Discontents in a part of the American army.... Letter from
General Washington on the subject.... Colonel Van Schaick
destroys an Indian settlement.... Expedition against the
Indians meditated.... Fort Fayette surrendered to the
British.... Invasion of Connecticut.... General Wayne storms
Stony Point.... Expedition against Penobscot.... Powles Hook
surprised by Major Lee.... Arrival of Admiral Arbuthnot....
Of the Count D'Estaing.... Siege of Savannah....
Unsuccessful attempt to storm that place.... Siege
raised.... Victory of General Sullivan at Newtown.... Spain
offers her mediation to the belligerents.... Declares war
against England.... Letter from General Washington to
congress respecting the annual formation of the army.... The
army goes into winter quarters.
[Sidenote: 1779]
The barbarities committed by the Indians, in the course of the
preceding year, on the inhabitants of the western frontiers, had added
motives of mingled resentment and humanity to those of national
interest, for employing a larger force in the protection of that part
of the Union than had heretofore been devoted to it.
General Washington had always believed that it was impossible to
defend the immense western frontier by any chain of posts which could
be established; and that the country would be protected much more
certainly by offensive than by defensive war. His plan was to
penetrate into the heart of the Indian settlements with a force
competent to the destruction of their towns; and also to reduce the
British post at Niagara, which gave its possessors an almost
irresistible influence over the six nations. This plan constituted one
of the various subjects of conference with the committee of congress
in Philadelphia, and received the entire approbation of that body.
The state governments also took a strong interest in the protection of
their western settlements. Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania,
applied, severally, to congress, urging the adoption of such vigorous
measures as would secure the frontiers against a repetition of the
horrors which had been already perpetrated. These papers were referred
to the committee which had been appointed to confer with General
Washington, in conformity with whose report it was resolved, "that the
Commander-in-chief be directed to take efficient measures for the
protection of the inhabitants, and chastisement of the savages."
The Six Nations had made some advances towards acquiring the comforts
of civilized life. Several comfortable houses were to be seen in their
populous villages; and their fertile fields and orchards yielded an
abundant supply of corn and fruit. Some few of their towns were
attached to the United States; but, in general, they were under the
influence of the British. Many of the loyalists had taken refuge among
them, and had added to their strength without diminishing their
ferocity. It was determined to lead a force into these villages,
sufficient to overpower any numbers they could possibly bring into the
field, and to destroy the settlements they had made. To guard against
reinforcements from Canada, means were used to inspire that colony
with fears for itself.
[Sidenote: Discontents in a part of the American army.]
As the army destined for this expedition was about to move, alarming
symptoms of discontent appeared in a part of it. The Jersey brigade,
which had been stationed during the winter at Elizabethtown, was
ordered early in May, to march by regiments. This order was answered
by a letter from General Maxwell, stating that the officers of the
first regiment had delivered a remonstrance to their Colonel,
addressed to the legislature of the state, declaring that, unless
their complaints on the subjects of pay and support should obtain the
immediate attention of that body, they were, at the expiration of
three days, to be considered as having resigned; and requesting the
legislature, in that event, to appoint other officers to succeed them.
They declared, however, their readiness to make every preparation for
obeying the orders which had been given, and to continue their
attention to the regiment until a reasonable time should elapse for
the appointment of their successors. "This," added the letter of
General Maxwell, "is a step they are extremely unwilling to take, but
it is such as I make no doubt they will all take; nothing but
necessity--their not being able to support themselves in time to come,
and being loaded with debts contracted in time past, could have
induced them to resign at so critical a juncture."
The intelligence conveyed in this letter made a serious impression on
the Commander-in-chief. He was strongly attached to the army and to
its interests; had witnessed its virtue and its sufferings; and
lamented sincerely its present distresses. The justice of the
complaints made by the officers could no more be denied, than the
measure they had adopted could be approved. Relying on their
patriotism and on his own influence, he immediately wrote a letter to
General Maxwell, to be laid before them, in which, mingling the
sensibility of a friend with the authority of a general, he addressed
to their understanding and to their love of country, observations
calculated to invite their whole attention to the consequences which
must result from the step they were about to take.
[Sidenote: Letter from General Washington on this subject.]
"The patience and perseverance of the army," proceeds the letter,
"have been, under every disadvantage, such as to do them the highest
honour both at home and abroad, and have inspired me with an unlimited
confidence of their virtue, which has consoled me amidst every
perplexity and reverse of fortune, to which our affairs, in a struggle
of this nature, were necessarily exposed. Now that we have made so
great a progress to the attainment of the end we have in view, so
that we can not fail without a most shameful desertion of our own
interests, any thing like a change of conduct would imply a very
unhappy change of principles, and a forgetfulness, as well of what we
owe to ourselves, as to our country. Did I suppose it possible this
could be the case, even in a single regiment of the army, I should be
mortified and chagrined beyond expression. I should feel it as a wound
given to my own honour, which I consider as embarked with that of the
army at large. But this I believe to be impossible. Any corps that was
about to set an example of the kind, would weigh well the
consequences; and no officer of common discernment and sensibility
would hazard them. If they should stand alone in it, independent of
other consequences, what would be their feelings on reflecting that
they had held themselves out to the world in a point of light inferior
to the rest of the army. Or if their example should be followed, and
become general, how could they console themselves for having been the
foremost in bringing ruin and disgrace upon their country. They would
remember that the army would share a double portion of the general
infamy and distress, and that the character of an American officer
would become as infamous as it is now glorious.
"I confess the appearances in the present instance are disagreeable,
but I am convinced they seem to mean more than they really do. The
Jersey officers have not been outdone by any others in the qualities
either of citizens or soldiers; and I am confident, no part of them
would seriously intend any thing that would be a stain on their former
reputation. The gentlemen can not be in earnest; they have only
reasoned wrong about the means of obtaining a good end, and, on
consideration, I hope and flatter myself they will renounce what must
appear to be improper. At the opening of a campaign, when under
marching orders for an important service, their own honour, duty to
the public and to themselves, and a regard to military propriety, will
not suffer them to persist in a measure which would be a violation of
them all. It will even wound their delicacy, coolly to reflect that
they have hazarded a step, which has an air of dictating terms to
their country, by taking advantage of the necessity of the moment.
"The declaration they have made to the state, at so critical a time,
that unless they obtain relief in the short period of three days, they
must be considered out of the service, has very much that aspect; and
the seeming relaxation of continuing until the state can have a
reasonable time to provide other officers, will be thought only a
superficial veil. I am now to request that you will convey my
sentiments to the gentlemen concerned, and endeavour to make them
sensible that they are in an error. The service for which the
regiment was intended will not admit of delay. It must at all events
march on Monday morning, in the first place to camp, and farther
directions will be given when it arrives. I am sure I shall not be
mistaken in expecting a prompt and cheerful obedience."
The representations of this letter did not completely produce the
desired effect. The officers did not recede from their claims. In an
address to the Commander-in-chief, they expressed their unhappiness
that any act of theirs should give him pain, but proceeded to justify
the step they had taken. Repeated memorials had been presented to
their legislature, which had been received with promises of attention,
but had been regularly neglected. "At length," said they, "we have
lost all confidence in our legislature. Reason and experience forbid
that we should have any. Few of us have private fortunes; many have
families who already are suffering every thing that can be received
from an ungrateful country. Are we then to suffer all the
inconveniences, fatigues, and dangers of a military life, while our
wives and our children are perishing for want of common necessaries at
home;--and that without the most distant prospect of reward, for our
pay is now only nominal? We are sensible that your excellency can not
wish nor desire this from us.
"We are sorry that you should imagine we meant to disobey orders. It
was and still is our determination to march with our regiment, and to
do the duty of officers until the legislature should have a reasonable
time to appoint others, but no longer.
"We beg leave to assure your Excellency, that we have the highest
sense of your ability and virtues;--that executing your orders has
ever given us pleasure;--that we love the service, and we love our
country;--but when that country gets so lost to virtue and justice as
to forget to support its servants, it then becomes their duty to
retire from its service."
This letter was peculiarly embarrassing. To adopt a stern course of
proceeding might hazard the loss of the Jersey line, an event not less
injurious to the service, than painful to himself. To take up the
subject without doing too much for the circumstances of the army,
would be doing too little for the occasion. He therefore declined
taking any other notice of the letter, than to declare through General
Maxwell that, while they continued to do their duty in conformity with
the determination they had expressed, he should only regret the part
they had taken, and should hope they would perceive its impropriety.
The legislature of New Jersey, alarmed at the decisive step taken by
the officers, was at length induced to pay some attention to their
situation; they consenting, on their part, to withdraw their
remonstrance. In the meantime, they continued to perform their duty;
and their march was not delayed by this unpleasant altercation.
In communicating this transaction to congress, General Washington took
occasion to remind that body of his having frequently urged the
absolute necessity of some general and adequate provision for the
officers of the army. "I shall only observe," continued the letter,
"that the distresses in some corps are so great, either where they
were not until lately attached to any particular state, or where the
state has been less provident, that the officers have solicited even
to be supplied with the clothing destined for the common soldiery,
coarse and unsuitable as it was. I had not power to comply with the
request.
"The patience of men animated by a sense of duty and honour, will
support them to a certain point, beyond which it will not go. I doubt
not congress will be sensible of the danger of an extreme in this
respect, and will pardon my anxiety to obviate it."
[Sidenote: Colonel Van Schaick surprises and destroys one of the
Indian settlements.]
Before the troops destined for the grand expedition were put in
motion, an enterprise of less extent was undertaken, which was
completely successful. A plan for surprising the towns of the
Onondagas, one of the nearest of the hostile tribes, having been
formed by General Schuyler, and approved by the Commander-in-chief,
Colonel Van Schaick, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Willet, and Major
Cochran, marched from fort Schuyler on the morning of the 19th of
April, at the head of between five and six hundred men; and, on the
third day, reached the point of destination. The whole settlement was
destroyed, after which the detachment returned to fort Schuyler
without the loss of a single man. For this handsome display of talents
as a partisan, the thanks of congress were voted to Colonel Van
Schaick, and the officers and soldiers under his command.
[Sidenote: Expedition against the Indians meditated.]
The cruelties exercised by the Indians in the course of the preceding
year, had given a great degree of importance to the expedition now
meditated against them; and the relative military strength and
situation of the two parties, rendered it improbable that any other
offensive operations could be carried on by the Americans in the
course of the present campaign. The army under the command of Sir
Henry Clinton, exclusive of the troops in the southern department, was
computed at between sixteen and seventeen thousand men. The American
army, the largest division of which lay at Middlebrook, under the
immediate command of General Washington, was rather inferior to that
of the British in real strength. The grand total, except those in the
southern and western country, including officers of every description,
amounted to about sixteen thousand. Three thousand of these were in
New England under the command of General Gates; and the remaining
thirteen thousand were cantoned on both sides the North River. The
bare statement of numbers, must show the incompetency of the American
army to the expulsion of the British from either New York or Rhode
Island. On their part, therefore, the plan of the campaign was,
necessarily, defensive; and the hazards and difficulties attending the
execution of even a defensive plan were considerable.
Independent of an extensive coast, at all places accessible to the
invading army, the Hudson, penetrating deep into the country which was
to be the theatre of action, gave great advantages in their military
operations to those who commanded the water.
After the destruction of forts Clinton and Montgomery in 1777, it had
been determined to construct the fortifications intended for the
future defence of the North River, at West Point, a position which,
being more completely embosomed in the hills, was deemed more
defensible. The works had been prosecuted with unremitting industry,
but were far from being completed.
Some miles below West Point, about the termination of the Highlands,
is King's Ferry, where the great road, affording the most convenient
communication between the middle and eastern states, crosses the North
River. The ferry is completely commanded by the two opposite points of
land. That on the west side, a rough and elevated piece of ground, is
denominated Stony Point; and the other, on the east side, a flat neck
of land projecting far into the water, is called Verplank's Point. The
command of King's Ferry was an object worth the attention of either
army; and Washington had comprehended the points which protect it
within his plan of defence for the Highlands. A small but strong work,
termed fort Fayette, was completed at Verplank's, and was garrisoned
by a company commanded by Captain Armstrong. The works on Stony Point
were unfinished. As the season for active operations approached, Sir
Henry Clinton formed a plan for opening the campaign with a brilliant
_coup de main_ up the North River; and, towards the latter end of May,
made preparations for the enterprise.
[Sidenote: May.]
These preparations were immediately communicated to General
Washington, who was confident that the British general meditated an
attack on the forts in the highlands, or designed to take a position
between those forts and Middlebrook, in order to interrupt the
communication between the different parts of the American army, to
prevent their reunion, and to beat them in detail. Measures were
instantly taken to counteract either of these designs. The
intelligence from New York was communicated to Generals Putnam and
M'Dougal, who were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to march;
and, on the 29th of May, the army moved by divisions from Middlebrook
towards the highlands. On the 30th, the British army, commanded by Sir
Henry Clinton in person, and convoyed by Sir George Collier, proceeded
up the river; and General Vaughan, at the head of the largest
division, landed next morning, about eight miles below Verplank's. The
other division, under the particular command of General Patterson, but
accompanied by Sir Henry Clinton, advancing farther up, landed on the
west side within three miles of Stony Point.
[Sidenote: June 1.]
[Sidenote: Fort Fayette surrendered to the British.]
That place being immediately abandoned, General Patterson took
possession of it on the same afternoon. He dragged some heavy cannon
and mortars to the summit of the hill in the course of the night; and,
at five next morning, opened a battery on fort Fayette, at the
distance of about one thousand yards. During the following night, two
galleys passed the fort, and, anchoring above it, prevented the escape
of the garrison by water; while General Vaughan invested it closely by
land. No means of defending the fort, or of saving themselves
remaining, the garrison became prisoners of war. Immediate directions
were given for completing the works at both posts, and for putting
Stony Point, in particular, in a strong state of defence.
It is scarcely supposable that the views of Sir Henry Clinton in
moving up the river, were limited to this single acquisition. The
means employed were so disproportioned to the object, as to justify a
belief that he contemplated farther and more important conquests.
Whatever may have been his plans, the measures of precaution taken by
Washington counteracted their execution; and before Clinton was in a
situation to proceed against West Point, General M'Dougal was so
strengthened, and the American army took such a position on the strong
grounds about the Hudson, that the enterprise became too hazardous to
be farther prosecuted.
[Sidenote: July.]
[Sidenote: Invasion of Connecticut.]
After completing the fortifications on both sides the river, at King's
Ferry, Sir Henry Clinton placed a strong garrison in each fort, and
proceeded down the river to Philipsburg. The relative situation of the
hostile armies presenting insuperable obstacles to any grand
operation, they could be employed offensively only on detached
expeditions. Connecticut from its contiguity to New York, and its
extent of sea coast, was peculiarly exposed to invasion. The numerous
small cruisers which plied in the Sound, to the great annoyance of
British commerce, and the large supplies of provisions drawn from the
adjacent country, for the use of the continental army, furnished great
inducements to Sir Henry Clinton to direct his enterprises
particularly against that state. He also hoped to draw General
Washington from his impregnable position on the North River into the
low country, and thus obtain an opportunity of striking at some part
of his army, or of seizing the posts, which were the great object of
the campaign. With these views, he planned an expedition against
Connecticut, the command of which was given to Governor Tryon, who
reached New Haven bay on the 5th of July, with about two thousand six
hundred men.
General Washington was at the time on the lines, examining in person
the condition of the works on Stony and Verplank's Points; in
consequence of which, the intelligence which was transmitted to head
quarters that the fleet had sailed, could not be immediately
communicated to the governor of Connecticut, and the first intimation
which that state received of its danger, was given by the appearance
of the enemy. The militia assembled in considerable numbers with
alacrity; but the British effected a landing, and took possession of
the town. After destroying the military and naval stores found in the
place, they re-embarked, and proceeded westward to Fairfield, which
was reduced to ashes. The good countenance shown by the militia at
this place is attested by the apology made by General Tryon for the
wanton destruction of private property, which disgraced his conduct.
"The village was burnt," he says, "to resent the fire of the rebels
from their houses, and to mask our retreat."
[Sidenote: July.]
From Fairfield the fleet crossed the Sound to Huntingdon bay, where it
remained until the eleventh, when it recrossed that water, after
which the troops were landed in the night on the low pasture, a
peninsula on the east side of the bay of Norwalk. About the same time,
a much larger detachment from the British army directed its course
towards Horse Neck, and made demonstrations of a design to penetrate
into the country in that direction.
[Sidenote: July.]
On the first intelligence that Connecticut was invaded, General
Parsons, a native of that state, had been directed by General
Washington to hasten to the scene of action. Placing himself at the
head of about one hundred and fifty continental troops, who were
supported by considerable bodies of militia, he attacked the British
in the morning of the twelfth, as soon as they were in motion, and
kept up an irregular distant fire throughout the day. But being too
weak to prevent the destruction of any particular town on the coast,
Norwalk was reduced to ashes; after which the British re-embarked, and
returned to Huntingdon bay, there to wait for reinforcements. At this
place, however, Tryon received orders to return to the White Stone;
where, in a conference between Sir Henry Clinton and Sir George
Collier, it was determined to proceed against New London with an
increased force.
On the invasion of Connecticut, the Commander-in-chief was prompt in
his exertions to send continental troops from the nearest encampments
to its aid; but, before they could afford any real service, Sir Henry
Clinton found it necessary to recall Tryon to the Hudson.
General Washington had planned an enterprise against the posts at
King's Ferry, comprehending a double attack, to be made at the same
time, on both. But the difficulty of a perfect co-operation of
detachments, incapable of communicating with each other, determined
him to postpone the attack on Verplank's, and to make that part of the
plan dependent on the success of the first. His whole attention
therefore was turned to Stony Point; and the troops destined for this
critical service, proceeded on it as against a single object.
[Sidenote: July.]
The execution of the plan was entrusted to General Wayne, who
commanded the light infantry of the army. Secrecy was deemed so much
more essential to success than numbers, that no addition was made to
the force already on the lines. One brigade was ordered to commence
its march, so as to reach the scene of action in time to cover the
troops engaged in the attack, should any unlooked-for disaster befall
them; and Major Lee of the light dragoons, who had been eminently
useful in obtaining the intelligence which led to the enterprise, was
associated with General Wayne, as far as cavalry could be employed in
such a service. The night of the fifteenth, and the hour of twelve,
were chosen for the assault.
Stony Point is a commanding hill, projecting far into the Hudson,
which washes three-fourths of its base. The remaining fourth is, in a
great measure, covered by a deep marsh, commencing near the river on
the upper side, and continuing into it below. Over this marsh there is
only one crossing place; but at its junction with the river, is a
sandy beach, passable at low tide. On the summit of this hill stood
the fort, which was furnished with heavy ordnance. Several
breast-works and strong batteries were advanced in front of the main
work; and, about half way down the hill, were two rows of abattis. The
batteries were calculated to command the beach and the crossing place
of the marsh, and to rake and enfilade any column which might be
advancing from either of those points towards the fort. In addition to
these defences, several vessels of war were stationed in the river,
and commanded the ground at the foot of the hill. The garrison
consisted of about six hundred men, commanded by Colonel Johnson.
General Wayne arrived about eight in the afternoon at Spring Steel's,
one and a half miles from the fort; and made his dispositions for the
assault.
[Sidenote: General Wayne surprises and takes Stony Point.]
It was intended to attack the works on the right and left flanks at
the same instant. The regiments of Febiger and of Meigs, with Major
Hull's detachment, formed the right column; and Butler's regiment,
with two companies under Major Murfree, formed the left. One hundred
and fifty volunteers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Fleury and Major
Posey, constituted the van of the right; and one hundred volunteers
under Major Stewart, composed the van of the left. At half past eleven
the two columns moved to the assault, the van of each with unloaded
muskets, and fixed bayonets. They were each preceded by a forlorn hope
of twenty men, the one commanded by Lieutenant Gibbon, and the other
by Lieutenant Knox. They reached the marsh undiscovered; and, at
twenty minutes after twelve, commenced the assault.
Both columns rushed forward under a tremendous fire. Surmounting every
obstacle, they entered the works at the point of the bayonet; and,
without discharging a single musket, obtained possession of the fort.
The humanity displayed by the conquerors was not less conspicuous, nor
less honourable than their courage. Not an individual suffered after
resistance had ceased.
All the troops engaged in this perilous service manifested a degree of
ardour and impetuosity, which proved them to be capable of the most
difficult enterprises; and all distinguished themselves, whose
situation enabled them to do so. Colonel Fleury was the first to enter
the fort and strike the British standard. Major Posey mounted the
works almost at the same instant, and was the first to give the watch
word--"The fort's our own."--Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox performed
the service allotted to them with a degree of intrepidity which could
not be surpassed. Of twenty men who constituted the party of the
former, seventeen were killed or wounded.
Sixty-three of the garrison were killed, including two officers. The
prisoners amounted to five hundred and forty-three, among whom were
one lieutenant colonel, four captains, and twenty subaltern officers.
The military stores taken in the fort were considerable.[18]
[Footnote 18: The author was in the covering party, visited the fort
next day, and conversed with the officers who had been engaged in
storming the works.]
The loss sustained by the assailants was not proportioned to the
apparent danger of the enterprise. The killed and wounded did not
exceed one hundred men; General Wayne, who marched with Febiger's
regiment in the right column, received a slight wound in the head
which stunned him for a time, but did not compel him to leave the
column. Being supported by his aids, he entered the fort with a
regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Hay was also among the wounded.
Although the design upon fort Fayette had yielded to the desire of
securing the success of the attack on Stony Point, it had not been
abandoned. Two brigades under General M'Dougal had been ordered to
approach the works on Verplank's, in which Colonel Webster commanded,
and be in readiness to attack them the instant General Wayne should
obtain possession of Stony Point. That this detachment might not
permit the favourable moment to pass unimproved, Wayne had been
requested to direct the messenger who should convey the intelligence
of his success to the Commander-in-chief, to pass through M'Dougal's
camp, and give him advice of that event. He was also requested to turn
the cannon of the fort against Verplank's, and the vessels in the
river. The last orders were executed, and a heavy cannonade was opened
on fort Fayette, and on the vessels, which compelled them to fall down
the river. Through some misconception, never explained, the messenger
despatched by General Wayne did not call on M'Dougal, but proceeded
directly to head quarters. Thus, every advantage expected from the
first impression made by the capture of Stony Point was lost; and the
garrison had full leisure to recover from the surprise occasioned by
that event, and to prepare for an attack. This change of circumstances
made it necessary to change the plan of operation. General Howe was
directed to take the command of M'Dougal's detachment, to which some
pieces of heavy artillery were to be annexed. He was ordered, after
effecting a breach in the walls, to make the dispositions for an
assault, and to demand a surrender; but not to attempt a storm until
it should be dark. To these orders, explicit instructions were
added not to hazard his party by remaining before Verplank's, after
the British should cross Croton River in force.
[Illustration: The Ruins of Stony Point--On the Hudson
_Here, on the night of July 16, 1779, Brigadier-General (Mad Anthony)
Wayne led his troops up the hill in darkness, surprised the British
garrison and captured this British stronghold at the point of the
bayonet. Not a shot was fired by the Americans, who lost fifteen
killed and eighty-three wounded; the British sixty-three killed and
533 prisoners. The fortifications were destroyed and the place, being
untenable, was abandoned shortly afterwards by the Americans._]
Through some unaccountable negligence in the persons charged with the
execution of these orders, the battering artillery was not accompanied
with suitable ammunition; and the necessary intrenching tools were not
brought. These omissions were supplied the next day; but it was then
too late to proceed against Verplank's.
On receiving intelligence of the loss of Stony Point, and of the
danger to which the garrison of fort Fayette was exposed, Sir Henry
Clinton relinquished his views on Connecticut, and made a forced march
to Dobbs' Ferry. Some troops were immediately embarked to pass up the
river, and a light corps was pushed forward to the Croton. This
movement relieved fort Fayette.
The failure of the attempt to obtain possession of Verplank's Point
leaving that road of communication still closed, diminished the
advantages which had been expected to result from the enterprise so
much, that it was deemed unadviseable to maintain Stony Point. On
reconnoitring the ground, General Washington believed that the place
could not be rendered secure with a garrison of less than fifteen
hundred men; a number which could not be spared from the army without
weakening it too much for farther operations. He determined therefore
to evacuate Stony Point, and retire to the Highlands. As soon as this
resolution was executed, Sir Henry Clinton repossessed himself of that
post, repaired the fortifications, and placed a stronger garrison in
it; after which he resumed his former situation at Philipsburg.
The two armies watched each other for some time. At length, Sir Henry
Clinton, finding himself unable to attack Washington in the strong
position he had taken, or to draw him from it, and being desirous of
transferring the theatre of active war to the south, withdrew into
York Island, and was understood to be strengthening the fortifications
erected for its defence, as preparatory to the large detachments he
intended making to reinforce the southern army.
Although this movement was made principally with a view to southern
operations, it was in some degree hastened by the opinion, that New
York required immediate additional protection during the absence of
the fleet, which was about to sail for the relief of Penobscot.
[Sidenote: Expedition against Penobscot.]
Early in June, Colonel M'Clean, with six hundred and fifty men, had
penetrated from Nova Scotia into the eastern parts of Maine, and taken
possession of a strong piece of ground on the Penobscot, which he had
begun to fortify.
[Sidenote: July 25.]
The state of Massachusetts, alarmed at an invasion which threatened a
serious diminution of territory, determined to dislodge him. A
respectable fleet, commanded by Commodore Saltonstal, and an army of
near four thousand men, under General Lovell, were prepared with so
much celerity, that the whole armament appeared in the Penobscot as
early as the 25th of July.
M'Clean had taken possession of a peninsula on the eastern side of
Penobscot, and had intrenched the isthmus connecting it with the
continent. The part towards the river was steep and difficult of
access; and was also defended by his frigates and batteries, the
principal of which was constructed about the centre of the peninsula.
After being repulsed in his first attempt, General Lovell effected a
landing on the western part of the peninsula, where he ascended a
precipice of two hundred feet; and, with the loss of only fifty men
killed and wounded, drove the party which defended it from the ground.
A battery was erected within seven hundred and fifty yards of the main
work of the besieged, and a warm cannonade was kept up for several
days on both sides.
Perceiving the difficulty of carrying the place with a militia
impatient to return to their homes, General Lovell represented his
situation to the government of Massachusetts, who applied to General
Gates, then commanding at Providence, for a reinforcement of four
hundred continental troops. This request was readily granted, and
Jackson's regiment was ordered to Penobscot. In the mean time an
ineffectual cannonade was continued, and preparations were made to
storm the works on the arrival of the expected reinforcements.
Such was the posture of affairs on the 13th of August, when Lovell
received information that Sir George Collier had entered the river
with a superior naval force. He re-embarked his whole army the
following night, and drew up his flotilla in a crescent across the
river, as if determined to maintain its position. This show of
resistance was made in the hope of stopping Sir George Collier until
the land forces on board the transports could be conveyed up the
river, and disembarked on the western shore. But the British general
was too confident in his strength to permit this stratagem to succeed;
and, as he approached, the Americans sought for safety in flight. A
general chase and unresisted destruction ensued. The ships of war were
blown up, and the transports fled in the utmost confusion up the
river. Being pursued by the British squadron, the troops landed in a
wild uncultivated country; and were obliged to explore their way,
without provisions, through a pathless wilderness, for more than a
hundred miles. Exhausted with famine and fatigue, they at length
gained the settled parts of the country, after having lost several men
who perished in the woods.
While Sir Henry Clinton continued encamped just above Haerlem, with
his upper posts at Kingsbridge, and the American army preserved its
station in the Highlands, a bold plan was formed for surprising a
British post at Powles Hook, which was executed with great address by
Major Lee.
This officer was employed on the west side of the river with
directions to observe the situation of the British in Stony Point,
but, principally, to watch the motions of their main army. While his
parties scoured the country, he obtained intelligence which suggested
the idea of surprising and carrying off the garrison at Powles Hook, a
point of land on the west side of the Hudson, immediately opposite the
town of New York, penetrating deep into the river. On the point
nearest New York, some works had been constructed, which were
garrisoned by four or five hundred men.
A deep ditch, into which the water of the river flowed, having over it
a drawbridge connected with a barred gate, had been cut across the
isthmus, so as to make the Hook, in reality, an island. This ditch
could be passed only at low water. Thirty paces within it was a row of
abattis running into the river; and some distance in front of it, is a
creek fordable only in two places.
This difficulty of access, added to the remoteness of the nearest
corps of the American army, impressed the garrison with the opinion
that they were perfectly secure; and this opinion produced an
unmilitary remissness in the commanding officer, which did not escape
the vigilance of Lee.
On receiving his communications, General Washington was inclined to
favour the enterprise they suggested; but withheld his full assent,
until he was satisfied that the assailants would be able to make good
their retreat.
The Hackensack, which communicates with the waters of the Hudson below
New York, runs almost parallel with that river quite to its source,
and is separated from it only a few miles. This neck is still farther
narrowed by a deep creek which divides it, and empties into the
Hackensack below fort Lee. West of that river runs the Passaick, which
unites with it near Newark, and forms another long and narrow neck of
land. From Powles Hook to the new bridge, the first place where the
Hackensack could be crossed without boats, the distance is fourteen
miles; and from the North River to the road leading from the one place
to the other, there are three points of interception, the nearest of
which is less than two miles, and the farthest not more than three.
The British were encamped in full force along the North River,
opposite to these points of interception. To diminish the danger of
the retreat, it was intended to occupy the roads leading through the
mountains of the Hudson to the Hackensack with a select body of
troops.
Every preparatory arrangement being made, the night of the eighteenth
of August was fixed on for the enterprise. A detachment from the
division of Lord Stirling, including three hundred men designed for
the expedition, was ordered down as a foraging party. As there was
nothing unusual in this movement, it excited no suspicion. Lord
Stirling followed with five hundred men, and encamped at the new
bridge.
[Sidenote: The British post at Powles Hook surprised by Major Lee and
the garrison made prisoners.]
Major Lee, at the head of three hundred men, took the road through the
mountains which ran parallel to the North River; and, having secured
all the passes into York Island, reached the creek which surrounds the
Hook between two and three in the morning. He passed first the creek,
and then the ditch undiscovered; and, about three in the morning,
entered the main work, and with the loss of only two killed and three
wounded, made one hundred and fifty-nine prisoners, including three
officers. Very few of the British were killed. Major Sutherland, who
commanded the garrison, threw himself with forty or fifty Hessians
into a strong redoubt, which it was thought unadviseable to attack,
because the time occupied in carrying it might endanger the retreat.
Wasting no time in destroying what could easily be replaced, Major Lee
hastened to bring off his prisoners and his detachment.
To avoid the danger of retreating up the narrow neck of land which has
already been described, some boats had been brought in the course of
the night to Dow's Ferry on the Hackensack, not far from Powles Hook.
The officer who guarded them was directed to remain until the arrival
of the troops engaged in the expedition, which, it was understood,
would happen before day. The light having made its appearance without
any intelligence from Major Lee, the officer having charge of the
boats conjectured that the attack had been postponed; and, to avoid
discovery, retired with them to Newark. The head of the retreating
column soon afterwards reached the ferry; and, fatigued as they were
by the toilsome march of the preceding night, were compelled to pass
as rapidly as possible up the narrow neck of land between the two
rivers to the new bridge. A horseman was despatched with this
information to Lord Stirling, and the line of march was resumed.
About nine in the preceding evening, Major Buskirk had been detached
up the North River with a considerable part of the garrison of Powles
Hook, and some other troops, for the purpose of falling in with the
American party supposed to be foraging about the English
neighbourhood.
On receiving intelligence of the disappointment respecting the boats,
Lord Stirling took the precaution to detach Colonel Ball with two
hundred fresh men to meet Lee, and cover his retreat. Just after Ball
had passed, Buskirk entered the main road, and fired on his rear.
Taking it for granted that this was only the advanced corps of a large
detachment sent to intercept the party retreating from Powles Hook,
Ball made a circuit to avoid the enemy; and Buskirk, finding a
detachment he had not expected, took the same measure to secure his
own retreat. The two parties, narrowly missing each other, returned to
their respective points of departure; and Lee reached the new bridge
without interruption.[19]
[Footnote 19: The author states these facts from his own observation,
and conversations with other officers of the detachment.]
This critical enterprise reflected much honour on the partisan with
whom it originated, and by whom it was conducted. General Washington
announced it to the army in his orders with much approbation; and
congress bestowed upon it a degree of applause more adapted to the
talent displayed in performing the service than to its magnitude.
[Sidenote: Arrival of Admiral Arbuthnot.]
A few days after the surprise of Powles Hook, the long expected fleet
from Europe, under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot, having on board a
reinforcement for the British army, arrived at New York. This
reinforcement however did not enable Sir Henry Clinton to enter
immediately on that active course of offensive operations which he
had meditated. It was soon followed by the Count D'Estaing, who
arrived on the southern coast of America with a powerful fleet; after
which the British general deemed it necessary to turn all his
attention to his own security. Rhode Island, and the posts up the
North River were evacuated, and the whole army was collected in New
York, the fortifications of which were carried on with unremitting
industry.
[Sidenote: St. Lucia taken by the British. St. Vincents and Grenada
by the French.]
The Count D'Estaing and Admiral Byron, having sailed about the same
time from the coast of North America, met in the West Indies, where
the war was carried on with various success. St. Lucia surrendered to
the British, in compensation for which the French took St. Vincents
and Grenada. About the time of the capture of the latter island,
D'Estaing received reinforcements which gave him a decided naval
superiority; after which a battle was fought between the two hostile
fleets, in which the Count claimed the victory, and in which so many
of the British ships were disabled that the Admiral was compelled to
retire into port in order to refit.
The earnest representations made on the part of the United States had
prevailed on the cabinet of Versailles to instruct the Count D'Estaing
to afford them all the aid in his power; and the present moment seemed
a fit one for carrying these orders into execution. Letters from
General Lincoln, from the executive of South Carolina, and from the
French consul at Charleston, urged him to pay a visit to the southern
states; and represented the situation of the British in Georgia to be
such that his appearance would insure the destruction of the army in
that quarter, and the recovery of the state.
[Sidenote: Count D'Estaing with his fleet arrives on the southern
coast of America.]
Yielding to these solicitations, the Count sailed with twenty-two
ships of the line, and eleven frigates, having on board six thousand
soldiers, and arrived so suddenly on the southern coast of America,
that the Experiment of fifty guns, and three frigates, fell into his
hands. A vessel was sent to Charleston with information of his
arrival, and a plan was concerted for the siege of Savannah. D'Estaing
was to land three thousand men at Beaulieu on the 11th of September,
and Lincoln was to cross the Savannah on the same day with one
thousand Americans, and effect a junction with him.
The town of Savannah was, at that time, the head quarters of General
Prevost. Apprehending no immediate danger, he had weakened the
garrison by establishing several out-posts in Georgia; and by leaving
Colonel Maitland with a strong detachment in the island of Port Royal,
in South Carolina.
On the appearance of the French fleet, expresses were despatched to
Colonel Maitland and to all the out-posts, directing the troops to
repair without loss of time to Savannah. These orders were promptly
obeyed; and, on the 10th of September, the several detachments in
Georgia had all arrived in safety, except the sick and convalescents
of the garrison of Sunbury, who were intercepted.
[Sidenote: September.]
[Sidenote: Siege of Savannah by the combined armies.]
On the 11th, General Lincoln reached Zubly's Ferry, and, on the 15th,
was assured that the French had disembarked in force. A junction of
the two armies was formed the next day before the town of Savannah.
On the night of the 12th, the Count D'Estaing had landed about three
thousand men at Beaulieu; and the next day, before the arrival of
General Lincoln, had summoned the garrison to surrender to the arms of
the King of France. Being desirous of gaining time, General Prevost
answered the summons in such a manner as to encourage the opinion that
he designed to capitulate; in the expectation of which a suspension of
hostilities for twenty-four hours was granted. In that important
interval, Colonel Maitland arrived from Beaufort, with the troops
which had been stationed at that place.
As the French were in possession of the main channel by which the
Savannah communicates with the sea, Colonel Maitland entered the town
by a route which had been deemed impracticable. He came round by
Dawfuskie, an island north of the mouth of the river, and landing in a
deep marsh, drew his boats through it into the Savannah, above the
place where the ships lay at anchor, and thence made his way by small
parties into the town.
On receiving this reinforcement, the resolution was taken to defend
the place to the last extremity; and, the next day, this determination
was communicated to the Count D'Estaing.
[Sidenote: September.]
After bringing up the heavy ordnance and stores from the fleet, the
besieging army broke ground; and, by the first of October, had pushed
their sap within three hundred yards of the abattis on the left of the
British lines. Several batteries were opened on the besieged which
played almost incessantly upon their works, but made no impression on
them.
The situation of D'Estaing was becoming critical. More time had
already been consumed on the coast of Georgia than he had supposed
would be necessary for the destruction of the British force in that
state. He became uneasy for the possessions of France in the West
Indies, and apprehensive for the safety of the ships under his
command. The naval officers remonstrated strenuously against longer
exposing his fleet on an insecure coast, at a tempestuous season of
the year, and urged the danger of being overtaken by a British
squadron, when broken and scattered by a storm, with a degree of
persevering earnestness which the Count found himself incapable of
resisting.
In a few days the lines of the besiegers might have been carried by
regular approaches, into the works of the besieged, which would have
rendered the capture of the town and garrison inevitable. But
D'Estaing declared that he could devote no more time to this object;
and it only remained to raise the siege, or to attempt the works by
storm. The latter part of the alternative was adopted.
On the left of the allied army, was a swampy hollow way which afforded
a cover for troops advancing on the right flank of the besieged, to a
point within fifty yards of their principal work. It was determined to
march to the main attack along this hollow; and, at the same time, to
direct feints against other parts of the lines.
[Sidenote: Unsuccessful attempt to storm it.]
On the morning of the 9th of October, before day, a heavy cannonade
and bombardment were commenced from all the batteries, as preliminary
to the assault. About three thousand five hundred French, and one
thousand Americans, of whom between six and seven hundred were
regulars, and the residue militia of Charleston, advanced in three
columns, led by D'Estaing and Lincoln, aided by the principal officers
of both nations, and made a furious assault on the British lines.
Their reception was warmer than had been expected. The fire from the
batteries of the besieged reached every part of the columns of the
assailants which had emerged from the swamp, and did great execution.
Yet the allied troops advanced with unabated ardour, passed through
the abattis, crossed the ditch, and mounted the parapet. Both the
French and Americans planted their standards on the walls, and were
killed in great numbers, while endeavouring to force their way into
the works. For about fifty minutes, the contest was extremely
obstinate. At length, the columns of the assailants began to relax,
and a pause was manifested in the assault.
In this critical moment, Major Glaziers, at the head of a body of
grenadiers and marines, rushing suddenly from the lines, threw himself
on those who had made their way into the redoubts, and drove them over
the ditch and abattis into the hollow which they had marched to the
attack. It became apparent that farther perseverance could produce no
advantage, and a retreat was ordered.
In this unsuccessful attempt, the French lost in killed and wounded,
about seven hundred men. Among the latter, were the Count D'Estaing
himself, Major General De Fontanges, and several other officers of
distinction. The continental troops lost two hundred and thirty-four
men, and the Charleston militia, who, though associated with them in
danger, were more fortunate, had one captain killed, and six privates
wounded.
The loss of the garrison was astonishingly small. In killed and
wounded, it amounted only to fifty-five. So great was the advantage
of the cover afforded by their works.
[Sidenote: The siege raised.]
[Sidenote: October 18.]
After this repulse, the Count D'Estaing announced to General Lincoln,
his determination to raise the siege. The remonstrances of that
officer were ineffectual; and the removal of the heavy ordnance and
stores was commenced. This being accomplished, both armies moved from
their ground on the evening of the 18th of October. The Americans,
recrossing the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry, again encamped in South
Carolina, and the French re-embarked.
Although the issue of this enterprise was the source of severe chagrin
and mortification, the prudence of General Lincoln suppressed every
appearance of dissatisfaction, and the armies separated with
manifestations of reciprocal esteem.
The hopes which had brought the militia into the field being
disappointed, they dispersed; and the affairs of the southern states
wore a more gloomy aspect than at any former period.
On receiving intelligence of the situation of Lincoln, congress passed
a resolution requesting General Washington to order the North Carolina
troops, and such others as could be spared from the northern army, to
the aid of that in the south; and assuring the states of South
Carolina and Georgia of the attention of government to their
preservation; but requesting them, for their own defence, to comply
with the recommendations formerly made respecting the completion of
their continental regiments, and the government of their militia while
in actual service.
During these transactions in the south, the long meditated expedition
against the Indians was prosecuted with success.
The largest division of the western army was to assemble at Wyoming,
on the main branch of the Susquehanna, and General Sullivan expected
to leave that place in the month of June. Such, however, were the
delays in procuring provisions and military stores, that it was the
last of July[20] before he could move from the place of rendezvous.
[Footnote 20: While Sullivan was preparing to invade their country,
the savages were not inactive. At the head of a small party of whites
and Indians, Joseph Brandt fell upon the frontiers of New York,
murdered several of the inhabitants, carried others into captivity,
and burnt several houses. He was pursued by about one hundred and
fifty militia, whom he drew into an ambuscade, and entirely defeated.
A few days afterwards, Captain M'Donald, at the head of a small party,
of whom a third were British, took a fort on the west branch of the
Susquehanna, and made the garrison, amounting to thirty men, prisoners
of war. The women and children, contrary to the usage of Indians, were
permitted to retire into the settled country.--_Gordon._]
[Sidenote: August.]
Another body of troops, designed to compose a part of the western
army, had passed the winter on the Mohawk. On the 22d of August, these
two divisions united, and the whole army, amounting to five thousand
men, marched up the Tyoga, which led into the heart of the Indian
country.
Such extensive and tedious preparations could not be made unobserved.
The plan of operations contemplated by Sullivan seems to have been
completely understood; and, notwithstanding the vast superiority of
his force, the Indians determined to defend their country. They
resolved to risk a general action for its preservation, and selected
the ground for the conflict with judgment.
About a mile in front of Newtown, they collected their whole force,
estimated by General Sullivan at fifteen hundred men, but by
themselves at only eight hundred, commanded by the two Butlers, Grey,
Johnson, M'Donald, and Brandt. Five companies of whites, calculated at
two hundred men, were united with them. They had constructed a
breast-work about half a mile in length, on a piece of rising ground.
The right flank of this work was covered by the river, which, bending
to the right, and winding round their rear, exposed only their front
and left to an attack. On the left, was a high ridge nearly parallel
to the general course of the river, terminating somewhat below the
breast-work; and still farther to the left, was another ridge running
in the same direction, and leading to the rear of the American army.
The ground was covered with pine interspersed with low shrub-oaks,
many of which, for the purpose of concealing their works, had been cut
up and stuck in front of them, so as to exhibit the appearance of
being still growing. The road, after crossing a deep brook at the foot
of the hill, turned to the right, and ran nearly parallel to the
breast-work, so as to expose the whole flank of the army to their
fire, if it should advance without discovering their position.
Parties communicating with each other were stationed on both hills, so
as to fall on the right flank and rear of Sullivan, as soon as the
action should commence.
[Sidenote: August.]
About eleven in the morning of the 29th of August, this work was
discovered by Major Par, who commanded the advance guard of the army;
upon which, General Hand formed the light infantry in a wood, about
four hundred yards distant from the enemy, and stood upon his ground
until the main body should arrive. In the mean time, a continual
skirmishing was kept up between Par's rifle corps, and small parties
of Indians who sallied from their works, and suddenly retreated,
apparently with the hope of being incautiously pursued.
Conjecturing that the hills on his right were occupied by the savages,
Sullivan ordered General Poor to take possession of that which led
into his rear, and, thence, to turn the left, and gain the rear, of
the breast-work; while Hand, aided by the artillery, should attack in
front. These orders were promptly executed. While the artillery played
on the works, Poor pushed up the mountain, and a sharp conflict
commenced, which was sustained for some time, with considerable spirit
on both sides. Poor continued to advance rapidly, pressing the
Indians before him at the point of the bayonet, and occasionally
firing on them. They retreated from tree to tree, keeping up an
irregular fire, until he gained the summit of the hill. Perceiving
that their flank was completely uncovered by this movement, and that
they were in danger of being surrounded, the savages abandoned their
breast-work, and, crossing the river, fled with the utmost
precipitation.
[Sidenote: Victory of General Sullivan at Newtown.]
This victory cost the Americans about thirty men. The ascertained loss
of the Indians was also inconsiderable. But they were so intimidated,
that every idea of farther resistance was abandoned. As Sullivan
advanced, they continued to retreat before him without harassing his
main body, or even skirmishing with his detachments, except in a
single instance.
He penetrated far into the heart of their country, which his parties
scoured, and laid waste in every direction. Houses, corn-fields,
gardens, and fruit trees, shared one common fate; and Sullivan
executed strictly the severe but necessary orders he had received, to
render the country completely uninhabitable for the present, and thus
to compel the hostile Indians, by want of food, to remove to a greater
distance.
The objects of the expedition being accomplished, Sullivan returned to
Easton in Pennsylvania, having lost only forty men by sickness and
the enemy.
The devastation of the country has been spoken of with some degree of
disapprobation; but this sentiment is the result rather of an amiable
disposition in the human mind to condemn whatever may have the
appearance of tending to aggravate the miseries of war, than of
reflection. Circumstances existed which reconciled to humanity this
seeming departure from it. Great Britain possessed advantages which
ensured a controlling influence over the Indians, and kept them in
almost continual war with the United States. Their habitual ferocity
seemed to have derived increased virulence from the malignity of the
whites who had taken refuge among them; and there was real foundation
for the opinion that an annual repetition of the horrors of Wyoming
could be prevented only by disabling the savages from perpetrating
them. No means in the power of the United States promised so certainly
to effect this desirable object, as the removal of neighbours whose
hostility could be diminished only by terror, and whose resentments
were to be assuaged only by fear.
While Sullivan laid waste the country on the Susquehanna, another
expedition under Colonel Brodhead, was carried on from Pittsburg up
the Alleghany, against the Mingo, Munscy, and Seneca tribes. At the
head of between six and seven hundred men, he advanced two hundred
miles up the river, and destroyed the villages and corn-fields on its
head branches. Here too the Indians were unable to resist the invading
army.
After one unsuccessful skirmish, they abandoned their villages to a
destruction which was inevitable, and sought for personal safety in
their woods.
On receiving the communications of General Sullivan, congress passed a
vote approving his conduct, and that of his army. That approbation,
however, seems not to have extended beyond his conduct in the Indian
country. His demands for military stores for the expedition had been
so high; in his conversations with his officers, he had so freely
censured the government for its failure to comply with those demands;
in general orders, he had so openly complained of inattention to the
preparations necessary to secure the success of the enterprise; that
considerable offence was given to several members of congress, and
still more to the board of war. From the operation of these causes,
when Sullivan, at the close of the campaign, complained of ill health,
and offered, on that account, to resign his commission, the endeavours
of his friends to obtain a vote requesting him to continue in the
service, and permitting him to retire from actual duty until his
health should be restored, were overruled; and his resignation was
accepted. The resolution permitting him to resign was, however,
accompanied with one thanking him for his past services.
Although these great exertions to terminate Indian hostility did not
afford complete security to the western frontiers, they were attended
with considerable advantages. The savages, though not subdued, were
intimidated; and their incursions became less formidable, as well as
less frequent.
The summer of 1779 passed away without furnishing any circumstance in
America which could be supposed to have a material influence on the
issue of the war. In Europe, however, an event took place which had
been long anxiously expected, and was believed to be of decisive
importance. Spain at length determined to make one common cause with
France against Great Britain. It was supposed that the two powers
would be able to obtain a complete ascendency at sea; and that their
combined fleets would maintain a superiority on the American coast, as
well as in Europe.
From the first determination of France to take part in the war, it
appears to have been the earnest wish of the cabinet of Versailles to
engage Spain likewise in the contest.
Her resentments against England, her solicitude to diminish the naval
strength of that nation, and her wish to recover Jamaica, Gibraltar,
and the Floridas, urged her to seize the fair occasion now offered of
dismembering the British empire, and accomplishing these favourite
objects. But her dread of the effect which the independence of the
United States might produce on her own colonies, mingled with some
apprehensions of danger from the contest she was about to provoke, had
produced an appearance of irresolution, which rendered her future
course, for a time, uncertain. In this conflict of opposite interests,
the influence of the cabinet of Versailles, and the jealousy of the
naval power of Britain, at length obtained the victory; and his
Catholic Majesty determined to prevent the reannexation of the United
States to their mother country; but to effect this object by
negotiation rather than by the sword.
[Sidenote: Spain offers her mediation to the belligerent powers.]
In pursuance of this pacific system, he offered his mediation to the
belligerent powers. This proposition was readily accepted by France;
but the minister of his Britannic Majesty evaded any explicit
arrangements on the subject, while he continued to make general verbal
declarations of the willingness of his sovereign to give peace to
Europe under the mediation of his Catholic Majesty. In consequence of
these declarations, the Spanish minister proposed a truce for a term
of years, and that a congress of deputies from the belligerent powers
should assemble at Madrid to adjust the terms of a permanent treaty;
into which deputies from the United States were to be admitted, as
the representatives of a sovereign nation. Although an explicit
acknowledgment of their independence was not to be required, it was to
be understood that they should be independent in fact, and should be
completely separated from the British empire.
This negotiation was protracted to a considerable length; and in the
mean time, all the address of the cabinet of London was used to detach
either France or the United States from their alliance with each
other. Notice of it was given to the American government by the
minister of France at Philadelphia, as well as by Mr. Arthur Lee, one
of their agents in Europe; and congress was repeatedly urged by the
former, to furnish those who might be authorized to represent them in
the conferences for a general treaty, with ample powers and
instructions to conclude it. An extraordinary degree of solicitude was
manifested to hasten the full powers, and to moderate the claims of
the United States.
It seems to have been the policy of the cabinet of Versailles to
exclude the American States from a share of the fisheries, and to
limit their western boundary to the settlements then made. Either from
a real apprehension that the war might be protracted should the United
States insist on the acknowledgment of their independence as a
preliminary to any treaty, or from an opinion that such preliminary
acknowledgment would leave the terms of the treaty less under the
control of France, and the American plenipotentiaries more masters of
their own conduct, Monsieur Girard laboured to persuade congress to
recede from that demand. If they could be independent in fact, he
thought the form not worth contending for.[21]
[Footnote 21: The author has seen notes taken by a member of congress,
of communications made by Mr. Girard, when admitted to an audience,
which avow these sentiments. The secret journals of congress sustain
this statement.]
While congress was employed in debating the instructions to their
ministers, the negotiation was brought to a close. As Spain became
prepared for hostilities, the offered mediation was pressed in such
terms as to produce the necessity of either accepting or rejecting it.
This drew from the cabinet of London a declaration that the
independence of the United States was inadmissible; upon which his
Catholic Majesty determined to take part in the war.
[Sidenote: War between Spain and England.]
On the departure of his minister from London without taking leave, the
British government issued letters of marque and reprisal against the
vessels and subjects of the Spanish crown; and a powerful Spanish
fleet, which had been preparing during the negotiation, was expedited,
to co-operate with that of France. Yet the independence of the United
States was not acknowledged, nor was their minister accredited.
Despatches, giving notice of the hostilities meditated by his
Catholic Majesty, were forwarded to Don Galvez, the governor of
Louisiana, who collected a considerable military force at New Orleans,
and reduced the settlements held by the British crown on the
Mississippi, which had not been apprised of the war.
Intelligence of this important event was given to congress while that
body was deliberating on the instructions to their negotiators. It is
not impossible that this information had some influence on those
deliberations; and, rendering the American government less solicitous
about the future conduct of Spain, diminished the motives for making
territorial sacrifices to that power. Their ministers were ordered to
make it a preliminary article to any negotiation, that Great Britain
should agree to treat with the United States, as sovereign, free, and
independent; and that their independence should be expressly assured
and confirmed by the terms of the treaty itself.
That the United States might be enabled to avail themselves without
further delays, of any occasion which might be presented for
terminating the war, Mr. John Adams, who was already in Europe, was
authorized to negotiate a treaty of peace, and a commercial treaty
with Great Britain; and Mr. Jay, at that time president of congress,
was appointed minister plenipotentiary to the court of Madrid, with
instructions to insist on the free navigation of the Mississippi;--a
claim to which Spain objected, and which was discountenanced by
France.
As the campaign drew to a close without affording any solid foundation
for the hope that the war was about to terminate, General Washington
repeated those efforts which he had made so often and so
unsuccessfully, to induce early preparations for the ensuing year. He
submitted to the view of his government a detailed report of the whole
army, which exhibited the alarming fact, that by the last of the
following June, the terms of service of nearly one-half the men under
his command would expire.
It was not the least considerable of the inconveniences attending the
complex system of government then prevailing in the United States,
that measures essential to the safety of the nation were never taken
in season. Thus, when the time for raising the quotas of the
respective states by voluntary enlistment had passed away, and the
necessity of resorting to coercive means had become absolute, those
means were so delayed, and so irregularly put in execution, that the
terms of service of different portions of the army expired almost
every month in the year; and raw troops, ignorant of the first
rudiments of military duty, were introduced in the most critical
moments of a campaign. Had timely and correspondent measures been
taken by the states to raise their respective quotas by a specified
time in the depth of winter, the recruits would have received the
advantage of a few months training before they were brought into
actual service, and the General, that of a certain uninterrupted force
for each campaign. This course of proceeding had been continually
recommended, and the recommendation had been as continually neglected.
[Sidenote: Letter from General Washington to Congress.]
"In the more early stages of the contest," said the Commander-in-chief
to congress, in a letter of the 8th of November, "when men might have
been enlisted for the war, no man, as my whole conduct, and the
uniform tenor of my letters will evince, was ever more opposed to
short enlistments than I was; and while there remained a prospect of
obtaining recruits on a permanent footing in the first instance, as
far as duty and a regard to my station would permit, I urged my
sentiments in favour of it. But the prospect of keeping up an army by
voluntary enlistments being changed, or at least standing on too
precarious and uncertain a footing to depend on for the exigency of
our affairs, I took the liberty in February, 1778, in a particular
manner, to lay before the committee of arrangement then with the army
at Valley Forge, a plan for an annual draught, as the surest and most
certain, if not the only means left us, of maintaining the army on a
proper and respectable ground. And, more and more confirmed in the
propriety of this opinion by the intervention of a variety of
circumstances, unnecessary to detail, I again took the freedom of
urging the plan to the committee of conference in January last; and,
having reviewed it in every point of light, and found it right, at
least the best that has occurred to me, I hope I shall be excused by
congress in offering it to them, and in time for carrying into
execution for the next year; if they should conceive it necessary for
the states to complete their quotas of troops.
"The plan I would propose is, that each state be informed by congress
annually of the _real deficiency_ of its troops, and called upon to
make it up, or such less specific number as congress may think proper,
by a draught. That the men draughted join the army by the first of
January, and serve until the first of January in the succeeding year.
That from the time the draughts join the army, the officers of the
states from which they come, be authorized and directed to use their
endeavours to enlist them for the war, under the bounties granted to
the officers themselves, and to the recruits, by the act of the 23d of
January, 1779, viz: ten dollars to the officer for each recruit, and
two hundred to the recruits themselves. That all state, county, and
town bounties to draughts, if practicable, be entirely abolished, on
account of the uneasiness and disorders they create among the
soldiery, the desertions they produce, and for other reasons which
will readily occur. That on or before the first of October annually,
an abstract, or return, similar to the present one, be transmitted to
congress, to enable them to make their requisitions to each state with
certainty and precision. This I would propose as a general plan to be
pursued; and I am persuaded that this, or one nearly similar to it,
will be found the best now in our power, as it will be attended with
the least expense to the public, will place the service on the footing
of order and certainty, and will be the only one that can advance the
general interest to any great extent."
These representations on the part of the Commander-in-chief were not
more successful than those which had before been made. Although the
best dispositions existed in congress, the proceedings of that body
were unavoidably slow; and the difficulty of effecting a concert of
measures among thirteen sovereign states, was too great to be
surmounted. In consequence of these radical defects in the system
itself, the contributions of men made by the states continued to be
irregular, uncertain, and out of season; and the army could never
acquire that consistency and stability, which would have resulted from
an exact observance of the plan so often recommended.
On receiving information of the disaster which had been sustained by
the allied arms at Savannah, Sir Henry Clinton resumed his plan of
active operations against the southern states. A large embarkation
took place soon after that event had been announced to him, which
sailed from the Hook towards the end of December. The troops were
commanded by himself in person, and the fleet by Admiral Arbuthnot.
The defence of New York and its dependencies were entrusted to General
Knyphausen.
The preparations made in New York for some distant enterprise were
immediately communicated by his faithful intelligencers to General
Washington, who conjectured its object, and hastened the march of the
troops designed to reinforce General Lincoln.
The season for action in a northern climate being over, the General
turned his attention to the distribution of his troops in winter
quarters. Habit had familiarized the American army to the use of huts
constructed by themselves; and both officers and men were content to
pass the winter in a hutted camp. In disposing of the troops,
therefore, until the time for action should return, wood and water, a
healthy situation, convenience for supplies of provisions, stations
which would enable them to cover the country, and to defend particular
positions, were the objects taken into consideration, and were all to
be consulted.
[Sidenote: The American army goes into winter quarters.]
With a view to these various circumstances, the army was thrown into
two great divisions. The northern was to be commanded by General
Heath; and its chief object was the security of West Point, and of the
posts on the North River, as low as King's Ferry. Subordinate to
this, was the protection of the country on the Sound, and down the
Hudson to the neighbourhood of Kingsbridge. The other and principal
division, under the immediate command of General Washington, was put
under cover, late in December, in the neighbourhood of Morristown.