Arrival of the British commissioners.... Terms of
conciliation proposed.... Answer of congress to their
propositions.... Attempts of Mr. Johnson to bribe some
members of congress.... His private letters ordered to be
published.... Manifesto of the commissioners, and
counter-manifesto of congress.... Arrival of Monsieur
Girard, minister plenipotentiary of France.... Hostilities
of the Indians.... Irruption into the Wyoming settlement....
Battle of Wyoming.... Colonel Dennison capitulates for the
inhabitants.... Distress of the settlement.... Colonel
Clarke surprises St. Vincent.... Congress determines to
invade Canada.... General Washington opposes the measure....
Induces congress to abandon it.
[Sidenote: 1778]
About the time that Commodore Parker sailed for the southern
states, the commissioners appointed to give effect to the late
conciliatory acts of Parliament, embarked for Europe. They had exerted
their utmost powers to effect the object of their mission, but without
success. Great Britain required that the force of the two nations
should be united under one common sovereign; and America was no longer
disposed, or even at liberty to accede to this condition. All those
affections, which parts of the same empire should feel for each other,
had been eradicated by a distressing war; the great body of the people
were determined, at every sacrifice, to maintain their independence;
and the treaty with France had pledged the honour and the faith of
the nation, never to consent to a reunion with the British empire.
[Sidenote: Arrival of the British commissioners.]
[Sidenote: Terms of conciliation proposed.]
The commissioners arrived in Philadelphia while that place was yet in
possession of their army, and are understood to have brought positive
orders for its evacuation. Their arrival was immediately announced to
General Washington by Sir Henry Clinton, who was joined with them in
the commission, and a passport was requested for their secretary,
Doctor Ferguson, as the bearer of their first despatches to congress.
The Commander-in-chief declined granting this passport until he should
receive the instructions of his government; on which a letter
addressed "To the president and other the members of congress," was
forwarded in the usual manner. Copies of their commission, and of the
acts of Parliament on which it was founded, together with propositions
conforming to those acts, drawn in the most conciliatory language,
were transmitted with this letter.
[Sidenote: Answer of Congress to these propositions.]
Some observations having been introduced into it reflecting on the
conduct of France,[10] the reading was interrupted, and a motion made
to proceed no farther in consequence of this offensive language to his
most Christian Majesty. This motion producing some debate, an
adjournment was moved and carried. When congress reassembled, the
warmth of the preceding day had not entirely subsided; but, after
several ineffectual motions to prevent it, the letter was read and
committed. The answer which was reported by the committee, and
transmitted to the commissioners, declared that "nothing but an
earnest desire to spare the farther effusion of human blood, could
have induced them to read a paper containing expressions so
disrespectful to his most Christian Majesty, the good and great ally
of these states, or to consider propositions so derogatory to the
honour of an independent nation.
[Footnote 10: The offensive words were "insidious interposition of a
power which has, from the first settlement of the colonies, been
actuated with enmity to us both; and notwithstanding the pretended
date or present form of the French offers."]
"That the acts of the British Parliament, the commission from their
sovereign, and their letter, supposed the people of the United States
to be subjects of the crown of Great Britain, and were founded on the
idea of dependence, which is totally inadmissible.
"That congress was inclined to peace, notwithstanding the unjust
claims from which this was originated, and the savage manner in which
it was conducted. They would therefore be ready to enter upon the
consideration of a treaty of peace and commerce, not inconsistent with
treaties already subsisting, when the King of Great Britain should
demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose. The only solid
proof of this disposition would be an explicit acknowledgment of the
independence of these states, or the withdrawing his fleets and
armies."
[Sidenote: July 13.]
On the 13th of July, after arriving at New York, the commissioners
addressed a second letter to congress, expressing their regrets that
any difficulties were raised which must prolong the calamities of war;
and reviewing the letter of congress in terms well calculated to make
an impression on those who had become weary of the contest, and to
revive ancient prejudices in favour of England and against France.
This letter being read, congress resolved that, as neither the
independence of the United States was explicitly acknowledged, nor the
fleets and armies withdrawn, no answer should be given to it.
It would seem that the first letter of congress must have convinced
the British commissioners that no hope could be indulged of restoring
peace on any other terms than the independence of the United States.
Congress must have been equally certain that the commissioners were
not empowered to acknowledge that independence, or to direct the
fleets and armies of Great Britain to be withdrawn. The intercourse
between them therefore, after the first communications were exchanged,
and all subsequent measures, became a game of skill, in which the
parties played for the affections and passions of the people; and was
no longer a diplomatic correspondence, discussing the interests of two
great nations with the hope of accommodation.
[Sidenote: Attempts of Mr. Johnson to bribe influential members of
congress.]
The first packet addressed by the commissioners to congress, contained
several private letters, written by Governor Johnson to members of
that body, in which he blended, with flattering expressions of respect
for their characters and their conduct, assurances of the honours and
emoluments to which those would be entitled who should contribute to
restore peace and harmony to the two countries and to terminate the
present war.
[Sidenote: Congress orders the publication of the private letters
from Johnson to the members of that body.]
A few days before the receipt of the letter of the 13th of July,
congress passed a resolution requiring that all letters of a public
nature received by any member from any subject of the British crown,
should be laid before them. In compliance with this resolution, the
letters of Governor Johnson were produced; and, some time afterwards,
Mr. Read stated, in his place, a direct offer which had been made him
by a third person, of a considerable sum of money, and of any office
in the gift of the crown, as an inducement to use his influence for
the restoration of harmony between the two countries. Congress
determined to communicate these circumstances to the American people,
and made a solemn declaration, in which, after reciting the offensive
paragraphs of the private letters, and the conversation stated by Mr.
Read, they expressed their opinion "that these were direct attempts to
corrupt and bribe the congress of the United States, and that it was
incompatible with their honour to hold any manner of correspondence
or intercourse with the said George Johnson, Esquire, especially to
negotiate with him upon affairs in which the cause of liberty is
interested." After an unsuccessful attempt to involve the other
commissioners in the same exclusion, this declaration was transmitted
to them while they were expecting an answer to a remonstrance on the
detention of the army of General Burgoyne.
On receiving it, Mr. Johnson withdrew from the commission, declaring
that he should be happy to find congress inclined to retract their
former declaration, and to negotiate with others on terms equally
conducive to the happiness of both countries. This declaration was
accompanied by one signed by the other commissioners, in which,
without admitting the construction put by congress on his letters, or
the authority of the person who held the conversation with Mr. Read,
they denied all knowledge of those letters or of that conversation.
They at the same time detailed the advantages to be derived by America
from the propositions they had made, "advantages," they added,
"decidedly superior to any which could be expected from an unnatural
alliance with France, only entered into by that nation for the purpose
of prolonging the war, after the full knowledge on their part of the
liberal terms intended to be offered by Great Britain." With this
declaration was transmitted a copy of the former remonstrance[11]
against the detention of the convention troops, without the signature
of Governor Johnson, and an extract from the instructions given by the
Secretary of State to Sir Henry Clinton, authorizing him to demand, in
express terms, a performance of the convention made with General
Burgoyne, and, if required, to renew and ratify all its conditions in
the name of the king.
[Footnote 11: Some expressions having been used in the letter,
respecting the convention troops, which were deemed disrespectful, no
other reply was made to it than that "congress gave no answer to
insolent letters."]
All the publications of the British commissioners indicate an opinion
that they could be more successful with the people than with congress;
and, not unfrequently betray the desire that the constituents of that
body might be enabled to decide on the measures taken by their
representatives.
On the part of congress, it was decreed of the utmost importance to
keep the public mind correct, and to defeat all attempts to make
unfavourable impressions on it. Several members of that body entered
the lists as disputants, and employed their pens with ability and
success, as well in serious argument, as in rousing the various
passions which influence the conduct of men. The attempt to accomplish
the object of the mission by corruption was wielded with great effect;
and it was urged with equal force that should the United States now
break their faith with France, and treat on the footing of dependence,
they would sacrifice all credit with foreign nations, would be
considered by all as faithless and infamous, and would forfeit all
pretensions to future aid from abroad; after which the terms now
offered might be retracted, and the war be recommenced. To these
representations were added the certainty of independence, and the
great advantages which must result from its establishment. The letters
of the commissioners were treated as attempts to sow divisions among
the people of which they might afterwards avail themselves, and thus
effect by intrigue, what had been found unattainable by arms.
These essays were read with avidity, and seem to have produced all the
effect which was expected from them among the friends of the
revolution.
[Sidenote: October 8.]
[Sidenote: Manifesto of the commissioners, and counter-manifestos by
congress.]
The commissioners appear still to have cherished the hope, that a
complete knowledge of the terms they had offered, operating on the
disappointment of the extravagant hopes which had been founded on the
arrival of a French fleet, would make a great impression on a large
portion of the American people. This opinion induced them, before
their departure, to publish a manifesto, addressed, not only to
congress, but to all the provincial assemblies, and all the
inhabitants of the colonies of whatever denomination, briefly
recapitulating the several steps they had taken to accomplish the
object of their mission, and the refusal of congress even to open a
conference with them. They declared their readiness still to proceed
in the execution of the powers contained in their commission, and to
treat either with deputies from all the colonies conjointly, or with
any provincial assembly or convention individually, at any time within
the space of forty days from the date of their manifesto. They also
proclaimed a general pardon for all treasons and rebellious practices
committed at any time previous to the date of their manifesto, to such
as should, within the term of forty days, withdraw from their
opposition to the British government, and conduct themselves as
faithful and loyal subjects. To enable all persons to avail themselves
of this proffered pardon, thirteen copies of the manifesto were
executed, one of which was transmitted by a flag of truce to each
state. A vast number of copies were printed, and great exertions were
made by flags and other means to disperse them among the people.
On being informed of these proceedings, congress, without hesitation,
adopted the course which the government of an independent nation is
bound to pursue, when attempts are made by a foreign power to open
negotiations with unauthorized individuals. They declared the measure
"to be contrary to the law of nations, and utterly subversive of that
confidence which could alone maintain those means which had been
invented to alleviate the horrors of war; and, therefore, that the
persons employed to distribute such papers, were not entitled to the
protection of a flag." They recommended it to the executive
departments in the respective states, "to secure, in close custody,
every person who, under the sanction of a flag, or otherwise, was
found employed in circulating those manifestoes." At the same time, to
show that these measures were not taken for the purpose of
concealment, they directed a publication of the manifesto in the
American papers. Care, however, was taken to accompany it with
comments made by individuals, calculated to counteract its effect. A
vessel containing a cargo of these papers being wrecked on the coast,
the officers and crew were made prisoners; and the requisition of
Admiral Gambier for their release, in consequence of the privilege
afforded by his flag, was answered by a declaration that they had
forfeited that privilege by being charged with seditious papers.
[Sidenote: October 30.]
Not long after the publication of this paper, a counter-manifesto was
issued by congress, in which, after touching on subjects which might
influence the public mind, they "solemnly declare and proclaim, that
if their enemies presume to execute their threats, or persist in their
present course of barbarity, they will take such exemplary vengeance
as shall deter others from a like conduct."
Thus ended this fruitless attempt to restore a connexion which had
been wantonly broken, the reinstatement of which had become
impracticable. With the war, and with independence, a course of
opinion had prevailed in America, which not only opposed great
obstacles to a reunion of the two countries under one common
sovereign, but, by substituting discordant materials in the place of
the cement which formerly bound them together, rendered such an event
undesirable even to the British themselves. The time was arrived when
the true interest of that nation required the relinquishment of an
expensive war, the object of which was unattainable, and which, if
attained, could not be long preserved; and the establishment of those
amicable relations which reciprocal interests produce between
independent states, capable of being serviceable to each other by a
fair and equal interchange of good offices.
This opinion, however, was not yet embraced by the cabinet of London;
and great exertions were still to be made for the reannexation of the
American states to the British empire. Even the opposition was not
united against a continuance of the war for the object now proposed;
and the Earl of Chatham, who had endeavoured first to prevent the
conflict, and afterwards to produce conciliation, closed his splendid
life in unavailing efforts to prevent that dismemberment which had
become inevitable.[12]
[Footnote 12: The author has been favoured by his estimable friend,
Major General Scott, with the perusal of an introduction written by
Mr. L. De Sevelinges, to Botta's "History of the war of the
independence of the United States of America," translated into French.
Mr. De Sevelinges professes to have received the most precious
explanations, relative to incidents and motives, from a gentleman
equally distinguished for his knowledge and his character, whose
situation enabled him to become acquainted with facts which were
concealed from the public. Speaking of the attempt made by Mr.
Johnson, he says, p. 19, it was essential "to break off all
communication with the agents of the British minister. Mr. Girard
directed all his efforts to this object, and had the good fortune to
effect it.
"But the English faction of tories subsisted. It was powerful from the
credit of its chiefs."
In a note on this passage, he says, "The most influential were Samuel
Adams and Richard Lee, (Richard H. Lee,) the brother of Arthur Lee,
one of the deputies of congress in France. He was convicted of having
secret intelligence with the British minister."
It would be injustice to the memoirs of these distinguished patriots
to attempt their vindication against this atrocious and unfounded
calumny. A calumny supported by no testimony, nor by a single
circumstance wearing even the semblance of probability, and confuted
by the whole tenour of their lives. The annals of the American
revolution do not furnish two names more entirely above suspicion than
Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee. With the first gentleman the
author was not personally acquainted. With the last he was; and can
appeal with confidence to every man who knew him, to declare the
conviction, that he died as he lived, a pure and devoted, as well as
enlightened friend of American independence. The same character was
maintained by Mr. Adams.
In casting about for the foundation of this calumny, the author is
inclined to look for it in the opinions entertained by these
gentlemen, on subjects connected with the negotiations for peace.
Since the publication of the secret journals of congress, it is
generally known that France countenanced the claim of Spain to
circumscribe the western boundary of the United States, by the line
prescribed in the royal proclamation of 1763, for settlement of vacant
lands. After Great Britain had consented to acknowledge the
independence of the United States, it was understood by those who were
acquainted with the views of the belligerents, that a disposition
existed on the part of France and Spain, to continue the war for
objects in which the United States felt no interest,--among others,
for Gibraltar and Jamaica. Some American statesmen, and the Lees were
of the number, probably Mr. Adams also, were extremely apprehensive
that the miseries of their country would be prolonged for these
objects. It is not impossible that the sentiments of these gentlemen
on these subjects, being in opposition to the views of France, might,
though founded entirely in American policy, be attributed to British
intrigues.]
[Sidenote: July 14.]
[Sidenote: Arrival of Girard, minister plenipotentiary from the King
of France.]
In the midst of these transactions with the commissioners of Great
Britain, the Sieur Girard arrived at Philadelphia, in the character of
Minister Plenipotentiary of his Most Christian Majesty.
The joy produced by this event was unbounded; and he was received by
congress with great pomp.
While these diplomatic concerns employed the American cabinet, and
while the war seemed to languish on the Atlantic, it raged to the west
in its most savage form.
[Sidenote: June 11.]
The difficulties which the inability of the American government to
furnish the neighbouring Indians with those European articles which
they were accustomed to use, opposed to all the efforts of congress to
preserve their friendship, have already been noticed. Early in 1778,
there were many indications of a general disposition among those
savages to make war on the United States; and the frontiers, from the
Mohawk to the Ohio, were threatened with the tomahawk and the scalping
knife. Every representation from that country supported the opinion
that a war with the Indians should never be defensive; and that, to
obtain peace, it must be carried into their own country. Detroit,
whose governor was believed to have been particularly active in
exciting hostilities, was understood to be in a defenceless condition;
and congress resolved on an expedition against that place. This
enterprise was entrusted to General M'Intosh, who commanded at
Pittsburg, and was to be carried on with three thousand men, chiefly
militia, to be drawn from Virginia. To facilitate its success, the
resolution was also taken to enter the country of the Senecas at the
same time, by the way of the Mohawk. The officer commanding on the
east of the Hudson was desired to take measures for carrying this
resolution into execution; and the commissioners for Indian affairs,
at Albany, were directed to co-operate with him.
Unfortunately, the acts of the government did not correspond with the
vigour of its resolutions. The necessary preparations were not made,
and the inhabitants of the frontiers remained without sufficient
protection, until the plans against them were matured, and the storm
which had been long gathering, burst upon them with a fury which
spread desolation wherever it reached.
[Sidenote: Colonel John Butler, with a party of Indians, breaks into
the Wyoming settlement.]
About three hundred white men, commanded by Colonel John Butler, and
about five hundred Indians, led by the Indian chief Brandt, who had
assembled in the north, marched late in June against the settlement of
Wyoming. These troops embarked on the Chemung or Tyoga, and
descending the Susquehanna, landed at a place called the Three
Islands, whence they marched about twenty miles, and crossing a
wilderness, and passing through a gap in the mountain, entered the
valley of Wyoming near its northern boundary. At this place a small
fort called Wintermoots had been erected, which fell into their hands
without resistance, and was burnt. The inhabitants who were capable of
bearing arms assembled on the first alarm at Forty fort, on the west
side of the Susquehanna, four miles below the camp of the invading
army.
The regular troops, amounting to about sixty, were commanded by
Colonel Zebulon Butler;[13] the militia by Colonel Dennison. Colonel
Butler was desirous of awaiting the arrival of a small reinforcement
under Captain Spalding, who had been ordered by General Washington to
his aid on the first intelligence of the danger which threatened the
settlement; but the militia generally, believing themselves
sufficiently strong to repel the invading force, urged an immediate
battle so earnestly, that Colonel Butler yielded to their
remonstrances, and on the 3d of July marched from Forty fort at the
head of near four hundred men to attack the enemy.
[Footnote 13: This gentleman is stated not to have been of the same
family with the leader of the invading army.]
The British and Indians were prepared to receive him. Their line was
formed a small distance in front of their camp, in a plain thinly
covered with pine, shrub oaks, and under growth, and extended from the
river about a mile to a marsh at the foot of the mountain. The
Americans advanced in a single column, without interruption, until
they approached the enemy, when they received a fire which did not
much mischief. The line of battle[14] was instantly formed, and the
action commenced with spirit. The Americans rather gained ground on
the right where Colonel Butler commanded, until a large body of
Indians passing through the skirt of the marsh turned their left
flank, which was composed of militia, and poured a heavy and most
destructive fire on their rear. The word "retreat" was pronounced by
some person, and the efforts of the officers to check it were
unavailing. The fate of the day was decided, and a flight commenced on
the left which was soon followed by the right. As soon as the line was
broken, the Indians, throwing down their rifles and rushing upon them
with the tomahawk, completed the confusion. The attempt of Colonel
Butler and of the officers to restore order were unavailing, and the
whole line broke and fled in confusion. The massacre was general, and
the cries for mercy were answered by the tomahawk. Rather less than
sixty men escaped, some to Forty fort, some by swimming the river, and
some to the mountain. A very few prisoners were made, only three of
whom were preserved alive, who were carried to Niagara.
[Footnote 14: The representation of this battle, and of the
circumstances attending the destruction of the Wyoming settlement,
have been materially varied from the statement made of them in the
first edition. The papers of General Washington furnished allusions to
the transaction, but no particular account of it. The author therefore
relied on Mr. Gordon and Mr. Ramsay, whose authority was quoted. Soon
after the work was published, he received a letter from a gentleman
then residing in that country, (Mr. Charles Miner,) who asserted with
confidence that the statement was incorrect, and gave himself a minute
detail of events, collected from persons who were in the settlement at
the time, and witnessed them.
The author has been since indebted to the same gentleman for a
statement of the battle, and of the events which followed it, drawn up
by one of the descendants of Colonel Zebulon Butler, to which the
certificates of several gentlemen are annexed, who were engaged in the
action. These documents, with one which will be mentioned, convince
him that the combined treachery and savage ferocity which have been
painted in such vivid colours, in the narratives that have been given
of this furious and desolating irruption, have been greatly
exaggerated. Historic truth demands that these misstatements should be
corrected.
The other document alluded to, is a letter from Zebulon Butler to the
board of war, making his report of the transaction. The letter has
been lately found among his papers, and is copied below.
_Grandenhutten, Penn Township, July 10th, 1778._
Honoured Sir,--On my arrival at Westmoreland, (which was only four
days after I left Yorktown,) I found there was a large body of the
enemy advancing on that settlement. On the first of July we mustered
the militia, and marched towards them by the river above the
settlement,--found and killed two Indians at a place where the day
before they had murdered nine men engaged in hoeing corn. We found
some canoes, &c. but finding we were above their main body, it was
judged prudent to return. And as every man had to go to his own house
for his provision, we could not muster again till the 3d of July. In
the mean time, the enemy had got possession of two forts, one of which
we had reason to believe was designed for them, though they burnt them
both. The inhabitants had seven forts for the security of their women
and children, extending about ten miles on the river, and too many men
would stay in them to take care of them; but after collecting about
three hundred of the most spirited of them, including Captain Hewitt's
company, I held a council with the officers, who were all agreed that
it was best to attack the enemy before they got any farther. We
accordingly marched,--found their situation,--formed a front of the
same extension of the enemy's, and attacked from right to left at the
same time. Our men stood the fire well for three or four shots, till
some part of the enemy gave way; but unfortunately for us, through
some mistake, the word _retreat_ was understood from some officer on
the left, which took so quick that it was not in the power of the
officers to form them again, though I believe, if they had stood three
minutes longer, the enemy would have been beaten. The utmost pains
were taken by the officers, who mostly fell. A lieutenant colonel, a
major and five captains, who were in commission in the militia, all
fell. Colonel Durkee, and Captains Hewitt and Ransom were likewise
killed. In the whole, about two hundred men lost their lives in the
action on our side. What number of the enemy were killed is yet
uncertain, though I believe a very considerable number. The loss of
these men so intimidated the inhabitants, that they gave up the matter
of fighting. Great numbers ran off, and others would comply with the
terms that I had refused. The enemy sent flags frequently--the terms
you will see in the enclosed letter. They repeatedly said they had
nothing to do with any but the inhabitants, and did not want to treat
with me. Colonel Dennison, by desire of the inhabitants, went and
complied,--which made it necessary for me and the little remains of
Captain Hewitt's company to leave the place. Indeed it was determined
by the enemy to spare the inhabitants after their agreement, and that
myself and the few continental soldiers should be delivered up to the
savages. Upon which I left the place, and came scarcely able to move,
as I have had no rest since I left Yorktown. It has not been in my
power to find a horse or man to wait on the board till now. I must
submit to the board what must be the next step. The little remains of
Hewitt's company (which are about fifteen) are gone to Shamoken, and
Captain Spalding's company, I have heard, are on the Delaware. Several
hundred of the inhabitants are strolling in the country destitute of
provisions, who have large fields of grain and other necessaries of
life at Westmoreland. In short, if the inhabitants can go back, there
may yet be saved double the quantity of provisions to support
themselves, otherwise they must be beggars, and a burthen to the
world.
I have heard from men that came from the place since the people gave
up, that the Indians have killed no person since, but have burnt most
of the buildings, and are collecting all the horses they can, and are
moving up the river. They likewise say the enemy were eight hundred,
one-half white men. I should be glad that, if possible, there might be
a sufficient guard sent for the defence of the place, which will be
the means of saving thousands from poverty--but must submit to the
wisdom of congress. I desire farther orders from the honourable board
of war with respect to myself, and the soldiers under my direction.
I have the honour to be
Your Honour's most obedient, humble servant,
ZEBULON BUTLER.]
[Sidenote: Colonel Dennison capitulates for the inhabitants.]
Further resistance was impracticable, Colonel Dennison proposed terms
of capitulation, which were granted to the inhabitants. It being
understood that no quarter would be allowed to the continental troops,
Colonel Butler with his few surviving soldiers fled from the valley.
[Sidenote: Distress of the settlement.]
The inhabitants generally abandoned the country, and, in great
distress, wandered into the settlements on the Lehigh and the
Delaware. The Indians, as is the practice of savages, destroyed the
houses and improvements by fire, and plundered the country. After
laying waste the whole settlement, they withdrew from it before the
arrival of the continental troops, who were detached to meet them.
[Sidenote: July 15.]
To cover every part of the United States would have required a much
greater number of men than could be raised. Different districts were
therefore unavoidably exposed to the calamities ever to be experienced
by those into the bosom of whose country war is carried. The militia
in every part of the Union, fatigued and worn out by repeated tours of
duty, required to be relieved by continental troops. Their
applications were necessarily resisted; but the danger which
threatened the western frontier had become so imminent; the appeal
made by its sufferings to national feeling was so affecting, that it
was determined to spare a more considerable portion of the army for
its defence, than had been allotted to that part of the Union, since
the capture of Burgoyne. On the first intelligence of the destruction
of Wyoming, the regiments of Hartley and Butler, with the remnant of
Morgan's corps, commanded by Major Posey, were detached to the
protection of that distressed country. They were engaged in several
sharp skirmishes, made separate incursions into the Indian
settlements, broke up their nearest villages, destroyed their corn,
and by compelling them to retire to a greater distance, gave some
relief to the inhabitants.
While the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania were thus suffering
the calamities incident to savage warfare, a fate equally severe was
preparing for Virginia. The western militia of that state had made
some successful incursions into the country north-west of the Ohio,
and had taken some British posts on the Mississippi. These were
erected in the county of Illinois; and a regiment of infantry, with a
troop of cavalry, were raised for its protection. The command of these
troops was given to Colonel George Rogers Clarke, a gentleman whose
courage, hardihood, and capacity for Indian warfare, had given
repeated success to his enterprises against the savages.
This corps was divided into several detachments, the strongest of
which remained with Colonel Clarke at Kaskaskia. Colonel Hamilton, the
Governor of Detroit, was at Vincennes with about six hundred men,
principally Indians, preparing an expedition, first against Kaskaskia,
and then up the Ohio to Pittsburg; after which he purposed to
desolate the frontiers of Virginia. Clarke anticipated and defeated
his design by one of those bold and decisive measures, which, whether
formed on a great or a small scale, mark the military and enterprising
genius of the man who plans and executes them.
[Sidenote: 1779 February.]
[Sidenote: Colonel Clarke surprises St. Vincents, and takes
possession of it.]
He was too far removed from the inhabited country to hope for support,
and was too weak to maintain Kaskaskia and the Illinois against the
combined force of regulars and Indians by which he was to be attacked
so soon as the season for action should arrive. While employed in
preparing for his defence, he received unquestionable information that
Hamilton had detached his Indians on an expedition against the
frontiers, reserving at the post he occupied only about eighty
regulars, with three pieces of cannon and some swivels. Clarke
instantly resolved to seize this favourable moment. After detaching a
small galley up the Wabash with orders to take her station a few miles
below Vincennes, and to permit nothing to pass her, he marched in the
depth of winter with one hundred and thirty men, the whole force he
could collect, across the country from Kaskaskia to Vincennes. This
march, through the woods, and over high waters, required sixteen days,
five of which were employed in crossing the drowned lands of the
Wabash. The troops were under the necessity of wading five miles in
water, frequently up to their breasts. After subduing these
difficulties, this small party appeared before the town, which was
completely surprised, and readily consented to change its master.
Hamilton, after defending the fort a short time, surrendered himself
and his garrison prisoners of war. With a few of his immediate agents
and counsellors, who had been instrumental in the savage barbarities
he had encouraged, he was, by order of the executive of Virginia, put
in irons, and confined in a jail.
This expedition was important in its consequences. It disconcerted a
plan which threatened destruction to the whole country west of the
Alleghany mountains; detached from the British interest many of those
numerous tribes of Indians south of the waters immediately
communicating with the great lakes; and had, most probably,
considerable influence in fixing the western boundary of the United
States.
[Sidenote: Congress determine to attack Canada, and the other British
possessions in North America.]
We have already seen that congress, actuated by their wishes rather
than governed by a temperate calculation of the means in their
possession, had, in the preceding winter, planned a second invasion of
Canada, to be conducted by the Marquis de Lafayette; and that, as the
generals only were got in readiness for this expedition, it was
necessarily laid aside. The design, however, seems to have been
suspended, not abandoned. The alliance with France revived the latent
wish to annex that extensive territory to the United States. That
favourite subject was resumed; and, towards autumn, a plan was
completely digested for a combined attack to be made by the allies on
all the British dominions on the continent, and on the adjacent
islands of Cape Breton and Newfoundland. This plan was matured about
the time the Marquis de Lafayette obtained leave to return to his own
country, and was ordered to be transmitted by that nobleman to Doctor
Franklin, the minister of the United States at the court of
Versailles, with instructions to induce, if possible, the French
cabinet to accede to it. Some communications respecting this subject
were also made to the Marquis, on whose influence in securing its
adoption by his own government, much reliance was placed; and, in
October, 1778, it was, for the first time, transmitted to General
Washington, with a request that he would inclose it by the Marquis,
with his observations on it, to Doctor Franklin.
This very extensive plan of military operations for the ensuing
campaign, prepared entirely in the cabinet, without consulting, so far
as is known, a single military man, consisted of many parts.
Two detachments, amounting, each, to sixteen hundred men, were to
march from Pittsburg and Wyoming against Detroit, and Niagara.
A third body of troops, which was to be stationed on the Mohawk during
the winter, and to be powerfully reinforced in the spring, was to
seize Oswego, and to secure the navigation of Lake Ontario with
vessels to be constructed of materials to be procured in the winter.
A fourth corps was to penetrate into Canada by the St. Francis, and to
reduce Montreal, and the posts on Lake Champlain, while a fifth should
guard against troops from Quebec.
Thus far America could proceed unaided by her ally. But, Upper Canada
being reduced, another campaign would still be necessary for the
reduction of Quebec. This circumstance would require that the army
should pass the winter in Canada, and, in the mean time, the garrison
of Quebec might be largely reinforced. It was therefore essential to
the complete success of the enterprise, that France should be induced
to take a part in it.
The conquest of Quebec, and of Halifax, was supposed to be an object
of so much importance to France as well as to the United States, that
her aid might be confidently expected.
It was proposed to request his Most Christian Majesty to furnish four
or five thousand troops, to sail from Brest, the beginning of May,
under convoy of four ships of the line and four frigates; the troops
to be clad as if for service in the West Indies, and thick clothes to
be sent after them in August. A large American detachment was to act
with this French army; and it was supposed that Quebec and Halifax
might be reduced by the beginning or middle of October. The army
might then either proceed immediately against Newfoundland, or remain
in garrison until the spring, when the conquest of that place might be
accomplished.
It had been supposed probable that England would abandon the farther
prosecution of the war on the continent of North America, in which
case the government would have a respectable force at its disposal,
the advantageous employment of which had engaged in part the attention
of the Commander-in-chief. He had contemplated an expedition against
the British posts in Upper Canada as a measure which might be
eventually eligible, and which might employ the arms of the United
States to advantage, if their troops might safely be withdrawn from
the sea board. He had, however, considered every object of this sort
as contingent. Having estimated the difficulties to be encountered in
such an enterprise, he had found them so considerable as to hesitate
on the extent which might safely be given to the expedition, admitting
the United States to be evacuated by the British armies.
In this state of mind, he received the magnificent plan already
prepared by congress. He was forcibly struck with the impracticability
of executing that part of it which was to be undertaken by the United
States, should the British armies continue in their country; and with
the serious mischief which would result to the common cause, as well
from diverting so considerable a part of the French force from other
objects to one which was, in his opinion, so unpromising, as from the
ill impression which would be made on the court and nation by the
total failure of the American government to execute its part of a plan
originating with itself; a failure which would, most probably,
sacrifice the troops and ships employed by France.
On comparing the naval force of England with that of France in the
different parts of the world, the former appeared to him to maintain a
decided superiority, and consequently to possess the power of shutting
up the ships of the latter which might be trusted into the St.
Lawrence. To suppose that the British government would not avail
itself of this superiority on such an occasion, would be to impute to
it a blind infatuation, or ignorance of the plans of its adversary,
which could not be safely assumed in calculations of such serious
import.
[Sidenote: General Washington urges reasons against the plan.]
A plan too, consisting of so many parts, to be prosecuted both from
Europe and America, by land and by water; which, to be successful,
required such a harmonious co-operation of the whole, such a perfect
coincidence of events, appeared to him to be exposed to too many
accidents, to risk upon it interests of such high value.
[Illustration: George Washington
_From the portrait by John Trumbull_
_Colonel Trumbull, whose portraits of Washington, Hamilton, Jay,
Adams, George Clinton and other Revolutionary contemporaries form a
notable gallery, was General Washington's aide-de-camp at the outbreak
of the War for Independence, and during its progress became a pupil of
Benjamin West, in London. The news of André's execution fastened upon
him the suspicion of being a spy, and he spent eight months in an
English prison. Returning to America he painted this and other
portraits of Washington, as well as a number of historical pictures,
including the "Resignation of Washington at Annapolis," which hangs in
the Capitol at Washington._]
In a long and serious letter to congress, he apologized for not
obeying their orders to deliver the plan with his observations upon it
to the Marquis; and, entering into a full investigation of all its
parts, demonstrated the mischiefs, and the dangers, with which it was
replete. This letter was referred to a committee, whose report admits
the force of the reasons urged by the Commander-in-chief against the
expedition, and their own conviction that nothing important could be
attempted unless the British armies should be withdrawn from the
United States; and that, even in that event, the present plan was far
too complex.
Men, however, recede slowly and reluctantly from favourite and
flattering projects on which they have long meditated; and the
committee, in their report, proceeded to state the opinion that the
posts held by the British in the United States would probably be
evacuated before the active part of the ensuing campaign; and that,
therefore, eventual measures for the expedition ought to be taken.
This report concludes with recommending "that the general should be
directed to write to the Marquis de Lafayette on that subject; and
also to write to the minister of these states at the court of
Versailles very fully, to the end that eventual measures may be taken,
in case an armament should be sent from France to Quebec, for
co-operating therewith, to the utmost degree, which the finances and
resources of these states will admit."
This report also was approved by congress, and transmitted to the
Commander-in-chief; who felt himself greatly embarrassed by it. While
his objections to the project retained all their force, he found
himself required to open a correspondence for the purposes of
soliciting the concurrence of France in an expedition he disapproved,
and of promising a co-operation he believed to be impracticable. In
reply to this communication, he said, "The earnest desire I have
strictly to comply in every instance, with the views and instructions
of congress, can not but make me feel the greatest uneasiness, when I
find myself in circumstances of hesitation or doubt, with respect to
their directions. But the perfect confidence I have in the justice and
candour of that honourable body, emboldens me to communicate, without
reserve, the difficulties which occur in the execution of their
present order; and the indulgence I have experienced on every former
occasion, induces me to imagine that the liberty I now take will not
meet with disapprobation."
After reviewing the report of the committee, and stating his
objections to the plan, and the difficulties he felt in performing the
duty assigned to him, he added, "But if congress still think it
necessary for me to proceed in the business, I must request their more
definitive and explicit instructions, and that they will permit me,
previous to transmitting the intended despatches, to submit them to
their determination.
"I could wish to lay before congress more minutely the state of the
army, the condition of our supplies, and the requisites necessary for
carrying into execution an undertaking that may involve the most
serious events. If congress think this can be done more satisfactorily
in a personal conference, I hope to have the army in such a situation
before I can receive their answer, as to afford me an opportunity of
giving my attendance."
[Sidenote: Induces Congress to abandon it.]
Congress acceded to his request of a personal interview; and, on his
arrival in Philadelphia, a committee was appointed to confer with him,
as well on this particular subject as on the general state of the army
and of the country.
The result of these conferences was, that the expedition against
Canada was entirely, though reluctantly,[15] given up, and every
arrangement recommended by the Commander-in-chief, received the
attention to which his judgment and experience gave all his opinions
the fairest claim.
[Footnote 15: See note No. II. at the end of the volume.]