By general carelessness and failure to realize the terrible result
which is bound to follow any lack of care, failure to comply with the
rules and _the uncertainty of detection and punishment if such
carelessness and failure to comply with rules does not cause an
accident_.
Every man in the train, engine, and switching service ought to have
every requirement of these rules by heart, understand exactly what
they mean, and be ready at any instant, and in any weather, to execute
them to the letter, and no punishment should be too severe for failure
to observe them to the very letter, for on their faithful observance
depend the lives of passengers--it may be some of your own loved
ones--of employees, and the safety of the property entrusted to the
companies for transportation, as well as their own. And yet, if the
instructions contained in the two fundamental rules and those known as
the "Flag Rules" had been observed, none of the following cases and
many others that help fill the records and the daily press would have
happened. It is a standing disgrace that such accidents happen, and
the sooner employees help get the careless and reckless men and the
drones out of the service, as it is your duty to yourself and the
companies to do, the quicker the traveling public, yourselves, the
property in transit, and that belonging to your employer and
yourselves, will be safe and the greater your certainty of getting to
the end of your run to be welcomed by the wife and children awaiting
you.
In this connection I want to suggest to the enginemen that when you
discover a cause for the sending out of a flagman give him a chance to
go back before you get stopped, so that he can cover the required
distance quicker. And as these rules are among the most important, if
not the most important, in the book, I call especial attention to
them.
The following cases will illustrate how much room there is for
improvement in this regard:
Joseph Atkinson, brakeman, injured September 26, at Muggleton. He
was standing on top of way-car in train which stopped just west of
the depot and then started up and ran into side of freight train.
Alexander Peabody, engineer, George F. Smivins, fireman, injured
at 10 p.m., October 3, on track 3, near Penryn Ave., Peltonville;
engine No. 784 was backing down track 3, and collided with engine
No. 1891 standing on that track. Instructions require engines
running on this track must run at slow rate of speed, so as to be
able to stop within their vision. The engine was running so fast
that it could not stop, although Engineer Peabody saw engine No.
1891 when 300 feet distant.
J. L. McPherson, yardmaster, and Jacob Gonorowski, brakeman,
injured at Peeweezle, July 28, were in caboose of extra engine No.
674, which was stopping for drawbridge, when engine No. 937,
Engineman Isidore Guggenheimer, ran into the rear of train.
Luke M. Peters, engineer, injured April 14 at Aromintap, was in
charge of engine No. 2143, backing around Y, when train No. 31
backed into extra No. 7326, to which engine No. 2143 was attached.
L. P. Jarvis, engineer, and Samuel Minns, fireman, injured
November 20, at 7:15 a.m., one-half mile east of Peeble's Corners;
engine No. 759 had just backed in on side track with work train,
and switch had not yet been closed; engine No. 1473, train No. 48,
Engineer Tibbits, Conductor Perry, came along at a high rate of
speed, and ran into this open switch just east of the home signal,
colliding with engine No. 759.
February 14, at 8:20 p.m., one mile north of Indianapolis, Ohio
division, extra freight engine, Packard conductor, collided with
Ohio division passenger train No. 11. This freight train had an
order to run from Indianapolis to Cameron as an extra. Indiana
division passenger train 141, due at Indianapolis at 8 p.m., was
15 minutes late. Conductor Packard of the extra was on station
platform when this train pulled in. He supposed it was Ohio
division No. 11 and so told his engineer, and pulled out and met
No. 11 a mile from the station. Two engineers and one fireman were
killed and five trainmen injured. If Rule 53 requiring conductors
and engineers of trains at meeting points to ascertain by word of
mouth what trains they are had been complied with accident would
have been avoided.
Nov. 5 freight train No. 52 slowed down to take side track at Park
Rapids when extra freight moving in same block, on caution card,
ran into caboose and rear brakeman was killed. If Rules 7, 14 or
15 had been complied with accident would not have occurred.
Rule 12a says: When you get a train order the conductors must read it
aloud and then sign it and show it to the engineman, the rear brakeman
or flagman, and the engineman must show it to the fireman and in case
of freight train to the head brakeman, who are required to read it,
the object being that every employee on the train will know what the
order is and if the engineman or conductor forget it the brakeman or
fireman may remember and by remembering prevent an accident.