
Monastir; Greece claimed all southern Macedonia, and Serbia parts of
northern and central Macedonia known as Old Serbia. The crux of the
whole problem was, and is, that the claims of Serbia and Greece do not
clash, while that of Bulgaria, driving a thick wedge between Greece and
Serbia, and thus giving Bulgaria the undoubted hegemony of the
peninsula, came into irreconcilable conflict with those of its rivals.
The importance of this point was greatly emphasized by the existence of
the Nish-Salonika railway, which is Serbia’s only direct outlet to the
sea, and runs through Macedonia from north to south, following the
right or western bank of the river Vardar. Should Bulgaria straddle
that, Serbia would be economically at its mercy, just as in the north
it was already, to its bitter cost, at the mercy of Austria-Hungary.
Nevertheless, Bulgarian propaganda had been so effectual that Serbia
and Greece never expected they would eventually be able to join hands
so easily and successfully as they afterwards did.
The then unknown quantity of Albania was also a factor. This people,
though small in numbers, was formidable in character, and had never
been effectually subdued by the Turks. They would have been glad to
have a boundary contiguous with that of Bulgaria (with whom they had no
quarrel) as a support against their hereditary enemies, Serbs in the
north and Greeks in the south, who were more than inclined to encroach
on their territory. The population of Macedonia, being still under
Turkish rule, was uneducated and ignorant; needless to say it had no
national consciousness, though this was less true of the Greeks than of
the Slavs. It is the Slav population of Macedonia that has engendered
so much heat and caused so much blood to be spilt. The dispute as to
whether it is rather Serb or Bulgar has caused interminable and most
bitter controversy. The truth is that it _was_ neither the one nor the
other, but that, the ethnological and linguistic missionaries of
Bulgaria having been first in the field, a majority of the Macedonian
Slavs had been so long and so persistently told that they were Bulgars,
that after a few years Bulgaria could, with some truth, claim that this
fact was so.
Macedonia had been successively under Greek, Bulgar, and Serb, before
Turkish, rule, but the Macedonian Slavs had, under the last, been so
cut off both from Bulgars and Serbs, that ethnologically and
linguistically they did not develop the characteristics of either of
these two races, which originally belonged to the same southern Slav
stock, but remained a primitive neutral Slav type. If the Serbs had
been first in the field instead of the Bulgars, the Macedonian Slavs
could just as easily have been made into Serbs, sufficiently plausibly
to convince the most knowing expert. The well-known recipe for making a
Macedonian Slav village Bulgar is to add _-ov_ or _-ev_ (pronounced
_-off, -yeff_) on to the names of all the male inhabitants, and to make
it Serb it is only necessary to add further the syllable _-ich, -ov_
and _-ovich_ being respectively the equivalent in Bulgarian and Serbian
of our termination _-son,_ e. g. _Ivanov_ in Bulgarian, and _Jovanovit_
in Serbian = _Johnson_.
In addition to these three nations Rumania also entered the lists,
suddenly horrified at discovering the sad plight of the Vlakh
shepherds, who had probably wandered with unconcern about Macedonia
with their herds since Roman times. As their vague pastures could not
possibly ever be annexed to Rumania, their case was merely used in
order to justify Rumania in claiming eventual territorial compensation
elsewhere at the final day of reckoning. Meanwhile, their existence as
a separate and authentic nationality in Turkey was officially
recognized by the Porte in 1906.
The stages of the Macedonian question up to 1908 must at this point be
quite briefly enumerated. Russia and Austria-Hungary, the two ‘most
interested powers’, who as far back as the eighteenth century had
divided the Balkans into their respective spheres of interest, east and
west, came to an agreement in 1897 regarding the final settlement of
affairs in Turkey; but it never reached a conclusive stage and
consequently was never applied. The Macedonian chaos meanwhile grew
steadily worse, and the serious insurrections of 1902-3, followed by
the customary reprisals, thoroughly alarmed the powers. Hilmi Pasha had
been appointed Inspector-General of Macedonia in December 1902, but was
not successful in restoring order. In October 1903 the Emperor Nicholas
II and the Emperor of Austria, with their foreign ministers, met at
Mürzsteg, in Styria, and elaborated a more definite plan of reform
known as the Mürzsteg programme, the drastic terms of which had been
largely inspired by Lord Lansdowne, then British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs; the principal feature was the institution of an
international gendarmerie, the whole of Macedonia being divided up into
five districts to be apportioned among the several great powers. Owing
to the procrastination of the Porte and to the extreme complexity of
the financial measures which had to be elaborated in connexion with
this scheme of reforms, the last of the negotiations was not completed,
nor the whole series ratified, until April 1907, though the gendarmerie
officers had arrived in Macedonia in February 1904.
At this point again it is necessary to recall the position in regard to
this question of the various nations concerned. Great Britain and
France had no territorial stake in Turkey proper, and did their utmost
to secure reform not only in the _vilayets_ of Macedonia, but also in
the realm of Ottoman finance. Italy’s interest centred in Albania,
whose eventual fate, for geographical and strategic reasons, could not
leave it indifferent. Austria-Hungary’s only care was by any means to
prevent the aggrandizement of the Serb nationality and of Serbia and
Montenegro, so as to secure the control, if not the possession, of the
routes to Salonika, if necessary over the prostrate bodies of those two
countries which defiantly barred Germanic progress towards the East.
Russia was already fatally absorbed in the Far Eastern adventure, and,
moreover, had, ever since the war of 1878, been losing influence at
Constantinople, where before its word had been law; the Treaty of
Berlin had dealt a blow at Russian prestige, and Russia had ever since
that date been singularly badly served by its ambassadors to the Porte,
who were always either too old or too easy-going. Germany, on the other
hand, had been exceptionally fortunate or prudent in the choice of its
representatives. The general trend of German diplomacy in Turkey was
not grasped until very much later, a fact which redounds to the credit
of the German ambassadors at Constantinople. Ever since the triumphal
journey of William II to the Bosphorus in 1889, German influence, under
the able guidance of Baron von Radowitz, steadily increased. This
culminated in the régime of the late Baron Marschall von Bieberstein,
who was ambassador from 1897 to 1912. It was German policy to flatter,
support, and encourage Turkey in every possible way, to refrain from
taking part with the other powers in the invidious and perennial
occupation of pressing reforms on Abdul Hamid, and, above all, to give
as much pocket-money to Turkey and its extravagant ruler as they asked
for. Germany, for instance, refused to send officers or to have a
district assigned it in Macedonia in 1904, and declined to take part in
the naval demonstration off Mitylene in 1905. This attitude of Germany
naturally encouraged the Porte in its policy of delay and subterfuge,
and Turkey soon came to look on Germany as its only strong, sincere,
and disinterested friend in Europe. For the indefinite continuance of
chaos and bloodshed in Macedonia, after the other powers had really
braced themselves to the thankless task of putting the reforms into
practice, Germany alone was responsible.
The blow which King Ferdinand had inflicted on the prestige of the
Young Turks in October 1908, by proclaiming his independence, naturally
lent lustre to the Bulgarian cause in Macedonia. Serbia, baffled by the
simultaneous Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and
maddened by the elevation of Bulgaria to the rank of a kingdom (its
material progress had hitherto been discounted in Serbian eyes by the
fact that it was a mere vassal principality), seemed about to be
crushed by the two iron pots jostling it on either side. Its
international position was at that time such that it could expect no
help or encouragement from western Europe, while the events of 1909
(cf. p. 144) showed that Russia was not then in a position to render
active assistance. Greece, also screaming aloud for compensation, was
told by its friends amongst the great powers that if it made a noise it
would get nothing, but that if it behaved like a good child it might
some day be given Krete. Meanwhile Russia, rudely awakened by the
events of 1908 to the real state of affairs in the Near East, beginning
to realize the growth of German influence at Constantinople, and seeing
the unmistakable resuscitation of Austria-Hungary as a great power,
made manifest by the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, temporarily
reasserted its influence in Bulgaria. From the moment when Baron
Aehrenthal announced his chimerical scheme of an Austrian railway
through the _Sandjak_ of Novi Pazar in January 1908— everybody knows
that the railway already built through Serbia along the Morava valley
is the only commercially remunerative and strategically practicable
road from Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest to Salonika and
Constantinople—Russia realized that the days of the Mürzsteg programme
were over, that henceforward it was to be a struggle between Slav and
Teuton for the ownership of Constantinople and the dominion of the Near
East, and that something must be done to retrieve the position in the
Balkans which it was losing. After Baron Aehrenthal, in January 1909,
had mollified the Young Turks by an indemnity, and thus put an end to
the boycott, Russia in February of the same year liquidated the remains
of the old Turkish war indemnity of 1878 still due to itself by
skilfully arranging that Bulgaria should pay off its capitalized
tribute, owed to its ex-suzerain the Sultan, by very easy instalments
to Russia instead.
The immediate effects of the Young Turk revolution amongst the Balkan
States, and the events, watched benevolently by Russia, which led to
the formation of the Balkan League, when it was joyfully realized that
neither the setting-up of parliamentary government, nor even the
overthrow of Abdul Hamid, implied the commencement of the millennium in
Macedonia and Thrace, have been described elsewhere (pp. 141, 148).
King Ferdinand and M. Venezelos are generally credited with the
inception and realisation of the League, though it was so secretly and
skilfully concerted that it is not yet possible correctly to apportion
praise for the remarkable achievement. Bulgaria is a very democratic
country, but King Ferdinand, owing to his sagacity, patience, and
experience, and also thanks to his influential dynastic connexions and
propensity for travel, has always been virtually his own foreign
minister; in spite of the fact that he is a large feudal Hungarian
landlord, and has temperamental leanings towards the Central European
Empires, it is quite credible that King Ferdinand devoted all his
undeniable talents and great energy to the formation of the League when
he saw that the moment had come for Bulgaria to realize its destiny at
Turkey’s expense, and that, if the other three Balkan States could be
induced to come to the same wise decision, it would be so much the
better for all of them. That Russia could do anything else than
whole-heartedly welcome the formation of the Balkan League was
absolutely impossible. Pan-Slavism had long since ceased to be the
force it was, and nobody in Russia dreamed of or desired the
incorporation of any Balkan territory in the Russian Empire. It is
possible to control Constantinople without possessing the Balkans, and
Russia could only rejoice if a Greco-Slavonic league should destroy the
power of the Turks and thereby make impossible the further advance of
the Germanic powers eastward.
That Russia was ever in the least jealous of the military successes of
the league, which caused such gnashing of teeth in Berlin, Vienna, and
Budapest, is a mischievous fiction, the emptiness of which was evident
to any one who happened to be in Russia during the winter of 1912-13.
The years 1908 to 1912 were outwardly uneventful in Bulgaria, though a
great deal of quiet work was done in increasing the efficiency of the
army, and the material prosperity of the country showed no falling off.
Relations with the other Balkan States, especially with Serbia and
Montenegro, improved considerably, and there was ample room for such
improvement. This was outwardly marked by frequent visits paid to each
other by members of the several royal families of the three Slavonic
kingdoms of the Balkans. In May 1912 agreements for the eventual
delimitation of the provinces to be conquered from Turkey in the event
of war were signed between Bulgaria and Serbia, and Bulgaria and
Greece. The most controversial district was, of course, Macedonia.
Bulgaria claimed central Macedonia, with Monastir and Okhrida, which
was the lion’s share, on ethnical grounds which have been already
discussed, and it was expected that Greece and Serbia, by obtaining
other acquisitions elsewhere, would consent to have their territories
separated by the large Bulgarian wedge which was to be driven between
them. The exact future line of demarcation between Serbian and
Bulgarian territory was to be left to arbitration. The possible
creation of an independent Albania was not contemplated.
In August 1912 the twenty-fifth anniversary of King Ferdinand’s arrival
in Bulgaria was celebrated with much rejoicing at the ancient capital
of Tirnovo, and was marred only by the news of the terrible massacre of
Bulgars by Turks at Kochana in Macedonia; this event, however,
opportune though mournful, tended considerably to increase the volume
of the wave of patriotism which swept through the country. Later in the
same month Count Berchtold startled Europe with his ‘progressive
decentralization’ scheme of reform for Macedonia. The manner in which
this event led to the final arrangements for the declaration of war on
Turkey by the four Balkan States is given in full elsewhere (cf. p.
151).
The Bulgarian army was fully prepared for the fray, and the autumn
manoeuvres had permitted the concentration unobserved of a considerable
portion of it, ready to strike when the time came. Mobilisation was
ordered on September 30, 1912. On October 8 Montenegro declared war on
Turkey. On October 13 Bulgaria, with the other Balkan States, replied
to the remonstrances of Russia and Austria by declaring that its
patience was at length exhausted, and that the sword alone was able to
enforce proper treatment of the Christian populations in European
Turkey. On October 17 Turkey, encouraged by the sudden and unexpected
conclusion of peace with Italy after the Libyan war, declared war on
Bulgaria and Serbia, and on October 18 King Ferdinand addressed a
sentimental exhortation to his people to liberate their
fellow-countrymen, who were still groaning under the Crescent.
The number of Turkish troops opposing the Bulgarians in Thrace was
about 180,000, and they had almost exactly the same number wherewith to
oppose the Serbians in Macedonia; for, although Macedonia was
considered by the Turks to be the most important theatre of war, yet
the proximity of the Bulgarian frontier to Constantinople made it
necessary to retain a large number of troops in Thrace. On October 19
the Bulgarians took the frontier town of Mustafa Pasha. On October 24
they defeated the Turks at Kirk-Kilissé (or Lozengrad), further east.
From October 28 to November 2 raged the terrific battle of Lule-Burgas,
which resulted in a complete and brilliant victory of the Bulgarians
over the Turks. The defeat and humiliation of the Turks was as rapid
and thorough in Thrace as it had been in Macedonia, and by the middle
of November the remains of the Turkish army were entrenched behind the
impregnable lines of Chataldja, while a large garrison was shut up in
Adrianople, which had been invested by the end of October. The
Bulgarian army, somewhat exhausted by this brilliant and lightning
campaign, refrained from storming the lines of Chataldja, an operation
which could not fail to involve losses such as the Bulgarian nation was
scarcely in a position to bear, and on December 3 the armistice was
signed. The negotiations conducted in London for two months led,
however, to no result, and on February 3, 1913, hostilities were
resumed. These, for the Bulgarians, resolved themselves into the more
energetic prosecution of the siege of Adrianople, which had not been
raised during the armistice. To their assistance Serbia, being able to
spare troops from Macedonia, sent 50,000 men and a quantity of heavy
siege artillery, an arm which the Bulgarians lacked. On March 26, 1913,
the fortress surrendered to the allied armies.
The Conference of London, which took place during the spring of that
year, fixed the new Turco-Bulgarian boundary by drawing the famous
Enos-Midia line, running between these two places situated on the
shores respectively of the Aegean and the Black Sea. This delimitation
would have given Bulgaria possession of Adrianople. But meanwhile
Greece and especially Serbia, which latter country had been compelled
to withdraw from the Adriatic coast by Austria, and was further
precluded from ever returning there by the creation of the independent
state of Albania, determined to retain possession of all that part of
Macedonia, including the whole valley of the Vardar with its important
railway, which they had conquered, and thus secure their common
frontier. In May 1913 a military convention was concluded between them,
and the Balkan League, the relations between the members of which had
been becoming more strained ever since January, finally dissolved.
Bulgaria, outraged by this callous disregard of the agreements as to
the partition of Macedonia signed a year previously by itself and its
ex-allies, did not wait for the result of the arbitration which was
actually proceeding in Russia, but in an access of indignation rushed
to arms.
This second Balkan war, begun by Bulgaria during the night of June 30,
1913, by a sudden attack on the Serbian army in Macedonia, resulted in
its undoing. In order to defeat the Serbs and Greeks the south-eastern
and northern frontiers were denuded of troops. But the totally
unforeseen happened. The Serbs were victorious, defeating the Bulgars
in Macedonia, the Turks, seeing Thrace empty of Bulgarian troops,
re-occupied Adrianople, and the Rumanian army, determined to see fair
play before it was too late, invaded Bulgaria from the north and
marched on Sofia. By the end of July the campaign was over and Bulgaria
had to submit to fate.
By the terms of the Treaty of Bucarest, which was concluded on August
10, 1913, Bulgaria obtained a considerable part of Thrace and eastern
Macedonia, including a portion of the Aegean coast with the seaport of
Dedeagach, but it was forced to ‘compensate’ Rumania with a slice of
its richest province (the districts of Dobrich and Silistria in
north-eastern Bulgaria), and it lost central Macedonia, a great part of
which it would certainly have been awarded by Russia’s arbitration. On
September 22, 1913, the Treaty of Constantinople was signed by Bulgaria
and Turkey; by its terms Turkey retained possession of Adrianople and
of a far larger part of Thrace than its series of ignominious defeats
in the autumn of 1912 entitled it to.
In the fatal quarrel between Bulgaria and Serbia which caused the
disruption of the Balkan League, led to the tragic second Balkan war of
July 1913, and naturally left behind the bitterest feelings, it is
difficult to apportion the blame. Both Serbia and Bulgaria were
undoubtedly at fault in the choice of the methods by which they sought
to adjust their difference, but the real guilt is to be found neither
in Sofia nor in Belgrade, but in Vicuna and Budapest. The Balkan League
barred the way of the Germanic Powers to the East; its disruption
weakened Bulgaria and again placed Serbia at the mercy of the Dual
Monarchy. After these trying and unremunerative experiences it is not
astonishing that the Bulgarian people and its ambitious ruler should
have retired to the remote interior of their shell.
_Explanation of Serbian orthography_
c = ts
č = ch (as in _church_)
ć = ” ” ” but softer
š = sh
ž = zh (as z in _azure_)
gj = g (as in _George_)
j = y
[Illustration: THE BALKAN PENINSULA]