CHAPTER III

CONFESSION

ARTICLE I

ESSENCE, NECESSITY, AND PROPERTIES OF CONFESSION

19. Essence and Necessity of Confession.

Though contrition is the most important of the dispositions which a

penitent must bring to the Sacrament, the confessing of the sins is

the most prominent feature to ordinary observers; hence the Sacrament

is often simply called confession, as in the very earliest ages of the

Church it was known simply as _confessio_ (in Greek _exomologesis_).

Sacramental confession is the self-accusation of sins committed after

Baptism and not yet remitted in the Sacrament, and it is made by the

penitent to a priest having the necessary faculties and with the object

of obtaining absolution.

Hence it is not a sacramental confession when the sins are told

_enarratione mere historica_; such a recital would not be an accusation,

nor would it be done with the view of acknowledging one’s self a sinner

or of obtaining absolution. Moreover, it is not a sacramental confession

if sins are revealed to a priest to obtain counsel or help from him,

or if they are told to the priest merely in derision, for there would

be no accusation in this, at least it would not be done with a view of

obtaining absolution. On the contrary, a confession invalid through any

defect whatever would be sacramental if it was made in order to obtain

absolution.

If, however, a man began by simply relating his sins to an authorized

priest without any idea of making a sacramental confession, and then in

order to obtain absolution accuses himself in general terms to the same

priest of those same sins, the confession would be sacramental, for then

a formal accusation would be made of those sins to the priest as judge,

in order that absolution might be given.

The necessity of this confession for all mortal sins committed after

Baptism is a dogma of the Church, and rests on the divine institution of

the Sacrament. The proof is to be sought in dogmatic treatises. In the

divine institution of this Sacrament, as a necessary means for obtaining

forgiveness of sin by confession to a priest, is included the divine

command of confessing sin, which binds all who have committed mortal sin

after Baptism. We have already spoken of this in treating of the duty of

approaching the Sacrament, since confession is one of the acts required

of the penitent on receiving this Sacrament.[214]

There remains yet another point which shows the necessity of confession.

Perfect contrition, as we have seen above, remits sin apart even from the

Sacrament, but it does not remove the obligation of mentioning the sins

so remitted to a duly authorized priest. The obligation remains, because

by Christ’s command every mortal sin committed after Baptism must be

submitted by confession to the power of the keys. This follows from the

words of Our Lord (John xx. 23); hence the Council of Trent teaches that

for those who have fallen into mortal sin after Baptism confession is as

necessary as Baptism is to those who have not been baptized.[215]

20. The Properties of Confession.

The necessary properties of confession have their origin in its nature

and object. The primary object of the confession is to put the confessor,

who is bound to act in his office as a judge, not as a despot, in a

position to form a judicial sentence, so that he may be able to decide

whether the sinner be worthy or unworthy of absolution, and also that

he may be able to impose a suitable penance. To succeed in this the

confession must be such as to allow the confessor a view of the whole

moral state of the penitent, hence it must be complete. This property,

however, being of very great importance, will be treated in a separate

division. The other necessary feature, the contrition, has been already

dealt with. The remaining properties are of secondary importance and not

essential; they turn partly on the integrity and partly on the contrition

and have been summarized in the following verses:—

Sit simplex, humilis confessio, pura, fidelis

Atque frequens, nuda et discreta, libens, verecunda,

Integra, secreta et lacrimabilis, accelerata,

Fortis et accusans et sit parere parata.

Though these properties are not so essential that the want of any one of

them nullifies the confession, they are all useful in their several ways

to instruct a penitent how to make a good confession. For this reason we

will treat of them:—

1. _Simplex._ The confession should be simple, straightforward, short,

and clear; the penitent will therefore avoid all unnecessary, superfluous

words, all prolix narrations and remarks which have no connection with

the matter; at the same time he will avoid the use of all unintelligible

expressions or such as are misleading and ambiguous; let his accusation

be so worded that he may take it for granted that the priest will

understand both the number and species of the sins. Thus, too, he must

not accuse himself in a vague and general manner, as, “I have had bad

thoughts”; for the confessor cannot judge from this whether a mortal or

a venial sin, or indeed any sin at all, has been incurred; let him use

such words as describe clearly the sins he has committed, making use

of the proper and specific terms. Finally, he should avoid unnecessary

repetitions of sins which differ only in number, not recounting them

separately because they were committed at different times or on

different occasions; all the sins should be grouped under their specific

names and the number given. It is the duty of the priest, in the case of

penitents who fail in this respect, to instruct them, at the same time

taking into account the peculiarities of the penitent and showing great

patience. St. Antoninus gives a very useful piece of advice on this

subject. Penitents, says he, who need consolation in their trials or

advice in their doubts should defer their difficulties till after they

have confessed and received absolution; otherwise, if they dilate on

these subjects during the confession of their sins, there is danger of

their contrition being weakened.

2. _Humilis._ Let the confession be humble, for a man approaches the

tribunal as a penitent, as one guilty of crime, as one accusing himself

to his judge and seeking grace and mercy; of such a one humility and

lowliness are to be expected. Surely the knowledge of one’s sins and

sinfulness revealed by an honest examination of the conscience, the

remembrance of repeated unfaithfulness and ingratitude to God, are reason

enough for being humble. Let this humility fill the heart, pervade the

accusation, be manifested in the whole exterior; then let the penitent go

into the confessional, kneeling, with head uncovered, like the publican

in the Gospel, who remained by the door of the Temple and dared not to

raise his eyes to heaven, but struck his breast and prayed: “God, be

merciful to me a sinner.” The words used by some are very appropriate

as an introduction to the confession: “I, a poor sinner, confess and

acknowledge to God, and to you, reverend father, in God’s place, that I

have sinned often and grievously by thought, word, deed, and omission,”

etc. Others, again, use the words of the Confiteor: “I confess to

almighty God, to Blessed Mary, ever a virgin, ... that I have sinned

exceedingly in thought, word, and deed,” etc.

3. _Pura._ The confession should be made with the object of gaining

pardon of sin and the grace of the Sacrament. If it were made with any

wicked and gravely sinful intention, it would be a sacrilegious and

invalid confession; if the penitent had any venially sinful object in

view, _e.g._ to gain esteem, the confession would be valid though the

penitent would incur the guilt of venial sin by it. If the penitent’s

principal intention is to be reconciled to God, though at the same time

there be present other motives not altogether forbidden, the confession

is unimpaired; the same may easily happen in other good works, and

secondary motives do not exclude the principal one.

4. _Fidelis (seu verax)._ The confession should be truthful and candid,

without lies and deceit. Hence the penitent must not conceal the sins

he has committed, nor confess those which he has not committed; neither

may he confess as certain what is doubtful, nor what is doubtful as

certain. It is disputed whether every lie in confession is a mortal

sin and renders the confession null. There are indeed theologians who

maintain that every lie told in confession is a mortal sin, because of

the sin being committed in the very act of receiving a Sacrament. This

view, however, is wrong. It is true that any lie told in confession is

more sinful than the same lie told under other circumstances would be,

on account of the irreverence to the Sacrament; but mortal sin would be

incurred only by a lie in confession when the lie concerns the _materia

necessaria_ of confession; in such a case the confession is invalid, for

the judge is deceived about the case, and that is gravely wrong. If the

penitent lies to the confessor in a matter which does not pertain to the

Sacrament, there is no mortal sin, for such a lie does not mislead the

judge nor imply a grave irreverence to the Sacrament, since still there

is real matter for the Sacrament and a sufficient disposition to obtain

the grace of the Sacrament. Accordingly, if the lie told in confession

has nothing to do with the confession itself, it is mortal or venial on

its own merits quite apart from the circumstances of its being told in

confession.

From what has been said it follows that a penitent incurs venial sin by a

lie told in confession when (1) he accuses himself falsely of a venial

sin or denies having committed a venial sin; except where this venial

sin forms the sole matter of confession, for then he would sin mortally,

not on account of the lie, but on account of the grave irreverence done

to the Sacrament in offering to the priest insufficient matter, for sins

falsely stated can never be matter for absolution.

(2) Moreover, it is only a venial sin if the penitent denies having

committed a mortal sin which he is not bound _hic et nunc_ to disclose,

either because he has already revealed it in a valid confession or

because he has pressing reasons for not disclosing it _hic et nunc_.

Indeed it is possible that there is no sin at all when a penitent makes

use of mental reservation. The confessor has no right to put questions

which have no connection with the _materia necessaria_, and the penitent

is not bound to answer such questions; to avoid a lie he may use a mental

reservation by choosing an ambiguous expression which contains the truth,

leaving the confessor to judge for himself. If, on the contrary, the

priest has a right to inquire of the penitent whether he has committed

some grave sin which has been already confessed, and the penitent denies

the charge, he would sin mortally.[216]

(3) If the penitent is questioned by the priest as to his home, his

condition, or his relatives or friends, and answers not according to the

truth, knowing that these questions have no bearing on the nature of his

sins, such untruths are only venial; for if a lie told in confession

with respect to venial sins, although these may be matter of confession,

be only a venial sin, a lie with respect to other things which have no

connection with the accusation of the sins is still less likely to be

mortal.

On the other hand, a mortal sin is incurred (1) when a penitent accuses

himself of having committed a mortal sin which he has never committed,

or denies having fallen into a mortal sin which he has incurred and

which has never been validly confessed, and which besides he has no valid

reason for concealing, or if he conceals a mortal sin which he is bound

to mention.

(2) When he gives the number of his mortal sins as greater than is

really the case. Here, however, ignorant and untaught penitents may be

excused, because they honestly think it better to give a large number in

preference to a small one. Besides,—

(3) A penitent sins mortally who confesses mortal sin as doubtful which

he is certain of having committed, or confesses as certain mortal sins of

which he has doubts. In such cases the penitent would be unsettling the

judgment of the confessor in a very grave matter.

(4) Moreover, it would be a mortal sin if the penitent confesses a

recent mortal sin, either explicitly or equivalently, as an old one

already confessed, for the priest is thus prevented from giving a correct

sentence and imposing the proper penance. It is another case when the

accusation leaves it doubtful whether the sin is an old or recent one, or

whether it has been already confessed or not, even if the penitent intend

that the confessor be persuaded that the sin is an old one.

(5) Finally, the penitent incurs a mortal sin if he denies the existence

of a habit of sin, or of a relapse or the existence of an occasion of

sin, or if he avoids any avowal on the subject so as to mislead the

confessor. It would accordingly be a mortal sin for a penitent to accuse

himself of a recent mortal sin at the end of his confession by using

a formula of this kind: “I accuse myself of the sins of my past life,

in particular of this sin ...”; for this formula by universal consent

implies only past sins already confessed. On the other hand, it would

not be a mortal sin in a general confession to mingle old with recent

sins, as long as the confessor knows that not all the mortal sins have

been already confessed; if the priest is persuaded that he ought to

gain a clearer knowledge, he may ask; if he believe that he may let the

matter rest there, it is his affair (and perhaps in many cases this

may be the prudent course). Still less is it a mortal sin, indeed it

may be counselled or obligatory in certain cases, for a penitent to say

that such or such sin has not yet been confessed, making the accusation

in such a way that the confessor does not suspect that the sin has

been recent. Such an expedient may be necessary when a priest himself

confesses sins committed in hearing confessions, not wishing to violate

the seal of confession.[217]

In addition, the confessor must remember that the faithful in general are

persuaded that a lie in confession is a very grave sin, so that he must

judge of its gravity according to the conscience of the penitent.[218]

5. _Frequens._ Confession ought to be frequently made (see above, § 3).

This includes also the repeated confession of sins already confessed and

absolved (see above, § 6).

6. _Nuda._ The penitent ought not to hide his sins by ambiguous words

or expressions which veil the hatefulness of the sin, in order to make

them appear less in the eyes of the confessor. A penitent who thus veils

his sins cannot have real contrition; there still remains in his heart

that false shame which confuses the intellect, and his soul is not

yet released from sin. Such conduct is in reality no less sinful than

concealing the sin entirely, for what is the difference between total

silence and answering so obscurely that the questioner is left in doubt?

Just as a penitent makes a bad confession who conceals what he ought to

tell, so does he who answers his confessor in such obscure terms that the

latter does not understand or is led to take a view which the penitent

knows to be wrong.

The conditional accusation is no better, as when, for example, a penitent

says: “If I have given way to impure thoughts, I accuse myself of them,”

etc. Such a confession is not an accusation of sins, nor is it a sign of

absolute aversion from them.

7. _Discreta._ The confession should be prudent, _i.e._ so worded that

the reputations of others do not suffer; hence the sins of others ought

not to be revealed except in so far as is necessary for the declaration

of one’s own sins. Not a few penitents prefer to tell the sins of others

rather than their own: wives, for instance, tell the sins of their

husbands, servants the sins of their masters. Such penitents must be

seriously admonished by their confessor for the future not to reveal the

sins of others lest they incur the guilt of detraction and God’s anger in

the very tribunal of His mercy. The question as to the partner in sin,

whether and under what circumstances he is to be revealed in confession,

is relegated to a later portion of the treatise.

The penitent’s own good sense will tell him to be as discreet and

decorous as possible in confessing his sins, especially those against

purity, without detracting from the completeness of the confession,

without being gross, and at the same time without failing in the

reverence due to the Sacrament; hence he should tell only what is

necessary for the integrity of the confession, and that as cautiously

and becomingly as is possible, quite briefly, in clear and intelligible

language; the confession must be perfect and at the same time chaste.

The confessor also must exercise great discretion and prudence in this

dangerous matter.[219]

Finally, a prudent penitent will choose a suitable and virtuous confessor

who unites real piety and prudent zeal to solid knowledge and a wide

experience.

Not only is it advisable and wholesome to have a regular confessor,

but it is absolutely necessary. Of course as far as the absolution is

concerned it is always valid, provided that the priest who gives it

has the requisite faculties; but as for the spiritual direction of the

penitent, it is by no means an indifferent matter who the confessor is;

if ever there is an occasion in which there is need of a trusty, reliable

friend, guide, and adviser, it is in making a confession. On this point

St. Francis of Sales writes: “When Tobias was about to send his son to

Rages, and the latter explained that he did not know the way, ‘Go, then,’

said his father, ‘and seek a man who knows the way, that he may guide

you.’ This is my advice to you, Philothea; if you really desire to tread

the way of perfection, seek out above all things a man of experience to

guide you and show you the way: this is the most important lesson of

all.”[220] And after treating the subject in his usual way, he quotes

the remarkable words which the great St. Louis shortly before his death

addressed to his son: “Confess often, and choose for your confessor a

man of experience, who has not only wisdom and science, but also zeal

for souls, and learn from him what you ought to do.” The priest as

God’s vicar is not a judge only, he is a physician, and it is not hard

to understand how one physician can differ from another. For a soul

which is anxious to get rid of sin, to be established in virtue, and

to make progress in Christian perfection, as all Christians are bound

to do, there is required not only the application of the Sacrament,

but guidance as well. The direction of souls goes much farther than

a mere dispensing of the Sacrament. There are many things in which a

soul eager for salvation must be anxious for further instruction; the

methods of combating with success different evil inclinations, the

methods of prayer, the performance of certain good works, the way of

carrying out the duties of one’s state of life with more zeal and merit,

and the attainment of perfection. An approved confessor and director is

undoubtedly very useful, nay, necessary, and the penitent should pick

out such a one. In a choice of this kind he should have no other object

but his salvation and spiritual progress, and hence he should choose a

well-instructed, experienced, and holy man to lead him in the way of God

in the interior life, one who knows the penitent’s condition, one whose

heart is full of love, one who is as far removed from a feeble indulgence

as from a repelling strictness. Firmness and gentleness should be united

in him, a firmness which does not crush and a gentleness which will not

allow presumption; he should inspire confidence so that the penitent

has no difficulty in unfolding his heart to him. To seek an ignorant

and inexperienced confessor is, as theologians express it, to choose a

sure guide to hell; and, according to the teaching of Suarez, etc., it

is a mortal sin when done with the intention of obtaining absolution by

fraud.[221] But a good confessor is a “faithful friend, a strong defense;

and he that hath found him hath found a treasure; ... and they that fear

the Lord shall find him.”[222] St. Francis of Sales directs Philothea to

make choice of a confessor after constant prayer, and assures her that

God will grant her this most important of petitions and send her a man

after his own heart.

When the penitent has made choice of his confessor in accordance with

those rules of common sense which great spiritual writers enjoin, his

duty is then to love him as his spiritual father, to fear him as the

judge of his conscience, to follow him as his guide in the path of

virtue, to take his advice as his physician in the maladies, affections,

and sufferings of his soul. He should follow him, as though he were an

angel leading the way to heaven; give him his whole confidence; deal

with him in all openness and frankness; disclose to him all the good

and evil in his soul without dissembling or reserve, and at the same

time entertain a respect for him which does not weaken his confidence in

him.[223]

Having once chosen a good confessor, the penitent should cling to him and

not change about from one to another; nothing is more harmful or more

foolish than such conduct; unstable and wandering penitents of this kind

give sufficient proof that all they want is to be absolved and not to be

helped and guided, and there is reason to suspect that their purpose of

amendment is by no means sincere. Should a penitent, however, be in such

a condition that to confess to his regular confessor would be too great a

difficulty and involve risk of making sacrilegious confession, it would

be better to look out for some other priest and confess to him.

The penitent ought not at the same time be so dependent on his confessor

as to be quite bewildered when a change becomes necessary. Discouragement

or sadness on this account, or a less frequent use of the Sacraments

would be a sign that this dependence was due to some undesirable cause

and could not be any longer regarded as confidence in the director.

What is to be thought of those penitents who have two confessors, one to

whom they are well known and whose good opinion they enjoy, and another

to whom they are not well known, using the former to tell him their more

frequent and smaller sins, and the latter for the confession of graver

faults, in order that they may thereby keep up their good reputation with

the first? Such conduct is certainly not _per se_ forbidden when there is

good reason for it, as may happen when any one is unwilling or does not

dare to reveal to his ordinary confessor some very shameful fall.

Still the practice is not without danger and so cannot be unconditionally

recommended, for it is a sign that a penitent is more anxious about his

good name than his progress in the spiritual life; indeed he might incur

grievous sin if such conduct exposed him to the danger of falling into

mortal sin, as would be the case if in pursuing this course he never

intended seriously to give up his sin. Such is the predicament of those

penitents who seek out inexperienced or easy-going confessors, or of

those who habitually fall into mortal sins, confessing them only to a

priest who, they know, will take the matter very quietly, while they

reveal their less grievous sins to some pious and strict confessor. On

the other hand, the case above quoted presents quite another aspect when

a penitent has on rare occasions fallen into a grave and shameful sin and

shrinks from revealing it to his ordinary confessor.[224]

8. _Libens._ The confession ought to be voluntary; the penitent should

approach the sacred tribunal spontaneously, not prompted by prayers or

threats, nor prevailed upon by promises, nor driven by fear of temporal

losses; he should willingly acknowledge his sins to the priest as the

minister of Christ Our Lord appointed to forgive sin and distribute

His graces. A man might of course be influenced by those exterior

motives to receive the Sacrament; and if he made an earnest act of

contrition and carried out the other requisites, he would make a valid

confession. There is, however, as Laymann observes, a real danger for

a man who goes to the Sacrament under compulsion that he will make his

confession invalid through want of contrition or through a deficient

accusation of his sins. It frequently happens that such penitents,

giving way to external pressure, perform their Easter confession, doing

it only to keep up appearances; they make no act of contrition, they

are unwilling to tell all that lies on their conscience, they are ready

to make a bad confession and communion. A prudent confessor may detect

their insincerity and sometimes will prevail upon them to make a good

confession.

9. _Verecunda._ The penitent should make his confession with confusion

at the number and greatness of his sins, his ingratitude and infidelity

to God his Lord and Father; this confusion should fill his soul and

reveal itself even in the self-accusation and in the whole bearing of

the penitent. Between this real shame of every good penitent and the

false shame which arises from pride and self-love is a great gulf; the

latter, unless overcome, will cause the penitent to be dishonest in his

accusation and to make a sacrilegious confession. The confessor should

be very considerate of the weakness of such penitents and encourage

them, helping them to make a candid avowal if he suspects false shame,

and he should be careful not to frighten and shock them by hard words or

untimely threats.

10. The other property of the confession, its integrity, will, on account

of its great importance, be reserved for a thorough discussion in another

paragraph.

11. _Secreta._ The accusation should be in secret. It should be made

so as to be heard only by the priest and not by others. Christ did not

institute public confession; and if in the early Church those who had

committed grave public sin and given public scandal were compelled

after private confession to make a public avowal of their offenses,

this was only part of the then existing discipline. As a matter of fact

the practice was productive of as much harm as good, and so the Church

put an end to it.[225] Confession by an interpreter would, however, be

valid, as well as a confession which had been overheard by others. There

is no obligation to confess through an interpreter if one happens to be

in a country of which he does not know the language, supposing there

is no priest to whom one can make himself understood, for the Lateran

Council[226] prescribes _confessio secreta_ made to a priest only (_soli

sacerdoti facienda_), and to employ an interpreter for confession would

be very onerous.[227] Such an obligation would exist only if a dying

man had doubts as to the perfection of his contrition, for the wish to

save our souls obliges us to avoid all risk. Then, however, it would be

sufficient to name one or two sins and make a general accusation of the

rest.[228]

Moreover, a sufficiently perfect confession may be made even through an

interpreter without the latter acquiring any knowledge of the sins. The

confessor, for example, in the case of the sick, may arrange through

the interpreter a system of signs, such as pressure of the hand, motion

of the head or eyes, by which the invalid may answer the questions put

by the priest through the interpreter, who may be placed with his back

to the priest and penitent; by a method of this kind even the number of

sins may be ascertained. Of course in a case like this the confessor must

be careful not to betray the penitent’s replies by the nature of his

questions. If a male penitent express a wish to confess in this manner,

he may be allowed to do so.[229]

A confession made in writing is _per se_ valid; on the other hand, as we

have already seen, absolution conveyed _per literas_ is null. The custom,

however, of making the confession by word of mouth must be strictly

adhered to (hence many theologians add to the other properties of a good

confession that it should be _vocalis_), and unless there are pressing

reasons for the contrary practice the confession should not be made by

writing or by any other system of signs; a sufficiently good reason for

allowing it would be great shame in mentioning certain sins or a defect

in speech. In such cases the priest would read the writing and the

penitent make some acknowledgment by word of mouth, such as, “I accuse

myself of all contained in the paper.” If the whole confession without

any good reason were made by writing or by signs, it would be invalid,

for the penitent would have sinned gravely by such an action unless he

had acted _bona fide_.[230]

A dumb penitent who can write and has no other way of making his

confession is, according to the _sententia communis et probabilior_,

obliged to make his confession in writing, for this would not be

burdensome to him. The opponents of this view insist on the danger of

the confession being revealed and, in consequence, deny the obligation

of making the confession in writing. Such a risk, as experience shows,

is not usually to be feared and may easily be avoided. There are indeed

not a few penitents who to secure their own peace of mind always write

their confessions and read them off to the priest. If, however, in a

particular case there is danger of revelation or any other serious

inconvenience to the penitent in consequence of his writing, there is no

obligation. So teaches St. Thomas, and with him are Suarez, Lugo, Sporer,

Salmanticenses, etc.[231]

12. _Lacrimabilis._ The confession should be made with real sorrow. It is

not necessary that it be accompanied by tears or sighs and other external

signs of the kind, but it is required that there be a real sorrow and

horror of sin. The internal sorrow should become _sensibilis_ or evident

by the confession so as to form _materia sacramenti_. The sentiment of

contrition can always be roused by grace, while tears are not in our

power.

13. _Accelerata._ The confession should be prompt; there should be no

delay in making it after mortal sin has been committed. This is not of

precept, but it is a counsel which should be readily followed by any one

who realizes the horror of sin and its consequences.

14. _Fortis._ The confession should be made with great courage, all

hindrances to a candid avowal of one’s sins being put aside, especially

false shame and the fear of losing the good esteem of the priest. It is

the delight of the devil, not before, but after entrapping a soul into

sin, to work upon the feeling of shame so vehemently that the penitent

is tempted to conceal sins which are particularly shameful. In this case

the penitent must use all his courage, and by reflecting on God’s command

and the awful consequences of a bad confession get the victory over this

false shame. He must put into practice Tertullian’s maxim, _Pereat pudor,

ne pereat anima_.

15. _Accusans._ The confession should be an accusation and not a series

of excuses. Thus the penitent ought to impute the sins to himself and

not to other causes, temptations of the devil, the passions, natural

weakness, etc., nor to the companions by whose advice or orders he has

gone astray. There may be of course occasions where what is objectively

a mortal sin may become only venial or perhaps no sin at all, through

inculpable forgetfulness or absent-mindedness or inadvertence.

16. _Parere paratus._ The penitent should be disposed to obey the

priest’s advice and commands; hence he should be ready to adopt the means

suggested for his improvement, to follow out the advice given, to avoid

the occasions of sin which are pointed out to him, and to accept the

penance which is imposed on him.

ARTICLE II

THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONFESSION

21. Necessity of the Integrity of Confession.

The confession is complete when the penitent reveals all the sins

which he is bound to tell. A distinction is drawn between material and

formal integrity. A confession is materially complete when a penitent

discloses all the mortal sins committed since Baptism which have not yet

been submitted to the keys, together with their number and species. On

the other hand, the confession is formally complete when he confesses

all the mortal sins which he is morally able and bound to reveal _hic

et nunc_.[232] From this definition it is clear that where there is

material integrity there is also formal integrity; a confession, however,

which is formally complete need not on this account be materially so.

With respect to the obligation of the integrity of confession we may lay

down the following propositions:—

I. It is of divine precept to confess all mortal sins committed after

Baptism. 1. This follows from the words by which Christ instituted the

Sacrament; by them He gave the Sacrament a judicial character. So teaches

the Council of Trent.[233] From the institution of the Sacrament of

Penance “the universal Church has always recognized that the complete

confession of sins was also instituted by Our Lord, and is necessary

_jure divino_ for all who have sinned after Baptism. For Our Lord Jesus

Christ when about to ascend into heaven left the priests as His vicars

and judges, by whom all mortal sins into which the faithful had fallen

were to be judged, that in virtue of the power of the keys they might

pronounce sentence of forgiveness or retention.” The priest is therefore

a judge, and as judge should pronounce the absolution. But the sentence

of a judge is valid only when it turns on the facts of the case; hence

a knowledge of the latter is required on the part of the judge. In

consequence the confessor, in order to pronounce a valid sentence, must

know intimately the facts of the case, the state of the sinner. Now

the facts of the case are the mortal sins of the penitent; hence the

confessor must be made acquainted with these; and as he can only learn

them from the penitent himself, the latter is bound to make a complete

statement of them.

2. The essential object of this Sacrament is the forgiveness of sins that

have been confessed. But one mortal sin cannot be forgiven apart from the

rest, since forgiveness is the result of the influx of sanctifying grace,

which does not remove sin as stains might be rubbed from a metal surface,

but at once raises man from a state of sin to a state of grace, from

being an enemy of God to being His friend. Moreover, sanctifying grace

and mortal sin cannot exist together in the soul. From this it follows

that all sins must be told without exception, in order that they may all

be remitted.

3. Add to this the essential connection between the judicial power of

the priest in the Sacrament and his power of punishing sin or imposing

a penance for it; but since the penance must be proportioned to the

misdeeds, the priest cannot exercise his powers properly unless, at

least, the mortal sins have been fully confessed. If, as must happen

at times, it is inopportune or, in fact, quite impossible to assign a

penance bearing any proportion to the number and magnitude of the sins,

that is quite _per accidens_ and the decision of the question is the

affair of the judge, not of the penitent. That Christ gave His Church the

power of punishing sin is abundantly proved by the practice of so many

centuries during which definite penances were assigned to certain sins.

Since, therefore, the Church of divine right can mete out just punishment

for sin, the penitent is bound by divine precept to submit himself to the

Church by an entire confession of all mortal sins. From the fact that

the confessor must pronounce sentence and impose a suitable penance, the

Council of Trent concludes “that all mortal sins of which the penitent

is conscious after diligent search must be confessed, even though they

be quite secret sins and only against the last two commandments of the

decalogue.”

4. Finally, the Sacrament of Penance has of its very nature another end

in view, that of preventing relapse. Thus the confessor is at the same

time the physician of the soul, empowered and obliged to prescribe the

means of reform. This duty can be effectually carried out only when he

knows intimately the penitent’s state of soul, so that the latter is

obliged to submit to his healing art all the mortal wounds of the soul.

Hence the Council of Trent anathematizes all who teach “that for

remission of sins in the Sacrament of Penance it is not necessary _jure

divino_ that all and every mortal sin be confessed of which a man is

conscious after faithful and diligent search.”[234]

II. The material integrity, however, is not always necessary for the

validity of confession and for obtaining its benefits. At times it

is morally and even physically impossible, either through inculpable

forgetfulness or for other reasons. Now God does not command

impossibilities. Hence the Council of Trent teaches: “The remaining sins

which escape the diligent inquiry of the penitent are considered as

included in the same accusation,” and so are forgiven, as though they had

been confessed. Hence it is abundantly clear that the material integrity

of the confession is not always necessary.

III. The formal integrity is, on the other hand, always necessary for

the validity of the Sacrament, and belongs to its essence. A penitent,

for instance, who out of shame conceals a mortal sin, transgresses

Christ’s command which obliges us to submit all mortal sins by a sincere

confession to the power of the keys, incurring at the same time a mortal

sin by his bad confession; such a confession cannot be valid nor have

any good effect. This is also taught by the Council of Trent[235] in the

following words: “While the faithful earnestly endeavor to confess all

the sins of which they are conscious, they present them to the Divine

Mercy that they may all be forgiven; those, however, who do otherwise and

knowingly conceal sins, present nothing to God’s goodness to be forgiven

through the priest. If the sick man is ashamed to show his wounds to the

physician, the latter cannot cure what is unknown to him.”[236]

To have a perfect understanding of the preceding, we must distinguish

between what is of the essence of the Sacrament and that which flows as

a consequence of the divine command. When anything is wanting to the

essence of the Sacrament, though the defect may be due to no fault on

the part of the person, the Sacrament is invalid; if, on the contrary,

there be wanting some requirement of divine precept, making the defect

culpable, the Sacrament is indirectly invalid because contrition is

wanting, since contrition cannot exist in any one who is in the very

act of sin; if, however, the defect be inculpable, the result of

forgetfulness or ignorance, the Sacrament is valid; the sins which were

omitted through no fault of the penitent are indirectly forgiven by the

infusion of sanctifying grace. There remains, however, the obligation of

making good the defect afterwards, as we shall see later.

22. Extent of the Integrity of Confession.

For a complete confession it is necessary to state clearly and precisely

not only all mortal sins, but their number and species and the

circumstances which change the species. This is the doctrine of the

Council of Trent when it enjoins the confession of each and every sin;

to do this a man must give the number of the mortal sins committed.

One who has missed Mass ten times and merely confesses, “I have missed

Mass,” has not confessed each and every sin, for an indeterminate number,

by the very fact of being undetermined, does not necessarily mean the

number ten; it may mean ten, but that possibility does not indicate

the number. With regard to the confession of the species and of the

circumstances changing the species, the Council teaches expressly that

the circumstances which change the kind (_species_) of sin ought to be

confessed. Since those circumstances are to be expressed which change the

kind of sin, nothing can be clearer than that, in accordance with the

decision of the Council, the sins are to be confessed according to their

species.[237]

The reasons which the Council[238] gives for insisting on the duty of

confessing the species of sin are that otherwise the sins would not

be perfectly revealed by the penitent or understood by the judge, and

that without a knowledge of the species of the sin the judge would be

unable to pronounce on the gravity of the sin and to inflict a suitable

punishment for it.

Thus the reasons which hold for the completeness of the confession

require also the species and number of the sins; without them the

confession has not the completeness which is demanded for it. The

confessor is a judge who must have the most accurate knowledge of

his penitent in order to pronounce sentence and inflict the necessary

penalty. Now he cannot know the state of his penitent unless he is

acquainted with the number and species of his sins, for it is the

species which determines the nature or essence of the sin. Besides,

the sins ought to be confessed according to their malice, but this can

be estimated only from the kind of sin and the number of times it has

been committed. Not all sins against the sixth commandment have the

same malice or belong to the same species, for to the special malice

of impurity may be added that of sacrilege or adultery if the sinner

be consecrated by vow to God or in the married state. And there is no

doubt that one who has committed a crime ten times is more deserving of

punishment than he who has fallen only once.

The penitent must confess the _species infima_, the ultimate species of

his sin, for this is what is ordinarily understood by the species, and

the Council of Trent insists upon this obligation. Hence it is not enough

to say, “I have sinned in thought, word, and deed,” or, “I have broken

the commandments of the Church”; the penitent must add the species, the

particular commandment broken, the observance of Sunday, fasting, yearly

confession, etc., and in addition the penitent must give the _species

infima_, whether he has missed Mass or broken his fast or abstinence. Nor

is the following accusation sufficient: “I have sinned against the sixth

commandment,” “I have been wanting in purity,” or the like; the species

must be given, defining whether the sin be incest or adultery, etc.,

or whether by thoughts, words, etc. So, too, when a penitent accuses

himself of sin against faith, it is not sufficient; he should state the

particular act by which he has sinned, whether by heresy, by unbelief, by

indifference, etc.

Supposing the penitent cannot remember the _species infima_ of a sin

which he has committed, he must state against what virtue he has sinned;

or if he cannot remember this, but has only a recollection of having

sinned mortally, he must confess this. This is the opinion of all

theologians (_communis et certa doctrina_).

To indicate fully the species of the sin, one must also tell whether

the sinful acts were external and whether the evil effects have been

retracted.

Since the sins themselves are the particular matter of the sacramental

tribunal, they must, as Lehmkuhl shows, be confessed _secundum specificam

distinctionem_, _i.e._ according to their specific differences. This is

not at all the same thing as the obligation of confessing the specific

malice (_specifica malitia_). Sins are human acts (_actus humanus_), and

so they may be classed _in specie actus_ as well as _in specie malitiæ_;

to desire to steal and to steal are acts having the same specific malice,

but they are not specifically the same act. Indeed no one would maintain

that one might confound the two sins in confession by merely confessing

the specific malice.[239] Hence the _actus externus_ which completes the

internal act[240] as a sin and on that account is _in se_ opposed to

right order and morality must be mentioned expressly in confession. The

_actus externus_ is either _commissio_ or _omissio_ (sin of commission

or omission). Thus, for example, the absence from Mass on a Sunday or

a holyday of obligation must be confessed, whether it happen through

indifference or love of study or idleness, because the absence from Mass

is what is objectively opposed to the law and what has been voluntarily

incurred. The wounding and killing of a man are external actions which

_in ratione peccati_ complete the sinful act of the will, and so it is

not enough to confess, “I had the desire to wound.” If he has inflicted

a wound, it is enough to say, “I have dealt a wound,” for he has

sufficiently indicated by that avowal the internal act. If, again, a man

wounded another intending to kill, it is not enough to say, “I intended

to kill,” but he must add, “and I wounded the man.”[241]

With regard to the obligation of confessing the effect[242] of a mortal

sin theologians are not of one mind, since it is not always clear whether

the evil effect flowing from a cause voluntarily chosen is _in sese_ a

sin or not. It is certain that the _malus effectus_ of a sinful action

must be confessed if such effect fall under a reservation, or under a

censure, or if the question of restitution is to be settled. However, it

is certain that if such effects were not at all foreseen, there is no

obligation to confess them. Thus a murder committed under the influence

of drink need not be confessed, supposing that such a consequence had

been altogether unforeseen.

As to the other cases, those theologians who deny that the _malus

effectus voluntarius in causa_ is a sin, because the effect is no longer

_in se_ voluntary or, being beyond the control of the will, is desired

only in its cause (_voluntarius in causa est_), maintain that such an

effect need not be confessed. Other theologians, as St. Thomas, Suarez,

Soto, Sanchez, etc., make a distinction, teaching that the _malus

effectus_ is no sin, when the evil will has been retracted by contrition

and repentance before the act has taken place whose effect cannot be

hindered; if, however, the evil will lasts, the effect is a sin. Hence a

priest who, to escape saying his office, would throw his breviary into

the sea, but repent of his act immediately after, is not obliged to

confess the omission of his office, since the omission was not a sin, but

only the evil effect of a sin already repented of. So, too, a man who

has given another poison and, before death takes place, confesses his

crime with sorrow is not obliged, after death has taken place, to accuse

himself again of murder. On the other hand, the evil effects which take

place when the will did not retract must be confessed, since they are

at least the completion of the external sin and share in the malice of

the cause. Mazzotta makes a distinction here which is very apt. He says:

if an effect follows from a sinful act, and though it may be prevented,

is not so prevented, the penitent must confess the effect because it

completes his neglect in so far as this is an external sin; if the

effect cannot be hindered, there is no obligation _per se loquendo_ to

confess the _malus effectus_, for it is neither a sin _in se_ nor does it

externally complete the sin.[243]

To the preceding we add two observations:—

1. Since the duty of making a complete confession rests on a command,

we are not obliged _per se_ to confess what is _probabiliter_ not

enjoined by the precept, for, in accordance with sound principles of

probabilism, a doubtful law has no binding force. To this we may add,

that a confession is valid in which the penitent omits nothing through

any grievous fault of his own, that is, knowingly or through culpable

ignorance and carelessness. Now the principles of probability furnish a

practically safe conscience with regard to the limits of a command; hence

in this case the confession is entire, at least formally entire, and that

is sufficient for the validity and grace of the Sacrament.

2. If the penitent, through forgetfulness or for some lawful reason,

without any blame attaching to him, omits to mention something which is

necessary for the integrity of the confession, he is bound to disclose

it on the next occasion; for, by the decision of the Council of Trent,

each and every mortal sin of which one is conscious must be mentioned,

that it may be directly remitted; hence if sins occur to the mind which

have not yet been confessed, they must be submitted to the power of the

keys. Thus Alexander VII condemned the proposition: Sins which have been

forgotten or omitted in confession on account of instant danger to life

or for any other reason, need not be mentioned in the next confession

(cf. Prop. 11 damn.).

23. The Number of Sins in Confession.

The declaration of the number of sins is another feature completing the

Sacrament. The penitent must give the number of his mortal sins so far as

he can; if he knows exactly how often he has fallen into a mortal sin, he

must state that number of times, neither increasing nor diminishing; if,

despite careful examination and reflection he cannot arrive at the real

number, he must give it as near as possible, adding the words “about”

or “at least”; in so doing he fulfills his obligation, for he has done

what he could, which is sufficient to enable a judgment to be pronounced

_humano modo_. Should the penitent, after having thus confessed in all

good faith, discover later on a more accurate number than that confessed,

he is not obliged to make another confession to supply this number; nor

should he disquiet himself, for the round numbers given in the first

confession included everything; it is only when the newly discovered

number is considerably greater than the vague estimate of his first

confession that he is obliged to confess again, because the number, and,

in consequence, the sin, was not perfectly confessed, since a far greater

number cannot be considered as included in his former round estimate.[244]

The question naturally arises what the confessor is to understand by a

numeral qualified by “about” or “at least.” As a general rule the greater

the number expressed, the greater is the number that may be understood

as implied; for instance, “about three times” would mean from two to

four times; “about five times,” from four to six times; “about ten

times,” from eight to twelve times; “about one hundred times,” at most

from ninety to one hundred and ten times. It is clear from this general

appreciation of theologians that the numbers implied by the term “about”

increase in proportion to the actual number mentioned. If the penitent

discovers that he has mentioned a number considerably less than the

truth, he must remedy the defect; if he has erred by giving too large

a number, he need not correct the mistake, because the larger number

includes the less. Moreover, it is advisable, instead of using high

numbers, to state how often the sin has been committed in the course of

a week or a month, etc., especially with regard to frequent or interior

sins. Indeed with habitual sinners it suffices to state how long they

have indulged the evil habit, and that they have given willful consent

more or less daily whenever occasion offered; this is enough, when the

actual number of sins is so doubtful that there would always be a grave

risk of a mistake in trying to determine it. “The confessor, when he

knows the period over which the accusation extends, may easily and safely

form his opinion in the case of a penitent whose will is habitually

inclined to sin, that the penitent has sinned as often as there were

necessary interruptions to his sin.”[245] This method in determining

the number of sins is as well founded as the other, for in this case,

too, all is done that is morally possible. Hence the confessor should

never force his penitent to give a determinate number, for this is in

most cases impossible. On the other hand, the confessor should help the

penitent to state the number in the way we have indicated.[246]

Hence a prostitute makes a sufficient statement in confessing how often

she has been accustomed to sin each day or week, at the same time telling

the species, or at least the more general species, of the sins so far

as possible; she would make a perfect confession by an accusation such

as follows: “I have spent so many years in this state of sin, and as

occasion offered I sinned with all who came, married and unmarried, and

also with those who were bound by vow.” Penitents must always give at

least the more general specific characters of their sins, and the number

of times per day or week they have sinned.[247]

A similar difficulty is presented in the case of those who have a

deeply rooted habit of sin—those, for example, who constantly entertain

impure desires with regard to women whom they chance to meet; it is

very difficult in such a case to give any number. Such people make a

perfect confession by stating that they are given to this habit, adding

whether they indulge frequently in the day or week; besides this they

should mention at least the more general specific characters, whether

they indulge these desires with regard to married people or relations or

persons consecrated to God.[248]

The same difficulty arises with regard to uneducated and ignorant people

who have to accuse themselves of impure conversations carried on at their

work during the whole day, on all sorts of subjects and before all kinds

of companions. They, too, may confess the number and species of their

sins as we have indicated above.[249]

Lugo and Sporer would also admit the confession as valid and give

absolution to a thief who accuses himself as follows: “Since I was ten

years old I have been so addicted to stealing that whenever a chance was

offered—and that happened very frequently—I stole what I could; besides I

have stolen sacred objects of considerable value on five occasions or, if

I mistake not, six.”[250]

Though the accusation of the species in confession usually offers more

difficulty than that of the number, yet Lugo advises the more learned

confessors in particular to refrain from being too exacting in demanding

the classification from their penitents. As the less-trained confessor

may fail in this respect by defect, the more learned confessor is exposed

to the danger of excess. The penitent must give the species of the sin,

and the confessor is bound to inquire with due regard to the penitent’s

ability and the knowledge which he had at the time of sinning; for a man

cannot do evil of which he is ignorant; moreover, it is sufficient to

have a general consciousness of grave malice.

24. The Confession of the Circumstances of Sins.

The circumstances under which sins are committed (_conditiones quæ

actus substantiam circumstant atque in ejus moralitatem influunt_) are

of different kinds: 1. Some change the species of the sin (_speciem

mutantes_); for example, the circumstance of a vow or of marriage adds

to the sin of impurity that of sacrilege or that of adultery. 2. Other

circumstances are aggravating (_aggravantes_) in greater or less degree

and _gradum moralitatis mutantes_ or _moralitatem augentes_—such, for

instance, as increase the malice within the limits of the same species;

they are the duration of the act, its intensity, its degree, the manner

of carrying it out, the particular occasion, etc. 3. Other circumstances

are mitigating (_minuentes_, _moralitatem minuentes_), because they

palliate the malice of the act; as, for example, want of advertence, etc.

The circumstances must be confessed:—

I. If they change the species of the sin. This is the express teaching

of the Council of Trent. Hence it is not enough to confess to stealing

if the property of the Church has been taken; for the stealing of a _res

sacra_ is not merely a sin of injustice but a theft from God and so a new

sin. If a child curses its parents, it is not enough to mention that it

cursed, for, since special reverence is due to parents, the violation of

that special reverence is a new sin.

The following circumstances call for particular mention:—

1. The circumstance of the person _who commits the sin_, when with regard

to the matter of the sin he is consecrated to God or bound by vow, as in

sins against purity, or when he sins against the chastity of the married

state, or when he stands in special spiritual relations towards those

with whom he sins.

If a man is consecrated to God by Holy Orders or the religious state and

has to confess a sin against purity, he must mention the circumstance of

his state of life, since he has committed a double sin, one of impurity

and another of sacrilege. Now those who are consecrated to God by Holy

Orders or the religious state incur the special sin of sacrilege when

they fall into impurity; the mere circumstance of the vow being simple

or solemn does not constitute a new species, nor the fact of being

bound to chastity by vows of religion as well as by Orders; these added

details need not be confessed. Many moralists teach also that those incur

sacrilege who are bound by a private vow of chastity, and St. Alphonsus

admits this opinion as probable. Hence all those who have sinned against

purity make a full confession when they confess the circumstance of the

vow by which they are bound, without distinguishing whether the vow

be private, solemn, simple, or that of Orders (_votum solemne ordinis

sacri_).

This is the doctrine of Lugo[251] and Lacroix;[252] Sanchez,[253] too,

defends this view on the ground that the solemn vow is in substance or

_in se_ not distinct from the simple vow. His authority seems to have won

over many theologians to the same opinion. Gury also holds this view; but

the Ratisbon[254] and Roman[255] editions of his valuable manual reject

it in the notes. Lehmkuhl,[256] moreover, opposes it and teaches that to

incur a personal sacrilege (and this is the question under discussion)

the person sinning (or with whom the sin has been committed) must be

consecrated to God _publica auctoritate_, _i.e._ by Holy Orders or by

vows of religion. Hence by the violation of a private vow of chastity

a sacrilege in its strict and proper sense is not incurred, though a

sin is committed against religion by the breach of fidelity to God.

Sacrilege is incurred by the abuse of a sacred object. Now that cannot

be called a sacred object which is privately consecrated to God without

any recognition on the part of the properly constituted authorities. A

private vow cannot produce this effect, for the common teaching of all

theologians, a few excepted, maintains that the breach of such a vow is a

violation of fidelity, not of the reverence due to God, at least not in

such a degree as to constitute a sacrilege strictly so called.[257] Thus

the more correct view is that of those who hold that, in confessing sins

against purity, the circumstance of Holy Orders and of the religious vow

is to be given; for whoever confesses as doubtful a circumstance which

certainly changes the species of the sin does not fulfill the precept of

confession. Such may be the case, for instance, where a priest conceals

the circumstance of Holy Orders and mentions only the violation of the

vow of chastity; for the violation of this vow is certainly a sacrilege

for those in whom it has been solemnized by the reception of “Holy

Orders,” while that of the simple vow is only doubtfully so.[258]

Parish priests by scandalizing their flock, parents their children,

teachers the scholars under their instruction, incur a special sin

against charity. Such persons have in virtue of their office the

strictest obligation to edify those intrusted to them and to keep them

away from harm. The case of a confessor who gives scandal to a person who

happens to be his penitent is different; but he is obliged to mention the

circumstance of this relationship when he has given scandal in connection

with the administration of the Sacrament; his office as confessor only

imposes on him the strict duty of guiding the penitent safely in the

Sacrament of Penance, and is only transitory, ending _per se_ with each

confession, while that of the parish priest and of the others mentioned

above demands a constant spiritual care of those intrusted to them. Other

offices involving authority do not change the species of the scandal

given to subjects, though they may increase its malice, if, for example,

a master leads his servant into sin. The dignity of a person does not of

itself change the species of the sin of scandal given to his subjects,

though it increases the gravity of a sin. If, however, a master has

taken upon himself the duties of a parent, for instance, towards his

servant-girl, he most certainly incurs a new and distinct sin by scandal

given to her, and must mention his special relation to the girl.

2. The circumstance of the person _with whom the sin has been committed_,

if God’s honor has suffered in any way, or if the rights of a third

person or the particular respect or love which is due to the said person

have been violated.

If the person with whom sin has been committed or who has been led

into sin is consecrated to God or bound by a vow referring to the

matter of the sin, a new and special sin is incurred against the

virtue of religion (_i.e._ a sin either of sacrilege or at least of

a violation of the vow). If any one commit a sin of impurity with a

relation, it is no longer merely a sin against purity, it is incest. It

is a probable opinion that the penitent is not obliged to mention the

exact degree of relationship whether by blood or marriage, since that

does not change the species _ratione incestus_, except in the first

degree either of blood-relationship or marriage connection; thus sin

committed between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and

daughter-in-law, mother-in-law and son-in-law, must be mentioned along

with the relationship; yet there is no doubt that _ratione superioritatis

vel pietatis_ sin incurred by a father with his own daughter or his

daughter-in-law, bears a different character from the sin of a son with

his mother or mother-in-law.

The sin of hatred acquires a new species of sinfulness when the hatred is

directed against those more closely connected, _e.g._ parents, children,

grandparents, grandchildren, and against those connected by marriage

in the first degree of the direct line, such as wife, godparents, and

brothers. Hatred of those most nearly related may much more easily become

a grievous sin than hatred of other people.[259]

3. The circumstance of _place_, if a sacrilege is thereby committed;

thus (_a_) if a sacred object or something belonging to the property

of the Church is stolen and taken out from a sacred building, a double

sacrilege, real and local, is committed. The circumstance of the local

sacrilege, that is, the fact that sin has been committed in the Church is

not of itself gravely sinful; hence when a profane object which is merely

accidentally in the Church is stolen, a sacrilege, though not a gravely

sinful one, is added to the sin of theft.[260] (_b_) If the immunity of

a church is violated; (_c_) if anything is done in a church by which it

is polluted in the sense of the canon law; (_d_) if profane occupations

gravely at variance with the holiness of the place are carried on in the

church, whether those occupations be in themselves sinful or not.

4. The circumstance of _time_; if, for instance, the time at which

the sin took place was the reason why the action in question has been

forbidden, and if by the action done at some particular time a special

offence is given to God. This circumstance might involve grave sin

(_a_) if Good Friday were chosen for the performance of an obscene

play; (_b_) if during the forbidden time a marriage were celebrated

with great pomp; (_c_) if during the celebration of Mass or immediately

after holy communion, before the sacred species had time to be altered,

the communicant were to commit some outrage greatly dishonoring to the

Blessed Sacrament. These are circumstances which moralists generally

enumerate as constituting a new species of sinfulness. On the other

hand, a sin committed on a Sunday or feast-day or on a communion-day

is not _per se_ invested with the particular malice of a sacrilege;

nevertheless the fact that a man relapses into his old sins on a

confession or communion day gives ground for the suspicion that his last

confession was devoid of real contrition and in consequence invalid and

sacrilegious.[261]

5. Finally, the circumstance of _the end_ in view is to be confessed if

it is _in se_ mortally sinful; for instance, a man who steals with the

object of getting drunk is guilty of drunkenness as well as theft, and on

that account must confess the purpose for which he stole.[262]

Now there are many penitents who cannot judge of the circumstances

which change the nature of the sin; such must be taught to mention in

confession whatever increases or diminishes the malice of the sin; the

rest will be supplied by the confessor, for he has the duty of asking the

penitent not only about the circumstances which affect the species of

sin, but everything which he considers necessary to aid him in forming

a correct judgment on the spiritual state of the penitent. This right

implies a duty on the part of the penitent to answer the questions

put to him; these questions turn for the most part on habits of sin,

relapses, and proximate occasions of sinning. Hence Innocent XI condemned

the proposition[263] which denies the obligation of answering when the

confessor makes inquiries about habits of sin. The knowledge of a habit

of sin, or of relapses, or of proximate occasions is very important in

settling whether absolution should be given or deferred;[264] besides

it is of supreme importance to the confessor in his office as physician

that he be in a position to suggest the necessary and proper means for

amendment. The penitent must, therefore, if asked, mention former sins

though already confessed. No one need take offense because he is thus

obliged _per accidens_ to repeat sins which have already been duly

forgiven; the purpose is not to pronounce a new sentence upon them, but

to enable the priest to form a correct judgment with regard to the sins

just confessed by noting their relation to former sins, and thus to

prescribe suitable means of correction and provide as much as possible

against relapses.[265]

II. Those circumstances are also to be mentioned by which sins of their

own nature venial become mortal (_C. aggravantes_). Intemperance is not

always a mortal sin, but it becomes so when it deprives a man of the use

of reason; to steal a cheap tool might of itself be only a venial sin,

but if the loss of it deprives a poor artisan of the means of doing a

day’s work, it becomes mortal. In the same way one ought to mention the

mitigating circumstances which make a mortal sin only venial or even no

sin at all.

Moralists give seven cases in which circumstances may change a venial

into a mortal sin:—

1. _Ratione conscientiæ erroneæ_, when a man through ignorance thinks a

venial sin to be mortal. 2. _Ratione scandali vel gravis damni_, when

grave scandal is given to one’s neighbor, doing spiritual or temporal

harm; as, for instance, if a priest were to speak lightly of sacred

things—thus St. Bernard[266] says: _Nugæ inter sæculares nugæ, in ore

sacerdotis blasphemiæ sunt_; or, again, if a priest behaved lightly with

a woman or were seen the worse for drink; or if one were to address a

person rather insultingly, foreseeing that he would break out into a

great rage and blasphemy; or if a woman dress vainly and foresee that

some young man at the sight of her will sin mortally by impious desires.

3. _Ratione pravi finis graviter mali_, when, for example, a small lie is

told to lead a girl into sin. The evil intention may not only increase

the guilt of a sinful action, but it will make an otherwise innocent

action sinful. 4. _Ratione formalis contemptus legis vel superioris_,

when a venial sin is committed out of formal contempt for the law or

lawgiver, or superior, as when a Catholic on an abstinence day, and

quite aware of the duty of abstaining, eats ostentatiously a little

flesh-meat to show the slight regard in which he holds the law.[267]

5. _Ratione pravi affectus in rem alioqui leviter malam_, when a man

is so attached to a venial sin that he would commit it even if it were

mortal, or in consequence of this attachment would be ready to commit

other mortal sins,[268] as, for instance, if a man chose rather to steal

than to overcome his vanity or intemperance. 6. _Ratione periculi seu

occasionis proximæ in peccatum mortale labendi_, when the venial sin is

known, or can be known, as a proximate occasion of mortal sin; a man, for

example, looks at a person of the other sex or entertains rather familiar

relations with her though he knows that such conduct in his case is a

proximate occasion of gravely sinful desires or actions. Even actions

otherwise neutral or indifferent may for this reason become gravely

sinful. 7. _Ratione cujuscunque circumstantiæ quæ mortalem in se malitiam

contineat_; thus insults, proceeding from envy and desire of revenge, may

be mortal sins.[269] Hence these circumstances must be confessed.

The following circumstances may make sins venial which are of their own

nature mortal: 1. Smallness of matter; 2. Want of full advertence; 3.

Want of consent; 4. A false conscience.[270]

These circumstances must be told in confession not in order to secure its

integrity, but that the confessor may be able to form a correct judgment.

III. Circumstances which make but little difference in the gravity of the

sin need not be confessed.

IV. Circumstances which aggravate a mortal sin within its own species to

a notable degree (_circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes intra eamdem

speciem_) need not _per se loquendo_ be confessed; this is the common and

most approved teaching of theologians; other reasons may exist which make

it expedient to mention these circumstances.

At the same time theologians are not unanimous on this subject. Three

opinions are current, and each one of them has its own probability

and its champions of no mean repute. We may as well observe that the

probability of the negative proposition (that there is no obligation) is

conceded even by its opponents; hence all grant (_ex omnium sententia_)

as probable that no one is bound to confess these circumstances, so that

a penitent cannot be forced to disclose them unless some exceptional case

should call for their mention.[271]

Those who maintain the affirmative proposition (_i.e._ the duty of

confessing the _circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_) fall back on

the reasons to which the Council of Trent appeals for the necessity of

confessing _circumstantias speciem mutantes_, viz. in order that the

confessor may make a correct judgment, impose a suitable penance, and

suggest the proper means of help; for, they add, the _circumstantiæ

notabiliter aggravantes_ exercise a great influence on the view of the

case taken by the confessor, and on that account ought to be confessed.

The fact of the Council defining that only the _circumstantiæ speciem

mutantes_ need be disclosed might be easily explained by supposing

that the Council defined only what was certain, and left theological

views where they were, neither approving nor condemning them. The last

conclusion, however, is not justified, for the Council prescribes that

_circumstantiæ speciem mutantes_ should be confessed without determining

any precept for the _aggravantes_, and if equally cogent reason had

existed for confessing both classes of circumstances, there could have

been no reason for restricting the doctrine to those which change the

species; for, says Lugo,[272] it ought to have made the decree to embrace

both classes without imposing any limiting clause.

Further demonstration is taken from the Rituale Romanum, which directs:

“If a penitent has not confessed the number, species, and circumstances

which ought to be given, the confessor must ask him.” By the word species

should be understood the _circumstantiæ speciem mutantes_, and by the

rest the _circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_. This distinction,

however, is unfounded, for by species is meant _species ex parte

objecti_, such as stealing, impurity, etc., and under _circumstantiæ

necessariæ_ the _circumstantiæ speciem mutantes_ or the _species ex parte

circumstantiarum_, as when theft becomes a sacrilege, etc.[273]

Appeal is made also to the Catechismus Romanus, which directs that those

circumstances should be confessed “which greatly increase or diminish

the malice.”[274] It may be objected to this, however, that the context

makes it clear that there is no necessity to interpret the passage as

referring to circumstances which merely increase the degree, not the

kind, of the guilt; for the Catechism continues thus: Many circumstances

are so serious that in them alone lies the whole gravity of the sin, so

that they ought to be confessed; but the only circumstances which can

make a sin grave are those that change the moral or theological species.

This is confirmed by the fact that the Ritual prescribes also that

circumstances very notably diminishing the gravity of the sin should be

revealed; for even the opponents grant that this has force only when the

mitigating circumstances change the species.[275] Moreover, the Catechism

illustrates its doctrine by declaring the necessity of mentioning the

circumstance of “a person consecrated to God” in a case of murder,

and the circumstance of “marriage” in the case of impurity; and these

belong to the circumstances which change the moral species. Finally,

if the Catechism adduces the example of a theft, it is no proof that

the question is not of circumstances which change the species, and when

it declares that one who has stolen one gold piece is less guilty than

another who has stolen a hundred pieces this may easily be understood of

a circumstance which (with regard to the absolute quantity) constitutes

a venial guilt and so introduces a distinct theological species.[276]

This view is held, among others, by Suarez, Sanchez, Gonet, Lacroix.

Other theologians teach that there is no necessity of confessing

_circumstantias notabiliter aggravantes_, but they make an exception

with regard to the circumstance of quantity in cases of theft. St.

Alphonsus, along with other theologians, however, is of opinion that

this exception ought not to be granted if the quantity is described as

being large; for from that the confessor can _per se_ make a sufficiently

accurate judgment. Ballerini remarks very justly that the exception

should be worded thus: Except when some additional reason exists, _e.g._

a reservation directed against a certain kind of incest or against the

theft of some given amount.

The third opinion denies absolutely the necessity of confessing

_circumstantias notabiliter aggravantes_, and this is the more common and

probable view, for which there are many and weighty reasons.

(_a_) The Council of Trent by positively limiting its decision to those

circumstances which change the species seems to exclude positively the

obligation of confessing others. It teaches that circumstances must be

mentioned because without them the sins would not be properly confessed

by the penitents nor properly understood by the judge, so that he would

be incapable of estimating correctly the gravity of the sins and of

imposing a becoming penance. From these words of the Council it is fair

to conclude that the penitent has done all that is necessary when he

confesses those circumstances.

(_b_) Moreover, we are bound only to declare mortal sin; now the

_circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_ within the same species evidently

add no new species of a mortal sin, hence they need not be confessed.

To confess them is an act of perfection, good, of course, and wholesome,

just as is the practice of confessing venial sins.

(_c_) Moreover, many consequences of no small importance follow from

the opposite doctrine. While the present opinion is calculated to set

at rest the minds of both penitent and confessor, the other has quite

the opposite tendency, for who could even approximately gauge how far

circumstances have a notable effect upon the sin? Imagine the difficult

and often fruitless inquiries a confessor would have to make with

many of his penitents in order to come to a satisfactory decision.

It follows, besides, from the opposite view that the _circumstantiæ

notabiliter minuentes_ would have to be confessed or else the confessor

would consider some sin more serious than it actually was, and even our

opponents grant that this is not necessary.

(_d_) Finally, the Church could not in the General Council deduce this

obligation from the words of Christ, otherwise she would not have

given that definite limit to the obligation; the law of confessing

_circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_ is, therefore, at least doubtful,

and a doubtful law has no binding force. Hence this opinion may be

adopted _in praxi_ with a safe conscience even though its opposite be

probable, and whoever follows it does not expose the Sacrament to any

danger of nullity, for to secure validity a formally entire confession is

sufficient, and of that there is no doubt.

This view is taught by St. Thomas (in 4 Sentent. d. 16, Q. 3, art. 2

et Opusc. 7, Q. 6), St. Antoninus, St. Bonaventura, St. Bernardine,

Lugo, Vasquez, Bonacina, Salmanticenses, and the greater number of

the older theologians. Among the more recent it is quite the common

doctrine; compare Gury and the different editors of his text-book, among

whom Ballerini is strongly in favor of this opinion, Müller, Lehmkuhl,

Aertnys, Mark, Konings, Simar, Kenrick, Gousset, Pruner, Ninzatti, etc.

It is, however, advisable to mention these circumstances, and it is

necessary:—

(_a_) When they affect the jurisdiction of the confessor, as in the case

of a censure or reservation. If one has struck a cleric, for instance,

it should be mentioned whether the assault was notorious or not; in

the former case it would be reserved to the Pope, in the latter to the

bishop; also if the person struck were a cardinal, a bishop, apostolic

nuncio, or other cleric, since the excommunication is reserved in a

special manner to the Pope.

(_b_) When they affect the character, in law or justice, of important

acts, as espousals, various contracts, restitution, etc., in order that

the penitent may receive proper instruction; this is most important in

cases of theft.

(_c_) When, finally, the confessor without a knowledge of these

circumstances is unable to direct his penitent as required for his

salvation.

Since these circumstances must be confessed, not because they are

_circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_, but on the grounds alleged, the

confessor has a right to question about them and the penitent is obliged

to answer as we have already observed.

Moreover, the faithful usually add these circumstances in confession

because it gives greater peace of heart and more abundant fruit; besides,

a better and safer guidance is thus secured and an opportunity of

practicing humility.

As to the utility and advisability of confessing circumstances all

theologians agree in making an exception with regard to sins against the

sixth commandment; for beyond what is necessary to determine the species

of the sin the confessor ought not to ask the penitent any further

question nor allow him to make any further statement. Even with regard to

the species theologians all teach with one accord that in so dangerous a

matter where scandal may so easily be given one may at times refrain from

inquiring into the species.[277]

Cedreno gives useful advice for the confession of the circumstances

attending sin: “If the person with whom you have sinned, the place where

the sin was committed, or the manner of its accomplishment, or any other

detail, gives you special remorse, then mention that point, for it will

then be the confessor’s duty to decide from these indications how far

they affect the species of the sin or only increase its gravity.”

25. The Confession of Doubtful Sins.

There are three points of view from which a sin may be regarded as

doubtful:—

1. With regard to the existence of the sinful action, as when a man

doubts whether he really committed the action.

2. With regard to the quality of the sin, as when a man knows he has

sinned, but doubts whether it is a mortal or a venial sin.

3. With regard to the confession of a sin, as when a man knows he sinned

grievously but doubts whether he ever confessed his sin.

The doubt may be positive or negative. A negative doubt exists when no

solid reason can be given either _pro_ or _con_, but only insignificant

arguments for both sides, so that no decision can be arrived at. A

positive doubt exists where two contradictory propositions have each

solid reasons in their support.

Armed with these premises we are now in a position to set forth the

doctrine with regard to the confession of doubtful sins.

I. A sin need not be confessed when there is no positive reason to

suspect its existence or gravity, or when there is positive ground

against believing its existence or gravity, even where there is a solid

reason on the other side. In other words, a sin negatively doubtful from

both points of view, or positively doubtful from both points of view, or

negatively doubtful on the side affirming guilt is not necessary matter

of confession; but a sin positively doubtful on the side affirming guilt

and only negatively doubtful on the side denying guilt, must be confessed.

With the exception of a few rigorists, theologians are unanimous in

teaching that a sin positively doubtful from both sides need not be

confessed; for if there is a _dubium facti_ which establishes the

obligation of a law, liberty is in possession, _i.e._ there is no

obligation. But in our case the fact of the sin is doubtful, thus we

are not obliged to confess it. Moreover, when the existence of a law is

doubtful we are not bound by it; but the law of confessing doubtful sins

is uncertain; hence we are not bound by it.

If, however, a man in danger of death doubted whether he had committed

a grievous sin, knowing that he had never been to confession since

that doubtful act, he would be obliged, in order to avoid the risk of

damnation, not indeed to confess that sin, but either to receive the

Sacrament of Penance, in which he confesses other sins, that thus he

might receive at least indirect absolution if his doubtful sins were

really mortal, or he should at least make an act of perfect contrition.

In such a case the act of perfect contrition _sine voto confitendi_ would

be sufficient, since no obligation binds him to confess the _peccata

dubia_.[278] So much for sins which are positively doubtful on both sides.

If, however, a very strong argument affirms our guilt with only very

slight reason to deny it, we are obliged, according to the unanimous

teaching of theologians, to confess those doubtful sins, for in such a

case the conviction of our innocence does not rest on solid grounds. Of

course our guilt is not conclusively proved; but in these things where

evidence is often wanting we must be led by principles of sound moral

certainty, even when they are unfavorable to us, since confession is

not only a burden, but a Sacrament, and as such a means for greater

sanctification.[279] In this case one cannot argue that _in dubio

facti_ (and this undoubtedly exists) the opposing arguments cancel one

another, as might two opposing witnesses; for this only takes place when

the two arguments are of the same kind and quite similar, as in the case

of two opposing eye-witnesses, when it is certain that one of the two

is mistaken and neither can be believed since it is not known where the

mistake lies. It is quite different, however, when the opposing reasons

are of distinct classes and unlike, as in the case of two witnesses

who do not recount what they themselves have seen, but bear witness to

various conjectures _pro_ and _con_; then they both deserve reasonable

attention, since the conjectures on either side rest on different motives.

If a penitent doubts positively whether he has sinned in some action, and

it is probable that advertence or consent, etc., was wanting, or that

full deliberation or consent was absent, he is not obliged to accuse

himself of this action in confession.

On the other hand, theologians are not so clear as to the obligation of

confessing sins which are doubtful _dubio negativo pro utraque parte_.

The older theologians, among whom St. Thomas and other eminent doctors

are to be found (Sanchez enumerates forty), insist on the duty of

confessing this class of doubtful sins. This opinion is founded on the

decree of the Council of Trent declaring that all grave sins _quorum

conscientiam habent_ (_sc._ _pœnitentes_) must be confessed; thus the

penitent must confess the sins as they are in themselves, those which are

certain as certain and those which are doubtful as doubtful. This is the

general and constant practice of the faithful, and by that fact we may

consider it as proceeding from Christ’s institution.[280]

Other theologians, of no small weight both by their number and authority,

do not impose the obligation of confessing these doubtful sins. St.

Alphonsus also defended this view in a very convincing manner on

internal grounds. The Council of Trent binds penitents only to reveal

those sins _quorum conscientiam habent_; it says nothing about _uti

sunt in conscientia_, or telling undoubted sins as certain and doubtful

as doubtful, but only _quorum conscientiam habent_, which means those

of which they have certain knowledge; for, according to St. Bernard,

_conscientia_ is nothing more than _cordis scientia_ and _judicium

practicum_ on the sins incurred. Now doubtful knowledge is neither

knowledge (_scientia_) nor a judgment (_judicium_), but a _suspensio

judicii_; hence no one can have a _conscientia peccati_ who has no proof

that he has incurred sin. This is the answer to the arguments of the

first opinion. Weight is added to this answer by the very words of the

same Council: “It is well known that in the Church of God nothing more is

demanded of the penitents but that each one after diligent examination

... confess those sins by which he is conscious to himself of having

grievously offended his Lord and God; the remaining sins, however,

which do not occur to him after diligent examination are considered as

included generally in the same confession.” Since, therefore, concludes

the holy Doctor, the penitent is not bound to confess his venial sins,

he is not bound to confess the doubtful ones, for the Council says

he is not obliged to confess any but the mortal sins of which he has

knowledge; but to doubt is not “to have knowledge,” it is rather “to

be wanting in knowledge.” Moreover, an _onus certum_ ought not to be

inflicted for a _delictum dubium_, and in the doubt whether the law

exists there is no obligation to observe the law. Finally, he who doubts

without good foundation should not heed the doubt. The faithful, it is

true, do confess these doubtful sins in order to gain peace and ease of

conscience, but not because they are bound to do so; it is also customary

and general for them to confess those which are positively dubious, and

no one holds that this is of obligation, not even our opponents.

The grounds for this opinion, and the objections to the opposite view,

are so convincing that it may be regarded as the more probable and be

followed _tuta conscientia_.[281] The following objection has no weight.

Since confession is a necessary means for salvation, and since in such

a case a man must take the safer means rather than trust to a probable

opinion, he is thus obliged to confess _peccata dubia_. A distinction

must be made. The Sacrament of Penance, and particularly the absolution

in which its efficacy for the most part consists, may certainly be called

a necessary means for salvation _in re vel in voto_ with regard to those

who have committed mortal sin after Baptism; besides, if a man doubt

whether he has sinned grievously, either perfect contrition or absolution

are necessary, and for that reason confession also in so far as this is

required to obtain valid absolution or sanctifying grace through the

absolution; but the integrity of confession can be regarded as necessary

only in so far as it is proved to be the prescribed means of obtaining

absolution _licite et valide_. The proof, however, for the necessity of

confessing doubtful sins is so little substantiated that, as we have

shown, the very opposite is proved from the words of the Council and the

explanation of St. Alphonsus.[282]

When one considers the teaching of those older theologians who maintained

the necessity of confessing _mortalia negative dubia_, it is not

difficult to see that, while their mode of expression comprises more,

yet, they really meant to say that a penitent is not to consider himself

free from all obligation of confessing his sin for some paltry reason

which is in his favor, though knowing at the same time that there are

weighty reasons to be urged against him and his freedom from mortal

sin.[283]

From this teaching it follows that he who has a negative doubt as to

whether he sinned is not _stricte loquendo_ obliged to confess before

communicating; but in order to make sure of the required dispositions he

ought either to make an act of perfect contrition or receive sacramental

absolution after confessing something which is included under _materia

certa_.[284]

For the rest it is in practice generally recommended to the faithful,

in order to secure peace of soul, to mention even their doubtful mortal

sins, though there is no obligation to do so, and the confession without

the accusation of these sins is complete; they must, however, be

instructed to confess these sins as doubtful and not as certain. If a

penitent have only sins of this sort to accuse himself of, he has a right

to conditional absolution on the first accusation of them. It is better,

however, to add other certain matter as the sins of one’s past life; this

is required if the absolution is to be unconditional.

In practice the following rules might be profitably observed:—

1. If there be a doubt as to whether the matter of a sin be grave,

ill-instructed penitents (_pœnitentes rudes_) should confess their doubts

because (_a_) they cannot guide their own consciences, or they do so

with great difficulty, and because (_b_) for the most part they do not

know how to distinguish between mortal and venial sin. Exception, of

course, is made for the scrupulous who are not in the habit of frequently

committing mortal sin. Well-instructed penitents are certainly not

obliged to confess doubtful mortal sins, since they are in a position

to guide their own consciences; yet they are advised to do so, for then

their confessor is informed of the dangers to which his penitent is

exposed and can warn, instruct, and free him from them.

2. If the doubt turns on the free consent of the will or full advertence,

(_a_) penitents of timorous consciences, who do not ordinarily sin

mortally, are in no way obliged to confess doubtful sins, for the

presumption is in their favor: _ex communiter contingentibus fit prudens

præsumptio_. Since they are not in the habit of sinning mortally, it is

fair to presume that their doubtful sins are not mortal; indeed they

ought not infrequently to be deterred from confessing them if they are

inclined to scrupulosity. “A man of approved virtue who is worried as to

whether he has consented to an impure temptation may be morally certain

that he has not consented; for it is morally impossible that a will so

constant in good resolutions should change without giving unmistakable

signs.”[285] (_b_) Penitents who, though not timorous, are not lax are

certainly not obliged to confess a doubtful consent, though they may be

advised to do so to secure peace of conscience and the other benefits

which follow from the practice. (_c_) If, however, the penitent has a

lax conscience, he is obliged to confess his doubtful sins, for the

presumption is against him.[286]

If, then, a pious person who often renews his resolution never to sin

mortally is not certain that he has ever revoked that resolution; if

he is startled when he perceives the evil and promptly repels the

temptation, and doubts whether he has given way; if he remembers that he

was in an excited state of mind; if he cannot tell whether the thought or

action took place in sleep or in waking moments, the presumption is that

there was no full consent.

The presumption, however, is against those who are accustomed to fall

easily into grave sin; had they withstood the temptation they would

remember what effort they made to overcome it. Hence Lacroix[287] very

justly concludes that such people never have a real negative doubt, since

the presumption determines the probability of consent or resistance to

the temptation.

Now comes the question as to what the penitent ought to do who has

confessed a mortal sin as doubtful and afterwards discovers that he has

certainly committed it; is he obliged to confess the sin anew or may he

consider the case closed? The sin has undoubtedly been remitted directly

by the power of the keys, since the conditional sentence “if thou hast

really sinned” becomes absolute where the condition has been verified.

St. Alphonsus[288] teaches that sins confessed as doubtful should be

mentioned again as certain if it turns out that they are certain; and

this doctrine he affirms to be the common opinion. The defenders of this

view maintain as their great argument that the sin was not confessed

as it was in the conscience at the moment when it was committed; then

it was a _peccatum certum_; moreover, they argue, the sentence passed

on a doubtful sin is quite different from that passed on a sin which

is certain. Yet in the case of sins which have been confessed in round

numbers St. Alphonsus himself teaches that even when the penitent

afterwards recalls the exact number, he is not obliged to confess

again; why, then, should this obligation be imposed on the penitent who

has confessed his sin as doubtful when he discovers later that it was

certain? A man who has confessed that he has committed a mortal sin about

ten times and later discovers that the number was twelve must either

confess as certain the two or more sins which were previously confessed

as doubtful, or, if this obligation is denied, he cannot be obliged to

confess a sin again which he has discovered to be certain after having

already confessed it as doubtful. That in the first instance the

penitent is free of all obligation to confess again, is the _sententia

communissima_, and it is borne out by the practice of the faithful; hence

in the other case the same freedom must be granted, for both decisions

rest on the same grounds. Nor can it be objected that the number of the

sins is merely a circumstance, while the sin itself is a substantial

fact, for the number belongs to the very substance, since it indicates so

many substantial acts.[289]

It is true that St. Alphonsus calls the affirmative opinion _communis_;

but since Lugo (though even he gave his adhesion practically to the view

of St. Alphonsus in consideration of the great number of theologians

who favored it) has combated the view with strong arguments, later

theologians adopted his side, so that the affirmative proposition

maintaining the duty of confessing again can no longer be considered as

_communis_. At present, as Ballerini aptly shows, the other view is the

_communior sententia_ and is established on good external and internal

probability, and may be unhesitatingly considered as _probabilior et

communior_.[290]

II. If a man is certain that he has committed a grave sin but doubts upon

slight grounds whether he has confessed it, he must accuse himself of it;

but if he has a sufficient probability that it has been confessed, he is

under no obligation.

In this case some positive reason is required to show that he has

complied with the obligation of confessing the sin, for an undoubted

command is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfilment; but where there is

really good reason to suppose that the sin has been confessed, that is,

a reason which, though open to some doubts, offers some probability,

the obligation may, in accordance with the principles of probability, be

regarded as not binding. “For if we are to avoid making laws and duties

odious, we ought to concede something to human probability taken in a

broad sense; thus presumption in a case of this kind often presents proof

of sufficient probability and security.”[291]

Hence a man who is accustomed to make his confessions with care, and

later on is unable to remember whether he has confessed this or that sin,

may presume that he has confessed it, and he is not obliged to confess it

again. This is the teaching of many eminent theologians.[292] Although

St. Alphonsus affirms that a man is obliged to mention again a sin which

has probably been already confessed, he does not condemn the contrary

opinion. If, again, a man who has been converted from a habit of sin, and

for a long period has been leading a good life, begins to doubt whether,

in the confessions either general or particular which have been made with

suitable care, some sin or circumstance has been withheld, he may be

forbidden to mention that sin or circumstance, or even to think of the

past at all. Finally, scrupulous people ought only to confess their past

sins when they are quite certain that they have never confessed them;

this is the _sententia communissima_.[293]

On the whole it is recommended in practice to mention doubtfully

confessed sins, because their confession helps much to peace of soul and

allays all anxieties.

Quite distinct from the preceding question is the case in which a man

fully confesses as certain some sin which he has committed, but which

neither he nor the confessor considered at the time as a mortal sin; if

afterwards, in consequence of better instruction or advice, he discovers

that the sin was mortal _ex genere suo_, he is not obliged to repeat it,

for it was already perfectly confessed and it is not necessary for the

validity of confession that the penitent or confessor should know that

the matter of a sin is grave, and it is the matter only that is involved

in this case.[294]

III. The sins which have been incurred after a doubtfully valid Baptism

must be confessed when Baptism is given conditionally. Lehmkuhl treats

very fully of this question and remarks that on this point there can be

no doubt after the late decisions of the Apostolic See. Many theologians

were inclined to free converts from the obligation of making a confession

of their sins on the ground that, their Baptism by a heretical minister

being doubtful, the sins committed after Baptism were doubtful matter for

confession; hence they thought that to such converts, if they confessed

matter sufficient in any way for receiving validly the Sacrament or the

grace of sanctification through the Sacrament, absolution might be given

conditionally; this, they maintained, was the practice to be recommended

in order that converts might not be obliged in the beginning of their

conversion to undergo this often very severe ordeal of a confession of a

lifetime.

In answer to repeated questions the Apostolic See (in the years 1715 and

1868) explicitly declared that converts who receive conditional Baptism

must after receiving this conditional Baptism confess the sins of their

past life and be absolved from them _sub conditione_. This decision

was given of course as an answer to a particular case laid before the

tribunal; but the intention of the Holy Office, as is quite clear, was

to pass a sentence and give a universal decision which might apply to

all cases falling under this head and which might be regarded in future

as the law on the matter, for this decree can be regarded only as an

authentic interpretation of the divine law by the Head of the Church,

and not as a local law of the Church or a part of her discipline. Nor

need any one be surprised that a decree, though particular in form,

has a universal application; for a command of the Church will never

prescribe anything as necessary matter of confession which is not in

accordance with the divine law.[295] In order, then, to recognize the

possibility that such a precept is contained in the decree of 1715 it

must be granted that, in accordance with divine right, the sins incurred

after doubtfully valid Baptism must be submitted to the keys. Such is

what we learn from that positive declaration; moreover, reason confirms

it, for, though one who is doubtfully baptized has not a certainty but

only a probability of receiving sacramental absolution of his sins, it in

no way follows that the obligation to confess them is only probable and

practically to be disregarded; for the duty of confessing and performing

the assigned penance is for all more certain than that probability of

receiving the effects of the Sacrament. This does not go beyond a moral

certainty taken in the wider sense, since it rests ultimately on the

validity of the Baptism and other conditions, so that doubts can always

be entertained about it. But the duty of confessing and performing the

assigned penance permits no such doubt, since every obligation though

it be based on grounds only morally certain is sufficiently evident;

otherwise there would be an end of anything like obligation in human

affairs.

Now with regard to confession and absolution of sins in the tribunal

of penance Christ has handed over all power to the jurisdiction of the

Church, and it is by Baptism that men come under this jurisdiction; this

is the external rite by which men are admitted as members. But no one

doubts that a man remains subject to the jurisdiction of a social body

into which he has been admitted by the acknowledged external rites till

that reception is proved to be invalid. All, therefore, who have in any

way received Baptism (which they were desirous of receiving validly,

though its validity admits of doubt) are as a general rule undeniably

and certainly subject to the Church’s jurisdiction and laws and are

bound to comply with the divine precept which ordains that their sins

should be told in confession and sentence passed upon them. In other

words, the doubt with regard to Baptism has this effect, that the Baptism

can be regarded as invalid in the sense that it can and ought to be

repeated conditionally lest the man should risk his eternal salvation,

but nowise in the sense that one who is doubtfully baptized may consider

himself free from the observance of these precepts and obligations which

are binding on the baptized by the ordinance of God or the Church;

among these duties the precept of confessing sins holds the principal

place.[296]

As to the ceremonies to be observed in receiving a convert into the

Church, there is nothing to prevent the confession being made first,

followed by the conditional Baptism, then a summary repetition of

the accusation along with an act of contrition and the conditional

absolution. This order is allowed by the Holy Office in a Rescript

of November, 1875. The American Ritual, on the other hand, gives the

following order: 1. Renunciation of heresy and profession of faith; 2.

Conditional Baptism; 3. Confession with conditional absolution. This

order was prescribed by the instruction of the Holy Office for North

America.[297]

26. Sins Omitted through Forgetfulness or other Causes not Blameworthy.

In order that the principles to be applied here may be understood, it

must first be observed that all grievous sins committed after Baptism

must be confessed; hence what has been said of the material and formal

integrity of confession as well as upon the distinction between sins

directly and indirectly remitted must be carefully borne in mind.

Since the formal or subjective integrity of confession consists in this,

that all mortal sins are mentioned which the penitent can recall after

a diligent examination of conscience, and of which the enumeration is

possible _hic et nunc_, it does not suffer by inculpable forgetfulness

on the part of the penitent; and the same holds true of all other

legitimate reasons which at any time excuse the penitent from objective

integrity.[298]

Sins which are required for objective though not for subjective integrity

are considered as included in the confession and are really remitted by

the absolution, not directly, however, but only indirectly.

Hence are derived the following principles:—

I. Mortal sins omitted without fault are and remain _materia necessaria_

of confession, or the objective duty of confessing them remains binding

as before.

These sins are, of course, really forgiven, but, as we have already

observed, only indirectly or _per concomitantiam_ through their

connection with the other mortal sins which have been confessed and

directly remitted. In the Sacrament of Penance the remission of sins

is effected by the absolution; but sins which have not been mentioned

do not directly fall under the absolution since, properly speaking,

they are unaffected by the sentence pronounced by a judge who knew

nothing about them. Nevertheless the absolution pronounced _rite et

valide_ over certain sins is effectual because it is sacramental and

because in God’s providence no remission of sin takes place without an

influx of sanctifying grace into the soul which presents no _obex_. Now

sanctifying grace removes the whole _reatus culpæ mortalis_ and restores

a man to perfect friendship with God and to his claim in the heavenly

kingdom. Thus valid absolution produces sanctifying grace in the soul and

consequently the remission of all mortal sins staining the soul, even

those inculpably forgotten.

There remains now the precept of Our Lord to submit all mortal sins to

the power of the keys in the Sacrament of Penance; these forgotten sins

have not been confessed as yet, nor has the priest pronounced any direct

sentence upon them. Though these sins have been remitted indirectly,

there still remains the obligation _ex jure divino_ of confessing them

directly to the judge in the tribunal of penance when they occur to

the mind again, not because these sins have been revived, but because

the neglect of God’s command in the matter would involve a new sin.

This holds of all mortal sins inculpably omitted, of their species,

of all circumstances changing the species, as well as of mortal sins,

confessed indeed, but to a priest without jurisdiction who either _bona

fide_ or for reasonable motives gave direct absolution of the sins for

which he had faculties, thereby remitting the others indirectly. Hence

Alexander VII condemned the proposition: “Sins which have been omitted in

confession either from an imminent danger to life or for any other motive

need not be mentioned in the following confession.” (Prop. XI. damn.) It

is different, however, in the case of reservation or censure for a sin

remitted indirectly if confession be made to a priest equipped with the

necessary faculties; for in general absolution is given from reservation

and censure, and the penitent is probably freed from the reservation

or censure attached to the sin forgotten; so that if the sin occur

again to his mind, he may be directly absolved by any confessor, even a

_confessarius simplex_.[299]

II. The obligation of confessing these forgotten sins does not urge

_ratione sui_ “as soon as possible” (_quam primum_), not even before

receiving holy communion.

Of course many distinguished theologians[300] teach that whoever

remembers a grave sin, even though not committed since the last

confession but forgotten, must confess that sin and receive absolution

before going to communion. The only reason urged is that he is conscious

of this sin; and, according to the Council of Trent, no one who is

conscious of grave sin may receive communion before having confessed

where there is an opportunity of making the confession. The defenders of

this view maintain that the Tridentine decree[301] is so expounded and

understood by the whole Church; they make an exception, however, for the

case where confession cannot be made without risk of scandal or infamy,

as, for example, when a priest is already celebrating Mass or a layman

has approached the communion-rail and cannot retire without exciting

remark.

It is permissible, however, with St. Alphonsus and other theologians (in

less number) to follow the other “very probable opinion” which denies

the obligation of confessing; for in reality confession has preceded

communion and the penitent has confessed all the sins of which he was

conscious, so that neither the Council of Trent nor the divine law seems

to demand more; moreover, the forgotten sin has been remitted indirectly,

the penitent is in the state of grace, not merely by an act of contrition

but in virtue of the valid confession. The practice of the faithful which

is appealed to for the opposite side is not to be regarded as of binding

force, but rather a pious and praiseworthy custom.

Though one may follow _tuta conscientia_ the opinion which denies the

obligation, it is good to recommend to the faithful to confess before

communion the sins which have been forgotten, unless the extremely

sensitive conscience of the penitent should require another course to be

adopted; the practice should not, however, be imposed as binding.[302]

The view held by some, though a very few, modern theologians, that it is

quite sufficient to mention these sins without receiving absolution, is

not at all in harmony with the divine institution of the Sacrament, for

confession is not made with the view of acquainting the priest with the

sins committed, but in order that they may be remitted by his judicial

sentence. Hence a serious argument for the necessity of confession can be

drawn only from the supposition that absolution is necessary. Accordingly

a penitent who confesses a new mortal sin immediately after absolution

must be absolved again. Of course this absolution may be put off to the

next confession if the penitent comes again to the same confessor to whom

he told the sin. Such delay, however, would hardly be recommended, since

it would involve the penitent in the following dilemma: Either he is not

free to choose his confessor on the next occasion on which he approaches

the Sacrament, or if he goes to some other priest he must confess the

same sin again.

III. The duty of confessing sins inculpably omitted must be fulfilled

either when there is danger of death or at the next confession, whether

it be a confession of duty or of choice.