UPPER PERU.
1814.
The military policy of the United Provinces had three distinct ends:
first, to construct a new nation within the geographical limits of the
old Viceroyalty of the River Plate; second, to aid in the establishment
of other South American nations, who would be their natural allies; and
third, to carry their arms beyond their frontiers for the removal of
obstacles to their expansion. Hence the expeditions to Paraguay and
Monte Video, the aid given to the insurgents in Chile, and the war waged
with the Viceroyalty of Peru. The army of the North, as the embodiment
of this threefold policy, was styled “The Auxiliary Army of Peru,” and
its mission was to incorporate the Provinces of Upper Peru as a portion
of the old Viceroyalty, to capture Lima, the centre of Spanish power in
South America, and to bring Lower Peru into an alliance similar to that
already contracted with Chile.
For four years Upper Peru had been the battlefield of the Patriots and
Royalists; it was now completely in the power of the latter. The four
provinces known as Upper Peru are shut in by mountain ranges, and have
no fluvial communication with either ocean. Situate within the tropics,
their high tablelands and intervening valleys furnish at once examples
of perpetual winter and perpetual spring, and yield all the natural
products of the globe.
Upper Peru is divided by two spurs from the Andes into three districts.
The western range runs parallel to the Pacific Ocean from the desert of
Atacama--which is a high tableland--to the first valleys of Lower Peru
on the coast, cutting off an arid and thinly-peopled district. The
central plain, well peopled but inclement, is the natural road from the
Argentine Republic to Lower Peru, and was the theatre of operations
during the preceding campaigns. The eastern range, with lofty peaks
covered with perpetual snow, looks down upon a truly intertropical
paradise. At its foot extends to the west the smiling valley of Clisa,
where stands the city of Cochabamba, with easy access over the hills to
the central plateau, and to Chuquisaca by valleys on the south-east.
Behind Cochabamba and to the east of the range lies the Valle Grande,
which collects the mountain streams and delivers them to the Amazon.
More to the north-east lies Santa Cruz da la Sierra in the midst of a
vast grassy plain, which slopes gradually away to the confines of
Brazil, Paraguay, and the Argentine Chaco.
The social organization of Upper Peru was a continuation of the system
of the Incas, complicated by the antagonism of races. Europeans had
established themselves in six cities, whose former inhabitants, driven
out to the ice-covered hills or to the torrid valleys, worked as serfs
for their lords and masters as cultivators of the soil or as miners. The
lower class in these cities consisted of half-breeds, and formed the
greater part of the population. All the rest of the country was peopled
exclusively by two indigenous races, who paid a capitation tax, and had
no civil rights. The language of the conquerors was unintelligible to
the mass of the people.
In this country the first rebellion against the domination of Spain was
quenched in blood in 1809, but news of the revolution of Buenos Ayres in
1810 rekindled the smouldering embers. The movement was supported by
Argentine troops under Balcarce, who won the first victory of the war at
Suipacha, but was afterwards totally defeated on the Desaguadero. The
Patriots of Cochabamba being thus left alone, fought another battle by
themselves at Sipe-Sipe on the 13th August, 1811, but were defeated.
The repulse of the second invasion under Belgrano in 1813 was another
great disappointment to them, but still the spirit of the people was not
crushed. There was, however, no cohesion among them; they had the
courage to resist and to die on the field of battle or on the scaffold,
but they were unable to concert any plan of action; thus these
successive disasters greatly weakened the ties which bound them to the
Patriots of Buenos Ayres, but vain were the efforts of the Spaniards to
overcome the passive resistance of the people. Heads of rebels were
exposed along the public roads, the properties of such as had fled were
confiscated and sold, towns were sacked, military commissions terrorized
the country, prisoners taken in the last campaign were sold as slaves to
the owners of the vineyards and plantations of Peru, but still
insurrectionary movements constantly broke out; even the Indians, armed
with nothing more than clubs, slings, and arrows, braved death with the
utmost stoicism, certain that they would be avenged. The Spanish
general, unable either to retreat or to advance, established his
headquarters at Tupiza; and while a portion of his army kept open
communications in the rear, his vanguard advanced to Salta, constantly
harassed by the country people, who rose in arms on the retreat of the
Patriot army to Tucuman.
The army which had twice defeated the armies of the United Provinces was
almost entirely composed of natives of the Highlands of Lower Peru. They
were men inured to hardships and privations, untiring on the march,
faithful to their flag, obedient to their officers, and undaunted under
fire. They were half-breeds, who spoke the same language as the people
of the country in which they fought. The climate of this country was the
same as that of their own, and they were accustomed to the peculiar
requirements of mountain warfare. All this gave them great advantages
over the Argentine troops on that field of action, and the remembrance
of defeats disheartened the Patriot army.
Belgrano after the rout of Ayohuma had left Colonel Don JUAN ANTONIO
ALVAREZ DE ARENALES as governor of Cochabamba and commandant of the
Patriot forces in the rear of the enemy, and Colonel Don Ignacio Warnes
as governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, under the orders of Arenales.
Only men of their stamp could have undertaken the desperate enterprise
of keeping alive the flames of insurrection in the mountains of Upper
Peru after such disasters.
Arenales is one of the most extraordinary characters of the Argentine
revolution. Born in Spain and educated in Buenos Ayres, he embraced with
ardour the American cause, and took a prominent part in the insurrection
at Chuquisaca in 1809. Taken prisoner, he was sent to Peru, and remained
in the casemates of Callao till set at liberty by the Cortes of Cadiz in
1812. At the time of the battle of Tucuman he was in Salta, and there
headed a patriotic movement which was immediately quelled. Previous to
the battle of Salta he had joined the army of Belgrano, and accompanied
it to Upper Peru. To austere manners, tenacity of purpose, and untiring
activity he added the virtues of a good citizen, great talents as an
administrator, inflexible will, and a brain fertile in warlike
stratagems. His face never displayed any signs of either pleasure or
pain, and his stern look and voice joined to his lion-like head, marked
him as one born to command; but under all lay a warm heart, more anxious
to do right than to win glory.
Warnes was of English descent, but was born in Buenos Ayres, and in 1807
had distinguished himself in defence of his native city.
San Martin, on learning from Belgrano the character of Arenales, at once
opened communications with him, and on two occasions sent him arms and
ammunition, with officers, to aid him in his operations.
While Belgrano was in Upper Peru, Colonel Landivar, a Spaniard, was made
prisoner at Santa Cruz de la Sierra. This man had been one of the most
merciless agents of Goyeneche, and he was kept for trial by the
General, “not for having fought against our system, but for the murders,
robberies, burnings, violences, extortions, and other excesses
perpetrated by him in contravention of the laws of war.” It was proved
that he had executed fifty-four prisoners of war, whose heads and arms
had been cut off and nailed to posts on the public roads. The accused
alleged that he had only ordered the execution of thirty-three
individuals, and that in obedience to express orders from Goyeneche,
which he produced in evidence. The defence was ably conducted by an
officer of the Grenadiers, who pleaded that the prisoner having acted
only in obedience to the orders of his superior could not be looked upon
as other than a prisoner of war. The Court pronounced sentence of death,
which sentence was laid before San Martin on the 13th January, 1814, who
at once signed it without consulting Government.
This trial gives an idea of the mode in which war was waged in Upper
Peru. The cruelties of the Spaniards produced reprisals on the part of
the insurgents, which so filled the land with bloodshed that “the
inhabitants looked calmly upon these scenes; no one hesitated to risk
his own life, and all sought to shed the blood of those of the other
party.” Such was the war into which Arenales now entered as leader of
the fifth insurrection of Cochabamba.
The Royalist army being in possession of the central plateau the
position of Arenales at Cochabamba was untenable, but the road by the
Valle Grande was open to him; he could join Warnes at Santa Cruz de la
Sierra, and communicate with the Argentine Provinces by the Chaco, and
from Santa Cruz he could march over well-wooded plains to Chuquisaca.
On the 29th November he commenced his retreat with sixty musketeers,
four small guns, a few cavalry, and a crowd of countrymen armed with
clubs and slings, who covered his flanks and rear. In the valley of
Misque he attempted to make a stand, but was forced across the
Cordillera to the head waters of the eastern streams. Overtaken at
Chillán, he beat off his pursuers, and reached the Valle Grande, where
he recruited his forces, forming an infantry battalion of one hundred
and sixty-five men, and two squadrons of cavalry, and was joined by some
guerilla chiefs.
The insurrection spread, and Pezuela despatched Colonel Blanco with six
hundred men and three light guns, to subdue it. On his march Blanco met
with six heads nailed to posts, a gage of defiance from the guerillas
who swarmed in the adjacent valleys.
On the 4th February the two armies met. The Patriots had at first the
advantage, till a part of their raw troops were seized with panic; the
Royalists captured their guns and remained masters of the field. Blanco
shot his prisoners, and cut off the heads of three leaders, after which
he retreated to Chillán for reinforcements.
Arenales retreated to the frontier of Santa Cruz, taking his arms and
spare ammunition with him on mule-back. Reinforced by Warnes he halted
at Abapo on the Rio Grande, and in March had two hundred and four
infantry and four small guns. Warnes refused to recognise his authority,
and took up a position for himself at Horcas with a thousand men,
advancing his outposts to Herradura and Petacas, passes of the
Cordillera considered impregnable, as they were nothing more than
flights of stairs cut in the sides of the mountain.
At the same time the Indians of the Chaco along the banks of the river
Pilcomayo rose up in favour of the Patriots; guerilla chiefs aroused a
part of the Province of La Plata; and the towns in Blanco’s rear were
again in insurrection. Pezuela despatched Colonel Benavente with five
hundred men, against this new insurrection; but in spite of sundry
advantages gained by both columns, Benavente was so weakened that he was
soon reduced to inaction, and Blanco, whose troops suffered greatly from
fever, was forced to evacuate the Valle Grande early in April and to
retreat to Misque.
Arenales, while encamped at Tumina, received information that Blanco,
resuming the offensive, had forced the passes of Herradura and Petacas,
and had dispersed the division under Warnes. He at once marched towards
the scene of action, and met Warnes at the head of only three hundred
men. The latter, learning wisdom by his reverses, placed himself under
his orders. Blanco had in the meantime taken the city of Santa Cruz, and
was now coming in search of them with six hundred men, of whom one-half
were regular infantry.
On the 24th May the Royalists came in sight, and the Patriots retreated
by a narrow defile, leaving a small party to draw on the enemy. At dawn
on the 25th they reached the town of LA FLORIDA, on the river Piray.
Arenales took up a position on the right of this small river, in an open
space where the bank was about two yards high. Below, the river spread
out, while in front lay a wide plain. His flanks were protected by dense
brushwood; the town was behind him. He planted his guns on the open,
placed his cavalry in ambuscade on each flank, with Warnes in command on
the right and De la Riva on the left. At the foot of the bank he opened
a trench, concealed by sand and brushwood, where he stationed his
infantry, kneeling, and awaited the attack. His entire force numbered
about eight hundred men.
Just before noon the same day a dropping fire was heard in the woods in
front. It came from the outpost, who were retreating before the enemy.
Soon after that the Royalist column debouched from the wood, preceded by
skirmishers. Blanco drew up his men on the plain, with strong cavalry
reserves on the flanks, and opened fire with his four-pounders. Then, as
the infantry advanced firing, the Patriot guns opened upon them. When
the skirmishers entered the river, the entrenched infantry poured in a
volley, and, springing from their shelter, charged through the smoke
with such impetuosity that, aided by the cavalry on the left, they
completely routed the enemy, Colonel Blanco remaining dead upon the
field.
Arenales headed the pursuit in person with so little caution that he was
attacked by a group of fugitives, who left him for dead with fourteen
wounds, three of them in the face. His men rushed in and saved him,
carrying him on their shoulders back to the camp.
Two flags, two guns, two hundred muskets, one hundred killed, and
ninety-nine prisoners, were the trophies of this victory, while the
Patriots lost only one man killed and twenty-one wounded, including
their leader.
Such was the action of La Florida, which saved Santa Cruz de la Sierra
and compelled the retreat of the Royalist army from Salta. It gives the
name to one of the principal streets of Buenos Ayres. For it Arenales
was raised to the rank of general, and a badge of honour was decreed to
the troops engaged.
Arenales was no sooner well of his wounds than he marched with his
division and reoccupied the Valle Grande, routing a Royalist force of
two hundred men at Postrer Valle on the 4th July, but was on the 5th
August himself defeated at Sumapaita. Afterwards reinforced by Padilla
with a body of Indian slingers, he forced Benavente to retreat from
Tomina, and again reoccupied the Valle Grande.
Eighteen months he maintained this extraordinary war at a cost to the
enemy of 1,300 men in killed, wounded, and missing, entering Cochabamba
at last in triumph, and joining the Argentine army with 1,200 men.
Over the vast plains of La Plata the revolutionary spirit had spread
almost unopposed, but where mountain ranges marked out the limits of
Upper Peru the movement could only advance by force of arms. The map of
the old Viceroyalty did not coincide with that of the social revolution
of the United Provinces. Upper Peru had been the high road from Buenos
Ayres to Lima in time of peace; it now remained for San Martin to decide
whether the same road was strategically the proper road to Lima or not,
in time of war.