CHAPTER III.

THE LAUTARO LODGE.

1812--1813.

The Provisional Junta, which was established at Buenos Ayres on the 25th

May, 1810, was a simple evolution of historic and municipal rights, and

was legalised by the election of deputies to it from the Cabildos. This

body was subsequently reconstructed, but this measure and the creation

of Provincial Juntas were retrograde movements, arising from a latent

tendency to decentralisation, in which lay the germ of the federal

system of a later day. The next step was the creation of a Triumvirate,

which, being a more centralised form of government, responded to the

immediate needs of the revolution, and was a necessity of the time.

In the Junta the conservative and revolutionary elements of society were

both represented, but the Triumvirate represented no party, and was

merely an anonymous Dictator. The revolution had as yet no defined

policy, and thus afforded no basis for the development of the democratic

idea.

A Legislative Assembly was convened, formed of deputies from the various

provinces, which drew up a constitution which virtually gave back the

executive power to the Cabildos. This Assembly was dissolved by the

Triumvirate, a measure greatly applauded by the public, but which

attacked the fundamental principle of government.

The Triumvirate then drew up and decreed a constitution of its own,

providing for the periodical election of the Executive by a mixed

assembly of notables and of representatives of different towns, who

should also act as a legislative council until the convention of a

National Congress.

These measures were far from satisfying the requirements of the

democratic party, who called for the immediate convocation of a National

Congress, which would give form and life to the Republic, though

government was still carried on in the name of the King. The Triumvirate

opposed the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, considering the time

for this had not yet come. Hence came about a fourth political

evolution, more dangerous and more important than any of the others.

San Martin returned to his native country a man unknown, but with a

certain repute as a brave soldier and a skilful tactician. His comrade,

Alvear, on the contrary, came of a family already well known in the

River Plate. Ambitious of glory and of power, and of a brilliant

imagination, he was a great contrast to San Martin, and assumed an

attitude of protection to him, recommending him to the Government of the

United Provinces as a good soldier.

Eight days after his arrival San Martin was confirmed in his rank as a

lieutenant-colonel, and was entrusted with the organization of a

squadron of cavalry, in which Alvear held the rank of major and Zapiola

that of captain. This was the origin of the famous regiment of mounted

grenadiers, which fought in all the battles of the War of Independence,

which gave to America nineteen generals and more than two hundred

officers, and of which, after shedding its blood and spreading its bones

across the continent from La Plata to Pichincha, a remnant returned

under the command of a trooper who in thirteen years had fought his way

up to the rank of colonel, and brought back their old standard with

them.

The experience of San Martin in Spain had taught him that success is not

possible in a long war without a solid military organization. He had

seen the Spanish armies, ever routed in spite of their heroism, when

remoulded under English discipline triumph over the first soldiers of

Europe. He knew that Spain, once free from war in the Peninsula, would

send her best troops and her best generals to America. Coolly he studied

the situation, and came to the conclusion that the war was but

commencing, that the armies of the revolution had no consistence, that

there was no plan of operations and no preparation for future

emergencies. He said nothing of this publicly, but quietly set to work

to found a new military school. Under his command the first squadron of

the mounted grenadiers became the school of a generation of heroes. He

did as Cromwell did in his day; he made one regiment the model for an

army. Under strict discipline, which did not repress individual energy,

he formed soldier and officer alike, one by one, instilling into them a

passion for duty and that cool courage which is the secret of success.

His first work was to instruct the officers, who under his guidance

became the monitors of the future school. To the companions of his

voyage he added men who had already seen service in the war, preferring

those who had risen from the ranks, but took none of higher rank than

lieutenant. To them he added cadets, chosen from respectable families of

the city of Buenos Ayres. He was their master both in tactics and in the

use of arms, and taught them both to study and to manœuvre with heads

erect. Their nerves he tried by nocturnal surprises, those who failed

being dismissed, as he wished “to have only lions in the regiment.”

He also established a sort of vigilance committee among them, and in

extreme cases gave permission to fight duels. On the first Sunday in

each month he presided at a meeting of this committee. In an adjoining

room each officer wrote on a blank ticket an account of any misconduct

he had observed. These tickets were folded and dropped into the hat of

the Major, and were then inspected by himself. If among them was any

accusation, the accused was sent from the room while the matter was

discussed. A committee of inquiry was named and directed to report at a

special meeting, where each officer gave his opinion in writing, and a

secret ballot decided whether the accused should remain in the corps or

not. In the first case the president, in the name of the committee and

in their presence, gave a full apology to the accused; in the second, a

special committee was appointed to wait upon him and procure his

resignation, he being at the same time notified that if he continued to

wear the uniform he would be forcibly stripped of it by the first

officer he met.

This tribunal had a concise and severe code which classified

transgressions worthy of punishment, from the act of ducking the head in

danger to that of refusing to fight a duel, be it just or unjust; also

striking a woman, even if insulted by her; and included all sorts of

personal misconduct.

The troopers were all carefully selected, short men not being admitted.

He subjected them to strict discipline, and armed them with the long

sabre of Napoleon’s cuirassiers, telling them that with this weapon they

could split like a melon the head of any _Goth_[8] they met. In their

first skirmish they gave practical proof of the truth of this lesson.

Finally, he gave to each trooper a war-name, forbidding him to answer to

any other.

Other squadrons were formed on the model of this one till a regiment was

embodied, and Government sent San Martin his commission as colonel with

these words:--

“Government sends you a commission as colonel of the mounted grenadiers,

and hopes that by the continuance of your steadiness and zeal you may

present the country with a corps capable alone of securing the liberties

of your fellow-citizens.”

Meantime San Martin had married Doña Maria de los Remedios Escalada, a

beautiful girl of one of the first families of the city.

San Martin made no pretence of being a politician, but among friends he

spoke plainly his opinions:--

“Until now the United Provinces have fought for no one knows what,

without a flag, and without any avowed principles to explain the origin

and tendency of the insurrection. We must declare ourselves independent

if we wish to be known and respected.”

With these ideas he did not hesitate to join those who desired the

convocation of a Constituent Congress, but he saw the necessity of

establishing some powerful nucleus of political force which should bring

superior intelligence to influence popular movements, preparing among a

few that which should be the apparent will of all. This idea he, aided

by Alvear, carried into effect by the installation of the celebrated

secret society known as THE LAUTARO LODGE, which exercised so great and

so mysterious an influence upon the destinies of the revolution.

This Lodge was established in Buenos Ayres about the middle of the year

1812. Its members were of all political parties, but the majority were

of the party at that time dominant in the State. The society was

organised in various grades; in the first, neophytes were initiated

according to the ritual of the Masonic lodges which were introduced into

Buenos Ayres prior to the outbreak of the revolution; in the higher

grades they were initiated into the higher purposes of the society, and

behind these was hidden the central lodge (Logia Matriz), in which lay

the supreme power of the society.

The declared object of the Lodge was:--

“To work systematically for the independence and happiness of America,

proceeding with honour and justice.”

Thus membership was exclusively confined to men of American birth. By

its constitution, if any of the brotherhood was elected supreme ruler

of the State, he could take no important step without consulting the

Lodge; he could not appoint a diplomatic agent, general-in-chief,

governor of a province, judge of an upper court, high church dignitary,

nor general officers, and could not punish any member of the

brotherhood, by his own authority. It was a law of the Society that all

members should mutually assist each other in all the exigencies of civil

life; that at the risk of life they should uphold the decrees of the

Lodge; and should inform it of anything which could influence public

opinion, or affect the public security. To reveal the secret of the

existence of the Lodge “by word or by sign” was punishable by death by

such means “as might be found convenient.” This penalty, was, however,

only intended to have a moral effect. By an addition to the

constitution, it was arranged that when any brother of the _Logia

Matriz_ was named general of an army or governor of a province, he

should have power to establish an affiliated society, with a smaller

number of members.

The Society failed to secure the adhesion of the members of the then

Government, but most of the popular leaders joined the Lodge, and its

ramifications soon extended to all classes, the most notable adherent

being Dr. Don Bernardo Monteagudo, who had great influence among the

younger citizens.

Very exaggerated ideas have been held as to the influence of the Lautaro

Lodge. Events have been attributed to its action and it has been held

responsible for executions and crimes with which the Society had nothing

whatever to do. It has been made the scapegoat of all the mistakes and

errors of the epoch. The Lodge of Lautaro was not a machine of

government or of speculative propaganda, it was an engine of revolution,

of war against a common enemy, and of defence against internal dangers.

In this sense it greatly contributed to give tone and direction to the

revolution, concentrating the forces of government, giving unity and

regularity to political evolutions, and a vigorous impulse to military

operations. Under its auspices was created the first popular Assembly

which gave form to the sovereignty of the people; to it was due that

spirit of propaganda which characterized the Argentine revolution, and

the maintenance of the alliance with Chile, which gave independence to

half the continent; but there was danger in the secrecy of its debates,

and in the irresponsibility of its collective power, which was manifest

when it became a tool in the hands of personal ambition. The limited

sphere in which its influence was felt proves that the Argentine

revolution was impelled by forces of much greater power, and obeyed

general laws over which it had no control.

The Portuguese army, then holding the left bank of the Uruguay, had

agreed to retire within the frontier in pursuance of an armistice

arranged, on the 26th May, 1812, by the interposition of the English

minister, between the United Provinces and the Court of Rio Janeiro. The

Spanish flag yet floated on the walls of Monte Video, but the road was

now open and a strong patriot army was concentrated on the right bank of

the Uruguay.

In Buenos Ayres public spirit revived on the discovery of a vast

conspiracy of European Spaniards under Alzaga, which was to have broken

out on the 5th July, in concert with the forces in Monte Video and the

Spanish squadron in the roadstead, aided by the Portuguese army, which

had not yet retired. The Triumvirate punished the conspirators with

great severity, and the base of operations was solidly secured.

In the North the situation was less promising. The Royalist army, after

completing the subjugation of Upper Peru, advanced in triumph to the

heart of the United Provinces, and invaded the Province of Tucuman. The

relics of the Patriot army were in retreat, under command of Belgrano,

and it was only hoped that they might reach Cordoba in safety. At this

critical juncture Belgrano, disregarding the positive orders of

Government, turned on the enemy, who were double in number to his own

forces, and completely routed them on the 24th September, near to the

city of Tucuman, capturing flags and cannon, and thus saved the

Argentine revolution.

By the constitution drawn up by the Triumvirate, it was established that

one of their number should retire every six months. On the expiration of

the first six months, they convened another Assembly to elect one in

place of the outgoing Triumvir. This Assembly, repeating the errors of

the previous one, took upon itself the attributes of a representative

body. Government dissolved it as it had the former one, and called upon

Don Juan Martin Pueyrredon to fill the vacant chair; but the national

spirit was no longer confined within the limits of the municipality of

Buenos Ayres, and demanded the immediate convocation of a National

Congress, elected by the people. The Triumvirate proposed that a third

Assembly should devote itself to drawing up a plan for the election of

the Congress. This Assembly accordingly met on the 6th October, in the

midst of the excitement caused by the news of the victory of Tucuman,

and elected as Triumvir a nominee of the Executive. Public opinion saw

in this only a continuance of the provisional system and was greatly

incensed, both against the Triumvirate and against the Assembly.

Behind the popular movement was the Lautaro Lodge under the direction of

Monteagudo, who secured the concurrence of San Martin and his

grenadiers, as also that of Alvear. This movement was much more

carefully prepared than that of the 25th May, 1810, or than that of the

5th and 6th April, 1811. The leaders drew up a plan of operations,

defining the parts to be played by the people, by the corporations, and

by the troops. They chose beforehand the members of the future

Government, and even made a programme of the policy they should pursue.

At half-past eleven on the night of the 7th October the troops of the

garrison commenced to defile into the Plaza Victoria, and took up

positions in front of the Cabildo. The grenadiers, with sabres sheathed,

were headed by San Martin and Alvear; after them came Colonel Ortiz

Ocampo with the 2nd regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pinto with the

cavalry. At daybreak on the 8th, the bell of the municipality was rung

and the people commenced to assemble. Soon three hundred persons, among

whom were the principal members of the religious orders, occupied the

galleries of the Chamber and presented to the Cabildo a petition with

more than three hundred signatures, asking--

“Under protection of the military for the suspension of the Assembly and

the deposition of the Triumvirate, so that the Cabildo, reassuming the

authority delegated to it by the people on the 22nd May, 1810, might

immediately create a new Executive encharged to convene a truly national

Assembly.”

The Cabildo acceded to everything, declaring by proclamation that the

Assembly when convened should have supreme power within limits defined

by the towns, in order to draw up a Constitution. They also appointed an

executive, consisting of Don Juan José Passo, Don Nicolas Rodriguez

Peña, and Don Antonio Alvarez Jonte, under the rules of the Provisional

Statute. All which was submitted to the people and approved of by

acclamation.

This revolution, which was municipal in its form, was essentially

national and democratic in its tendency. The principle of the

sovereignty of the people was recognised by calling a general Congress;

the old traditions, which gave supremacy to the capital, were set aside;

and the first bold step was taken in the path of independence.

The new Triumvirate lost no time in setting about their appointed task;

the Constituent Assembly was speedily convened, the victorious army of

Tucuman was strongly reinforced, and another army was despatched to

besiege Monte Video.

Thus in the space of seven months from the arrival of San Martin in

Buenos Ayres the aspect of affairs was completely changed. Government

was consolidated, its policy defined, public spirit was aroused, and the

revolution, with two armies, boldly displayed the flag of independence.

But the military situation was precarious, everything depended upon the

result of a battle.

Monte Video was a fortress of the second class, was defended by 335

guns, of which 175 were in battery, was garrisoned by more than 3,000

troops and by 2,000 militia, and was further protected by a squadron of

14 ships of war, mounting 210 guns, and by a flotilla, while the United

Provinces had not even a gunboat. Here was the centre of reaction and

the natural base for any expedition from the Peninsula, while the state

of relations with Brazil increased the danger from this quarter.

The Royalist army, beaten at Tucuman, had been strongly reinforced, and

lay entrenched at Salta, waiting the arrival of another army from Upper

Peru.

Government summoned a council of military chiefs--of whom San Martin was

one--and of influential citizens, to aid the Cabildo in devising

measures to meet these threatening dangers. It was decided that Monte

Video must be taken at any cost, and that Belgrano should be instructed

to drive the enemy from Salta, in order to open the road to the centre

of the Spanish power at Lima.

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