be respited till further orders from me, they remaining in close custody
meanwhile.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL BUTTERFIELD.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 4, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL BUTTERFIELD:
The news you send me from the Richmond Sentinel of the 3d must be greatly
if not wholly incorrect. The Thursday mentioned was the 28th, and we have
despatches here directly from Vicksburg of the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st;
and, while they speak of the siege progressing, they speak of no assault
or general fighting whatever, and in fact they so speak as to almost
exclude the idea that there can have been any since Monday the 25th, which
was not very heavy. Neither do they mention any demand made by Grant
upon Pemberton for a surrender. They speak of our troops as being in good
health, condition, and spirits. Some of them do say that Banks has Port
Hudson invested.
A. LINCOLN.
TO SECRETARY STANTON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, June 4, 1863.
HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.
MY DEAR SIR:--I have received additional despatches, which, with
former ones, induce me to believe we should revoke or suspend the order
suspending the Chicago Times; and if you concur in opinion, please have it
done.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL HOOKER.
WASHINGTON, D.C. JUNE 5, 1863
MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER:
Yours of to-day was received an hour ago. So much of professional military
skill is requisite to answer it that I have turned the task over to
General Halleck. He promises to perform it with his utmost care. I have
but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case
you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no
means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force
at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in
entrenchments and have you at advantage, and so, man for man, worst you at
that point, While his main force would in some way be getting an advantage
of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being
entangled up on the river like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable
to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or
to kick the other.
If Lee would come to my side of the river I would keep on the same side
and fight him, or act on the defensive, according as might be my estimate
of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions,
which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General
Halleck.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO MRS. GRIMSLEY.
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 6, 1863.
Mrs. ELIZABETH J. GRIMSLEY, Springfield, Ill.:
Is your John ready to enter the naval school? If he is, telegraph me his
full name.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL DIX,
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 6, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe, Va.:
By noticing the news you send from the Richmond Dispatch of this morning
you will see one of the very latest despatches says they have nothing
reliable from Vicksburg since Sunday. Now we here have a despatch
from there Sunday and others of almost every day preceding since the
investment, and while they show the siege progressing they do not show any
general fighting since the 21st and 22d. We have nothing from Port Hudson
later than the 29th when things looked reasonably well for us. I have
thought this might be of some interest to you.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL DIX.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, June 8, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe:
We have despatches from Vicksburg of the 3d. Siege progressing. No general
fighting recently. All well. Nothing new from Port Hudson.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL DIX.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. JUNE 8, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe:
The substance of news sent of the fighting at Port Hudson on the 27th we
have had here three or four days, and I supposed you had it also, when
I said this morning, "No news from Port Hudson." We knew that General
Sherman was wounded, but we hoped not so dangerously as your despatch
represents. We still have nothing of that Richmond newspaper story of
Kirby Smith crossing and of Banks losing an arm.
A. LINCOLN
TELEGRAM TO J. P. HALE.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, June 9, 1863.
HON. JOHN P. HALE, Dover, N. H.:
I believe that it was upon your recommendation that B. B. Bunker was
appointed attorney for Nevada Territory. I am pressed to remove him on the
ground that he does not attend to the office, nor in fact pass much time
in the Territory. Do you wish to say anything on the subject?
A. LINCOLN
TELEGRAM TO MRS. LINCOLN.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, June 9, 1863.
MRS. LINCOLN, Philadelphia, Pa.:
Think you had better put "Tad's" pistol away. I had an ugly dream about
him.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL HOOKER.
WASHINGTON, D.C. June 9, 1863
MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER:
I am told there are 50 incendiary shells here at the arsenal made to fit
the 100 pounder Parrott gun now with you. If this be true would you like
to have the shells sent to you?
A. LINCOLN
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL HOOKER.
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 10, 1863
MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER:
Your long despatch of to-day is just received. If left to me, I would not
go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had
Richmond invested to-day you would not be able to take it in twenty days;
meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined.
I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point. If he
comes towards the upper Potomac, follow on his flank, and on the inside
track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when
opportunity offers. If he stay where he is, fret him and fret him.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO MRS. LINCOLN.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, June 11,1863.
MRS. LINCOLN, Philadelphia:
Your three despatches received. I am very well and am glad to know that
you and "Tad" are so.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL HOOKER.
[Cipher.]
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, JUNE 12, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER:
If you can show me a trial of the incendiary shells on Saturday night, I
will try to join you at 5 P.M. that day Answer.
A. LINCOLN.
TO ERASTUS CORNING AND OTHERS.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, June 12, 1863.
HON. ERASTUS CORNING AND OTHERS.
GENTLEMEN:--Your letter of May 19, inclosing the resolutions of a public
meeting held at Albany, New York, on the 16th of the same month, was
received several days ago.
The resolutions, as I understand them, are resolvable into two
propositions--first, the expression of a purpose to sustain the cause
of the Union, to secure peace through victory, and to support the
administration in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the
rebellion; and, secondly, a declaration of censure upon the administration
for supposed unconstitutional action, such as the making of military
arrests. And from the two propositions a third is deduced, which is that
the gentlemen composing the meeting are resolved on doing their part
to maintain our common government and country, despite the folly or
wickedness, as they may conceive, of any administration. This position is
eminently patriotic, and as such I thank the meeting, and congratulate the
nation for it. My own purpose is the same; so that the meeting and myself
have a common object, and can have no difference, except in the choice of
means or measures for effecting that object.
And here I ought to close this paper, and would close it, if there were no
apprehension that more injurious consequences than any merely personal
to myself might follow the censures systematically cast upon me for doing
what, in my view of duty, I could not forbear. The resolutions promise
to support me in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the
rebellion; and I have not knowingly employed, nor shall knowingly employ,
any other. But the meeting, by their resolutions, assert and argue that
certain military arrests, and proceedings following them, for which I am
ultimately responsible, are unconstitutional. I think they are not. The
resolutions quote from the Constitution the definition of treason, and
also the limiting safeguards and guarantees therein provided for the
citizen on trial for treason, and on his being held to answer for capital
or otherwise infamous crimes, and in criminal prosecutions his right to
a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. They proceed to
resolve "that these safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the
pretensions of arbitrary power were intended more especially for his
protection in times of civil commotion." And, apparently to demonstrate
the proposition, the resolutions proceed: "They were secured substantially
to the English people after years of protracted civil war, and were
adopted into our Constitution at the close of the Revolution." Would not
the demonstration have been better if it could have been truly said that
these safeguards had been adopted and applied during the civil wars and
during our Revolution, instead of after the one and at the close of the
other? I too am devotedly for them after civil war, and before Civil war,
and at all times, "except when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require" their suspension. The resolutions proceed to
tell us that these safeguards "have stood the test of seventy-six years
of trial under our republican system, under circumstances which show that,
while they constitute the foundation of all free government, they are the
elements of the enduring stability of the republic." No one denies that
they have so stood the test up to the beginning of the present rebellion,
if we except a certain occurrence at New Orleans hereafter to be
mentioned; nor does any one question that they will stand the same test
much longer after the rebellion closes. But these provisions of the
Constitution have no application to the case we have in hand, because
the arrests complained of were not made for treason--that is, not for the
treason defined in the Constitution, and upon the conviction of which the
punishment is death--nor yet were they made to hold persons to answer
for any capital or otherwise infamous crimes; nor were the proceedings
following, in any constitutional or legal sense, "criminal prosecutions."
The arrests were made on totally different grounds, and the proceedings
following accorded with the grounds of the arrests. Let us consider the
real case with which we are dealing, and apply to it the parts of the
Constitution plainly made for such cases.
Prior to my installation here it had been inculcated that any State had
a lawful right to secede from the national Union, and that it would be
expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees of the doctrine
should fail to elect a president to their own liking. I was elected
contrary to their liking; and accordingly, so far as it was legally
possible, they had taken seven States out of the Union, had seized many
of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all
before I was inaugurated, and, of course, before I had done any official
act whatever. The rebellion thus begun soon ran into the present civil
war; and, in certain respects, it began on very unequal terms between the
parties. The insurgents had been preparing for it more than thirty years,
while the government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had
carefully considered all the means which could be turned to their account.
It undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that in their own
unrestricted effort to destroy Union, Constitution and law, all together,
the government would, in great degree, be restrained by the same
Constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers
invaded all departments of the government and nearly all communities
of the people. From this material, under cover of "liberty of speech,"
"liberty of the press," and "habeas corpus," they hoped to keep on foot
amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and
aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that
in times such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution itself the
"habeas corpus" might be suspended; but they also knew they had friends
who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile their
spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause. Or if, as
has happened, the Executive should suspend the writ without ruinous waste
of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are
always likely to occur in such cases; and then a clamor could be raised in
regard to this, which might be at least of some service to the insurgent
cause. It needed no very keen perception to discover this part of the
enemies program, so soon as by open hostilities their machinery was fairly
put in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed
rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by
degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the
Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety. Nothing is better
known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent to
such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for trials of
individuals--or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert, and this in
quiet times, and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in
times of peace bands of horse-thieves and robbers frequently grow too
numerous and powerful for the ordinary courts of justice. But what
comparison, in numbers have such bands ever borne to the insurgent
sympathizers even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too
frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to
hang the traitor. And yet again, he who dissuades one man from
volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as
much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or
inducement may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any
civil court would take cognizance.
Ours is a case of rebellion--so called by the resolutions before me--in
fact, a clear, flagrant, and gigantic case of rebellion; and the provision
of the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it," is the provision which specially applies
to our present case. This provision plainly attests the understanding
of those who made the Constitution that ordinary courts of justice are
inadequate to "cases of rebellion"--attests their purpose that, in such
cases, men may be held in custody whom the courts, acting on ordinary
rules, would discharge. Habeas corpus does not discharge men who are
proved to be guilty of defined crime, and its suspension is allowed by the
Constitution on purpose that men may be arrested and held who can not
be proved to be guilty of defined crime, "when, in cases of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it."
This is precisely our present case--a case of rebellion wherein the public
safety does require the suspension--Indeed, arrests by process of courts
and arrests in cases of rebellion do not proceed altogether upon the same
basis. The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and
continuous perpetration of crime, while the latter is directed at sudden
and extensive uprisings against the government, which, at most, will
succeed or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case arrests
are made not so much for what has been done as for what probably would be
done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive
than the former. In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily
understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and
says nothing when the peril of his government is discussed, cannot be
misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more
if he talks ambiguously--talks for his country with "buts," and "ifs,"
and "ands." Of how little value the constitutional provision I have quoted
will be rendered if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall
have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples: General
John C. Breckinridge, General Robert E. Lee, General Joseph E. Johnston,
General John B. Magruder, General William B. Preston, General Simon B.
Buckner, and Commodore Franklin Buchanan, now occupying the very highest
places in the rebel war service, were all within the power of the
government since the rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to
be traitors then as now. Unquestionably if we had seized and had them
the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then
committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested,
would have been discharged on habeas corpus were the writ allowed to
operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not unlikely
to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than
too many.
By the third resolution the meeting indicate their opinion that military
arrests may be constitutional in localities where rebellion actually
exists, but that such arrests are unconstitutional in localities where
rebellion or insurrection does not actually exist. They insist that such
arrests shall not be made "outside of the lines of necessary military
occupation and the scenes of insurrection." Inasmuch, however, as the
Constitution itself makes no such distinction, I am unable to believe that
there is any such constitutional distinction. I concede that the class
of arrests complained of can be constitutional only when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require them; and I insist
that in such cases--they are constitutional wherever the public safety
does require them, as well in places to which they may prevent the
rebellion extending, as in those where it may be already prevailing; as
well where they may restrain mischievous interference with the raising and
supplying of armies to suppress the rebellion as where the rebellion may
actually be; as well where they may restrain the enticing men out of
the army as where they would prevent mutiny in the army; equally
constitutional at all places where they will conduce to the public safety
as against the dangers of rebellion or invasion. Take the particular
case mentioned by the meeting. It is asserted in substance that Mr.
Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried "for no other
reason than words addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course
of the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of the
general." Now, if there be no mistake about this, if this assertion is the
truth, and the whole truth, if there were no other reason for the arrest,
then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand,
was made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility
to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because
he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to
encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an
adequate military force to suppress it. He was not arrested because he
was damaging the political prospects of the administration or the personal
interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army,
upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He
was warring upon the military, and thus gave the military constitutional
jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging
the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake
of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory
evidence.
I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be in favor
of suppressing the rebellion by military force--by armies. Long experience
has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be
punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law
and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a
simple-minded boy and not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induced him
to desert. This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a
father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working
upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is
fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible
government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think
that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only
constitutional, but withal a great mercy.
If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in
believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not
be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety does not require them: in other words, that the Constitution is
not in its application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or
invasion involving the public safety as it is in times of profound peace
and public security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction, and I
can no more be persuaded that the government can constitutionally take
no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that
the same could not be lawfully taken in times of peace, than I can be
persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man
because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able
to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American
people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the
right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law
of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite
peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to
believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during
temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder
of his healthful life.