CHAPTER I

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONFESSIONAL

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF

THE CONFESSIONAL

_A GUIDE IN THE ADMINISTRATION

OF THE SACRAMENT OF

PENANCE_

BY

PROF. CASPAR E. SCHIELER, D.D.

EDITED BY

REV. H. J. HEUSER, D.D.

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AT OVERBROOK SEMINARY

INTRODUCTION BY THE

MOST REV. S. G. MESSMER, D.D., D.C.L.

ARCHBISHOP OF MILWAUKEE

SECOND EDITION

NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO

BENZIGER BROTHERS

PRINTERS TO THE

HOLY APOSTOLIC SEE

PUBLISHERS OF

BENZIGER’S MAGAZINE

Nihil obstat.

REMIGIUS LAFORT,

_Censor Librorum_

Imprimatur.

✠ JOHN M. FARLEY,

_Archbishop of New York_

NEW YORK, AUG. 31, 1905

COPYRIGHT, 1905, BY BENZIGER BROTHERS.

INTRODUCTION

“There is nothing more excellent or more useful for the Church of God and

the welfare of souls than the office of Confessor. By his sacred ministry

the sinner is lightened of the burden of sin, freed from the yoke of

Satan and concupiscence, and clothed again with the robe of innocence

previously lost. Weak knees are confirmed (Is. xxxv. 3); that is, men

weak and idle in mind receive new vigor, and lastly the just are aroused

and enkindled to persevere in goodness and to reach with freshly spurred

zeal for the crown of justice laid up for them (2 Tim. iv. 8).

“How great and arduous is the office of Confessor appears clearly from

the fact that by it he is made a judge in the place of Christ and that

of his judgment he must some day render a strict account to the Supreme

Judge. To him, therefore, apply the words with which the pious king of

Israel charged the judges appointed by him, ‘Take heed what you do: for

you exercise not the judgment of man, but of the Lord God; and whatever

you judge, it shall redound to you’ (2 Paral. xix. 6). In this tribunal,

however, the priest may not consider himself to be only a _Judge_ to

hear the culprit’s confession, to correct him, and then, having imposed

sentence, to send him away. He must also act the part of the _Shepherd_

and, following the example of the Good Shepherd, must know his sheep,

bring back to the fold those that strayed away and fell among thorns,

and finally lead them unto wholesome pastures and the waters of eternal

refreshment. He must be a _Physician_ giving suitable remedies to the

sick, and treating and healing with anxious and skillful hand the

wounds of the soul. Lastly he must be a _Father_, and like the father in

the Gospel cheerfully receive with the kiss of peace the prodigal son

returning from exile, where he had been lost and consumed by hunger and

filth; he must vest the son found again with the first robe, refresh him

with the fatted calf and delicious dishes, and restore him to the former

place and dignity of heir and son.

“Therefore let the priest who goes to hear confession seriously ponder

over these offices of judge, shepherd, physician, and father, and

endeavor, as far as in him lies, to fulfill them in deed and work. Above

all let him remember that he acts in the place of Christ and as an

ambassador for God, as the Apostle often tells us” (Conc. Balt. Pl. II.

nn. 278, 279, 280).

The present volume is a practical commentary upon these weighty words

of the Fathers of the Baltimore Council. The tremendous responsibility

of the Catholic priest exercising the ministry of the Sacrament of

Penance must appear in a truly dazzling light to the mind of every one

who but glances over the following pages. Human intelligence can never

fully grasp the true significance of this divine sacrament, which works

at the same time forgiveness of sin and sanctification by grace; which

is for poor fallen man at once the judgment of God’s infinite hatred

of sin and the manifestation of His infinite mercy for the repentant

sinner; which brings humiliation and punishment while it fills the soul

returning to God with unspeakable joy and comfort. Who can tell the

number of souls troubled by sin and sinful temptations who have found

peace and consolation, strength and holy courage in this sacrament? the

number of souls kept not only for days, but for years in the bondage

of evil passion and Satan who were, by the words of absolution, freed

from that ignominious slavery and led again to enjoy the freedom of the

children of God? the number of souls snatched from the brink of perdition

by the strong hand of God extended to them through His minister in the

confessional? the number of souls buried in spiritual death by grievous

sin who were brought out from their tombs to supernatural life and the

sunshine of heavenly grace by the power of sacramental confession? Only

the book of life reveals them all.

To be the minister of such a sacrament is, indeed, a glorious calling.

Most excellent in itself and most useful for the Christian people is

the office of Confessor. But the Fathers of the Council tell us it is

also a most arduous office. In very truth, the faithful administration

of the Sacrament of Penance demands a great deal more of the personal

coöperation of the minister with the recipient than any other sacrament.

Not to mention the fact that in the other sacraments, marriage alone

excepted, the acts of the recipient desirous to receive the sacrament

have nothing directly to do with the substance and validity of the

sacrament, while in confession these acts are not a mere condition,

but form the _materia ex qua_ the sacrament arises, there is not the

slightest doubt whatever of the most serious and grave duty of the

confessor to assist the penitent as far as possible towards a worthy and

profitable confession. He is not only bound, as in all other sacraments,

to insure the validity of the sacrament and to assure himself of the

required disposition of the recipient, but here more than elsewhere he

must himself effect and bring forth, as well as he can, the worthy and

right disposition of the penitent. Nor is this all. Confession is not

merely to free the sinner from sin for a few passing moments; it must so

strengthen his will and direct his heart that he will avoid the coming

danger and resist the future temptation. Herein lies the difficult and

arduous task of the confessor. It is in the discharge of this duty that

the priest needs all the love and charity, patience and meekness, of the

spiritual father; all the prudence and close attention, the knowledge

and experience of the spiritual physician; all the understanding of the

holy law and the firmness, impartiality, and discretion of the spiritual

judge; the watchful care and patient search of the spiritual shepherd;

the holy knowledge and wisdom of the spiritual teacher; the fervid

prayer, saintly life, and burning zeal for souls necessary to him who

is to be the minister of Jesus Christ unto sinful man redeemed by His

precious blood.

Even this is not all. Confession is not only a means of cleansing the

sinner from the stain of sin and vice, and of giving him strength and

courage in the battle against temptation; but it is also to help the

just and holy man to rise continually higher on the ladder of Christian

perfection. It is the sacrament for saint and sinner. The greatest saints

of God in holy Church had the greatest reverence and desire for holy

confession. St. Charles Borromeo went to confession every day. Hence

the tender care of the flowers and fruits of Christian virtue in the

heart of his penitent is another important duty of the father confessor.

How is he to fulfill it in a manner profitable to the penitent and to

himself, unless he is well acquainted with the principles and facts of

the spiritual life by a thorough study of Christian ascetics and the

earnest practice of Christian perfection? What a responsibility when a

soul called by God to the higher walks of Christian life, and willing to

follow the call, be it in the world or in the cloister, falls into the

hands of an ignorant, neglectful, or heedless confessor! But what glory

to God, what happiness of soul, what merit for heaven, when by holy zeal

and skillful effort the minister of God in holy confession leads the

Christian soul, panting after God as the hart panteth after the fountains

of water (Ps. xlii. 2), into the sanctuary of God’s love, grace, and

mercy! What a glorious ministry!

We can only hope and pray that Catholic priests will carefully read the

beautiful and instructive lessons that Dr. Schieler’s book offers, and

ponder over them day and night. There is no greater blessing for Church

and State, society and individual, than an army of priests who are

confessors according to the spirit of Christ; for they are in a fuller

sense than others “good stewards of the manifold grace of God” (1 Petr.

iv. 10).

✠ S. G. MESSMER.

EDITOR’S PREFACE

An English translation of Dr. Schieler’s exhaustive work on “The

Sacrament of Penance,” for the use of theological students and missionary

priests, had been advised by some of our bishops and professors of

theology. It was felt that, under present conditions, a work in the

vernacular on a subject which involved to a very large extent the

practical direction of souls was an actual necessity for many to whom the

Latin texts dealing with the important questions of the Confessional were

for one reason or another insufficient.

There was one serious objection to the publication of a work in English,

which, since it deals with most delicate subjects, might for this reason

cause an unqualified or prejudiced reader to misunderstand or pervert its

statements, so as to effect the very opposite of what is intended by the

Church in her teaching of Moral and Pastoral Theology. Between the two

dangers of a lack of sufficiently practical means to inform and direct

the confessor and pastoral guide of souls in so difficult and broad a

field as is presented by the missions in English-speaking countries, and

the fear that a manual from which the priest derives his helpful material

of direction may fall into the hand of the ill-advised, for whom it was

not intended, the latter seems the lesser evil, albeit it may leave its

deeper impression upon certain minds that see no difficulty in using the

sources of information in which the Latin libraries abound.

One proof of both the necessity and the superior advantage of having

a vernacular expression of this branch of theological literature, for

the use of students and priests in non-Latin countries, is readily

found in the fact that authorized scholarship and pastoral industry in

Germany have long ago seen fit to supply this need for students in its

theological faculties, and for priests on the mission, and that the

benefit of such a course has shown itself far to overlap the accidental

danger of an unprofessional use of the source of Moral Theology in the

hands of a lay-reader, or one hostile to the Catholic Church who might

pervert its doctrine and arouse the zeal of the prudish.

The work was, therefore, not undertaken without serious weighing of the

reasons for and against its expediency from the prudential as well as

moral point of view. As a competent translator of it, the name of the

Rev. Richard F. Clarke, S.J., of the English Province, whose editions of

Spirago’s catechetical volumes had given him the advantage of special

experience in kindred work, suggested itself to the publishers. Father

Clarke actually undertook the translation, and had fairly completed it

when death overtook him. The manuscript was placed in my hands with

a request to prepare it for publication. After much delay, due to a

multiplicity of other professional duties, I found it possible, with

the coöperation of the Rev. Dr. Charles Bruehl, who kindly consented to

undertake the principal work of revision, to complete the volume which is

now placed at the disposal of our clergy. There is probably room for some

criticism in parts wherein I have undertaken to alter the expressions of

the author and of the original translator, with a view of accommodating

the matter to the temperament of the English reader. In this I may have

sinned at times both by excess and by deficiency; but these blemishes

can, I trust, be eliminated in future editions of a work which, for

the rest, contains so much of instructive material as to prove itself

permanently useful to the theologian and pastor.

In some cases I would not wish to be understood as sharing the author’s

views, nor should I have deemed an insistence upon the often-cited

opinions of casuists quite so essential in a work of this kind as it

seemed to the learned author. But in this I did not feel authorized to

depart from his text, even if I had not fully appreciated the advantage

of his ample references and quotations in matters of detail. Whatever we

think of the author’s personal views, his citations of the masters in

the science of morals give to his book certain advantages entitled to

recognition.

With these restrictions borne in mind, it would be difficult to

exaggerate the usefulness of a work such as this, which directs the

priest in the sacramental ministry of Penance as indicated by the laws

and practice of the Church.

The aim of every pastor must in the first place be to rouse the

consciences of the individual members of his flock to motives of

pure and right living. The Gospel of Christ furnishes the model of

such living, and the Church is the practical operator under whose

direction and authority the principles of the Gospel are actively

carried into society, from the lowest to the highest strata. The

sacramental discipline of the Confessional is the directest and most

powerful instrument by which the maxims and precepts of the Gospel are

made operative and fruitful in the individual conscience. A prominent

non-Catholic writer of our day has characterized the Catholic Church

as the _Empire of the Confessional_. So she is, and her empire is the

strongest, the most penetrating, permanent, and effective rule for the

good conduct of the individual and the peace and prosperity of the

community that can be conceived.

On the proper operation, therefore, of the Sacrament of Penance depends

in the first place all that we can look for of satisfaction and peace

upon earth. But the administration of the Sacrament of Penance is solely

in the hands of the priest or confessor. If he knows what to do, if he

is wisely diligent in doing what the discipline of the Confessional

instructs him to do, he will rule his people with order and ease, he

will gain their gratitude and their love, he will reap all the fruits of

a happy ministry, and his name will be in benediction among men of good

will within and without the fold.

The Confessional is a tribunal. It demands a certain knowledge of the

law, exercise of discretion and prudence in the application of the law,

and the wisdom of kindly counsel to greater perfection. As the lawyer,

the judge, the physician, learn their rules of diagnosis and prescription

in the first instance from books and then from practice, so the future

confessor, for three or four years a student of theology, deems it his

first and most important duty to study Moral Theology, and this with

the single and almost exclusive purpose of making use of it in the

Confessional. Moral Theology gives him the principles of law and right,

the rules to apply them to concrete cases, and certain precedents by

way of illustration, in order to render him familiar with actual and

practical conditions. But the young priest learns much more during the

first few months and years of his actual ministry by sitting in the

Confessional and dealing with the consciences of those who individually

seek his direction.

There is some danger that the practical aspect, with all the distracting

circumstances of sin’s work in the soul, may in time obscure the

clear view of principles and make the confessor what the criminal

judge is apt to become during long years of incumbency, oversevere or

overindulgent, as his temper dictates. He may thus lose that fine sense

of discrimination, that balanced use of fatherly indulgence and needful

correction, which the position of the representative of eternal justice

and mercy demands.

To obviate this result, which renders the Confessional a mere work of

routine and absolution, instead of being, as it should be, a means of

correction and reform, the priest, like the judge, needs to read his

books of law and to refurbish his knowledge of theory and practice and

his sense of discernment. But the theological texts with which he was

familiar under the Seminary discipline, where nothing distracted him from

the attentive use of them, are not now so readily at hand. Their Latin

forms are a speech which, if not more strange and difficult than during

his Seminary course, seems more distant and uninviting. The priest, even

the young priest, would rather review his Moral Theology in the familiar

language in which he is now to express his judgments to his penitents.

This fact alone suggests the pertinent use of the book before us. There

the confessor, the director of the conscience, finds all that he was

taught in his Moral Theology. He finds much more; for the author has

made the subject a specialty of treatment which leads him to light up

every phase of the confessor’s task. He has himself studied all the

great masters in the direction of souls from the Fathers of the Church

down to the Scholastics of the thirteenth century; and more especially

those that follow, who have entered into the theory and art of psychical

anatomy—Guilelmus Paris, Cardinal Segusio, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure,

Gerson, St. Charles Borromeo, Toletus, De Ponte, St. Francis of Sales,

Lugo, Lacroix, Concina, Cajetan, and Bergamo, St. Alphonsus, Reuter, and

finally those many doctors of the last century who have written upon the

duties of the confessor in the light of modern necessities and special

canon law.

It is hardly necessary to explain to the priest who has passed over

the ground of the sacramental discipline as found in his theological

text-books, how the subject is here presented in the detail of analysis

and application to concrete conditions. Penance is a Virtue and it is a

Sacrament. To understand the full value of the latter we must examine

its constituent elements, the matter, form, conditions, the dispositions

and acts of the penitent, sorrow for sin, purpose of amendment, actual

accusation of faults in the tribunal—requisites which are dealt with by

Professor Schieler in the traditional manner, but with clearness and

attention to detail.

Of special importance are the suggestions in the third chapter, touching

the integrity of the Confession: the number, circumstances certain

and doubtful, of the sins, and the reasons which excuse the penitent

from making a complete confession; likewise the treatment of invalid

confessions, of general confessions, their purpose, necessity, or danger

as the case may be; satisfaction, its acceptance or commutation.

The main object of the treatise lies, however, as might be supposed, in

the exposition of the confessor’s powers and jurisdiction, and of the

reservation and abuse of faculties. These matters are in the first place

discussed from the theoretical standpoint. Then follows the application,

which takes up the second principal part of the work. Here we have the

confessor in the act of administering the Sacrament. He is told how

he is to diagnose the sinner’s condition by the proposal of questions

and by ascertaining his motives—how far and to what end this probing

is lawful and wise. Next the qualities of the confessor, his duties

and responsibilities, are set forth in so far as they must lead him to

benefit his penitent both in and out of the tribunal of penance. The

obligation of absolute secrecy or the _sigillum_ is the subject of an

extended chapter.

From the general viewpoint which the confessor must take of his

penitent’s condition and the safeguards by which he is to protect the

penitent both as accused and accuser, our author leads us into the

various aspects of the judge’s duties toward penitents in particular

conditions. Thus the sinner who is in the constant occasion of relapse

into his former sin, the sinner who finds himself too weak to resist

temptation, the penitent who aims at extraordinary sanctity, the

scrupulous, the convert, form separate topics of detailed discussion.

The last part of the volume deals with the subjects of confessions of

children, of young men and young women, of those who are engaged to be

married, of persons living in mixed marriage, of men, religious women, of

priests, and of the sick and dying.

Some of our readers may recall that we have protested against too

implicit a reliance on an artificial code of weights and measures

in the matter of sin; and to them it may seem that in seconding the

translation of such a work as this we go contrary to the principles

advocated, because our author presents the same application of canon law

and judicial decision which has been sanctioned by the great moralists

and canonists of the schools. But let the reader remember that in the

text-books of the Seminary, we have as a rule the principles and precepts

presented in their skeleton form so as to leave the impression of fixed

maxims, which cannot be altered, although they are in many cases only

the coined convictions of individual authors, to whose authority the

student is taught to swear allegiance. In the present volume principles

and precepts are so discussed that they admit of an all-sided view, and

as a result do not hinder that freedom of judgment which is so essential

a requisite in a good judge and, therefore, in a confessor. For the rest

we felt it, of course, to be our duty toward the author to preserve his

train of thought and reasoning, and if anything is needed to make his

exposition especially applicable to our missionary conditions of time

and place, it will be easily supplied by any one who shall have read and

studied the present work.

H. J. HEUSER.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PART I

_PENANCE AS A VIRTUE AND AS A SACRAMENT_

1. The Virtue of Penance 17

2. The Sacrament of Penance 20

3. Necessity of the Sacrament of Penance 22

4. Forgiveness of Venial Sin 29

5. The Constituent Parts of the Sacrament of Penance in General 37

6. The Remote Matter of the Sacrament of Penance in Particular 39

7. The Form of the Sacrament 50

8. Conditional Absolution 59

PART II

_THE RECIPIENT OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE,

OR THE ACTS OF THE PENITENT_

9. Who can Receive the Sacrament of Penance 70

CHAPTER I

CONTRITION

10. Extent and Efficacy of Contrition 71

11. The Essential Features of Perfect Contrition 76

12. The Effects of Perfect Contrition and the Obligation of

Procuring it 81

13. Imperfect Contrition 88

14. The Necessary Qualities of Contrition 98

15. The Relation of Contrition to the Sacrament 111

CHAPTER II

THE PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT

16. Necessity and Nature of the Purpose of Amendment 121

17. Properties of the Purpose of Amendment 126

18. The Purpose of Amendment with regard to Venial Sin 133

CHAPTER III

CONFESSION

_Article I. Essence, Necessity, and Properties of Confession_

19. Essence and Necessity of Confession 137

20. Properties of Confession 138

_Article II. The Integrity of the Confession_

21. Necessity of the Integrity of Confession 153

22. Extent of the Integrity of Confession 157

23. The Number of Sins in Confession 163

24. The Confession of the Circumstances of Sins 166

25. The Confession of Doubtful Sins 180

26. Sins omitted through Forgetfulness or Other Causes not

Blameworthy 193

27. Reasons Excusing from Complete Accusation 198

_Article III. The Means to be employed in Order to make

a Perfect Confession_

28. The Examination of Conscience 215

29. Invalid Confessions 222

30. General Confession 228

31. The Manner of Hearing General Confession 238

32. Plan for making a General Confession 245

CHAPTER IV

SATISFACTION

33. The Imposition of Penance by the Confessor 256

34. The Acceptance and Performance of the Penance by the Penitent 271

35. The Commutation of the Penance 274

PART III

_THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENT_

=Section I. The Powers of the Confessor=

36. Orders, Jurisdiction, Approbation 279

CHAPTER I

JURISDICTION

37. The Minister of the Sacrament with Ordinary Jurisdiction 284

38. The Minister of the Sacrament with Delegated Jurisdiction

or Approbation 288

39. _Jurisdictio Delegata Extraordinaria_, or, the Supplying of

Deficient Jurisdiction by the Church 300

40. The Administration of the Sacrament of Penance to Members

of Religious Orders 307

41. Jurisdiction and Approbation for the Confessions of Nuns 311

CHAPTER II

LIMITATION OF JURISDICTION OR RESERVED CASES

42. Reserved Cases in General 316

43. The Papal Reserved Cases 326

44. Absolution of Reserved Sins 340

CHAPTER III

ABUSE OF POWER BY THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENT

45. Inquiring after the Name of the Accomplice in Sin 351

46. The Absolution of the _Complex in Peccato Turpi_ 354

47. _Sollicitatio Proprii Pœnitentis ad Turpia_ 364

=Section II. The Office of the Confessor=

CHAPTER I

THE ESSENTIAL DUTIES OF THE CONFESSOR IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS

OFFICE; OR, THE CONFESSOR CONSIDERED IN HIS OFFICE OF JUDGE

48. The Knowledge of the Sins 379

49. The Nature of the Questions to be put to the Penitent 382

50. The Examination of the Dispositions of the Penitent 398

51. The Confessor’s Duty in Disposing his Penitents 402

52. The Duty of the Confessor to administer, to defer, or to

refuse Absolution 407

CHAPTER II

THE ACCESSORY DUTIES OF THE CONFESSOR

_Article I. The Preparation_

53. The Virtues which the Confessor must Possess 416

54. The Scientific Equipment of the Confessor 424

55. The Prudence of the Confessor 434

_Article II. Duties of the Confessor during Confession_

56. The Duty of instructing and exhorting the Penitent (_Munus

Doctoris_) 438

57. The Duty of suggesting Remedies against Relapse (the

Confessor as Physician) 448

CHAPTER III

THE DUTIES OF THE CONFESSOR AFTER THE CONFESSION

58. The Duty of correcting Errors occurring in the Confession 460

59. The Duty of preserving the Seal of Confession 466

60. The Subject of the Seal of Confession 471

61. The Object or Matter of the Seal of Confession 473

62. Violations of the Seal 476

=Section III. The Duties of the Confessor toward Different

Classes of Penitents=

CHAPTER I

THE TREATMENT OF PENITENTS IN DIFFERENT SPIRITUAL CONDITIONS

_Article I. The Occasionarii_

63. Sinful Occasions and the Duty of avoiding them 487

64. The Duties of the Confessor toward Penitents who are in

_Occasione Proxima Voluntaria_ 493

65. The Duties of the Confessor toward Penitents who are in

_Occasione Necessaria_ 496

66. Some Commonly Occurring Occasions of Sin 501

_Article II. Habitual and Relapsing Sinners_

67. Definition and Treatment of Habitual Sinners 518

68. Relapse, and the Treatment of Relapsing Sinners 521

69. Relapsing Sinners requiring Special Care 530

70. Penitents aiming at Perfection 536

71. Hypocritical Penitents 543

72. Scrupulous Penitents 545

73. Converts 555

CHAPTER II

THE TREATMENT OF PENITENTS IN DIFFERENT EXTERNAL

CIRCUMSTANCES

74. The Confession of Children 561

75. The Confession of Young Unmarried People 575

76. The Confessor as Adviser in the Choice of a State of Life 583

77. Betrothal and Marriage 592

78. The Confessor’s Attitude toward Mixed Marriages 600

79. How to deal with Penitents joined in “Civil” Marriage only 607

80. The Confessor’s Conduct toward Women 608

81. The Confessions of Men 614

82. The Confession of Nuns 618

83. The Confession of Priests 624

CHAPTER III

PENITENTS IN EXTREME DANGER

84. The Importance of the Priest’s Ministry at the Bedside of

the Sick and the Dying 630

85. The Confessions of the Sick 632

86. Absolution of the Dying 645

TOPICAL INDEX 655

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONFESSIONAL

PART I

_PENANCE AS A VIRTUE AND AS A SACRAMENT_

1. The Virtue of Penance.

At all times penance has been the necessary means (_necessitate medii ad

salutem_) of obtaining pardon for those who had committed mortal sin.

“If we do not do penance, we shall fall into the hands of the Lord,” is

the warning of the Old Testament (Ecclus. ii. 22). And when God sent

His prophets, it was to arouse men to repentance by the announcement

of His wrath, and threatening punishments. The forerunner of Our Lord

solemnly exhorts the assembled crowds, “Do penance; the kingdom of heaven

is at hand.” Our Lord Himself insists on the same point with awful

determination, “Unless you do penance you shall all likewise perish”

(Luke xiii. 3). He proclaims as the task of His own public ministry and

the great mission of His Church, “to call sinners to repentance” (Luke v.

32). Accordingly, the burden of the Apostles’ preaching was, “Do penance”

(Acts ii. 38), for “God hath also to the gentiles given repentance unto

life” (Acts xi. 18).

Thus penance is indispensable to the sinner by divine ordinance, as the

Council of Trent expressly teaches (Sess. xiv. c. 1). It is not less

clearly dictated by natural law. “For reason prompts man to do penance

for the sins which he has committed; but divine command determines the

manner according to which it is to be performed.”[1]

Taken in its widest sense, penance may be defined as a regret for some

past action. Such a regret is not necessarily virtuous, for a morally

indifferent or even a good action may be to us a source of displeasure

and grief. But even in its restricted meaning, denoting grief, on account

of some bad action, penance does not yet include the idea of virtue.

Grief is caused by the perception of anything we look upon as an evil.

Now sin may be regarded as an evil in more than one way. Then only does

our penance rise to the height of a virtue, if we feel sorry for our

sins, not by reason of some temporal disadvantage we have incurred, but

for God’s sake, whose holy law we have transgressed and whose majesty we

have outraged. In other words, the virtue of penance requires that we

detest sin as an evil of a higher, supernatural order.

Penance is not a virtue of its own and specifically distinct from other

virtues. St. Thomas considers it as belonging to the virtue of justice,

because by it we perform an act of justice toward God, since we restore

to Him the honor of which sin has deprived Him, and make reparation for

our wrongdoings.[2] Apparently, it springs from the virtue of religion,

as an effect thereof; for to detest one’s sin as an injustice done to God

implies an acknowledgment of His sovereign goodness and majesty. This

submission to God is an act of the virtue of religion.[3] Furthermore,

Lehmkuhl[4] is right in attaching the act of penance to virtues of

different species. For sin, being in many ways an evil and opposed to

holiness and duty, may be deplored from different reasons; and so our

penance belongs to that virtue which supplies the motive of sorrow. Thus,

a sinner may loathe his impurity from a love of purity, his intemperance

from a love of temperance, his pride from a love of humility; he may also

abhor sins because they are repugnant to more general virtues, such as

the love of God and gratitude toward God.[5]

The virtue of penance, thus being a complete destruction of all affection

to sin, has an intimate bearing on the Sacrament of Penance. It is the

disposition required on the part of the sinner, not only for the worthy,

but also for the valid reception of the Sacrament. It represents, so to

speak, the matter of the Sacrament, so that without it the Sacrament is

null and void. Consequently, it enters as a constituent part into the

very essence of the Sacrament.

The most important act of the virtue of penance is an act of the will

and is called contrition. It is contrition that gives birth to penance,

vivifies and animates it. Without contrition, there is no remission

of sin; for it alone leads to a sincere avowal of our guilt and a

meritorious satisfaction.

The second act of penance is the confession of sin: it is penance

exercised by speech. Justice exacts that the guilty should acknowledge

their wickedness, and also make amends for the sins committed by words.

The third act of penance is satisfaction in expiation of our misdeeds.

The bad deed is compensated by some good action, which we are not bound

to do, but which we perform in order to supply for our past deficiencies.

This is penance in deed.

These three acts of penance are most intimately connected with the

Sacrament, and this union imparts to them a special efficacy and

strength; for the imperfect virtue, which of itself is unable to effect

justification, by its elevation to sacramental dignity acquires the power

of conferring sanctifying grace.[6]

2. The Sacrament of Penance.

The arguments for the existence of the Sacrament of Penance do not form

part of our task; they come within the scope of dogmatic theology.

We shall only point out some theological propositions on which our

subsequent dissertations are based.

1. Jesus Christ gave to His apostles and their successors in the holy

ministry the power of forgiving and retaining sins committed after

Baptism.

2. This power is judicial and is exercised in the form of a judicial

process. On this evident deduction from the words of the institution is

based the entire Catholic teaching concerning the Sacrament of Penance.

3. The exercise of this judicial power constitutes a Sacrament, the

object of which is to reconcile the sinner to his God.

4. The outward sign of the Sacrament is the exercise of the judicial

functions; this comprises, on the one hand, the acts of the

penitent,—contrition, confession, and satisfaction; and on the other, the

priestly absolution, being the sentence delivered by the representative

of God.

5. The grace conferred by the Sacrament is the remission of all sins,

embracing the effacement of the guilt, the obliteration of the eternal

punishment, and the condonation of, at least, a portion of the temporal

punishment. This remission of sin is accomplished by the infusion of

sanctifying grace, which, moreover, constitutes a title to certain actual

graces, helping the penitent to bring forth worthy fruits of penance, to

overcome temptation, to avoid relapse, and to amend his life.

At the same time the infused virtues are restored and the merits of

former good works lost by sin are regained.

On zealous penitents, besides, special gifts are bestowed, such as peace

of heart, cheerfulness of mind, and great spiritual consolation.

Though the Sacrament of Penance is administered after the fashion of a

judicial trial, still its administration deviates in many points from

the customs of forensic practice. The chief points of divergence are the

following:—

1. The aim which the secular judge has in view is to convict the

criminal, and by the infliction of a penalty, proportioned to the nature

and the greatness of the crime, to restore the order of justice violated

by the offense; the acquittal of the innocent is only a secondary

consideration. The sacramental judge, on the contrary, reestablishes the

relations between God and man, destroyed by sin, not so much by imposing

a punishment, as by effecting a reconciliation. His chief preoccupation

is the individual welfare of the penitent; the verdict, therefore, is a

sentence of absolution and release from guilt; however, the sinner must

perform a certain penance, to be determined by the confessor.

2. It follows from this that the final sentence in the tribunal of

penance, by which the case is decided, is always one of acquittal. Any

other sentence passed in the sacramental court is only intermediate,

amounting to a temporary postponement of absolution.

3. In the ordinary session of justice, besides the judge and the accused,

we find a prosecutor, witnesses, and pleaders. In the sacramental court

there are only the judge and the sinner, who is his own prosecutor,

pleading guilty. The proceedings are shrouded in perfect secrecy. The

bench cites the criminal against his will, and holds him by force; at

the confessional, the sinner presents himself of his own free will.

The spiritual judge must credit the account of the penitent, be it in

his favor or disfavor, since he alone can bear witness to the state of

his conscience. Only when there is moral certainty of the opposite,

may the priest distrust the statements of the sinner. On the contrary,

the ordinary judge has the right to reject any plea advanced by the

criminal.[7]

3. Necessity of the Sacrament of Penance.

The Council of Trent declared in its fourteenth session, with regard to

this point: “The Sacrament of Penance is as necessary to those who have

incurred mortal sin after baptism, as baptism itself is to those who are

not yet regenerated.”[8] It follows from this teaching of the Council

that, since Baptism is indispensable to eternal salvation, penance is

equally necessary. To use the exact language of theologians, it is

necessary _in re vel saltem in voto_. Which means that those who can

actually receive the Sacrament are bound to have recourse to it in order

to be freed from their sins; but that those for whom the reception of

this Sacrament is for any reason impossible, will be cleansed from their

sins by the desire of receiving it. This desire is always included in

perfect contrition.[9]

For when Our Lord granted to His apostles the power of forgiving or

retaining sins, and thereby instituted the Sacrament of Penance for the

remission of grievous sin, committed after Baptism, He evidently asserted

it to be His will that the sinner should be subjected to the power of

the keys by the reception of this Sacrament, the latter thus becoming

a necessary means of obtaining pardon for grievous sin committed after

baptismal regeneration. The power of the keys vested in the apostles

and their successors would be a useless gift if the faithful, without

submitting to that power, could be released from their sins and gain the

heavenly kingdom. The more so, as the priest possesses also the power of

retaining sins; a power unfavorable to the sinner; but which the sinner

could elude if the Sacrament of Penance had not been made a necessary

means of forgiveness. Nor would the sinner undergo the inconveniences

connected with the reception of the Sacrament of Penance, if he were

not persuaded of Christ’s precept, imposing the Sacrament of Penance as

a means of reconciliation. Venial sins, however, are forgiven without

reference to the Sacrament of Penance, as we shall show in another

place.[10]

Thus, by divine precept, all who have incurred mortal sin after Baptism

are bound to receive this Sacrament. The obligation is absolute (_per

se_) in danger of death; for, in this case, the reception is necessary.

Hence those are bound who are suffering of a dangerous disease; a mother

before her first confinement, or before any subsequent birth, if her

travails are of an especially alarming nature; a criminal sentenced to

death, before his execution; and any one foreseeing the lack of another

opportunity for his whole life of making a confession.

There are other times in the course of our life when the obligation of

confession becomes actual and pressing; the Church, acting according

to the intentions of Christ, has specified these occasions more

particularly. For the Sacrament was not instituted merely to dispose

man for his passage from this life, but also to heal his spiritual

infirmities, to shield him against relapse into sin, and to strengthen

him to lead a virtuous life. Consequently, we would frustrate the object

of the Sacrament if we were to postpone its reception to the hour of

death.

_Per accidens_ it is obligatory to receive this Sacrament: (1) for a

person who desires or is bound to receive holy Communion, and who happens

to be in a state of mortal sin; (2) when the Sacrament of Penance is

the only means for overcoming a temptation or avoiding grievous sin;

(3) when any one feels himself incapable of making an act of perfect

contrition, and yet is by his duties required to be in a state of grace;

for instance, if one has to administer a Sacrament, or simply because one

realizes that it is wrong to remain in a state of enmity with God for any

considerable period.[11]

The divine precept of approaching the Sacrament of Penance does not

urge immediately that a mortal sin has been committed, for it is an

affirmative command, and affirmative precepts do not press of their own

accord, but only at certain times and under given circumstances. Besides,

the Church’s precept of an annual confession for all the faithful, who

have fallen into mortal sin, proves sufficiently that divine law does not

enforce confession immediately after committing mortal sin.

The precept of the Church concerning the Sacrament of Penance binds

only those who have sinned mortally. For the Church’s intention is

merely to define more clearly the extent of the divine command; so the

ecclesiastical precept does not exceed the limits of the divine precept,

and Christ commanded only that mortal sin should be confessed. Hence one

who has committed no mortal sin is not subject to the law of the Church

prescribing yearly confession. In practice, however, the question has no

import; for which of the faithful, guilty only of venial sin, would omit

to go to confession at least once a year, or would think of receiving

holy Communion without previously having confessed?[12]

He who has committed a mortal sin, but, forgetting all about it,

confesses only venial sins, and some days later remembers again the

mortal sin, is, according to a probable opinion, no longer subject to the

precept of yearly confession; for, since the confession was valid, the

mortal sin omitted by sheer forgetfulness is forgiven; and there only

remains the obligation of submitting the forgotten sin to the power of

the keys in the next confession.[13]

For the same reason alleged above, the law of the Church extends

only to those who have reached the age of discernment, and whose

minds are sufficiently developed to render them capable of sin. It is

impossible[14] to fix any definite limit of age in this matter. Much

depends on the child’s personal gifts, its training and education. In

each individual case the moral maturity of the child must be gauged by

its general accomplishments and its ways of acting. During the ordinary

course of religious instruction, the pastor will find ample material on

which to base a decision; in case of doubt, the testimony of the parents

and the teachers may be taken into account.[15] Seven years is usually

assigned as the age at which children of average ability and proper

training have arrived at the period of discretion which enables them to

understand the malice of mortal sin.

Hence it becomes a duty to instruct the children for confession when

they have reached about the seventh or eighth year, or, according to

circumstances, even earlier. But even children of an inferior age, if

they seem to have sufficient understanding, should not be allowed to

die without absolution, though it be pronounced only conditionally.

Of course, the priest will help them to elicit the necessary acts of

contrition and purpose of amendment. This should be done though it be

doubtful that the child has committed a sin or if it has forgotten the

sin committed.

It is not a good practice, therefore, to defer the instruction of

children on this Sacrament to their ninth year or later; since it does

an injustice to the more intelligent children. Moreover, in the case of

those children who are sick, this lack of early preparation is apt to

deprive them of both the Sacrament of Penance and Extreme Unction, which

is a serious matter, if they have been capable of committing mortal

sin.[16]

The precept of the Church imposes annual confession, _saltem semel in

anno_. Beyond this, time and season are not specified. Theologians

interpret the law in general as follows: all who are conscious of mortal

sin are bound to confess within the period between January 1 and December

31, or, what practically amounts to the same, within the time comprised

between the Easter of one year and the Easter of the following year.

For, whoever makes his confession with a view to his Easter Communion,

certainly does confess within the limits of a civil year, though the

earlier or later date of Easter may make the interval elapsing between

the confessions more than a year.

Since the precept of yearly confession refers only to mortal sins, the

common teaching of theologians is that, whosoever has accused himself at

Easter time of venial sin only, but falls into mortal sin before the year

has expired, must go to confession again before the end of the year, in

order to fulfill the ecclesiastical precept.[17]

The faithful, however, adds Lehmkuhl, should be exhorted never to put off

the reception of the Sacrament, or at least the eliciting of an act of

perfect contrition, when they have had the misfortune of offending God

grievously; for a soul in the state of mortal sin is in a most deplorable

and dangerous condition. Still we are not authorized to insist on this

as being an obligation imposed by the Church, since some distinguished

theologians maintain the contrary.[18]

He who one year, whether by his own fault or not, fails to make his

confession, but during the next confesses all his sins, satisfies thereby

the obligations with respect to both years, in the case, at least, when,

during the current year, he has committed a mortal sin which he includes

in his confession; for he has fulfilled the precept which enjoins

reconciliation with God. If, on the contrary, the penitent has committed

only venial sins in the current year, and confessed them along with the

mortal sins of the previous year, and later on falls into grievous sin,

he is obliged to make another confession in order to comply with the law

of the Church.[19]

He who has not confessed for a whole year, must, according to the more

common and probable opinion, confess as soon as possible; because the

Church has defined the period for fulfilling the precept, not for the

purpose of limiting the obligation to a determinate date, but to incite

men to perform their duty in proper time (_non ad finiendam sed ad

urgendam obligationem_). Hence, a man would sin against the precept as

often as he shirked an opportunity of making the neglected confession,

thereby renewing the intention not to obey the law.[20]

He who has sinned grievously, and foresees that in the course of the year

he shall be prevented from going to confession, must avail himself of the

presently occurring opportunity, for in these circumstances the duty of

confessing is actually pressing.

The precept of the Church prescribes, moreover, that the faithful confess

their sins sincerely (_fideliter_). By a bad confession we cannot

discharge our duty. This was distinctly confirmed by Alexander VII,

condemning a proposition to the contrary. (Prop. 14.)

A further provision of the Lateran decree, to confess _proprio

sacerdoti_, which formerly obliged the faithful to make their annual

confession to their own parish priest, bishop, vicar-general, or the

Pope, has long been abrogated by a recognized universal contrary

practice. Confession may, therefore, be made to any priest duly

authorized by the bishop.[21]

The excommunication for the violation of the Church’s precept of annual

confession, as of Paschal Communion, is not a _pœna latæ_, but a _pœna

ferendæ sententiæ_.

The ardent wish of the Church is that her children should confess

frequently during the year. This is apparent from the wording of the

law. Frequent confession is of the greatest usefulness to all without

exception, to the sinner as well as the just. It destroys the evil

inclinations born by sin and averts its terrible consequences.

1. Although, absolutely considered, a single confession made worthily

and with due preparation is able to arrest us in the downward career of

vice, to extinguish the long-nourished flame of passion, to correct our

evil inclinations and habits, to confirm us in grace, and to insure us

against relapse; yet this is not the ordinary course of things. When we

are cleansed from our sins by the Sacrament, we have yet to face a long

struggle with the remains of sin; for the wounds inflicted by sin, though

closed by the grace of absolution, leave us in a weakened condition, and

may easily reopen. To effect a perfect cure of the soul, and to purify

its inclinations and habits, there exists no more efficacious means than

frequent confession. It leads us to greater watchfulness over ourselves,

constitutes an act of humility, forces us to renew our good resolutions;

it equips us with many special graces, intended to assist us in our

spiritual warfare, and to enable us to persevere in the paths of virtue

in spite of the manifold difficulties which we encounter.

2. Frequent confession is also the most powerful means to counteract the

disastrous consequences of sin. The most fatal of these are: blindness of

the soul, hardening of the heart and final impenitence. As often as we

go to confession, the great salutary truths of our religion are recalled

to our mind. We reflect on God and our last end, on Jesus Christ and His

love and mercy, on the wickedness and the dreadful punishments of sin,

on our august duties, and on God’s holy law. Frequent confession is an

antidote against the hardening of the heart, since it arouses in us a

profound hatred of sin, love for God, fear of His wrath, and the desire

of accomplishing His will. Finally, as at every confession we again

banish sin from our hearts, frequent confession is the best preparation

for a penitent life and a happy death.

Also the just derives great benefits from frequent confession; he is more

and more cleansed from the lesser faults, committed daily; the grace and

love of God are increased in his heart, and special helps to overcome

his failings and weakness are granted to him. The oftener the just man

approaches this holy Sacrament, the more fully does he partake of its

peculiar graces.[22]

4. Forgiveness of Venial Sin.

By divine and ecclesiastical precept we are bound only to confess

mortal sins; there is no obligation to confess venial sins; these may

be forgiven without receiving the Sacrament of Penance. “Venial sins,

by which we are not shut out from the grace of God and into which we

fall more frequently, though they be rightly and profitably declared in

confession, as the practice of pious people demonstrates, may be omitted

without guilt, and be expiated by many other methods.” Such is the

teaching of the Council of Trent.[23]

Before enumerating the methods by which venial sins can be remitted we

wish to observe:—

1. The most necessary condition for the remission of any sin, and

therefore also of venial sin, is _contrition_. So long as a man is

attached to sin and does not detest it, God cannot forgive it, for He

is infinitely holy and just. It is not, however, absolutely necessary

to specify the sins and make a formal act of sorrow for them, otherwise

David’s prayer _Ab occultis meis munda me_ (Ps. xviii. 13) would be

useless and the remission of forgotten sins impossible. _Virtual_

contrition is sufficient, _i.e._ the sinner must be actually contrite

for all his sins, and from universal motives which apply even to those

sins of which he is unconscious or which he has forgotten. He must also

have the intention of including in that contrition all the sins by

which he has offended God. Although venial sin is more easily forgiven

than mortal, yet this forgiveness is impossible without at least a

virtual contrition for it. For when a man falls into venial sin he turns

inordinately to creatures, not, however, as in mortal sin, by entirely

abandoning God, his last end, and unreservedly giving himself up to

creatures. This attachment to creatures, however, makes it necessary

that he should, if not formally and explicitly, at least virtually and

implicitly, turn away from them and combat this guilty affection for

creatures by a contrary act of the will. A work done to please God, or a

mere act of love without abhorrence of sin, does not remit that sin. As

venial sin may coexist with the general habit of the love of God, so it

may coexist with a particular act of that love; for a man can make an

act of perfect love or even an act of perfect contrition and still retain

a leaning toward some particular venial sin.[24]

2. Since the presence of venial sin is compatible with that of

sanctifying grace, and since a man can be sorry for one venial sin

without being necessarily sorry for another, it follows that one venial

sin may be forgiven and others left unforgiven.

3. A penitent who is burdened with both mortal and venial sins may by

perfect contrition or the Sacrament of Penance be freed from his mortal

sins and yet be left with his venial sins still upon him because he is

not sorry for these.

4. Hence, if a man is in the state of mortal sin, his venial sins cannot

be remitted without the mortal sin being at the same time forgiven; for

God cannot forgive one who will not acknowledge and love Him as Lord and

God; and, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, just as mortal sin is

forgiven by the influx of sanctifying grace, so the remission of venial

sin is dependent on a movement of grace or love, which therefore must be

actually present.[25]

Venial sins are forgiven:—

1. By the Sacrament of Penance, and that directly and _ex opere operato_,

when they are submitted in confession to the power of the keys with

_formal_ contrition and purpose of amendment.

2. “By many other means,”[26] such as:—

(_a_) All the Sacraments; they remit sins _ex opere operato_, and

especially those sins which are opposed to the particular end of the

Sacrament. For the object of every Sacrament is the sanctification of

souls, and hence the removal of all that hinders this sanctification.

Now venial sins in particular, by hindering the conferring of richer

graces, are an obstacle in the way of attaining sanctity. Cardinal

Lugo, in treating this subject, illustrates it by the attitude of two

friends: “Even where, in the strict nature of things, we cannot expect

that the influx of grace should cause the remission of sins, yet it is

in accordance with good feeling that where fresh and closer ties of

friendship have been formed, little offences should be condoned. If,

then, the influx or increase of grace is a new bond of friendship between

God and the just man, uniting him more intimately with God, an embrace of

love, so to speak, and a kiss of peace, it is probable and reasonable to

suppose that there is granted also a remission of the smaller sins which

have been retracted.”[27]

It is always, however, necessary and sufficient to elicit at least a

virtual or implicit contrition, contained in a pious and supernatural

affection toward God, which is opposed to venial sins, and is

consequently a virtual horror and retraction of the same.[28]

Not all the Sacraments, however, effect this forgiveness in the same

manner. Next to the Sacrament of Penance, Baptism and Extreme Unction

have a peculiar power, because they were instituted by Christ for the

very purpose of forgiving sins. If an adult who had been purified of

original sin and of his mortal sins by perfect love and contrition (the

Baptism of desire), but, on account of his attachment to venial sins,

was not yet freed of these, were to receive Baptism, all his venial sins

for which he had at least virtual contrition would be forgiven through

this Sacrament. For, according to the teaching of the Council of Trent,

Baptism effects a new birth, and in consequence the remission of sins,

with the exception, of course, of those venial sins which the newly

baptized person has not yet renounced.[29]

Of Extreme Unction the Council of Trent, referring to James v. 15,

teaches that it forgives the sins which defile the soul, and removes the

remains of sin.[30]

With respect to the Holy Eucharist the same Council[31] declares that

although the forgiveness of sin is certainly not the principal fruit of

this Sacrament, yet, in accordance with our Lord’s commands, we should

receive it in order thereby to be freed from our daily trespasses and

strengthened against mortal sin.

Hence there is no doubt that the Holy Eucharist removes venial sins.

But theologians do not agree how it produces this effect—whether, as

in the case of the three preceding Sacraments, immediately, _ex opere

operato_, or only mediately, _ex opere operantis_. The champions of both

views appeal to St. Thomas, who on the one hand teaches that the Holy

Eucharist acts after the manner of bodily food, repairing what in the

heat of concupiscence we have lost by venial sin, and on the other hand

declares the peculiar grace (_res sacramenti_) of this Sacrament to be

_caritas_, and that not only _quantum ad habitum sed etiam quantum ad

actum_; in other words charity is elicited in this Sacrament, and through

its operation venial sins are forgiven.[32]

Suarez interprets St. Thomas as teaching that the Holy Eucharist effects

the remission of venial sins _ex opere operato_, and this interpretation

would seem to have the preference over that of theologians who, with St.

Alphonsus, insisting on the words just quoted, hold that the Sacrament of

the Eucharist works _ex opere operantis_.[33]

The three remaining Sacraments, of Confirmation, Orders, and Marriage, do

not so directly imply forgiveness of venial sin; still they pour into the

soul of the recipient a new grace, and so they, too, must be considered

as remitting venial sins when no obstacle is put in the way.[34] The

range of this power varies according as the grace conferred in the

Sacrament is more or less opposed to some particular sin or kind of sins.

The most efficacious of the last-named Sacraments in eliminating venial

sin is that of Confirmation, because its influence extends to the whole

life of faith and grace, strengthening and bringing it to perfection.[35]

Holy Orders give grace to the recipient, so that he may attain the

holiness and perfection that befit his state, and in consequence they

also purify from sin.[36] Finally, Matrimony remits venial sins because

it confers the grace by which concupiscence is curbed and restrained,

and by which the recipients are enabled to fulfil their duties of mutual

sanctification.

(_b_) Venial sins are likewise removed by the holy sacrifice of the Mass,

which of its own nature is a sacrifice of atonement, a _sacrificium vere

propitiatorium_.[37] It works this forgiveness, as theologians teach,

_per modum impetrationis_, therefore mediately, by obtaining for the

sinner from God the grace of contrition or other virtues, excluding

affection for sin.[38]

(_c_) The sacramentals also destroy venial sins. “By the use of the

sacramentals the faithful confess and awaken their faith, hope, reverence

for God, a longing for interior holiness and sinlessness, or a horror

of sin, and sorrow for past offences. The symbols blessed or used by

the Church confer a grace which produces or strengthens desires and

acts of different virtues, which in turn destroy venial sin and atone

for it.”[39] Hence a sacramental possesses power of remitting sin in

proportion as its character and the blessing of the Church cause it to

excite or strengthen acts of virtue in the faithful. The Church has a

sacramental especially designed for the remission of venial sins, and

makes use of it on those occasions when the faithful need greatest purity

of heart. It consists of the two prayers: _Misereatur vestri_, etc., and

_Indulgentiam, absolutionem_, etc.[40] To these we may add the use of

holy water, which, in accordance with the intention and prayers of the

Church when she blesses it, is designed to ward off the devil’s influence

from animate and inanimate creatures and to protect them from impurity,

sickness, and harm.[41] The effect of the other sacramentals in procuring

remission of venial sins is not so direct. The more they are of their own

nature suited to awaken contrition, and the more directly the intention

in the use of them is directed to the cleansing from sin, so much the

more effectual are they in this respect.[42]

(_d_) Contrition by itself also procures the remission of venial sins,

and more especially when it is perfect (_contritio_), since, then, it

destroys mortal sin and is, therefore, still more efficacious in the case

of venial. Perfect contrition removes all venial sins if it is universal,

that is to say if it extends to all venial sins, or if a man is disposed

never more to commit venial sin and would be sorry for all his past sins,

if they were present to his mind. On the other hand, an act of perfect

contrition does not remit all venial sins, if it extends only to this or

that particular venial sin, or if a person is disposed to avoid only one

or other of his venial sins.[43]

According to the teaching of the more numerous and distinguished

theologians, even imperfect contrition remits venial sins; this imperfect

contrition (_attritio_) must spring from some supernatural motive

referring to God—such for instance as the thought that venial sin is a

violation of the obedience or reverence due to God.[44] By _attritio_ the

affection toward sin is entirely uprooted and the will is withdrawn from

the sin, man turns again to God as his last end, and expiates his fault

by his sorrow.[45]

(_e_) Moreover, the “love of God above all things” remits venial sins if

it is actual and formally or virtually opposed to venial sin.[46]

(_f_) Lastly, venial sins are forgiven by good works done from a

motive of penance (_ex affectu pœnitentiæ_), especially those to which

Holy Scripture assigns the virtue of destroying venial sin. Such are:

prayer[47] (John xiv. 13 s.; xvi. 23), almsgiving and fasting, especially

the works of mercy and mortification (Ecclus. iii. 33; iv. 1-11; Tob.

iv. 11; Dan. iv. 24; Matt. v. 7; John iii. 5-10; 1 Reg. vii. 5, etc.; 1

Esdras viii. 21, etc.). Cf. S. Thom. II. II. Q. 147, art. 1 _et_ 3.[48]

5. The Constituent Parts of the Sacrament of Penance in General.

As in the other Sacraments a distinction is made between the _matter_

and the _form_, so too in the Sacrament of Penance; but with a certain

difference, which appears from the fact that the Council of Trent speaks

of the matter of this Sacrament as a _quasi-materia_. The _Catechismus

Romanus_[49] states this more fully when it says: This Sacrament is

distinguished from the other Sacraments especially in this, that the

matter of the other Sacraments is a substance produced by nature or

art, while in the Sacrament of Penance it is the acts of the penitent,

especially the contrition, confession, and satisfaction; yet it is not

because these acts are not to be considered as truly matter of the

Sacrament that the Holy Council calls them _quasi-materia_ (“as it were

the matter”), but because they are not materially or externally applied,

like water in Baptism and chrism in Confirmation. These three acts of the

penitent are styled by the Council of Trent the parts (_partes_) of the

Sacrament of Penance “in so far as they are required by God’s ordinance

in the penitent for the completeness of the Sacrament and for the entire

and perfect remission of sin.”[50] To these must be added the absolution

of the priest, which constitutes the form. Hence we have to consider as

parts of the Sacrament: (1) contrition, (2) confession, (3) satisfaction,

and (4) absolution.[51]

The three acts of the penitent have not all, however, the same

importance. The satisfaction belongs to the Sacrament only in so far as

its integrity and its complete efficacy are concerned; hence it is not an

essential, but only an integral part of the Sacrament. It is true that

the power of imposing on the penitent a suitable satisfaction belongs

essentially to the administration of this Sacrament; hence also the

penitent is obliged to accept this penance and to declare himself willing

to perform it. The actual performance of the penance, however, is not

necessary in order that the Sacrament should produce its effect.[52]

The confession or self-accusation of the penitent in presence of the

priest is the principal matter of this Sacrament, for this is necessary

_in se_ and _per se_, in order that the confessor may form a judgment and

administer the Sacrament.

Contrition is a necessary constituent of the Sacrament but merely _in se_

not _per se ipsum_, and only as contained in the accusation, which is an

outward manifestation of the contrition; for contrition is not _per se_

subject to the senses, but must be outwardly shown in some way in order

to become manifest.[53] “The contrite accusation, therefore, realizes all

the conditions of the matter in the Sacraments.”[54]

Theologians draw a further distinction in this Sacrament between the

proximate and the remote matter (_materia proxima et remota_). _Proxima

materia_ consists of the acts which the penitent has to perform, and

_remota materia_ of the sins committed after Baptism which the penitent

has repented of and confessed and for which he must do satisfaction.[55]

6. Of the Remote Matter of the Sacrament of Penance in Particular.

The remote matter of this Sacrament are, as we have already seen, the

sins committed after Baptism. Those committed before Baptism are forgiven

entirely in Baptism, wherefore they are not, properly speaking, subject

to the Sacrament of Penance. Again, a man is not under the Church’s

jurisdiction till he is baptized, and this Sacrament of Penance is

administered by virtue of the jurisdiction which the Church exercises

over her members. The sins which are confessed are not, however, _materia

ex qua_, as is water in the Sacrament of Baptism, by means of which the

Sacrament is conferred, but _materia circa quam_, with regard to which

the penitent performs the necessary acts and receives absolution. As, for

example, in a lawsuit the matter proposed for decision and the sentence

are called the matter of the case, so here the sins which form the

object of the sacramental process instituted for the remission of sins

are regarded as the remote matter of penance.[56] This remote matter is

divided into:—

1. _Necessary_ and _free_ matter (_necessaria et libera_), _i.e._

necessary _as a consequence of the divine command_, by which definite

sins (a definite _materia remota_) must be submitted to the sacramental

tribunal and the power of the keys, so that the penitent who wilfully

neglects this course cannot receive the Sacrament validly. By free matter

we understand those sins which the penitent voluntarily confesses whilst

not bound to do so by divine law.

2. _Certain_ and _doubtful_ (_certa et dubia_), _i.e._ matter which

in the judgment of the confessor is a certain and valid object of

absolution; or matter regarding which absolution cannot be pronounced

without misgiving.

3. Finally, _sufficient_ and _insufficient_ (_sufficiens et

insufficiens_), _i.e._ such matter as suffices for the administering

of the Sacrament and the granting of absolution, whether the matter be

necessary or free, and such over which sacramental absolution cannot be

pronounced.

_Necessary matter_ comprises all grievous sins committed after Baptism

and not at any former time submitted directly to the power of the keys;

of all and each of them the penitent is obliged to accuse himself.

Sins are remitted _directly_ when they have been remitted _per se_

quite independently of other sins. This is the case when they have been

explicitly confessed to a priest having the required jurisdiction.

Sins are forgiven _indirectly_ when they are remitted in conjunction

with other sins, and not _per se_. This happens when a penitent omits

a sin through invincible ignorance or forgetfulness or inability; or

if a confessor without proper jurisdiction, for serious reasons, gives

absolution. In both cases such sins are remitted in conjunction with the

other sins which have been explicitly confessed and over which the priest

had jurisdiction. This must be so, for a penitent cannot at the same

time experience God’s mercy by the remission of the sins which he has

confessed and also be an object of God’s wrath with respect to his other

sins; moreover, the inpouring grace, through the remission of the sins

that have been confessed, is not compatible with the presence of mortal

sin remaining in the soul.

It is in consequence of Christ’s institution that all the sins committed

after Baptism and not yet directly forgiven, and also the sins only

indirectly forgiven, must of necessity be revealed to the priest; for in

appointing the priest to be His representative, Christ made him the judge

before whom all mortal sins must be brought, that, in virtue of the power

of the keys, he might pass sentence of loosing or binding.[57] Over sins

which have not yet been directly remitted the confessor has pronounced

no judgment, for they were unknown to him; hence, in accordance with

Christ’s command, even sins indirectly forgiven must be submitted by

confession to the power of the keys in order that they may obtain direct

forgiveness.[58]

The following classes of sins are _sufficient_ and _free_ matter for

confession:—

(_a_) The _venial sins_ committed after Baptism. These are matter

sufficient because Christ gave His priests power to forgive _all_

sins, therefore also venial sin; and the Council of Trent teaches that

it is good and wholesome to confess venial sins. Since, however, the

recommendation of the Council imposes no obligation to confess them, as

they may be remitted by other means, they are free matter.

(_b_) _Sins already directly forgiven_ are also _free_ matter. Since they

have already been remitted by sacramental absolution they may be said

to exist no longer. Nevertheless, though they have been forgiven, one

may renew his sorrow for them, and on that account the absolution may be

given again validly, even if no other sins be presented. This is proved

by the general practice of the faithful and the unanimous teaching of

theologians, who declare that contrite confession of a past sin is always

_materia proxima_ of the Sacrament; a sin which has received forgiveness

remains always a sin of the past and so can be made the object of sorrow

and of sacramental accusation.[59]

Moreover the highest authority in the Church favors this view; for

Benedict XI teaches[60]: “Though it be not necessary, yet we consider it

very wholesome to repeat the confession of special sins on account of

the humiliation which they cause.” Although, in these words, the Holy

Father speaks of humiliation only as the advantage to be drawn from the

confession of previously forgiven sin, it is quite evident that he does

not intend to exclude the great benefits which the absolution pronounced

over these sins must bring, for the confessions of which the Pope speaks

are made only in order to obtain absolution.[61]

Thus, besides this salutary humiliation, the confession of forgiven

sins and the absolution again pronounced over them cause an increase of

sanctifying grace and a remission of temporal punishment, augment the

hatred for sin, and dispose the penitent, who has only human shortcomings

or venial sins of less moment to disclose, better toward a sincere

contrition. How in this case the true notion of “absolution,” which is

in fact identical with the influx of sanctifying grace, is preserved,

remains for the dogmatic theologian to settle; for our purpose it is

enough to indicate briefly Lugo’s explanation. “As,” says the learned

Cardinal, “after making a vow I can bind myself afresh to its observance

by renewing the vow in a manner which binds me independently of the

former promise, so God may again waive His right of punishing sin, by a

renewal of the compact with man to pardon past sins, and this repeated

renunciation of the divine right is as efficacious as the first, and is

made by a new infusion of sanctifying grace.”[62]

Since venial sins and mortal sins already directly remitted are _free

matter_, it is not necessary to accuse one’s self of them with such

accuracy and perfection regarding number and species as in the case of

necessary matter, even if there be nothing else to confess. In this case

we cannot urge the two reasons for which the accusation of mortal sins

not yet confessed must include the details of species and number, for

neither has God ordered it, nor is it required in order that the judicial

power may be properly exercised with regard to them. Hence it suffices to

accuse one’s self in such a way as to enable the priest to form _some_

sort of judgment. That this is possible if the sin is confessed at least

_generically_ (_generice_) is seen from other cases. For instance, a

man who knows that on one occasion he sinned gravely against the sixth

commandment but has forgotten the exact specific nature of the sin, or

that he has sinned gravely but has quite forgotten what the sin was, is

obliged, as all theologians teach, to confess that he has sinned gravely

against purity, or, in the latter instance, that he had committed a

mortal sin. Many extend this obligation to a sin which is only doubtfully

mortal, of which the penitent cannot any longer remember the species, and

which moreover is the only sin weighing upon his conscience.[63]

We have viewed our subject with respect to the validity of the Sacrament.

Let us see how in practice a general accusation may be made, and how far

such general accusations are valid and permissible matter for absolution.

1. A penitent may accuse himself thus: “I have sinned and I accuse

myself of the sins of my whole life,” and if the confessor has no other

knowledge of these sins, such an accusation is general in the widest

sense; to this class belongs also an accusation conveyed by an expression

of sorrow without any explicit avowal of sin.

2. A more particular but still general accusation is: “I accuse myself of

all the mortal sins which I have committed.”

3. Yet more precise is the accusation: “I accuse myself of all the

lies I have told, or of all the sins I have committed against purity,

or justice, or this or that particular virtue,” thus pointing out the

virtue or the command against which he has sinned, but without giving the

ultimate specific character (_infima species_) of the sin.

4. Finally, the penitent may declare the ultimate species (_infima

species_) of the sin without determining the precise act and without the

specific circumstances and their number; _e.g._ I accuse myself of all

profanations of the name of God, of all sinful looks dangerous to purity,

of all deception in my dealings with my neighbor, etc.

When there is question in the confession of _materia libera_:—

1. The last two methods of general accusation are sufficient for the

valid and licit administration of the Sacrament, whether the whole

confession consist of such a general accusation or whether this general

accusation be added to a confession of venial sins to make sure of

contrition. The second method of accusation might perhaps be allowed;

but if any one wished to make the _whole_ confession by this _second_

method of general accusation, embracing in this manner sins already

confessed without some sort of a special mention of venial sins lately

committed, the confessor might well object and could not easily give

absolution unless in case of some pressing necessity. If, however, sins

not yet explicitly confessed are declared, and a general accusation is

added of the second kind for the sake of security, this may be considered

as sufficient both _quoad valorem_ and _quoad liceitatem_. For the

accusation, “I have sinned mortally,” is not quite vague, as it expresses

a certain degree of sinfulness which may very well be (and at times is

all that can be obtained) the object of a judicial sentence.

2. An entirely vague accusation, although there be necessary matter,

may be accepted as being sufficient in cases of extreme necessity—when

a detailed accusation is impossible and absolution must be given. For

instance:—

(_a_) At the time of death, when the dying man can no longer speak or is

unconscious, and has already shown signs of a desire for absolution; for,

according to the Roman Ritual, such a man is to be absolved (_absolvendus

est_), and this official book of the Church suggests nothing about making

the absolution conditional.

(_b_) In other cases of impending death, when the desire for absolution

is expressed by any sort of sign; _e.g._ in a shipwreck where there is

not time to make a full accusation.

(_c_) If a penitent is too ignorant or too weak-headed, even with the

help of the confessor’s questions, to render an accurate account, at

least absolution may at times be given to such a penitent if he has not

had it for a long period.[64]

3. When it is a question of venial sins only (on the supposition that

these either alone or in conjunction with other doubtful matter have

been confessed), the confessor may not give absolution for an accusation

which is quite vague, for such an accusation offers no _entirely certain_

matter for absolution, and from what is allowed in danger of death we may

not conclude that the same will suffice for the validity of absolution in

cases where there is no urgency. A confession, for instance, delivered by

a messenger is permissible only in the case of imminent death where no

other means can be devised; this is clear from the propositions condemned

by Clement VIII and Paul V. In any other case, the unanimous voice of

theologians declares such a confession invalid. Hence if valid matter can

be presented, it must be done if absolution is to be given.

This is clear, too, on the merits of the case itself. One may always

presume that the desire which a dying man expresses for absolution is at

least a hesitating, if not definite, acknowledgement of having committed

mortal sin by the fact that he considers absolution necessary and

desirable; but if a man, though able, accuses himself of no definite sins

to his confessor, it is tantamount to a declaration that he has committed

only venial sins. Now the confession of mortal sin in general contains

something definite; whereas an accusation of venial sin in general is

altogether vague; hence the _causa judicialis_ in this case is quite

unknown, and no sentence can be passed where the charge is unknown and

undetermined.

Finally, it is quite foreign to the practice of the Church to make a

confession by the formula, “I have no mortal sins; I am sorry for my

venial sins, and I ask absolution.” He who evades, therefore, a fuller

accusation of his venial sins, when he could make one, is unworthy of

absolution, which is intended to be given by the Church only to those

who make a definite accusation.[65] Though, adds Laymann,[66] no one is

bound by any law to confess venial sins, yet whoever wishes to receive

sacramental absolution must accuse himself at least of some venial sin,

_in specie_.[67] Suarez says, and rightly, that the validity of such an

accusation may be defended speculatively, but that practically it is to

be condemned on account of the uncertainty of the matter. “I declare,

then,” he continues, “that, though we are not strictly bound to confess

the species of the venial sins, yet, supposing that we wish absolution,

we are bound to offer certain and definite matter. But in case of

necessity or where it is impossible to make a more definite accusation

(as might happen in the case of a man who is dying) such matter would

doubtlessly be sufficient.”[68]

“Since, then,” concludes Lehmkuhl, “outside the cases of necessity or

impossibility a vague confession of only venial sins does not supply

definite matter, it is not sufficient to add it to the particular

confession in order to have a more secure ground for a valid absolution

than by the accusation of the smaller sins committed since the last

confession, unless the confessor from previous knowledge of the penitent

can decide whether sufficiently definite matter is presented to him in

this vague general assertion.”[69]

In consequence the following rules are recommended in practice:—

1. If, in order to secure unquestionably definite matter from the past

life of the penitent, some sin or other is confessed in addition to those

committed since the last confession, it ought to be done by mentioning

the virtue or the commandment which was violated.

2. Some really grave sin ought to be mentioned.

3. It should not be mentioned out of mere routine, but with real sorrow

of heart.

4. Since of late a number of writers defend the mere vague accusation

on this free matter as valid and permissible[70] even outside cases of

necessity, the confessor when unable to get more definite matter may

acquiesce and grant absolution.

5. If one desires to derive real spiritual profit from the confession of

venial sins, too great minuteness as well as too great vagueness must be

avoided; some particular venial sin which causes more uneasiness than the

rest might be made a subject of more especial sorrow and more careful

accusation, otherwise in many cases the sorrow as well as the accusation

and purpose of amendment are likely to be too vague, if not completely

absent. It has been pointed out previously that gross ignorance on the

part of the penitent is a reason for taking a very general accusation as

valid for absolution.

In practice the confessor should attend to the following rules:—

In the case of a penitent who accuses himself of no sin in particular,

let the priest inquire whether this be due to the fact that the penitent

has really not committed any mortal sin, or to invincible ignorance, or

to a rooted habit of sin which has produced in the penitent a darkening

of the intellect and a recklessness with regard to his salvation. If the

penitent accuses himself of no sin in particular because he is really

quite unconscious of grave trespass, the confessor might suggest to

him a few lesser sins such as are usually committed by people in the

same station of life, and ask if, since the last confession or in his

past life, he has ever given way to such sins—if, for instance, he has

offended his neighbor, or been violent, angry, disobedient, careless

in prayer, etc. If the penitent answers in the affirmative to one or

other of these questions, the confessor should excite him to repentance

and purpose of amendment, so far as he sees it necessary, and then

absolve him. If, however, the penitent answers all questions with a No,

and cannot be induced to acknowledge any sin of his past life, further

questioning should be avoided, and the penitent urged to make an act of

sorrow for all the sins of his whole life, especially those committed

against his neighbor, or against obedience, etc. If the penitent accede

to this, as often happens, in spite of his former declaration that he is

not conscious of any sin even in his past life, the priest should arouse

him to sorrow and a firm resolution, and absolve him conditionally if the

penitent has not received absolution for a long time.

With such penitents there will be reason to suspect that their

disposition comes from want of knowledge of the most necessary truths

of salvation. If the priest discover this to be the case—as he may by a

few judicious questions—he may not absolve him till after instruction in

these necessary truths. Ordinarily it will be well to instruct him at

once before leaving the confessional, for fear that he should neglect

approaching the Sacraments—a consequence much to be apprehended—or take

no pains to get instructed. If, however, the priest finds out that the

cause of the ignorance is a rooted habit of sin, or the insensibility

following on certain sins which have so fatal an effect in this

matter—as, for instance, impurity or drunkenness—he must exercise great

patience, putting before the penitent earnestly the awful consequences of

his sinful life, instruct him, and in every possible way prepare him with

true apostolic zeal to receive worthily the sacrament, either immediately

or later, if the absolution be deferred, and to fulfill his resolutions

of making an earnest amendment.[71]

7. The Form of the Sacrament.

The form of the Sacrament, “in which its power principally lies,”[72]

consists of the words which the priest utters over the penitent: _Ego te

absolvo a peccatis tuis in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti,

Amen_. To these words the custom of the Church has added others which

have become fixed in the ritual and are prescribed, though “they do

not belong to the _essence_ of the form and are not necessary for the

conferring of the Sacrament.”[73]

There is no doubt that the words _Ego te absolvo_, or _te absolvo_ simply

(since the pronoun _Ego_ is contained in the verb _absolvo_), belong to

the _essence_ of the form. These words are _de essentia formæ_, because,

as St. Thomas says,[74] they signify the _virtus clavium et totum

Sacramenti effectum_.

According to most theologians the words _a peccatis tuis_ do not belong

to the essence and the validity of the Sacrament; for this view we

may quote St. Thomas and the authority of the Roman catechism, which

says: “The form is: _Ego te absolvo_.” The words _a peccatis tuis_ are

sufficiently indicated by the accusation of the penitent and the act of

the priest who gives absolution. Other theologians, however, maintain

that these words are essential, arguing that since Christ in instituting

the Sacrament used the words, “Whose sins you shall forgive,” the

remission of sins ought to be expressly mentioned. Though the first view

is the more probable, the words ought not to be omitted in practice,

since in the conferring of the Sacraments the safer opinion should be

followed.[75]

If the words _absolvo a peccatis tuis_ were used, omitting the word

_te_, the form would still be probably valid, since _te_ is sufficiently

implied in the word _tuis_; in practice, however, this view ought not

to be taken, but the safer opinion followed.[76] The absolution would

certainly be invalid if the priest said only _absolvo_, because the

object of the absolution is not indicated and the sense is indefinite.[77]

The words _In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, Amen_, are

certainly not of the essence of the form, since Christ in instituting the

Sacrament made no reference to the Blessed Trinity; they are, however,

most appropriately added to express that the priest absolves from sin by

the authority and power of God.[78]

In cases of necessity absolution may be given by the same priest to many

persons at the same time, while he says, _Ego vos absolvo a peccatis

vestris_; thus, for instance, soldiers may be absolved at the beginning

of a battle. As many Sacraments are conferred as there are persons

absolved, if they give any token of sorrow and in some way confess their

sinfulness.[79]

The _Rituale Romanum_ prescribes how a priest should give absolution,

and, as it is the official book of the Church, he is bound to follow its

directions. Any unauthorized change would be a sin because it is a breach

of the commands of the Church; indeed the confessor would sin grievously

if he wished to introduce any change into the form of absolution.

“When the priest is about to give absolution,” is the direction of the

Ritual, “after imposing a penance on the penitent and the latter having

accepted it, let him say: _Misereatur tui omnipotens Deus et dimissis

peccatis tuis perducat te ad vitam æternam. Amen._ Then he raises his

right hand over the penitent and says: _Indulgentiam, absolutionem et

remissionem peccatorum tuorum tribuat tibi omnipotens et misericors

Dominus. Amen._

“_Dominus noster Jesus Christus te absolvat, et ego auctoritate ipsius

te absolvo ab omni vinculo excommunicationis_ (_suspensionis_) _et

interdicti in quantum possum et tu indiges. Deinde ego te absolvo a

peccatis tuis in nomine Patris ✠ et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen._

“If the penitent is not a cleric, the word _suspensionis_ is omitted.”

Then follows the prayer: “_Passio Domini nostri Jesu Christi, merita

beatæ Mariæ Virginis et omnium Sanctorum, quidquid boni feceris et mali

sustinueris, sint tibi in remissionem peccatorum, augmentum gratiæ et

præmium vitæ æternæ. Amen._”

If there are many penitents to be heard and in urgent confessions, the

_Misereatur_ and _Indulgentiam_ may be omitted and simply the _Dominus

noster_, etc., said. The prayer _Passio Domini_, etc., may also be left

out.[80] It is recommended, however, not to omit this last prayer,

because by virtue of it (so teaches St. Thomas) the good works of the

penitent acquire the character of sacramental satisfaction, and a share

in the merits of Christ as well as those of our blessed Lady and of the

saints.[81]

“In cases of pressing necessity, in danger of death, the priest may

simply say: _Ego te absolvo ab omnibus censuris et peccatis in nomine

Patris ✠ et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen._”

Such is the form of absolution according to the prescription of the

Roman Ritual. The confessor is at liberty to make use of the above

abbreviations under the circumstances mentioned. It would be very wrong

to attempt to put in all the prayers, if there were danger of a man

dying without receiving absolution; in this case the priest must use the

shorter form given by the Ritual.[82]

The priest will be more eager to carry out the directions of the Church

if he reflects on the meaning of the prayers which precede and follow

the absolution; the former constitute an admirable preparation for that

great act of mercy, the latter a most appropriate crowning of the same;

all secure a special help for the penitent. Even the blessing which,

according to some rituals, the priest is enjoined to give with the words:

_Dominus sit in corde tuo et in labiis tuis ut digne et competenter_ (or

_rite_) _confitearis peccata tua. In nomine Patris ✠ et Filii et Spiritus

Sancti. Amen_, is important. The accusation of so many sins is a heavy

burden to the penitent; false shame and the devil will unite to deter him

from a sincere accusation; and so the priest prays that the Lord with

His grace may so act on the heart of the penitent that with sincerity

and contrition he accuses himself of what burdens his conscience. In the

_Misereatur_ the priest prays that God may grant in His mercy remission

of the sins which the penitent confesses, and give him eternal life

(_anticipando_ by sanctifying grace, and perfectly in the next world).

The _Indulgentiam_ contains the same petition for “grace, absolution,

and remission,” of sins confessed and of all others; it is not meant as

a mere repetition, as a sort of compliance with Our Lord’s counsel of

insisting on the first petition; but in the repetition of the synonyms

the priest is no doubt intended to plead for God’s mercy and power

that the penitent may have _complete_ forgiveness of sin. This perfect

forgiveness includes also the remission of the temporal penalties, since

these, as the _reliquiæ peccatorum_, are so intimately connected with

the sin itself that in early Christian times they were briefly included

under the category of _peccata_, and the Church, in the so-called general

absolution given on the occasion of a plenary indulgence of temporal

punishment, still uses the formula _indulgentiam plenariam et remissionem

omnium peccatorum tibi concedo_.

Then the priest goes on to reconcile the penitent to the Church by

the removal of all censures which close the door to the Sacraments

and other means of grace. This absolution from censure should always

precede that of the sins as a measure of precaution even when no sins

involving censure have been confessed. The Church insists on this, and

many moralists teach that the confessor by omitting this _absolutio a

censuris_ would commit a venial sin by his disobedience to the command of

the Church. Even in cases of the most pressing urgency the priest should

use the form: _Ego te absolvo ab omnibus censuris et peccatis in nomine

Patris_, etc.[83] St. Alphonsus does not regard this omission as a sin if

the priest uses the formula of absolution with the intention of absolving

from censure as well as sin, and he argues from the words of the Council

of Trent, which says only that this clause is added _laudabiliter_.[84]

If, however, a penitent has incurred a censure and the priest first

absolves from the sin and afterwards from the censure, such inversion

of the order would be matter of grievous sin when the censure is

excommunication debarring from the reception of the Sacraments; not,

however, in the case of suspension or interdict. This inversion would

also be a grievous sin even if the priest intended to absolve from both

sins and censures, although in this case the words _absolvo te a peccatis

tuis_ can be understood of the absolution from censures on account of the

intimate connection between the two.[85] Such an absolution, therefore,

would be valid though given in defiance of the Church’s prescription, for

the censure does not affect the validity but only the lawfulness of the

absolution.[86]

The penitent must be present and the absolution pronounced over him by

the confessor if it is to be valid. This is abundantly clear from the

divine institution of the Sacrament, from the practice of the Church, and

from a decree of the Head of the Church. Hence the absolution cannot be

given in writing nor by signs. According to the teaching of the Councils

of Florence and Trent the form of this Sacrament, as of all the others

(except that of matrimony, where a mere sign of consent is sufficient),

is in the words which the priest must pronounce and articulate over the

penitent. The Sacraments owe their institution to Christ; for, though

matrimony existed as a divine institution before His coming, it was

sanctified by Him and raised to the dignity of a means of grace in His

Church. The essential rites of the Sacraments were defined by Christ,

and we learn them from Scripture or tradition. We know from a uniform

tradition that the form of all the Sacraments except matrimony consists

essentially in words articulated by the lips; as for the Sacrament of

Penance, the evidence is clear as well from the actual use prescribed in

all penitentials and from the teaching of the Fathers, as from the decree

of Eugenius IV to the Armenians.

It is not, however, necessary that the words of absolution should be

heard by the penitent or others; in fact it is recommended to say them in

a low voice, so that, in case absolution is for some reason withheld from

a penitent, others may not know of it.

The fact that the absolution should be pronounced in words requires as

its complement that the penitent should be present, for the words _Ego te

absolvo_ are not such as we would address to a person when absent, but

thus we speak to one who is nigh. The form must certainly be applied to

the matter actually present; moreover, according to the Council of Trent

the sinner should present himself before the tribunal as the accused.

This is quite clear, too, from the constant tradition of the Church, in

which all penitentials contain a form which is pronounced over one who

is present, and either explicitly require the immediate presence of the

penitent before the confessor or evidently suppose it; nor do we find in

the whole of antiquity any clear instance of a sacramental absolution

pronounced over an absent person.

A confession, therefore, made to a priest by writing or by messenger

is invalid if the absolution is given to the penitent in his absence.

Moreover, the absolution is illicit and invalid if given to an absent

penitent even though the confession has been made by him in person to

the priest. Further, too, the absolution is illicit and invalid which

is given to a present penitent who has not confessed in person to the

priest—if, for instance, the confession has been by letter; exception is

made for the case where the penitent presents himself to the priest and

for some good reason accuses himself only in general of sins about which

he has informed the confessor by letter, if the latter at the time of the

confession retains a knowledge of the sins in particular.[87]

The _præsentia moralis_ of the penitent is sufficient for absolution.

This condition is satisfied if the priest and the penitent are

sufficiently near to hear one another when they speak in an ordinary

tone of voice, though cases may occur where the voice must be exerted a

little more than is usual.[88] In general greater proximity is required

for valid absolution than is demanded for hearing a preacher or for

satisfying the obligation of hearing Mass.[89]

St. Alphonsus declares with respect to this subject that Tamburini is

justified in rejecting the view of Leander, who holds that the moral

presence is secured if the priest sees the penitent or is sensibly aware

of his presence.[90] A man may be seen at a distance at which it would

be impossible to hold speech with him in the usual manner or even by

raising the voice. If in case of necessity absolution must be given at a

distance, it should be given _sub conditione_.

Hence to secure the validity of the absolution it is required (1) that

the confessor and the penitent should not be in rooms which are in no

way connected; and if (2) they are in the same room, they should not be

too far apart, certainly not more than twenty paces; if the distance

is notably less, there need be no misgiving about the validity of the

absolution; finally (3) the required proximity is secured if the priest

knows that the penitent is present.

(_a_) If the penitent has already left the confessional but is still

close by the confessor, he may and ought to be absolved, even, according

to Lugo, Tamburini, and others, if he be so merged in the crowd that he

cannot be seen; the confessor must, however, be certain that he is not

or cannot be far off; for the penitent is still morally present and has

the desire of receiving absolution. The penitent ought, however, to be

recalled if this can be done without causing disturbance or remark.

(_b_) If, through fear of infection or for other reasons, the priest

cannot enter a sick-room, he may validly absolve the penitent from the

window or the door.[91]

(_c_) If at a distance a priest sees some one falling from a height or

into the water, or if he knows that some one is buried under the ruins

of a building, etc., he should give absolution conditionally.[92]

Absolution must, under ordinary circumstances, be given absolutely; for

weighty reasons it may and ought to be given conditionally (_conditione_).

8. Conditional Absolution.

It is the unanimous teaching of all theologians that in certain cases,

for weighty reasons, the Sacraments may be administered conditionally,

and, what is more, must be so administered. With regard to Baptism and

Extreme Unction this is prescribed by the Roman Ritual, with regard to

Confirmation by Benedict XIV, with regard to the Holy Eucharist, where a

doubt exists as to the validity of the consecration, by the Rubrics of

the Mass, and with regard to Orders by the S. Congregatio Concilii.[93]

The question now under consideration is whether the Sacrament of Penance

given conditionally is valid.

Many theologians were of opinion that a conditional absolution was

opposed to the judicial character of this Sacrament. They argued that

the conditional form was not judicial, and in particular would not

admit a _condition with regard to law_ (_conditio juris_), on which the

confessor was bound to pronounce judgment (_e.g._ if thou art prepared,

disposed, etc.), whereas they permitted a _condition with regard to the

fact_ (_conditio facti_) (_e.g._ if thou art alive). This distinction

is, however, irrelevant; for even though the question of the penitent’s

disposition be left undecided, still the priest judges (1) of the sins

which have been confessed, and (2) gives his sentence on the apparent

worthiness and preparation of the penitent and the penance to be imposed;

and (3) judges on the advisability of conferring conditional absolution

or not, according to the effect it will have on the penitent. In any

case, the argument from the difference which a conditional sentence would

create between a human court and the sacramental tribunal proves nothing,

since the two courts differ in many points.[94] It is to be particularly

noted that the sentence of an earthly court is always carried out; while

the effect of the sentence which the priest pronounces in the divine

tribunal always depends on conditions known only to God, so that the

priest’s sentence is always conditional even when it is pronounced in an

absolute form. A conditional sentence is in no way inconsistent with the

nature of a judicial judgment either in general or in the Sacrament of

Penance.

Lehmkuhl enlarges on this point:[95] “It is not repugnant in a civil

tribunal for a judge to give sentence with a condition like the

following, for instance: ‘If payment be not made by a certain date,’ or

to grant a hearing to a plaintiff ‘provided that such or such document

be found among his papers,’ which document, of course, he will order to

be searched for by trustworthy men. Indeed, every sentence of a human

tribunal, whether in civil or in criminal causes, is seldom pronounced

without the implicit condition ‘if the evidence of the witnesses be

true’; for unless it rested upon this supposition and condition, the

sentence would be unjust and consequently null, more especially if

pronounced by any but the supreme authority.”

Thus the sacramental sentence always presupposes that the penitent is

telling the truth and has real sorrow; under such circumstances the

confessor may be mistaking even when he thinks he is certain, all the

more so as the sacramental sentence is pronounced always ministerially,

and, in order to be efficacious, must be in accordance with the sentence

of God. This, however, is no impediment to the absolution being for the

most part pronounced absolutely both as to form and intention. This the

confessor must observe as long as he has no solid ground for thinking

that his judgment is not in accordance with God’s; for a condition which

rests only on a possibility or on a groundless suspicion is practically

not worth considering and ought not to be acted upon; in reality it is

quite sufficiently implied in the nature of the case.

If, however, for some good reason it is to be feared that the judgment of

the confessor is different from that of God, while the pressing necessity

of the case, or the good of the penitent requires that absolution be

given even though doubtful, reverence for the Sacrament demands that

the condition be added _explicitly_ in word, or at least in the mind, so

that it amounts to a protest on the part of the priest that where the

condition is in default he withdraws his intention of pronouncing the

sacred words of absolution in the person of Christ.

The opponents of conditional absolution urge in favor of their view the

proposition that in doubt about the validity of the Sacraments the safer

opinion must be followed. With regard to the validity of conditional

absolution there is no doubt, since the views of its opponents have no

probability either intrinsic or extrinsic. Moreover, it is not true

that the safer opinion with regard to the validity of the Sacraments is

always to be followed; for, since the Sacraments were instituted for

man’s benefit, cases occur in which the Sacraments must be exposed to

the danger of nullity, in order to help one who is in extreme spiritual

necessity. An instance in point would be the case of a dying man whose

dispositions are doubtful. To let him die without absolution would surely

expose him to the certain danger of damnation. Supposing he were in good

dispositions, whatever misgivings I might have on the subject, should I

not be responsible for his damnation? I might have opened the gates of

heaven to him and I have not done it! Am I then to absolve him without

any condition? But supposing he is not disposed; even if the Sacrament

were not nullified, I should be guilty of having exposed it to the

danger of invalidity. From such a dilemma the only escape is the use of

conditional absolution; by it I can help the dying man if he is in good

dispositions, and I insure the Sacrament against nullity when I have the

intention of not conferring it unless the man be disposed.[96]

Hence theologians teach that absolution given _sub conditione_ is valid

if the condition be fulfilled; the condition, however, must be _de

præsenti_ or _de præterito_; absolution given under a _conditio de

futuro_ would be invalid, for in a _conditio de futuro_ the minister

of the Sacrament has no intention of conferring the Sacrament _hic et

nunc_; his intention would rather be to confer the Sacrament when the

condition will have been fulfilled; by that time, however, the matter is

no longer present which for the validity of the Sacrament must be joined

to the form. On the other hand, the Sacrament may be validly given under

a condition _de præsenti_ or _de præterito_, because the intention is

absolute if the condition is fulfilled; if not fulfilled, the intention

of administering the Sacrament is wanting, so that the Sacrament is not

exposed to irreverence. In this case the conditional intention passes

into an unconditional one, _i.e._ becomes absolute. But the conditional

intention is efficacious for validity only if the condition is completed

or satisfied at the moment when the matter and form of the Sacrament are

brought together. The absolution would also be valid if it were given

with the condition: “if you are alive, if you are baptized, if you are

present, if you really intend to make restitution”; while an absolution

would be invalid if given under conditions such as, “if you are

predestined, if it be in the mind of God that you will make restitution

this year,” since such knowledge is withheld from men. Finally, an

absolution given with the condition, “if you are going to improve,” would

also be invalid.[97]

It is also _allowed_ to give absolution _sub conditione_ when there is

just reason for so doing; and in case of necessity the priest is bound

under mortal sin to give conditional absolution.[98]

The view of some theologians is to be condemned who hold that one may

impart conditional absolution for _any insignificant reason_, or without

urgent need, or in _any doubt of the requisite dispositions_ even in a

penitent burdened with mortal sin. This is a doctrine which bears too

openly the stamp of laxity, and it is pernicious to souls. What a number

of sacrileges would follow from such a practice! The confessor would be

no longer a faithful and prudent minister of the Sacrament, he would be

casting pearls before swine, and by his too easy compliance in giving

absolution he would imperil the souls of his penitents.[99]

On the other hand, we cannot admit the teaching of those theologians[100]

who hold that absolution _sub conditione_ is permitted only in extreme

necessity or in great danger.

A sufficient reason for imparting absolution under condition would be in

the case where unconditional absolution would expose the Sacrament to

danger of nullity on account of a reasonable doubt of the existence of

some one or other of the requisites for the validity of the Sacrament,

and where at the same time by putting off the absolution the penitent

would be exposed to danger of real spiritual harm.

From what has been said we gather that in the following cases absolution

may be given _sub conditione_:—

1. If the priest doubt whether he has absolved a penitent who has

confessed a mortal sin.

2. In doubt whether the penitent in question is morally present.

3. In doubt whether the penitent is alive or already dead.

4. If the priest doubt (_dubio facti_) whether he has jurisdiction, and

the confession must be made; in such a case the confessor must tell the

penitent that he has given absolution only _sub conditione_, so that if

proof be forthcoming later on that jurisdiction was wanting, the penitent

will know that he has not been absolved and must accuse himself again of

the mortal sins mentioned in that confession. If the doubt turn on the

question of law (_dubium juris_), _i.e._ on a point where theologians do

not agree whether absolution can be given in such a case, the absolution

may be pronounced without any condition.[101]

5. In doubt whether the matter be sufficient: this may happen (_a_) when

an adult is baptized _sub conditione_ and is to be absolved at the same

time; and (_b_) when a penitent declares only some imperfections, and

there is doubt whether they are really venial sins, and when the same

penitent can offer no certain sins of his past life. To such a penitent

absolution may, according to a probable view, be given at intervals, so

that he may not be deprived for long of the benefits of the Sacrament of

Penance; absolution in such cases ought not to be given more than once

a month. For the same reason absolution can be given _sub conditione_

when the penitent, unable to present certain matter from his past life,

has only sins of less moment to confess and there is doubt as to the

existence of sorrow for such sins.[102] Moreover, if the penitent offer

no certain matter, the confessor is not _bound_ to inquire for it in

order to give absolution, and after making vain inquiry he is not obliged

to give absolution _sub conditione_, since the penitent in such case has

no sure claim to it.

If, however, any doubt exists as to the presence of necessary matter, or

whether a sin confessed along with the imperfections be mortal or not,

for which, however, the penitent is certainly contrite, then absolution

under condition must be given.

6. In doubt whether the necessary dispositions with regard to mortal sin

are present conditional absolution may sometimes, though not always, be

given; it must be given when urgent reasons counsel such a step. For

instance:—

(_a_) To those who are in danger of death, from whatever cause.

(_b_) When the penitent honestly thinks he is well disposed, and when the

confessor fears that if absolution be refused or put off, the penitent

may fall into worse ways or be frightened away from the Sacraments, or

that he will certainly receive some other Sacrament, as, for instance,

Marriage or Confirmation, in an _unworthy_ state.

Finally, conditional absolution may be given to children and others of

whom it is doubtful whether they possess sufficient use of reason or the

necessary knowledge of the truths of faith. These may receive conditional

absolution not only when in danger of death, but also when they have to

fulfill the law of the Church, and especially if they have confessed a

sin which is doubtfully or probably mortal; they must be so absolved even

if they are relapsing sinners, for while in doubtfully disposed penitents

who have the full use of reason absolution must be delayed, since hopes

may be entertained that they will return better disposed later, in the

case of children or feeble minded no such hope can be well entertained.

Indeed, according to a probable view such penitents may receive

conditional absolution at intervals of two or three months, when they

confess only venial sins, that they may not go for any considerable time

without the grace of the Sacrament. The confessor is, however, obliged

to instruct children and feeble-minded persons and to dispose them for

absolution.[103]

We answer some objections urged against the doctrine that in the cases

mentioned absolution may be given conditionally.

1. This practice is full of danger and is the cause of many sins.

The practice is full of danger, it is true, if absolution is given

indiscriminately without necessity or some special reason; if, however,

the rules given above are observed, it is no longer dangerous or harmful.

2. It is further objected that a penitent conditionally absolved will

approach the altar and make a sacrilegious communion, a risk not to be

incurred lightly.

The confession of such a penitent is not sacrilegious, hence the

communion is not; for, by supposition, the penitent is in good faith. At

the worst the communion would be without fruit or profit; nor can we say

that the communion is quite useless, for its reception is an occasion

for eliciting different acts of virtue. Indeed, according to the common

teaching on this subject, the communicant who receives in mortal sin and

with imperfect contrition, yet in good faith, is placed thereby in a

state of grace. To make an act of imperfect contrition should not be a

great difficulty, since holy communion usually arouses pious emotions of

love and sorrow in those who approach in good faith.

3. It is likewise objected that a conditionally absolved penitent will

never confess his sins again, and if he is not rightly disposed will die

in his sins.

It may be replied that doubtfully absolved sins are remitted (_a_)

by the reception of holy communion, as we have already shown; (_b_)

indirectly in the following confession along with the other sins which

he confesses, even if he were never again to submit them to the keys. If

it be urged here that the penitent might never come to confession again,

we should reply that such a case is extremely rare and to be treated

as quite improbable. On the contrary, the penitent would be exposed to

much graver risk of his salvation if, in a situation of such necessity

as we postulate for the giving of conditional absolution, he were to be

dismissed without it.

4. Another objection is drawn from the first of the propositions

condemned by Innocent XI, whence it appears that no one may presume to

follow a probable opinion in dispensing the Sacraments. The conclusion

drawn is that no one may give an absolution which is doubtfully valid.

This practice is absolutely forbidden where the validity of the

Sacrament and the welfare of the individual are endangered by such

administration of the Sacrament; if, however, necessity or solid reasons

demand such practice, it is allowed.[104] Moreover, the proposition

condemned by Innocent is concerned only with the essential portions of

the Sacrament, the validity of matter and form in so far as these depend

on the minister of the Sacrament. In our case the matter is presented

by the penitent and is outside the control of the minister. Otherwise,

indeed, penitents might often enough be dismissed without absolution, for

frequently no certainty can be had as to their dispositions, but at most

a greater or lesser probability.

5. Finally some would limit the use of conditional absolution to cases of

the greatest rarity and of most pressing necessity—when, for instance,

a dying man is quite unconscious or already in his agony; for in any

other case it is entirely his own fault if he be doubtfully disposed.

This is the view of the anonymous author of the Letters against the

distinguished work of Cardinal Gousset: _Justification de la doctrine de

Saint Liguori_.[105]

This objection is based on several false premises:—

1. It is untrue that one who is doubtfully disposed is certainly

indisposed; it is at least _per se_ untrue, for it is a contradiction in

terms.

2. It is untrue that the penitent is always responsible for not seeming

certainly disposed; for he can be quite prepared without the confessor

knowing about it; again, as long as he is not certainly unprepared, he

may be actually in the proper dispositions.

3. Many considerations respecting the penitent’s salvation may, as we

have seen, urge the confessor to decide on giving rather than refusing

absolution. At times the priest would be guilty of the gravest imprudence

by putting off the absolution till extreme need should arise, when the

penitent might be unable to avail himself of the Sacrament. “Do you

wish to put off the reconciliation of the dying man to his God till the

moment when he can no longer express his wishes? Will you, in order to

make the absolution certain, wait till the penitent is at the last gasp,

so that it is doubtful if he is capable of receiving the Sacrament?...

I repeat, the Sacraments are made for men, not men for the Sacraments.

By pursuing such a course you would act in opposition to Him who out of

His mercy gave us the Sacrament; you would depart from the spirit of the

Church which, like a tender mother, administers the Sacraments, when you

maintain that we can only apply the principle of _sacramenta propter

homines_ in cases where the dying sinner cannot even by signs express

what is going on in the recesses of his soul.”[106]

PART II

_THE RECIPIENT OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, OR THE ACTS OF THE PENITENT_

9. Who can Receive the Sacrament of Penance.

Every man who has fallen into formal sin after Baptism is capable of

receiving the Sacrament of Penance. Whoever, therefore, has not yet

been baptized, or, having been baptized, has committed no sin since

Baptism, is incapable of sacramental absolution. All children who have

not attained to the use of reason are unable to receive this Sacrament;

to these we may add such adults as cannot make that use of their reason

which is necessary for disposing them to receive this Sacrament.

In order that a baptized person may make a valid and fruitful use of this

Sacrament, he must elicit those acts which we have mentioned before;

he must be genuinely sorry for his sins, be ready to do penance, and

submit his sins to the power of the keys vested in the Church. These acts

form not only the essential and necessary dispositions for receiving

the Sacrament, but—and this is a peculiar feature of the Sacrament of

Penance—they are also the _materia proxima_. The following sections will

be devoted to the consideration of these acts in their double aspect.

CHAPTER I

CONTRITION

10. Extent and Efficacy of Contrition.

The most prominent position among the acts of the penitent belongs to

contrition.

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent contrition is a hearty

sorrow and detestation for past sin together with a firm resolution to

sin no more.[107]

We must investigate more closely the _essence_ of this contrition.

Contrition is a hearty _sorrow_; this sorrow is interior; hence the

prophet speaks of a rending of the heart (_scindite corda vestra_!—Joel

ii. 13), and so contrition is called _contritio cordis_, a grinding of

the heart. A merely external show of sorrow, the mere recital of an act

of contrition, is therefore not a true sorrow. Moreover, since sorrow is

a moral act and all moral acts proceed from the will, sorrow must have

its roots in the will.

Many very different things may cause us great grief; for instance, the

death of a dear relation, the loss of earthly goods, the failure of our

plans and undertakings, the suffering of wrongs and affronts, experience

of ingratitude and unkindness, a thoughtless word which one has uttered,

a mere breach of etiquette that one has committed. Contrition, however,

is grief of the soul for _past sin_.

The sins of others may cause us real and deep feelings of pain. What

fervent Christian is unconcerned at the many sins which are daily

committed and the many affronts offered to God? We are pained by them,

but we cannot be contrite for them. We can have contrition only for the

_sins which we have ourselves committed_—_de peccato commisso_, as the

Council of Trent expresses it.

This being the case, sorrow as understood in this connection is not to be

confused with:—

(_a_) Merely speculative sorrow (_dolor intellectivus_), _i.e._, the mere

knowledge of the hatefulness and horror of sin. Reason when not blinded

can recognize and must recognize clearly the hatefulness and wickedness

of sin; yet in spite of this knowledge the will may cling to it and love

it; indeed such cases are of frequent occurrence.

(_b_) Or the feeling of guilt or the remorse of conscience (_terrores

conscientiæ_) which Luther taught to be of the essence of true sorrow.

The feeling of guilt may be present without the help of our will, and

even against our will. Remorse of conscience may be roused in us without

our wishing it, and it may happen that we cannot allay it even when we

wish to do so.

(_c_) Finally, the resolve to amend, the _resipiscentia_, and even the

giving up of the sin is not of itself true sorrow; a man may forsake his

sin merely because he has indulged in it to excess, because it has no

longer any attraction for him, or because he has become tired of it.

True sorrow is not merely a pain and bitterness of heart; it is also a

real hatred and horror of sin; but hatred and horror are acts of the

will, for it is the will which hates and loves, shrinks from an object

or embraces it. The will may shrink from sin at the same time that

sensuality makes us crave for the sin; the will, however, must not give

way to the craving.

Sorrow and detestation of sin are in themselves distinct, yet they are

so bound up in man’s nature, that, where there is detestation there is

necessarily also sorrow, so that true and efficacious sorrow for sin, as

sin, cannot exist without detestation of the same.[108]

As to the question whether contrition lies more in sorrow for sin

or in detestation of it—in other words, in dislike, hatred, and

aversion—theologians answer that contrition is founded principally on

detestation for sin, and with reason, for:—

(_a_) By this detestation the sinner retracts his evil will and turns

towards God; this detestation is, moreover, the cause of sorrow. When,

therefore, it is asserted that the sinner should above all have sorrow

for his sins, and when by this is understood a sorrowful hatred of

sin, this is correct, for in this case horror of sin is there with

its complement. Moreover, we must not lose sight of St. Alphonsus’

dictum[109] that there is no reason to doubt that one sentiment includes

the other; he who has a horror of his sins is sorry for them, and whoever

is supernaturally sorry for them detests them.

Since contrition is the most important element in the disposition of

the sinner, it is proper to give in detail the acts which belong to

contrition, and to show how the sinner may attain to perfect contrition.

First and foremost, a preliminary act of faith and hope of obtaining

pardon by the merits of Christ should be made. How can he repent of his

sins who does not believe that there is a God and that God is offended

by sin, who does not believe that God is faithful to His promises and

merciful to sinners, and who does not hope that God will pardon him?

These acts of faith and hope, though they need not be made _explicitly_,

are the foundations of contrition; on them are built up the remaining

elements which go to form the perfect act. These are:—

1. The knowledge of the hatefulness of sin as an offense against God,

and of the awful punishments which the sinner incurs. This knowledge is

necessary in order to acquire contrition, for the law of man’s nature

makes him love and strive for what his reason proposes to him under the

appearance of good, and hate and avoid what it presents as evil.

2. An act of the will, which desires to avoid the evil now known as such;

on this follows:—

3. The hatred of past sins which have caused that evil, and the desire

of undoing the sin committed. This desire, in the abstract, is only

a velleity and quite inefficacious, for that which is done cannot be

undone; but it is of efficacy in so far as it means a wish to undo, if

it were possible, the sin by which God has been offended and punishment

incurred.

4. From this hatred there arises in the rational appetite or in the will

a sorrow and real distress that the sins have been committed; hence also

follows:—

5. In the sensitive appetite, by picturing to ourselves the horror and

evil consequences of sin, a certain hatred and sorrow, which may become

so keen as to produce sighs and tears.

6. The resolve and firm determination never more to sin and offend God,

or, what comes to the same thing, a resolution to observe faithfully and

perfectly God’s commands.

7. Finally, there appears in the truly repentant sinner a willingness to

render satisfaction to God for past sins, to chastise and punish himself,

and to repair God’s honor.[110]

Contrition is either _perfect_ or _imperfect_[111] according as the

sorrow and hatred arise from a motive of perfect love or of some

supernatural motive which is inferior to perfect love. Since we

understand here by love (_caritas_) the _amor benevolentiæ_, by which

we love God above all things for His own sake, _i.e._ on account of His

infinite perfections, we may define perfect contrition (_contritio_) as a

sorrow and hatred for past sins together with a firm purpose never more

to sin, because sin is an injury to God, who is loved above all things

for His own sake.

Imperfect contrition (_attritio_) may be founded on many other

supernatural motives; these are usually, as the Council of Trent

declares, the fear of hell or punishment and the hatefulness of sin.[112]

Thus imperfect contrition may be defined: sorrow and detestation of past

sin with the determination never more to sin, because sin is an offense

against God, who utterly abhors it on account of its hatefulness and

avenges it with punishment. The thought of God, the supreme Lord of all,

infinitely holy, to whom sin is detestable by its shamefulness, fills the

sinner with confusion; the thought of God, who punishes sin with infinite

justice, fills him with fear of the punishments of sin, and, impelled by

this fear, he repents of having offended God by his sin.

Perfect and imperfect contrition coincide in this respect, that they

are both a supernatural sorrow and hatred for sin regarded as an injury

to God; they differ, however, specifically in this, that perfect

contrition proceeds from perfect love of God, and imperfect contrition

from a variety of other less noble motives; they also differ in their

efficacy.[113]

11. The Essential Features of Perfect Contrition.

According to the unanimous teaching of theologians, which is based on

the Council of Trent, perfect contrition proceeds from perfect love. The

Council declares that contrition founded on _caritas_ is perfect; that,

in consequence, its perfection depends on _caritas_; hence in order to

acquire a complete grasp of the nature of perfect contrition we must

investigate the nature of love, its degrees and kinds.

The love of God, of which only there is question here, has for its

object God alone, and the motive of this love is similarly always God

Himself. There are many aspects under which God may be presented to us

as an object of love, and these aspects determine the different degrees

of love. First of all there are two kinds of this love: _pure_ or

_disinterested_ love, _amor benevolentiæ_ (_amicitiæ_), and selfish or

_interested_ love (_amor concupiscentiæ_). God can be loved because He

is most worthy of love, because He is good, because He is the highest

good. If we love God for His own sake because He is most lovable _in

Himself_ (_prout est in se summum bonum_), we have the first kind of

love, the pure love of God; if we love Him on our own account because He

is _for us_ the highest good (_prout nobis est summum bonum_), we have

the second kind of love. The pure love of God is called perfect love,

the other imperfect. If now we consider more closely the imperfect love

of God, we find two degrees. God is here the object of love in as much

as He is good to man, _i.e._ on the one hand God confers His benefits

on man on earth and His everlasting possession in heaven completes the

happiness of man hereafter, and on the other hand the loss of God means

to man on earth unhappiness and suffering and in the next life the

eternal punishment of hell. If a man disregards totally the idea of God

as a person to be loved and keeps in view only his own selfish interests,

he evidently loves only himself, thinking merely of his own present

and future well-being, his own joys and sufferings, his own reward and

punishment. Such a love, which hardly deserves the name, is downright

selfishness and is rightly called a mercenary love (_amor mercenarius_).

This love corresponds to the fear which is called _purely servile_,

_timor serviliter servilis_, that fear which hates only the punishment

and not the sin, which cherishes the inclination to sin, so that a man

would sin if he did not fear punishment. Both love and fear of this kind

belong to the lowest degree and destroy all supernatural merit and reward.

But there is an imperfect love of God in which man’s heart really turns

to God simply because God is good to him, it is true, yet so that he

loves Him efficaciously and really and regards the loss of God as the

loss of all good and the greatest of misfortunes. Since in such a love of

God there is mingled a great deal of the love of self, so that one love

is not present without the other, it cannot yet be called the pure love

of God, but receives a special name, the _love of chaste concupiscence_,

_amor castæ concupiscentiæ_. To this love corresponds that fear of

eternal punishment, which does not exclude the thought of God, which

fears the punishment of hell because it is the loss of the vision of

God, _i.e._ the _pœna damni_. This love is called also the _amor spei_,

because in it the hope of possessing God in heaven, the highest reward of

all pure souls, is an essential element.

A higher grade of love, midway between this perfect and imperfect love,

is called the _love of gratitude_, _amor gratitudinis_, in which we love

God for the benefits which He has conferred. When this love is prompted

more by the thought of the gifts than the giver, more by the benefit than

by the love of the benefactor, it approaches in quality to the love of

hope (_amor spei_); one reflects on the past, the other on the future.

If, however, the motive of this love of gratitude directly regards the

giver and his good will towards mankind, then God is loved with a pure

love, for God’s benevolence and love towards men are intimately united

with His perfections. This kind of love of gratitude may well be classed

with pure love or _caritas_. It is a perfect love (1) because God is

loved for His own sake, on account of His infinite goodness and love

and generosity, which are identical with God Himself; (2) because it is

a benevolent love. All love in respect of its object is either selfish

or benevolent; _now this love of gratitude is not selfish because it

does not regard its own profit, nor does it strive to gain anything for

itself_; (3) because it is a love of friendship, for it is a love which

wishes well to Him who loves us and makes a return of love for love.[114]

A great number of distinguished theologians assert that the love of

gratitude is perfect love, and the contrition based on it perfect

contrition.[115] The Council of Trent might be adduced in favor of this

view, since in Sess. 14, cp. 5, can. 4, it enumerates among the motives

of imperfect contrition merely the hatefulness of sin and its punishment

without the least reference to the motive of gratitude. It is of

considerable moment to settle this point exactly, for, as Deharbe says,

“a man might never know how to elicit an act of perfect contrition if he

were to form a false notion of perfect love. Who can deny that in many

cases salvation depends on an act of perfect contrition, and that even

where it is possible to receive the Sacrament of Penance it is always

advisable to make at least an effort to arouse not only imperfect but

also perfect contrition?”[116]

We should be loath to omit the remark that the love of Christ crucified

is an eminent incentive to perfect love, and that the sorrow for sin

which is founded on the thought that sin was the cause of the awful

sufferings and shameful death of Our Saviour, belongs to perfect

contrition. A man who is well disposed towards Christ, believing Him

to be God, has all that is required to arouse perfect love; and if,

influenced by this love, he detests and determines to avoid all that

brought such great suffering on Christ, he is exercising an act of

perfect love and contrition.[117]

This love is most intimately connected with the love of gratitude, since

“for our sins was He wounded and for our iniquities was He stricken.”

Indeed nothing is so calculated to fill us with gratitude towards God

as the thought of all that the Son of God has done and suffered for us.

The crib, the cross, and the Sacraments are the three great monuments of

His enduring love towards us, and at the same time they are the three

inexhaustible founts of motives of our love for Him. Hence it is that

the Church recalls to us so frequently these benefits of Christ. “When

we meditate upon her ceremonies and practices, the spirit of her feasts

and solemnities, her altars and temples, her prayers, the sense of the

liturgies and the object of her devotions, our thoughts are compelled

to consider the marvelous love of God and what Our Saviour has done and

suffered for us, and we are reminded to be thankful to the Lord and to

requite His love with our love.”[118]

From this love of gratitude, as the first stage on the way to pure

love, we may ascend yet higher and attain to that entirely pure love

by which we seek God as the highest good in Himself, as infinite

beauty, as complete perfection, as the source of all goodness, beauty,

and perfection, without reference, so far as that is possible, to our

own profit. This love is shown by joy in God’s perfections (_amor

complacentiæ_); the soul which has this love forgets itself and is lost

in the object of its love for which alone it lives; its sole desire is

God’s happiness (_amor benevolentiæ_), and it would willingly add to it

(_amor desiderii_) but since such increase is impossible it rejoices in

things as they are (_amor gaudii_).

It cannot be disputed that such a disinterested love is possible on

earth, since many pious souls have had it in an eminent degree; still it

must be observed that although the higher stages of love surpass and in

surpassing absorb the lower, they do not eliminate them entirely; on the

contrary, this pure love does not and cannot exclude the love of hope.

It is the explicit teaching of the Church that love for God on earth

cannot be so disinterested as to exclude all thought of ourselves and our

eternal welfare.

This stage of love answers to filial fear (_timor filialis_) when one

thinks no longer about punishment nor fears it, but dreads to give

displeasure or offense to the beloved one and carefully avoids all that

arouses the anger of God.

The sorrow arising from perfect love is therefore perfect sorrow,

_contritio_. This, like unselfish love, may have varying stages of

intensity[119] and may be more or less perfect; no special degree of

intensity, however, is required, and the lowest is sufficient. It is only

right and desirable, however, that we should have the greatest sorrow

possible for our sins, penetrating soul and body, so that the whole man

may repent of his faults and the tools of sin become again instruments

of love.[120] This, however, is not always in our power, and, being a

grace, we must ask for it.

We may now sum up our conclusions: Perfect contrition, _contritio_,

is the hatred of sin proceeding from a pure love of God with a firm

resolution of amendment, a disposition which includes filial fear, and,

so far from excluding the hope of salvation and fear of punishment, tends

rather to develop them.[121]

12. The Effects of Perfect Contrition and the Obligation of Procuring it.

Perfect contrition restores the sinner to grace at once, even before he

has approached the Sacrament of Penance, though the desire of receiving

the Sacrament is necessary; it removes the eternal punishment and in part

the temporal punishment.

The first part of this statement is _fidei proxima_, for the Council of

Trent teaches[122] that perfect contrition reconciles man to God before

the Sacrament is received, but that this reconciliation by perfect

contrition is not effected without the desire, which is included in

the act of contrition, of receiving the Sacrament. This doctrine was

confirmed by the condemnation pronounced by Gregory XIII and Urban VIII

on the twenty-first and thirty-second of the propositions of Baius.

Baius and Jansenius taught among other things that perfect contrition

without the Sacrament cannot restore to grace unless in exceptional

circumstances, _e.g._ in martyrdom, at the hour of death, when there is

no possibility of confessing, or when it is _summe intensa_.

Finally, this doctrine of the efficacy of perfect contrition is clearly

expressed in Holy Scripture and in the monuments of tradition; the

proofs belong to the domain of dogmatic theology.[123] We add only a

single consideration which springs from a well-known principle: Perfect

contrition arises from love and is in its essence nothing but an act of

love. Now perfect love unites us to God, so that we live in Him and He in

us.[124] This perfect union with God overcomes all separation from Him

which arose through sin.

Such, then, is the effect of perfect contrition, however poor and weak

it may be, for in spite of this it is a sorrow which is inspired and

informed by perfect love. Nor does a greater or less degree change

the species; the Council of Trent is positive in its declaration that

perfect contrition reconciles us to God, and assigns no limit which must

be attained before producing this effect. Such, too, is the unanimous

teaching of St. Thomas,[125] St. Alphonsus,[126] and the other great

theologians.

The sinner is restored to grace by perfect contrition without the

Sacrament only when he has the intention of receiving it, for the actual,

or at least intentional, reception of the Sacrament is the one single

means ordained by Christ for the removal of mortal sin. This intention

is included in the act of perfect contrition, as the Council of Trent

goes on to teach; hence all theologians hold that the implicit desire

(_votum implicitum_) is sufficient, for whoever has true contrition has

the wish to fulfill all the commands of God, and hence the command of

Christ enjoining the confession of sin.[127] Perfect contrition is an act

of perfect love, and this urges man to fulfill the commands of God in

accordance with Christ’s words: “He who loves Me will keep My word.”[128]

Hence it may happen that a sinner is justified by an act of perfect

contrition without any actual confession; it is sufficient that he does

not exclude the purpose of confessing his sin.[129]

The resolution to confess the sin does not include the resolution to

confess it _as soon as possible_ (_quam primum_). It is enough to confess

when a precept of God or of the Church urges.[130]

The other effect of perfect contrition, the remission of eternal

punishment, follows from what we have been already considering;

moreover the condemnation of Baius’ seventieth proposition makes this

doctrine _proxima fidei_. This, too, is the teaching of all Catholic

theologians.[131] The guilt is removed by sanctifying grace; but one who

has sanctifying grace is a child of God, and has as his heritage a claim

to heaven.

Finally, we gather from the Council of Trent[132] and the common doctrine

of theologians[133] that a part also of the temporal punishment of sin,

in proportion to the intensity of contrition, is remitted, so that a very

great and perfect contrition may blot out all the temporal punishment.

Two very _practical_ remarks, applicable both to confessor and to

penitent, may find their place here.

Mortal sin is not forgiven, and the sinner is not reconciled to God,

till he has made good the injury done to God; in other words, till he

has done penance. This is a truth of faith.[134] It follows, then, that

he who has the misfortune to fall into sin is obliged to repent of it,

and in such wise as to obtain forgiveness; to adopt any other course is

to frustrate the whole end of his existence. He must therefore make an

act of perfect contrition, or supplement the imperfect contrition by the

Sacrament of Penance.

This obligation is certainly pressing when there is danger of death,

because it is the necessary means for salvation, and every man is bound

by love of God and of himself to take precautions against being forever

an enemy of God and of being involved in eternal damnation.

The question now arises whether on other grounds there is a strict

obligation of making an act of perfect contrition, for instance, from the

consideration of God who has been offended, or for our own interests,

since we may die at any moment, and because one who is in a state of

mortal sin is but little capable of avoiding other mortal sins.

The following answer may be given:—

1. God might have insisted that the sinner should make good at once after

his sin the evil committed, and the injury done to God by mortal sin

would be quite motive enough for such legislation. As a matter of fact

God does not make any such demand; instead of insisting on His rights, He

is long-suffering and permits the sinner to heap offense on offense.

On the other hand, a man cannot remain long in mortal sin without

offending God again and once more incurring sin; for it is an insult to

the love we owe to God to remain long a slave of the devil and an enemy

of God, and such behavior on the part of the sinner makes him guilty of

contempt of God’s friendship and rights. To incur, however, grievous sin

in this way, the neglect to make an act of perfect contrition must have

extended over a considerable time. As to what constitutes a considerable

time, it is not easy to define a hard-and-fast limit; a period of

several years would certainly be considerable, and it would be a grave

sin to remain so long a time in the state of mortal sin; but a man who

reconciles himself to God within the limits of the time prescribed by

the Church for confession would certainly not incur a new sin _per se_,

special circumstances, of course, being excluded which might demand that

an act of perfect contrition be made at once.[135]

The possibility of dying before being reconciled to God is certainly a

very strong motive to induce a man to consult the safety of his soul and

to free it as soon as possible from the state of mortal sin; for at any

moment death may surprise a man without warning. If, however, there be

no pressing danger of death, that possibility is not sufficient to make

delay of reconciliation a new sin; hence one who dies a sudden death may

be plunged into hell by sins for which he had not atoned, but he would

not be guilty of a new sin by having put off his repentance.

But there is an obligation to avoid putting off for a long time one’s

conversion, and hence an act of perfect contrition after mortal sin,

because a man in the state of mortal sin is in the greatest danger

of falling into other mortal sins, since he has not strength enough

to vanquish severe temptations and to withstand the violence of his

passions, and since, as St. Gregory the Great[136] says, the unrepented

mortal sins which burden his soul draw him by their weight into other

worse sins. “Without sanctifying grace it is not possible to refrain long

from mortal sin,” says St. Thomas;[137] the sinner might, if he wished,

have the necessary moral strength to overcome temptation and to resist

his passions; he might curb them by the divine power of grace; but there

is the law of the distribution of God’s graces, that God gives only to

those who love Him efficacious grace, and while a man persists of his

own free will in the state of sin and enmity with God, he equivalently

expresses his contempt of grace and so makes himself unworthy of it. As

God is ever pouring richer and richer graces on those who make good use

of them and coöperate with them, so He withdraws them from those who

neglect and resist them. Hence we may adopt the well-founded teaching of

St. Alphonsus,[138] who states that the sinner ought not to put off for

longer than a month his reconciliation with God; in other words, that the

act of perfect contrition should not be delayed beyond that time. By such

delay he would incur a new sin. This subject, moreover, is intimately

connected with the duty of eliciting the act of love; for according to

a very probable opinion of many theologians, of whom the authority is

recognized and approved by St. Alphonsus, we are bound to elicit at least

once a month an act of love, because we should keep God’s commands either

not at all or at least with great difficulty if we failed for so long a

time to elicit such an act, and if we were so little solicitous about

our duty of loving God. It is impossible to make an act of perfect love

without bewailing one’s sins by which a God so infinitely worthy of love

has been offended. Hence St. Alphonsus in his practical directions to

confessors says:[139] “The duty of making an act of contrition is urgent

when one is obliged to make an act of love.”[140]

Since the faithful for the most part are ignorant of any obligation of

making an act of perfect contrition within a given time after falling

into mortal sin, and, therefore, incur no sin by the non-fulfillment of

it, the confessor need not trouble himself to make inquiries about it in

the past life of his penitents; indeed he may abstain from instructing

them on the existence of such obligation. But he should not fail—without,

however, mentioning that neglect means a new sin—to urge his penitents

by other motives to return to a state of grace, for the future, as

quickly as possible after falling into mortal sin, at least by an act of

perfect contrition, and, if occasion offer, by going to confession. Sad

experience shows that one fall into mortal sin is very soon followed by

others.[141]

Finally, there is an obligation (_per accidens_) to awaken perfect

contrition when one has to exercise some act for which a state of grace

is required and the Sacrament of Penance is not accessible. A priest, for

instance, is in a state of mortal sin and is called upon to administer

one of the Sacraments, or one of the faithful has to receive one of

the Sacraments of the living and cannot get absolution beforehand. This

also holds true if an act of perfect love has to be made; in this case

every one is obliged, when there occurs to his mind a mortal sin not yet

repented of, to detest the same and to be sorry for it from the motive of

the love of God. According to the general opinion of theologians an act

of love should be made in the hour of death, whence St. Alphonsus teaches

that a dying man who has confessed with only imperfect sorrow should be

recommended to elicit an act of perfect contrition, for it is impossible

to make an act of love without bewailing the sins from the same motive of

love.[142] Finally, this duty is pressing when one is exposed to severe

temptations which cannot be overcome while one is in a state of enmity

with God.

We would add another observation: Since perfect contrition is so

pleasing to God and so helpful to those sinners especially who have

fallen seriously, the pastor of souls should seize every opportunity of

instructing the faithful and urging them to elicit such acts frequently,

especially when they are in danger of death and have no opportunity

of approaching the Sacrament of Penance. Children particularly should

be taught on this subject, and a good form of the act given to them.

They may have need of it themselves in order to be saved from eternal

damnation, and they may come to the assistance of their elders at the

hour of death; indeed experience teaches that well-instructed children

more than once have reminded people in such straits of the act of perfect

contrition, and have persuaded those persons to make it with them;

finally, what has been learned in childhood will turn out useful to many

in their old age.

13. Imperfect Contrition.

The effects of imperfect contrition (_attrition_) are not so great as

those of perfect contrition. Imperfect contrition, which excludes the

desire of sinning and includes the hope of pardon (this belongs to

the sorrow necessary for the Sacrament of Penance), is the proximate

disposition which the sinner must have if he is to be justified in the

Sacrament of Penance. This is of faith.[143]

Passages almost innumerable of the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers,

decrees of Councils and theologians, present this doctrine as revealed by

God.[144]

Consequently it is the common and certain teaching of theologians that

to receive the grace of the Sacrament of Penance imperfect contrition

is sufficient, and that perfect contrition is not of necessity. The

Council of Trent declares expressly: “Although imperfect contrition

without the Sacrament of Penance is not able _per se_ to restore the

sinner to justifying grace, yet it disposes him for the reception of

grace in this Sacrament.” The Council is speaking here of the ultimate or

proximate disposition which, in union with the Sacrament, suffices for

the remission of sin; for it opposes the efficacy of imperfect contrition

with the Sacrament to its inefficacy without the Sacrament. Without the

Sacrament it cannot produce justification, but disposes towards its

reception in the Sacrament; it must therefore produce in the Sacrament

this justification, and the disposition of which the Council speaks must

be understood of the proximate disposition which is immediately followed

by grace; otherwise the contrast drawn between the two would have no

meaning.

This conclusion is confirmed when we consider the institution of the

Sacrament. Christ’s object in instituting this Sacrament was to restore

the baptized to the life of grace; if it did not really confer the grace

of justification, it would have been a means frustrated of its end, and

would not have the power which it was intended to have; it could not be

expected to call for dispositions which of themselves would atone for

sin, and this would be the case if perfect contrition were the required

disposition. A remedy for a disease would be a poor gift if it could

not cure the disease until the latter was already removed. Finally,

the Church received the power of the keys in order that it might loose

or retain sins; if perfect contrition were required as the necessary

condition, the sins would not be remitted by the power of the keys, but

by the dispositions of the penitent. Therefore imperfect contrition is

sufficient for justification in the Sacrament of Penance.[145]

Since imperfect contrition in union with the Sacrament has the same

effects as perfect contrition without the Sacrament, theologians say

that the penitent becomes in the Sacrament _ex attrito contritus_; this

expression is not to be understood of the act, as though _attritio_

became _contritio_.

Imperfect contrition, as we have already seen, arises from the thought of

the hideousness of sin and from the _fear_ of the punishment which God in

His justice inflicts on the sinner. The following are the classes into

which, according to St. Thomas,[146] fear is divided:—

1. Worldly fear, _timor mundanus_, when man is feared more than God, or

when one offends God in order to avoid suffering.

2. Natural fear, _timor naturalis_, the fear of temporal misfortunes.

3. Slavish fear, _timor serviliter servilis_, when one shrinks from sin

merely from fear of punishment, and when one is ready to sin again if

there were no punishment. Theologians say of such a man: _solum manum

cohibet, voluntatem autem non retrahit a peccato_.

Quite distinct from this fear is:—

4. Servile fear, _timor servilis_, when a man fears the punishments which

God inflicts on sin, and on that account really avoids and detests sin:

_qui non solum manum sed etiam voluntatem cohibet a peccato_, as the

schoolmen express it.

5. Filial fear, _timor filialis seu castus_, is the fear of a man who

honors and loves God as his Lord and Father, and from that motive avoids

sin and loves the law of God. The last two kinds of fear conjoined form:—

6. Mixed fear, _timor mixtus seu initialis_, which is the disposition

of a man who fears sin because it offends God and also because it is

punished. Hence St. Thomas gives a clear and short account of these last

three kinds of fear: Sometimes man turns to God and clings to Him because

he is afraid of evil. This evil may be twofold, the evil of punishment

and the evil of guilt. If a man turn and cling to God from fear of

punishment, this is servile fear; and when it is done from fear of guilt

it is filial fear, for children are afraid of offending their father; if,

however, it is done from the fear of the punishment and of the guilt,

it is then _timor initialis_, which is intermediate between servile and

filial fear.[147]

The sorrow proceeding from servile fear is _attritio_, that imperfect

sorrow which, when it excludes the desire of sinning and is joined to the

hope of pardon, disposes the sinner to receive the grace of justification

in the Sacrament of Penance. It may now be asked whether, along with

this imperfect sorrow based on fear as its only motive, there may not

be required besides, in order to dispose the sinner _proxime_ for the

receiving of grace, some sort of love, at least initial, or whether this

love be included in that sorrow. On this subject the Council has given no

direct answer. In the seventeenth century this question was debated with

such heat that Alexander VII (June, 1667), in order to establish peace,

forbade, in the strongest terms and under pain of excommunication _latæ

sententiæ_, that any of the disputants in this matter should accuse their

opponents of heresy. Four distinct views were proposed and defended on

this subject:—

1. The first view teaches that sorrow from the motive of fear, as long

as it is true sorrow, is quite sufficient of itself for obtaining

sanctifying grace in the Sacrament. This sorrow produces hatred and

detestation of sin and a return to God’s law, and is inseparable from

the hope of pardon. Hence the sinner becomes capable of receiving

the grace of the Sacrament. Melchior Canus is the most famous of the

defenders of this view, who are called Attritionists because they hold

that mere attrition from the fear of the punishments inflicted on sin

is a sufficient disposition. They thought that every sort of love was

excluded from this contrition based on fear, a position which seems

impossible both psychologically and in view of the action of grace; as

was evidently the general opinion of the Fathers at the Council of Trent.

Instead of the present clause in cap. 4: _attritio eum ad gratiam in

sacramento pœnitentiæ impetrandam disponit_, another had been presented

to them: _ad constitutionem sacramenti sufficit, ac donum Dei esse ac

Spiritus S. impulsum verissimum non adhuc quidem inhabitantis sed tantum

moventis quo pœnitens adjutus_ (_cum sine aliquo dilectionis in Deum motu

esse vix queat_) _viam sibi ad justitiam munit et per eam ad Dei gratiam

facilius impetrandum disponitur_. Since it was urged that men of eminent

learning made a distinction between such sorrow and love, the present

form of the clause was chosen in order to avoid defining a scholastic

question on which the Doctors were not of one mind; by using the word

_disponit_ the Council did not wish to mean a sufficient disposition,

and to indicate this more clearly it purposely avoided the use of the

word _sufficit_.[148]

2. The second opinion holds that the sorrow based on fear is sufficient

only when there is joined with it some beginning of the love of God, as

our highest good. This view supported by the most eminent theologians

rests on solid foundations, and is now the more usual opinion among

theologians. That there is nothing in this view opposed to the Council of

Trent is clear from what has been said above on this point. In another

place in the Sixth Session (cap. 6) there is indirect authority for it,

where the Council, in describing the progress towards preparation for

the first grace, teaches that the sinner who is disposing his soul for

justification must begin to love God as the source of all justice.[149]

Hence as preparation for the first justification of adults a beginning

at least of love is required. Now what is required for their first

justification in Baptism, that, at the very least, is demanded for the

second justification by Penance, since, as the Fathers express it,

Penance is a toilsome Baptism, _baptismus laboriosus_; consequently

if a distinction is to be made in terms of greater or less, greater

dispositions are required for Penance than for Baptism. Moreover,

the Council is unmistakably clear in its declaration that what it

teaches with regard to the first justification applies equally to the

justification by penance.[150]

In the place where the Council treats of the sorrow required as a

preparation for the Sacrament of Penance, it speaks of it plainly as the

beginning of a new life;[151] such it could not be if it did not include

love, or at least the beginnings of love; for since the new life consists

in the love of God, the beginning of the new life must of necessity

include the beginning of the love of God.[152]

A third reason may be found in the very nature of the subject. According

to the Church’s teaching, the justification of an adult means a real

conversion, and this of itself includes a beginning of love. By mortal

sin man turns from God to the creature; if the conversion is to be real,

he must not only turn away from the creature, but also return to God, and

that cannot happen without some initial love. Moreover, it is in the very

nature of man ever to desire and love something as his highest good, be

it the creature, as happens in mortal sin, or the Creator; since by his

conversion he ceases to make the creature his sole object and aim, he

must direct his desires to God the uncreated good, and so must love God

at least as his highest good.

But this love which is required to accompany imperfect contrition in

order to make it a sufficient disposition for obtaining grace in the

Sacrament, is not the beginning of the _amor benevolentiæ_ or the

_caritas perfecta_ or perfect love; for, as has been seen above, any

act of contrition proceeding from perfect love in any degree at once

restores a man to grace without the reception of the Sacrament; similarly

the beginning of perfect love, joined with imperfect contrition, would

justify the sinner without the Sacrament.[153] Penance would thus be

a meaningless institution. It is rather the beginning of the _amor

concupiscentiæ_ or of the _caritas imperfecta_, in which we love God

because He is good to us. This beginning of love is included in imperfect

contrition, which arises chiefly from the fear of God’s punishments; for

Holy Scripture (Ecclus. xxv. 16) calls the fear of God the beginning

of love. Hope of eternal happiness is another motive, for, as St.

Thomas of Aquin says, when we hope to obtain a benefit from any one

we are drawn towards him and begin to love him. Whoever, then, has

imperfect contrition and receives the Sacrament in the hope of pardon,

already begins to love God as his liberator, his champion, his Lord.

No special intensity is required in this love; it need only be the

beginning of love, as long as the love is real—and this is called _amor

initialis_.[154]

3. A third opinion demands, not a beginning of imperfect love, but

perfect love in its first stages, that is, _caritas initialis_. It need

not, however, be so strong as to suffice to remove sin of itself, nor

need it be independent of other motives, such as servile fear. Such

sorrow, however, would be no longer _attritio_, but _contritio_, which in

any degree by itself justifies the sinner apart from the Sacrament.

4. The fourth opinion goes yet further and requires that along with

_attritio_ there should be not only pure love, but in such measure that

of itself it should move the sinner to bewail his sins and give them up.

This is of its nature _contritio_, whence the defenders of this last

opinion are called contritionists.[155]

This question is not one of mere theoretical interest, but is of highly

practical application; for if the acts of the penitent are the _materia

proxima_ of the Sacrament, and if it is the confessor’s duty to make

certain of the presence of these acts before giving absolution, he must

do so also with respect to contrition; for this reason he must study the

nature and properties of contrition in order to secure the integrity of

the Sacrament.

From this it is at once apparent that the contritionist must proceed

differently from the attritionist. The former will, if he is true to his

principles, not only investigate whether the penitent’s sorrow for sin

be joined with belief and hope of pardon, but also whether that sorrow

proceed from the love of God, or at least the beginning of it, which love

must be a love of God above all things. This investigation, however, is

very difficult, and wearisome to confessor and penitent, at least if

the latter be uninstructed. The attritionist, on the contrary, merely

inquires whether his penitent has sorrow springing from a motive of faith

and the hope of forgiveness; this inquiry offers no difficulty to either

confessor or penitent. Once it is established that the sorrow comes from

a motive of faith and is joined to the hope of pardon, one may fairly

presume and conclude that there is _amor initialis_, so that further

investigation is superfluous; for if we hope for good from any one, we

have already at least a beginning of love for him.

Moreover, the confessor will observe that since the view requiring a

beginning of love with imperfect contrition is more probable than the

opposite, _probabilitate externa et interna_, it is also the safer;

since, however, in giving and receiving the Sacraments an explicit papal

decision enjoins the adoption of the safer view, it is not only of

counsel but of precept, strongly binding, to elicit before receiving the

Sacrament of Penance together with contrition an act of love, if only

initial love. Though the initial love which is comprised in the imperfect

contrition is not the love of benevolence or _caritas_, but the _amor

concupiscentiæ_, yet _caritas_ is in no way excluded from it, and cannot

be excluded without grievous sin on the part of the penitent. Would it

not be the sign of a bad disposition if a man were expressly unwilling to

avoid sin if it did not deprive him of heaven or lead him to hell? “I do

not say,” says St. Francis de Sales on this subject, “that this sorrow

excludes the perfect love of God; I say only that it does not of its

own nature include it; it neither rejects it nor embraces it; it is not

opposed to love, but it can exist without it.”

Thus imperfect contrition disposes the penitent towards perfect love.

Any one who desires and hopes to attain so great a boon as the grace of

God, all unmerited as it is, will certainly be unable to refrain from

meditating on the infinite love which procures him this great grace, and

from that he will rise to the love of God for His own sake as infinitely

good and lovable. Hence St. Thomas says that whenever a man hopes to get

a benefit from God he is led to love God for His own sake only.[156]

We add one more practical observation: The imperfect contrition arising

from fear of hell, which excludes the desire of sin, and in which is

contained at least virtually the hope of pardon, is quite sufficient to

secure the fruit of the Sacrament of Penance; yet we ought to take pains

that we have, as far as possible, perfect contrition, not only because

this is more pleasing to God, but also because in this way the grace is

made more certain and more grace is obtained and a greater measure of the

temporal punishment remitted; because we are thus more sure of attaining

true and necessary attrition, and finally, because we fulfill in this

manner the precept which binds us to make, from time to time during our

lives, an act of love. Indeed if a penitent chose to dwell only on the

lowest motives of contrition, it would be a sign that his heart was not

sufficiently fixed upon God, and there would be occasion for suspecting

that there still lurked in his soul an undue affection for sin, curbed

only by fear of punishment.[157]

14. The Necessary Qualities of Contrition.

If the Sacrament of Penance is to be received validly and with fruit, the

contrition must be real, formal, supernatural, universal, supreme, and

sacramental.[158]

1. First of all, the contrition must be real or genuine. Now contrition

is, according to the Council of Trent, a grief of the soul and a horror

of sin. A sorrow expressed only in words would be a sham sorrow; that

would not do: a real sorrow is required. A sorrow merely imaginary,

even without guilt on the part of the penitent, in which case his good

faith would certainly save him from the guilt of a sacrilege, could not

possibly supply for the want of a necessary and essential part of the

Sacrament.[159] Hence God’s command by the prophet Joel: _Scindite corda

vestra et non vestimenta vestra_—Rend your hearts and not your garments

(the sign of mourning; Joel ii. 3). And truly it is meet that sorrow

should begin there where sin had its origin, namely, in the heart; for

from the heart, as the Scripture tells us, come forth evil thoughts,

murders, adulteries, etc.[160]

The contrition must be formal, _i.e._ explicit; a virtual or implicit

contrition, such as is contained in another act, say in an act of love

or the resolution to confess and receive absolution, is not enough even

though it excludes the affection towards sin.

Thus a penitent might conceivably elicit an act of perfect love without

making any act of contrition, and then, after confessing his sins, be

justified in virtue of the act of perfect love, though he would not

validly receive absolution if he confined himself to the act of love. The

contrition must be quite explicit, for it is the essential matter of the

Sacrament, and virtual matter here would be about as practical as virtual

bread and wine in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Hence it is not enough

to say: “I love thee, O my God, above all things, because thou art the

sovereign good; forgive me my sins.” Such words are only an act of love

and a prayer for pardon, not a formal act of sorrow. The words must be

explicit: “I am sorry for my sins.”[161]

Hence we see the error in the opinion held by several of the older

theologians, who called attrition any kind of sorrow which did not come

up to the standard of perfect contrition by want of an adequate motive of

sorrow, or through deficiency of resolution of amendment, or because sin

was not shunned as the greatest of evils.

Others besides have conjectured that it was necessary and sufficient for

absolution in the Sacrament that the penitent believes he had contrition,

_i.e._ that he ought to make efforts to be contrite and to believe that

he has perfect contrition; such a putative sorrow, according to them,

was sufficient, however distinct it might be from the sorrow of perfect

contrition.

Both views are false. If imperfect contrition were only a velleity,

instead of being a real horror of sin, it would not be sufficient for

the Sacrament, and such sorrow could never be called genuine attrition.

On the contrary, any sorrow which has the properties enumerated above

is sufficient even if the penitent knowingly confine his efforts to

imperfect contrition without aspiring to perfect it.[162]

There were also some theologians who maintained as a probable opinion

that the virtual sorrow included in a formal act of love or in a

resolution of amendment was sufficient. This view is stigmatized by

Suarez as rash, by Vasquez as false. Other theologians, however, consider

that this condemnation is too severe.

On this question Reuter[163] remarks that a penitent need not be worried

about the formal act of sorrow if he has elicited an act of perfect love

while reflecting on his sins (_memor peccatorum_), for it is morally

impossible for any one with his sins before his eyes to elicit an act

of perfect love of God without detesting his sins. The same may be said

with regard to the purpose of amendment, for it is morally impossible

to form it without having formal sorrow. This is made clear from the

consideration of any practical resolution which is based on supernatural

motives; for if the hatred of sin is not yet a formal detestation and

sorrow of past sin, it becomes so in any one who reflects that he has

been guilty of sin.[164]

2. The sorrow which disposes for the worthy reception of the Sacrament

must on the one hand be prompted by divine supernatural grace which

begins, accompanies, and perfects the whole work of salvation, and on the

other must proceed from some supernatural motive based on faith; for the

dispositions required for a supernatural gift must be supernatural. The

second condition is more important, for God will certainly give grace to

a man to do that which he is obliged to do. Merely natural or worldly

love or fear will give rise to natural sorrow; supernatural sorrow

springs from a supernatural fear or love of God. The distinction between

the two is not merely quantitative but qualitative; they have nothing in

common, and no amount of natural sorrow will ever rise to the dignity

of supernatural sorrow. Natural sorrow is of no efficacy in the work of

conversion. When the prophets exhort to repentance they do not confine

themselves to exhort the sinner, “Be converted,” but, “Be ye converted

to the Lord your God.” A true penitent was, in their eyes, not one who

turned from his sins; they required that he should also turn to God.

Sorrow, then, must have a religious character, must be prompted by divine

grace, must spring either from fear or love of God.

If sorrow is to have this supernatural character, it must be based on

supernatural motives suggested by faith. Faith is the first condition

for justification which the Council of Trent demands of the sinner; in

addition to this other conditions are laid down, especially the act of

hope. These acts need not be formally elicited, but it is required that

the motive of sorrow for sin should proceed from faith if it is to be of

use for salvation.

We may thus approach the question which, as Lehmkuhl says, many

moralists treat with a certain scrupulosity—whether before the Sacrament

is received explicit acts of faith and hope must be made, or whether

implicit acts are sufficient. Lehmkuhl himself answers the question as

follows:[165] To require that the penitent should elicit an act of faith

with its formal object explicitly and with deliberation before or apart

from the act of contrition is unreasonable; there would be reason for it

only in the case of a penitent who had lost his faith by sinning against

it. But an act of faith meaning the assent to a proposition of faith

which springs from the habit of faith (_assensum in aliquam veritatem

ut fide notam ab habitu fidei oriundum_), is rightly demanded since

it is otherwise impossible to derive contrition from a supernatural

motive. Thus there is no doubt that a formal and explicit act of faith is

necessary; but this is certainly present if the necessary contrition be

there.

Accordingly St. Alphonsus is quite justified in believing that he can

reconcile the divergent views of the theologians by teaching that formal

faith is certainly necessary, but not reflex faith: that is a separate

and distinct consideration of the grounds of faith. It is just the same

with regard to hope; for if a man receive the Sacrament in a genuine

spirit of penance in order to get forgiveness of his sins, he is making

an act of hope _explicite_ (though not yet _reflexe_, still _exercite_)

that God will grant him pardon in the Sacrament through the merits of

Christ.[166] All this, however, holds good only for the faithful who are

instructed in the things necessary for salvation.

Our faith presents to our consideration many motives for contrition,

which, as has been shown above, are reduced to two by the Council of

Trent: fear of punishment and hatefulness of sin. This hatefulness may

have many forms: the general malice which belongs to every sin (in so far

as it is an injury to God our highest good, and rebellion against Him, or

ingratitude to God our Father and Benefactor, or infamous unfaithfulness

to Jesus our loving Redeemer), or the particular malice which is proper

to each sin, since every sin has its own peculiar wickedness and is

the opposite to some special virtue. A further motive is found in the

sufferings and death of Christ, which may be considered a motive

of _caritas_, and the loathsome state of the soul when deprived of

sanctifying grace.

Among the punishments which excite us to salutary contrition are first of

all the fire of hell, and then purgatory.

All these motives may be called eternal; the pains of purgatory may be

numbered among the eternal motives because they begin only when a man has

passed from this life into eternity.

It is to be observed that any one of these motives is sufficient to

awaken in us true contrition; nor is it necessary that we should choose

a motive with which we made acquaintance first by revelation; we know

many of these motives as well by reason as by faith; we must only take

care that the motive which impels us to sorrow appeals to us not merely

from the point of view of reason, but as proposed by faith. If, however,

one is moved to contrition by a particular motive, namely, the peculiar

malice of some sin even when this malice is made known to us by faith,

it is better to add a universal motive either of fear or of the malice

residing in all sin, so that the sorrow may not be insufficient or

doubtful for any sin which, having escaped observation, was not repented

of.

The sorrow which comes from the thought of the temporal sufferings of

this life may be regarded as supernatural if these sufferings are looked

upon as inflicted by God, as being signs of His anger, and as a sort of

foretaste of His eternal punishments if we do not amend. Hence the sorrow

which comes from the thought of earthly pains cannot be set down at once

and absolutely as supernatural sorrow; the supernatural aspect must be

kept in view, and then the sorrow may be regarded as supernatural and

sufficient for approaching the Sacrament. Not only reason, but faith

also, teaches us that in God’s providence sin has many evil consequences,

and that on account of sin God strikes mankind with pains and calamities

both private and public. Moreover, the Council of Trent enumerates among

the motives of attrition “the fear of hell and of punishment,” and in the

punishment we are to understand the pains of this life, for the Council

mentions as an example the Ninivites who repented of their sins, moved

by fear of the destruction of their city, which had been prophesied by

Jonas, unless they did penance; nor are the Ninivites the only instance

where God has threatened temporal punishment in order to frighten sinners

and move them to penance. Not all theologians, however, admit temporal

punishments as motives of supernatural sorrow (among them Vasquez and

Toletus); they try to weaken the argument drawn from the Council of

Trent by asserting that the Council does not speak of two motives, which

apart from one another can give rise to sufficient contrition, but that

the words are to be taken conjunctively, so that the fear of earthly

punishments must be joined to fear of the pains of hell, since the latter

only are made known to us by faith. Our proof is in no way invalidated

by this argument; besides, many theologians, and those the most famous,

stand by the first view, so that it may be considered as the _sententia

communis_. The words of one of them, the eminent Suarez, may be quoted

here. He writes:[167] “Hence I infer that such sorrow [as is required

for the valid reception of the Sacrament of Penance] must proceed from

a divine and supernatural motive. That a temporal and human sorrow is

not sufficient is plain from the words of the Council of Trent, and the

reason is not to be misunderstood, for such a motive does not deprive

the will of the affection towards sin.” And in another place he writes:

“Vega (l. 13 in Trid. c. 14) concedes that sorrow based on the fear of

other punishment apart from hell-fire is sufficient for attrition. This

view is correct if we suppose that the fear is not merely human and

natural. Granted that the pains be only temporal, if they are considered

as inflicted by God, as proclaiming God’s anger, as being a foretaste in

some way of the divine punishments in the next life if we do not reform,

they can move us to a supernatural sorrow which may fairly be classed

with the sorrow which is based on the fear of hell; thus we exercise the

virtue of Christian hope when we look to God for temporal benefits in so

far as they affect in any way our eternal life or fall under the special

and supernatural providence of God.”

Since, however, the negative proposition denying the efficacy of sorrow

springing from fear of earthly punishments for reception of the Sacrament

is the safer one and is not altogether improbable, it is the view which

must be adopted in practice; so a penitent should not confine himself

to the thought of the temporal penalties, but use it to proceed to the

consideration of the divine justice as revealed in eternal penalties,

“for,” as Lugo expresses it, “this consideration will create the fear

of God, who can inflict both one and the other penalty.” This last

reflection will certainly move him to a determined resolution to avoid

sin as the greatest of evils, and to avoid it even if that involves other

suffering. If, however, a man dwell on the thought of the suffering

which his sins have drawn upon him, or on the suffering which usually

follows in the train of sin, he will not necessarily be induced thereby

to resolve steadfastly to shun sin more than any other evil; for it is

possible that the avoiding of sin may involve him in greater misfortunes

in this life than those which would come from committing the sin; and

it is impossible that the fear of a less evil will effectually nerve a

man to endure the worse evil. Nevertheless the sorrow and purpose of

amendment, if they are to be of any use for justification, must be such

as to determine the man _implicite_ to endure all the evils of this

life rather than commit sin; and though the penitent is not obliged to

reflect _explicite_ on the matter, yet the motive of his sorrow and

amendment must be so powerful that, as long as this motive is present,

it would compel him to choose any suffering rather than sin. Finally, it

may be mentioned that the consideration of the temporal suffering is a

powerful weapon in the hands of the confessor to move an obstinate and

unrepentant sinner to contrition, and thence to lead him to higher and

safer motives.[168]

3. The sorrow must be universal (_universalis_), _i.e._ it must extend to

all past sins, at least to those which are mortal. No single mortal sin

can be forgiven unless it is repented of, nor without other mortal sins

of which one has been guilty being forgiven, for none can be forgiven

without sanctifying grace; but sanctifying grace is incompatible with

mortal sin, for it is impossible that any one should be at the same time

a child of God and the slave of the devil, worthy of everlasting reward

and deserving eternal punishment; because “there is no condemnation to

them that are in Christ Jesus” (Rom. viii. 1). Hence it is promised in

Holy Scripture: “If the wicked do penance for all the sins which he hath

committed, and keep all My commandments, ... living he shall live”;[169]

and the second Lateran Council says, that a repentance would evidently be

useless in which a man left out several sins and repented only of one;

for it is written: “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one

point, is become guilty of all.” He who is attached to one sin shall no

more cross the threshold of eternal life than one who is addicted to all

possible sins.[170]

There are only two ways of attaining universal contrition; one way is to

apply special motives of sorrow to each particular sin, the other is to

repent of all sins, both the known and the unknown, through a universal

motive. This universality does not require that one should reflect on

all his sins so as to elicit an act of contrition for each particular

sin; this is necessary only if a man confines himself to those motives

which of their own nature do not apply to all mortal sins. In practice,

however, it is strongly recommended to base the sorrow on universal

motives. If, then, a man is sorry for his sins, his mortal sins at

least, from a universal motive, and afterwards recalls other sins, he

may confess them along with the rest and receive absolution for them

without having to make a new act of contrition; this fresh act would be

required if his repentance had proceeded from motives peculiar to each

sin. Besides there arises at the fresh recollections of his other sins in

a repentant sinner a renewal of his sorrow; this renewal is useful, for

it insures a more perfect preparation, but it is not necessary.

We must distinguish between the universality of the sorrow and the

universality of the purpose of amendment. The sorrow is general when it

extends to all sins committed, at least to those which are mortal; the

resolution, however, must be to avoid all mortal sins whether they have

been committed or not.

If a penitent has only venial sins to confess, the sorrow need not be

universal; it must have, however, the other properties.[171] Since venial

sin may coexist in the soul along with sanctifying grace, the love of God

is not lost, and since one venial sin may be forgiven apart from others,

it is enough in preparing for confession to make an act of sorrow for one

or other of the venial sins. Of course in such a case only those sins are

forgiven which are repented of; nor is it incompatible with the essence

of venial sin that a man should be really sorry for one, especially if it

be peculiarly vile, without being sorry for the rest.

Still, the penitent should exert himself to be sorry for all the venial

sins of which he accuses himself. It is no sin to confess venial sins for

which one is not sorry, so long as _materia sufficiens_ for which there

is actual sorrow is offered to the power of the keys. It may be assumed

that the penitent, confessing venial sins for which he is not sorry,

does not care to be absolved from them; from these the confessor does

not intend to absolve. Reasons may exist for confessing venial sins for

which there is no real sorrow, _e.g._ in order to practice humility, to

be better known and guided by one’s confessor, etc.[172]

4. The sorrow must be a sorrow surpassing all other sorrow (_sovereign_,

_supreme_) which shrinks from past sin as a greater evil than any in

the world, so that a man is prepared to forego every good and suffer

any evil rather than fall into sin again. This sorrow must be supreme

_appretiative_. Yet it is not required that the sensible feeling of pain

should be infinitely great or surpassing all other pain; nor is it

necessary that the heart should feel more keenly, or be more disturbed,

or be more cast down than it would be by some earthly suffering or loss

which should appeal more immediately to the sensitive faculties. Thus a

man may experience a more intense and lively sorrow for temporal losses,

such as the death of a dear friend or relation, and yet his contrition

may be appreciatively much greater. Of this he would give ample proof

if he were disposed to avoid sin, even though the sin could make good

his losses. Hence it is not by the acuteness of the sensible suffering

that sorrow for sin must surpass other pain, but by the displeasure

at past sin and the determination of the will to endure all kinds of

suffering and every temporal calamity and evil rather than consent to a

single mortal sin. The sorrow for sin must therefore be appreciatively

sovereign, not necessarily intensively so. The intensity makes no change

whatever in the substance of an act. Though contrition is usually the

more perfect the more intense it is, yet the intensity ought not to be

aimed at, for it would only prepare the way for scruples; moreover, there

is no proof that such intensity is necessary.[173]

Though the penitent must have a greater horror of sin than of any other

evil, it is not necessary that he should make a deliberate comparison

of it with other evils, and make a vivid picture of each particular

misfortune, putting to himself the question whether he is ready to endure

it in preference to committing sin. Indeed such a course would be highly

imprudent and dangerous and likely to destroy the real contrition and

purpose of amendment which he had, as well as to excite an inclination

for the sin which he detested. Hence when such comparisons obtrude

themselves on the mind of the penitent, he should positively reject them

and cling to the absolute and unconditional general resolution of never

sinning again, helping himself by the reflection that God’s grace will

never be wanting at the right moment, and resolving with the help of that

grace never more to sin.[174]

The question whether the sorrow can ever be excessive is already answered

from the foregoing. The sorrow which is of the essence of contrition,

_i.e._ displeasure at our past sins in so far as they are an injury to

God, can never be excessive; the greater our love, the greater must

be our displeasure, and love cannot be too great. As to the sensible

feeling of sorrow which is not at all necessary for true contrition,

this should never be carried so far as to interfere with the duty of

self-preservation, though as a matter of course there is little occasion

to fear that sensible sorrow will go so far. For the sensible sorrow over

a spiritual evil is always somewhat remote and cannot easily be so acute

as direct physical suffering or as the pain which comes from a misfortune

appealing directly to the senses.[175]

As in contrition there is no definite intensity required, neither is any

certain duration; for a man may in one moment elicit an act of perfect or

imperfect contrition; it may be quite suddenly aroused by divine grace,

as in the case of David when he exclaimed in his sorrow, “I have sinned

against the Lord,” or as in the case of St. Peter, who at one glance of

Jesus was melted into bitter tears. The moment contrition becomes actual

it is sufficient for absolution. In practice, however, the faithful

should be urged to spend some time before confession in rousing a genuine

sorrow that will answer all demands, by reflecting with the help of God’s

grace on the nature of sin and its consequences; moreover, they should

be cautioned not to be satisfied with a mechanical repetition of an act

of contrition, otherwise the sorrow may be wanting, or at its best be

very weak. Yet sorrow is of the highest importance because it is the most

essential of the _actus pœnitentis_, the very soul of confession.[176]

15. The Relation of Contrition to the Sacrament.

Finally, the sorrow must be sacramental, _i.e._ in connection with the

Sacrament of Penance. For instance, in order that attrition along with

the Sacrament may be able to restore a man to sanctifying grace, it

must be joined with at least the implicit intention of receiving the

Sacrament, and coexist virtually with the absolution.

A man who in preparing for confession bewails the sins which he has

discovered in examining his conscience, makes an act of contrition _ex

intentione implicita_ of receiving the Sacrament. If, however, his sorrow

is expressed without any intention of receiving the Sacrament or without

any thought of confession, he must renew his act of sorrow in order to be

sure of receiving absolution validly, unless he afterwards decides to go

to confession in consequence of the still virtually enduring contrition,

so that his confession proceeds from his sorrow. Hence the following

conclusions are drawn:—

I. An act of contrition made without reference to the receiving of

absolution makes the validity of the absolution doubtful.

II. It is not necessary, however, that the penitent should make the act

of contrition in consequence of his resolution to go to confession. This

is the usual practice, it is true, and certainly a very good one, but

it is enough if by his contrition he be moved to make his confession,

and if he thus unite his sorrow, still persevering, with the sacramental

act. It is also sufficient if the penitent makes an act of sorrow in

the interval between the confession of his sins and the giving of the

absolution.[177]

The reason for making these demands upon the penitent is that the acts

of the penitent are not only an interior preparation for, but they are

the _materia ex qua_ of, the Sacrament. The sorrow, therefore, must

be brought into relation to the Sacrament; and since this doctrine is

probable and is the common teaching, this relation must be established in

practice at least _ante factum_, _i.e._ the confessor must before giving

absolution take care that the penitent makes his act of sorrow with a

view to the Sacrament.

Hence the question amounts really to this: What relation is demanded

between the act of sorrow and the Sacrament? not whether such a relation

be necessary; for, on the one hand, it cannot be defended with any

probability that such relation is unnecessary, and, on the other hand,

it is not in accordance with either truth or prudence that the penitent,

before making the act of contrition, should establish its relation to the

confession or be obliged to have the intention of receiving the Sacrament.

Some sort of bond, however, must exist between the contrition and the

Sacrament. It is false to infer from the Catholic teaching of the Council

of Trent that the eliciting of the act of sorrow or _dolor in fieri_, as

it is called, is the _materia proxima_ of the Sacrament; it is rather

the sorrow already elicited or the _dolor in facto esse_, which is the

matter of the Sacrament; it is not in or by itself _proxima materia_: it

becomes so by means of the confession and in union with the confession.

That sorrow is sufficient which coexists in any way with the will of

receiving the Sacrament. In other words, the sorrow must _inform_

the confession, _i.e._ make the accusation a penitent or sorrowful

confession, and apt to effect a reconciliation with God. If then the

sorrow coexists in any way with the confession and is referred to it,

that sorrow constitutes _proxime_ the matter of the Sacrament and there

is no necessity for the penitent to have the intention of confessing

before making the act of contrition. In a similar way water is the matter

of Baptism; it is not necessary that the water should be procured with

the intention of conferring the Sacrament; it is quite enough to take the

water which comes to hand and to apply it to the sacramental use. Now

there can be no doubt that the sorrow also, though not elicited with a

view to the Sacrament, can remain present in some way in the soul, and

while so present may later on be brought into contact with and applied

to the Sacrament. A man, for instance, who under the influence of his

contrition seeks an opportunity of going to confession, or makes use of

the opportunity of going which presents itself, has certainly not lost

his contrition; he has it rather in greater abundance, though he reflects

no more on his sorrow, nor even retains any certain recollection of it

afterwards.

Lacroix has no sufficient reason for demanding that sorrow must be

aroused with the view of going to confession, saying that otherwise the

sorrow would not be a sacramental act, just as the pouring of water

made without the intention of baptizing, though referred immediately

afterwards to the baptismal act and the form added, is not a sacramental

function. The comparison, we answer, is not to the point, for the sorrow

is not _in et per se materia proxima_ as is the pouring of the water

in Baptism. If, however, a man poured out the water with some other

intention, and then still in the act of pouring formed the intention

of baptizing, the Baptism would be valid. The same argument holds for

penance; hence that sorrow is sufficient which coexists in any way with

the wish to receive the Sacrament.

In the case quoted above where the penitent first confesses his sins and

then makes his act of sorrow before receiving the Sacrament, or when he

is moved to contrition by the words of his confessor, a difficulty may

arise, since the confession must be a sorrowful one. Such an enumeration

of the sins cannot, of course, be considered as informed by sorrow; the

humble demand for absolution, however, takes up the accusation again and

perfects it; and makes it _materia proxima_ of the Sacrament.

If, on the contrary, the sorrow has been elicited with no idea at all

of confessing the sin, there is reason for doubting whether an act so

completely independent of the confession will become _materia_ of the

Sacrament. Absolution cannot be demanded in face of the probability of

such an essential defect; yet one can hardly acquire sufficient certainty

of the existence of such defect to make the repetition of the confession

obligatory.[178]

III. The sorrow must coexist at least virtually with the absolution if it

is to be sacramental. This virtual coexistence is secured if the sorrow

is excited immediately before the accusation or the absolution, or even

one, two, or four hours before confession; and St. Alphonsus admits

that real sorrow may last one or two days and still be sufficient for

absolution, when it comes from the desire of being reconciled with God,

or when it urges a man to go to confession in order to avoid the sins

along with the occasion of them. On the other hand, a sorrow removed by

so long an interval would not be sufficient for valid absolution if the

confession were made out of mere devotion, or in fulfilment of a vow,

or for some similar reason. In these latter instances one or two hours

is the widest limit which could be assigned for the virtual duration of

the contrition. Hence we must condemn the teaching of some moralists

that the act of sorrow endures over an unlimited time, and that it is

quite sufficient if it is not retracted in the interval. Of course the

act of contrition loses completely all its value for absolution by any

retraction; and sorrow is retracted expressly by any new complacency in

the sin or by any fresh mortal sin.

The reasons for the doctrine just given have already been laid down

in the preceding paragraphs on the relation between contrition and

absolution. The theologians fall back in particular on the analogy

between the civil and sacramental tribunals. As in a civil process some

time may elapse between the hearing of the case and the passing of the

sentence without invalidating the sentence, so some interval may elapse

between the sorrow and the absolution by which sentence is pronounced;

this delay, however, must not be too long.[179]

In practice the priest must teach the faithful and insist on their

renewing the act of sorrow immediately before confession, if it is some

time since they made it, and also on a due amount of time being given to

eliciting contrition, since the fruit of the Sacrament is more abundant

in proportion to the care taken in preparing for it.

In the case, however, where confession has been made with genuine sorrow

but without the necessary reference to the Sacrament, the penitent

should not be obliged to repeat the confession, for the other view with

regard to the sorrow, that it is not _materia sacramenti_, but only

a disposition on the part of the penitent, is not altogether without

probability; besides it is scarcely probable that the former act of

contrition has not been renewed when the man intended to confess, and

that it has no sufficient coexistence with the confession, or at least

with the intention to confess. Only when there is danger of death or any

risk of the penitent dying before receiving absolution again, the safer

course, as far as possible, should be adopted; for on such important

occasions prudence counsels us to guard against even slight doubts, so as

not to jeopardize our eternal salvation.

It is certain, as we remarked above, that the act of contrition is

retracted by a fresh mortal sin, and its effect, in consequence, no

longer endures. It is not so easy to settle the question, with regard to

venial sins, as to whether the sorrow for venial sin based on a universal

motive is revoked by a fresh venial sin, or whether the sorrow continues.

If it is conceded that the sorrow is revoked, scruples may easily arise

if the sorrow has not been renewed immediately before confession. This

practice is very good; but not necessary, if the fresh venial sin is less

grievous than those which the penitent intended to confess when he made

his act of sorrow.[180]

There is still another question to consider. An act of contrition is

made, extending to all past sins, those which are forgotten as well

as those which are remembered; must this be renewed if the penitent

afterwards confesses the forgotten sins and desires a second absolution?

A renewal of the sorrow in this case does not seem necessary, provided

that the sorrow in the first confession extended to all past sins,

even those which by chance had escaped the memory; for in this case

the process was not objectively complete. The sorrow and the implicit

intention of receiving absolution were applied to all sins, even those

inculpably forgotten; and as the renewal of the sorrow would not be at

all necessary if the penitent, after making an act of contrition on

universal grounds, recalls just before the absolution some sins forgotten

and confesses them before the absolution is pronounced, so it is not

necessary in the case mentioned, since it is much the same whether one

receives many particular absolutions or a general one embracing all the

sins. Such is the view of the greater number of the moralists. Lugo, St.

Alphonsus, and Reuter may be mentioned particularly as favoring it; St.

Alphonsus calls this teaching _communis_, Roncaglia _moraliter certa_,

Sporer, Elbel, and many others _probabilissima_; it has been declared

even _indubitata apud omnes_; _pro ea stat_, says Lugo, _communis

praxis_. If in this case one or two confessors perhaps insist on the

renewal of the sorrow, the greater number agree in acting differently or

in suggesting it merely as a piece of advice.

The champions of the other view urge that the case is closed by the first

absolution; if then absolution is to be given again, a new _materia

proxima_ is required, and even if the sorrow continue, it has no relation

to the second absolution. It is easily seen that this is not a strong

reason.[181] Yet though the renewal of the sorrow be not necessary for

the validity of the absolution, it is advisable to make again the act

of sorrow, which is easy to do and certainly increases the grace. The

confessor deals prudently with a penitent under such circumstances when

he requires him to make a short renewal of his act of contrition.[182]

The doctrine just developed is not only adopted _ex communi sententia_

in the case more or less frequent, where a mortal sin which had been

forgotten is confessed immediately after or very soon after absolution,

but also in two other cases. For instance, a penitent in immediate danger

of death must be absolved after one or two sins have been confessed;

after this, if he be still alive, the confession is continued and

completed. The other example is when a penitent (a very rare case)

is absolved by his superior from the reserved sins only, and from the

remaining sins by another confessor.[183]

The result of this doctrine ought not to be, however, that confessors

and penitents become less solicitous about contrition for sins already

remitted by the Sacrament. It may, however, as Ballerini remarks, be very

useful in quieting scruples, especially of those who accuse themselves of

venial sins and in addition tell some mortal sin already confessed and

absolved; for if there is little ground for doubting the sorrow for past

mortal sins in a penitent who has usually only venial sins to confess,

and shows by his constant victories over temptation his aversion to

mortal sin, yet certain anxious penitents are frequently troubled with

scruples about their want of contrition, especially if they happen to

hear a preacher who, with a zeal sometimes devoid of prudence, condemns

the repeated confession of past sins made without true contrition. Such

scruples may be overcome by various means, but especially by the doctrine

just given.[184]

To conclude with a few practical questions:—

1. How must the confessor deal with a penitent who thinks he has only

very slight contrition? He must first of all not be too hasty in deciding

that this penitent is indisposed and without the necessary contrition;

there are men whose hearts are so hard and inaccessible to sensible

impressions that it is only with difficulty and at rare intervals that

they are moved to a sensible sorrow, and such are easily inclined to

think that they have not the proper dispositions. The confessor must

remember that the feeling of sorrow is not at all required, but that

a real grief over the past life and an earnest desire to amend are

sufficient; he must satisfy himself that these dispositions are present

and cannot demand more. He may, moreover, reasonably assume the presence

of these dispositions in the penitent if the latter be willing to listen

to warning and instruction, if he has at any time really endeavored to

amend, if he is ready to perform the penance imposed, and to carry out

other prescriptions of a like nature.[185]

2. When with regard to former confessions the priest wishes to ascertain

whether the penitent has had real sorrow, the following points may serve

as indications:—

(_a_) If the penitent has made use of the means suggested to him for

overcoming the sin.

(_b_) If he has avoided at least the proximate occasions of sin.

(_c_) If the number of sins has become less.

(_d_) If the penitent is convinced that he had real sorrow and purpose of

amendment; for it is a first principle in the Sacrament of Penance that

the penitent’s word is to be taken, since he is there his own accuser and

witness.[186]

The priest must act here with great prudence so as not to frighten away

the penitent, and at the same time not to indulge in an indiscreet

leniency by which he would himself commit sin and involve both the

penitent and himself in ruin.

3. It is not easy for the confessor to discover when the penitent has not

real contrition; the following directions, which Cardinal Denoff in his

pastoral brought to the notice of all the confessors of his diocese, may

be of use:—

(_a_) If the penitent approaches with a proud bearing as though despising

the minister of Christ.

(_b_) If he answers with impatience and anger the questions which the

confessor is bound to put.

(_c_) If in the course of his confession he constantly makes excuses and

accuses others more than himself.

(_d_) If he mentions the gravest sins as though they were ordinary

occurrences.

(_e_) If it is evident that he is trying to conceal a mortal sin which

the confessor in the course of his examination has detected.

(_f_) If he refuses to accept a penance proportioned to the number

and gravity of his sins, and given with all consideration for his

circumstances.

(_g_) If he is unwilling to employ the necessary means to reform.

(_h_) If, finally, he belongs to the number of those unhappy sinners who

seek ignorant or easy-going confessors, with a view of getting absolution

only, without any intention of reforming.[187]

4. If the priest has to deal with an obstinate sinner, he must discreetly

unite mildness and severity, but above all pray to God for him, since

every good gift comes from the Father of light. He may picture to him

God’s great mercy and the love of Jesus to give him courage; or he may

try to soften the hardness of his heart by reminding him of God’s justice

(cf. S. Alph. Praxis Confessar. cp. I).

Theory and practice of the confessional · 第 1 / 12 章