THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

Before presenting Bismarck, it will be necessary to glance at the work

of those great men who prepared the way not only for him, but also for

the soldier Moltke,--men who raised Prussia from the humiliation

resulting from her conquest by Napoleon.

That humiliation was as complete as it was unexpected. It was even

greater than that of France after the later Franco-Prussian war. Prussia

was dismembered; its provinces were seized by the conqueror; its

population was reduced to less than four millions; its territory was

occupied by one hundred and fifty thousand French soldiers; the king

himself was an exile and a fugitive from his own capital; every sort of

indignity was heaped on his prostrate subjects, who were compelled to

pay a war indemnity beyond their power; trade and commerce were cut off

by Napoleon's Continental system; and universal poverty overspread the

country, always poor, and now poorer than ever. Prussia had no allies

to rally to her sinking fortunes; she was completely isolated. Most of

her fortresses were in the hands of her enemies, and the magnificent

army of which she had been so proud since the days of Frederic the Great

was dispersed. At the peace of Tilsit, in 1807, it looked as if the

whole kingdom was about to be absorbed in the empire of Napoleon, like

Bavaria and the Rhine provinces, and wiped out of the map of Europe like

unfortunate Poland.

But even this did not complete the humiliation. Napoleon compelled the

King of Prussia--Frederic William III.--to furnish him soldiers to fight

against Russia, as if Prussia were already incorporated with his own

empire and had lost her nationality. At that time France and Russia were

in alliance, and Prussia had no course to adopt but submission or

complete destruction; and yet Prussia refused in these evil days to join

the Confederation of the Rhine, which embraced all the German States at

the south and west of Austria and Prussia. Napoleon, however, was too

much engrossed in his scheme of conquering Spain, to swallow up Prussia

entirely, as he intended, after he should have subdued Spain. So, after

all, Prussia had before her only the fortune of Ulysses in the cave of

Polyphemus,--to be devoured the last.

The escape of Prussia was owing, on the one hand, to the necessity for

Napoleon to withdraw his main army from Prussia in order to fight in

Spain; and secondly, to the transcendent talents of a few patriots to

whom the king in his distress was forced to listen. The chief of these

were Stein, Hardenberg, and Scharnhorst. It was the work of Stein to

reorganize the internal administration of Prussia, including the

financial department; that of Hardenberg to conduct the ministry of

foreign affairs; and that of Scharnhorst to reorganize the military

power. The two former were nobles; the latter sprung from the people,--a

peasant's son; but they worked together in tolerable harmony,

considering the rival jealousies that at one time existed among all the

high officials, with their innumerable prejudices.

Baron von Stein, born in 1757, of an old imperial knightly family from

the country near Nassau, was as a youth well-educated, and at the age of

twenty-three entered the Prussian service under Frederic the Great, in

the mining department, where he gained rapid promotion. In 1786 he

visited England and made a careful study of her institutions, which he

profoundly admired. In 1787 he became a sort of provincial governor,

being director of the war and Domaine Chambers at Cleves and Hamm.

In 1804 Stein became Minister of Trade, having charge of excise,

customs, manufactures, and trade. The whole financial administration at

this time under King Frederick William III was in a state of great

confusion, from an unnecessary number of officials who did not work

harmoniously. There was too much "red tape." Stein brought order out of

confusion, simplified the administration, punished corruption, increased

the national credit, then at a very low ebb, and re-established the bank

of Prussia on a basis that enabled it to assist the government.

But a larger field than that of finance was opened to Stein in the war

of 1806. The king intrusted to him the portfolio of foreign

affairs,--not willingly, but because he regarded him as the ablest man

in the kingdom. Stein declined to be foreign minister unless he was

entirely unshackled, and the king was obliged to yield, for the

misfortunes of the country had now culminated in the disastrous defeat

at Friedland. The king, however, soon quarrelled with his minister,

being jealous of his commanding abilities, and unused to dictation from

any source. After a brief exile at Nassau, the peace of Tilsit having

proved the sagacity of his views, Stein returned to power as virtual

dictator of the kingdom, with the approbation of Napoleon; but his

dictatorship lasted only about a year, when he was again discharged.

During that year, 1807, Stein made his mark in Prussian history. Without

dwelling on details, he effected the abolition of serfdom in Prussia,

the trade in land, and municipal reforms, giving citizens

self-government in place of the despotism of military bureaus. He made

it his business to pay off the French war indemnity,--one hundred and

fifty million francs, a great sum for Prussia to raise when dismembered

and trodden in the dust under one hundred and fifty thousand French

soldiers,--and to establish a new and improved administrative system.

But, more than all, he attempted to rouse a moral, religious, and

patriotic spirit in the nation, and to inspire it anew with courage,

self-confidence, and self-sacrifice. In 1808 the ministry became warlike

in spite of its despair, the first glimpse of hope being the popular

rising in Spain. It was during the ministry of Stein, and through his

efforts, that the anti-Napoleonic revolution began.

The intense hostility of Stein to Napoleon, and his commanding

abilities, led Napoleon in 1808 imperatively to demand from the King of

Prussia the dismissal of his minister; and Frederick William dared not

resist. Stein did not retire, however, until after the royal edict had

emancipated the serfs of Prussia, and until that other great reform was

made by which the nobles lost the monopoly of office and exemption from

taxation, while the citizen class gained admission to all posts, trades,

and occupations. These great reforms were chiefly to be traced to Stein,

although Hardenberg and others, like Schön and Niebuhr, had a hand

in them.

Stein also opened the military profession to the citizen class, which

before was closed, only nobles being intrusted with command in the army.

It is true that nobles still continued to form a large majority of

officers, even as peasants formed the bulk of the army. But the removal

of restrictions and the abolition of serfdom tended to create patriotic

sentiments among all classes, on which the strength of armies in no

small degree rests. In the time of Frederic the Great the army was a

mere machine. It was something more when the nation in 1811 rallied to

achieve its independence. Then was born the idea of nationality,--that,

whatever obligations a Prussian owed to the state, Germany was greater

than Prussia itself. This idea was the central principle of Stein's

political system, leading ultimately to the unity of Germany as finally

effected by Bismarck and Moltke. It became almost synonymous with that

patriotism which sustains governments and thrones, the absence of which

was the great defect of the German States before the times of Napoleon,

when both princes and people lost sight of the unity of the nation in

the interests of petty sovereignties.

Stein was a man of prodigious energy, practical good sense, and lofty

character, but irascible, haughty, and contemptuous, and was far from

being a favorite with the king and court. His great idea was the unity

and independence of Germany. He thought more of German nationality than

of Prussian aggrandizement. It was his aim to make his countrymen feel

that they were Germans rather than Prussians, and that it was only by a

union of the various German States that they could hope to shake off the

French yoke, galling and humiliating beyond description.

When Stein was driven into exile at the dictation of Napoleon, with the

loss of his private fortune, he was invited by the Emperor of Russia to

aid him with his counsels,--and it can be scarcely doubted that in the

employ of Russia he rendered immense services to Germany, and had no

little influence in shaping the movements of the allies in effecting the

ruin of the common despot. On this point, however, I cannot dwell.

Count, afterward Prince, Hardenberg, held to substantially the same

views, and was more acceptable to the king as minister than was the

austere and haughty Stein, although his morals were loose, and his

abilities far inferior to those of the former. But his diplomatic

talents were considerable, and his manners were agreeable, like those of

Metternich, while Stein treated kings and princes as ordinary men, and

dictated to them the course which was necessary to pursue. It was the

work of Hardenberg to create the peasant-proprietorship of modern

Prussia; but it was the previous work of Stein to establish free trade

in land,--which means the removal of hindrances to the sale and purchase

of land, which still remains one of the abuses of England,--the ultimate

effect of which was to remove caste in land as well as caste in persons.

The great educational movement, in the deepest depression of Prussian

affairs, was headed by William, Baron von Humboldt. When Prussia lay

disarmed, dismembered, and impoverished, the University of Berlin was

founded, the government contributing one hundred and fifty thousand

thalers a year; and Humboldt--the first minister of public

instruction--succeeded in inducing the most eminent and learned men in

Germany to become professors in this new university. I look upon this

educational movement in the most gloomy period of German history as one

of the noblest achievements which any nation ever made in the cause of

science and literature. It took away the sting of military ascendency,

and raised men of genius to an equality with nobles; and as the

universities were the centres of liberal sentiments and all liberalizing

ideas, they must have exerted no small influence on the war of

liberation itself, as well as on the cause of patriotism, which was the

foundation of the future greatness of Prussia. Students flocked from all

parts of Germany to hear lectures from accomplished and patriotic

professors, who inculcated the love of fatherland. Germany, though

fallen into the hands of a military hero from defects in the

administration of governments and armies, was not disgraced when her

professors in the university were the greatest scholars of the world.

They created a new empire, not of the air, as some one sneeringly

remarked, but of mind, which has gone on from conquering to conquer. For

more than fifty years German universities have been the centre of

European thought and scholastic culture,--pedantic, perhaps, but

original and profound.

Before proceeding to the main subject, I have to speak of one more great

reform, which was the work of Scharnhorst. This was that series of

measures which determined the result of the greatest military struggles

of the nineteenth century, and raised Prussia to the front rank of

military monarchies. It was the _levee en masse_, composed of the youth

of the nation, without distinction of rank, instead of an army made up

of peasants and serfs and commanded by their feudal masters. Scharnhorst

introduced a compulsory system, indeed, but it was not unequal. Every

man was made to feel that he had a personal interest in defending his

country, and there were no exemptions made. True, the old system of

Frederic the Great was that of conscription; but from this conscription

large classes and whole districts were exempted, while the soldiers who

fought in the war of liberation were drawn from all classes alike:

hence, there was no unjust compulsion, which weakens patriotism, and

entails innumerable miseries. It was impossible in the utter exhaustion

of the national finances to raise a sufficient number of volunteers to

meet the emergencies of the times; therefore, if Napoleon was to be

overthrown, it was absolutely necessary to compel everybody to serve in

the army for a limited period, The nation saw the necessity, and made no

resistance. Thus patriotism lent her aid, and became an overwhelming

power. The citizen soldier was no great burden on the government, since

it was bound to his support only for a limited period,--long or short as

the exigency of the country demanded. Hence, large armies were

maintained at comparatively trifling expense.

I need not go into the details of a system which made Prussia a nation

of patriots as well as of soldiers, and which made Scharnhorst a great

national benefactor, sharing with Stein the glory of a great

deliverance. He did not live to see the complete triumph of his system,

matured by genius and patient study; but his work remained to future

generations, and made Prussia invincible except to a coalition of

powerful enemies. All this was done under the eye of Napoleon, and a

dreamy middle class became an effective soldiery. So, too, did the

peasants, no longer subjected to corporal punishment and other

humiliations. What a great thing it was to restore dignity to a whole

nation, and kindle the fires of patriotic ardor among poor and rich

alike! To the credit of the king, he saw the excellence of the new

system, at once adopted it, and generously rewarded its authors.

Scharnhorst, the peasant's son, was made a noble, and was retained in

office until he died. Stein, however, whose overshadowing greatness

created jealousy, remained simply a baron, and spent his last days in

retirement,--though not unhonored, or without influence, even when not

occupying the great offices of state, to which no man ever had a higher

claim. The king did not like him, and the king was still an

absolute monarch.

Frederick William III. was by no means a great man, being jealous,

timid, and vacillating; but it was in his reign that Prussia laid the

foundation of her greatness as a military monarchy. It was not the king

who laid this foundation, but the great men whom Providence raised up in

the darkest hours of Prussia's humiliation. He did one prudent thing,

however, out of timidity, when his ministers waged vigorous and

offensive measures. He refused to arm against Napoleon when Prussia lay

at his mercy. This turned out to be the salvation of Prussia, A weak

man's instincts proved to be wiser than the wisdom of the wise. When

Napoleon's doom was sealed by his disasters in Russia, then, and not

till then, did the Prussian king unite with Russia and Austria to crush

the unscrupulous despot.

The condition of Prussia, then, briefly stated, when Napoleon was sent

to St. Helena to meditate and die, was this: a conquering army, of which

Blücher was one of its greatest generals, had been raised by the _levee

en masse_,--a conscription, indeed, not of peasants alone, obliged to

serve for twenty years, but of the whole nation, for three years of

active service; and a series of administrative reforms had been

introduced and extended to every department of the State, by which

greater economy and a more complete system were inaugurated, favoritism

abolished, and the finances improved so as to support the government and

furnish the sinews of war; while alliances were made with great Powers

who hitherto had been enemies or doubtful friends.

These alliances resulted in what is called the German Confederation, or

Bund,--a strict union of all the various States for defensive purposes,

and also to maintain a general system to suppress revolutionary and

internal dissensions. Most of the German States entered into this

Confederacy, at the head of which was Austria. It was determined in

June, 1815, at Vienna, that the Confederacy should be managed by a

general assembly, called a Diet, the seat of which was located at

Frankfort. In this Diet the various independent States, thirty-nine in

number, had votes in proportion to their population, and were bound to

contribute troops of one soldier to every hundred inhabitants, amounting

to three hundred thousand in all, of which Austria and Prussia and

Bavaria furnished more than half. This arrangement virtually gave to

Austria and Prussia a preponderance in the Diet; and as the States were

impoverished by the late war, and the people generally detested war, a

long peace of forty years (with a short interval of a year) was secured

to Germany, during which prosperity returned and the population nearly

doubled. The Germans turned their swords into pruning-hooks, and all

kinds of industry were developed, especially manufactures. The cities

were adorned with magnificent works of art, and libraries, schools, and

universities covered the land. No nation ever made a more signal

progress in material prosperity than did the German States during this

period of forty years,--especially Prussia, which became in addition

intellectually the most cultivated country in Europe, with twenty-one

thousand primary schools, and one thousand academies, or gymnasia, in

which mathematics and the learned languages were taught by accomplished

scholars; to say nothing of the universities, which drew students from

all Christian and civilized countries in both hemispheres.

The rapid advance in learning, however, especially in the universities

and the gymnasia, led to the discussion of innumerable subjects,

including endless theories of government and the rights of man, by which

discontent was engendered and virtue was not advanced. Strange to say,

even crime increased. The universities became hot-beds of political

excitement, duels, beer-drinking, private quarrels, and infidel

discussion, causing great alarm to conservative governments and to

peaceful citizens generally. At last the Diet began to interfere, for it

claimed the general oversight of all internal affairs in the various

States. An army of three hundred thousand men which obeyed the dictation

of the Diet was not to be resisted; and as this Diet was controlled by

Austria and Prussia, it became every year more despotic and

anti-democratic. In consequence, the Press was gradually fettered, the

universities were closely watched, and all revolutionary movements in

cities were suppressed. Discontent and popular agitations, as usual,

went hand in hand.

As early as 1818 the great reaction against all liberal sentiments in

political matters had fairly set in. The king of Prussia neglected, and

finally refused, to grant the constitutional government which he had

promised in the day of his adversity before the battle of Waterloo;

while Austria, guided by Metternich, stamped her iron heel on everything

which looked like intellectual or national independence.

This memorable reaction against all progress in government, not confined

to the German States but extending to Europe generally, has already been

considered in previous chapters. It was the great political feature in

the history of Europe for ten years after the fall of Napoleon,

particularly in Austria, where hatred of all popular movements raged

with exceeding bitterness, intensified by the revolutions in Spain,

Italy, and Greece. The assassination of Kotzebue, the dramatic author,

by a political fanatic, for his supposed complicity with the despotic

schemes of the Czar, kindled popular excitement into a blazing flame,

but still more fiercely incited the sovereigns of Germany to make every

effort to suppress even liberty of thought.

During the period, then, when ultra-conservative principles animated the

united despots of the various German States, and the Diet controlled by

Metternich repressed all liberal movements, little advance was made in

Prussia in the way of reforms. But a great advance was made in all

questions of political economy and industrial matters. Free-trade was

established in the most unlimited sense between all the states and

provinces of the Confederation. All restraints were removed from the

navigation of rivers; new markets were opened in every direction for the

productions of industry. In 1839 the Zollverein, or Customs-Union, was

established, by which a uniform scale of duties was imposed in Northern

Germany on all imports and exports. But no political reforms which the

king had promised were effected during the life of Frederick William

III. Hardenberg, who with Stein had inaugurated liberal movements, had

lost his influence, although he was retained in power until he died.

For the twenty years succeeding the confederation of the German States

in 1820, constitutional freedom made little or no progress in Germany.

The only advance made in Prussia was in 1823, when the Provincial

Estates, or Diets, were established. These, however, were the mere

shadow of representative government, since the Estates were convoked at

irregular intervals, and had neither the power to initiate laws nor

grant supplies. They could only express their opinions concerning

changes in the laws pertaining to persons and property.

On the 7th of June, 1840, Frederick William III. of Prussia died, and

was succeeded by his son Frederick William IV., a religious and

patriotic king, who was compelled to make promises for some sort of

constitutional liberty, and to grant certain concessions, which although

they did not mean much gave general satisfaction. Among other things the

freedom of the Press was partially guaranteed, with certain

restrictions, and the Zollverein was extended to Brunswick and

Hesse-Homburg. Meantime the government entered with zeal upon the

construction of railways and the completion of the Cathedral of Cologne,

which tended to a more permanent union of the North German States. "We

are not engaged here," said the new monarch, on the inauguration of the

completion of that proudest work of mediaeval art, "with the

construction of an ordinary edifice; it is a work bespeaking the spirit

of union and concord which animates the whole of Germany and all its

persuasions, that we are now constructing." This inauguration, amid

immense popular enthusiasm, was soon followed by the meeting of the

Estates of the whole kingdom at Berlin, which for the first time united

the various Provincial Estates in a general Diet; but its functions were

limited to questions involving a diminution of taxation. No member was

allowed to speak more than once on any question, and the representatives

of the commons were only a third part of the whole assembly. This

naturally did not satisfy the nation, and petitions flowed in for the

abolition of the censorship of the Press and for the publicity of

debate. The king was not prepared to make these concessions in full,

but he abolished the censorship of the Press as to works extending to

above twenty pages, and enjoined the censors of lesser pamphlets and

journals to exercise gentleness and discretion, and not erase anything

which did not strike at the monarchy. At length, in 1847, the desire was

so universal for some form of representative government that a royal

edict convoked a General Assembly of the Estates of Prussia, arranged in

four classes,--the nobles, the equestrian order, the towns, and the

rural districts. The Diet consisted of six hundred and seventy members,

of which only eighty were nobles, and was empowered to discuss all

questions pertaining to legislation; but the initiative of all measures

was reserved to the crown. This National Diet assembled on the 24th of

July, and was opened by the king in person, with a noble speech,

remarkable for its elevation of tone. He convoked the Diet, the king

said, to make himself acquainted with the wishes and wants of his

people, but not to change the constitution, which guaranteed an absolute

monarchy. The province of the Diet was consultative rather than

legislative. Political and military power, as before, remained with the

king. Still, an important step had been taken toward representative

institutions.

It was about this time, as a member of the National Diet, that Otto

Edward Leopold von Bismarck appeared upon the political stage. It was a

period of great political excitement, not only in Prussia, but

throughout Europe, and also of great material prosperity. Railways had

been built, the Zollverein had extended through North Germany, the

universities were in their glory, and into everything fearless thinkers

were casting their thoughtful eyes. Thirty-four years of peace had

enriched and united the German States. The great idea of the day was

political franchise. Everybody aspired to solve political problems, and

wished to have a voice in deliberative assemblies. There was also an

unusual agitation of religious ideas. Rouge had attempted the complete

emancipation of Germany from Papal influences, and university professors

threw their influence on the side of rationalism and popular liberty. On

the whole, there was a general tendency towards democratic ideas, which

was opposed with great bitterness by the conservative parties, made up

of nobles and government officials.

Bismarck arose, slowly but steadily, with the whole force of his genius,

among the defenders of the conservative interests of his order and of

the throne. He was then simply Herr von Bismarck, belonging to an

ancient and noble but not wealthy family, whose seat was Schönhausen,

where the future prince was born, April 1, 1815. The youth was sent to a

gymnasium in Berlin in 1830, and in 1832 to the university of Göttingen

in Hanover, where he was more distinguished for duels, drinking-parties,

and general lawlessness than for scholarship. Here he formed a memorable

friendship with a brother student, a young American,--John Lothrop

Motley, later the historian of the Dutch Republic. Much has been written

of Bismarck's reckless and dissipated life at the university, which

differed not essentially from that of other nobles. He had a grand

figure, superb health, extraordinary animal spirits, and could ride like

a centaur. He spent but three semestres at Göttingen, and then repaired

to Berlin in order to study jurisprudence under the celebrated Savigny;

but he was rarely seen in the lecture-room. He gave no promise of the

great abilities which afterward distinguished him. Yet he honorably

passed his State examination; and as he had chosen the law for his

profession, he first served on leaving the university as a sort of clerk

in the city police, and in 1834 was transferred to Aix-la-Chapelle, in

the administrative department of the district. In 1837 he served in the

crown office at Potsdam. He then entered for a year as a sharpshooter of

the Guards, to absolve his obligation to military service.

The next eight years, from the age of twenty-four, he devoted to

farming, hunting, carousing, and reading, on one of his father's estates

in Pomerania. He was a sort of country squire, attending fairs, selling

wool, inspecting timber, handling grain, gathering rents, and sitting as

a deputy in the local Diet,--the talk and scandal of the neighborhood

for his demon-like rides and drinking-bouts, yet now studying all the

while, especially history and even philosophy, managing the impoverished

paternal estates with prudence and success, and making short visits to

France and England, the languages of which countries he could speak with

fluency and accuracy. In 1847 he married Johanna von Putkammer, nine

years younger than himself, who proved a model wife, domestic and wise,

of whom he was both proud and fond. The same year, his father having

died and left him Schönhausen, he was elected a member of the Landtag, a

quasi-parliament of the eight united Diets of the monarchy; and his

great career began.

Up to this period Bismarck was not a publicly marked man, except in an

avidity for country sports and skill in horsemanship. He ever retained

his love of the country and of country life. If proud and overbearing,

he was not ostentatious. He had but few friends, but to these he was

faithful. He never was popular until he had made Prussia the most

powerful military State in Europe. He never sought to be loved so much

as to be feared; he never allowed himself to be approached without

politeness and deference. He seemed to care more for dogs than men. Nor

was he endowed with those graces of manner which marked Metternich. He

remained harsh, severe, grave, proud through his whole career, from

first to last, except in congenial company. What is called society he

despised, with all his aristocratic tendencies and high social rank. He

was born for untrammelled freedom, and was always impatient under

contradiction or opposition. When he reached the summit of his power he

resembled Wallenstein, the hero of the Thirty Years War,--superstitious,

self-sustained, unapproachable, inspiring awe, rarely kindling love,

overshadowing by his vast abilities the monarch whom he served

and ruled.

No account of the man, however, would be complete which did not

recognize the corner-stone of his character,--an immovable belief in the

feudalistic right of royalty to rule its subjects. Descended from an

ancient family of knights and statesmen, of the most intensely

aristocratic and reactionary class even in Germany, his inherited

instincts and his own tremendous will, backed by a physique of colossal

size and power, made effective his loyalty to the king and the monarchy,

which from the first dominated and inspired him. In the National Diet of

1847, Herr von Bismarck sat for more than a month before he opened his

lips; but when he did speak it became evident that he was determined to

support to the utmost the power of the crown. He was _plus royaliste

que le roi._ In the ordinary sense he was no orator. He hesitated, he

coughed, he sought for words; his voice, in spite of his herculean

frame, was feeble. But sturdy in his loyalty, although inexperienced in

parliamentary usage, he offered a bold front to the liberalism which he

saw to be dangerous to his sovereign's throne. Like Oliver Cromwell in

Parliament, he gained daily in power, while, unlike the English

statesman, he was opposed to the popular side, and held up the monarchy

after the fashion of Strafford. From that time, and in fact until 1866,

when he conquered Austria, Bismarck was very unpopular; and as he rose

in power he became the most bitterly hated man in Prussia,--which hatred

he returned with arrogant contempt. He consistently opposed all reforms,

even the emancipation of the Jews, which won him the favor of

the monarch.

When the revolution of 1848 broke out, which hurled Louis Philippe from

the French throne its flames reached every continental State except

Russia. Metternich, who had been all powerful in Austria for forty

years, was obliged to flee, as well as the imperial family itself. All

the Germanic States were now promised liberal constitutions by the

fallen or dismayed princes. In Prussia, affairs were critical, and the

reformers were sanguine of triumph. Berlin was agitated by mobs to the

verge of anarchy. The king, seriously alarmed, now promised the boon

which he had thus far withheld, and summoned the Second United Diet to

pave the way for a constituent assembly. In this constituent assembly

Bismarck scorned to sit. For six months it sat squabbling and fighting,

but accomplishing nothing. At last, Bismarck found it expedient to enter

the new parliament as a deputy, and again vigorously upheld the absolute

power of the crown. He did, indeed, accept the principle of

constitutional government, but, as he frankly said, against his will,

and only as a new power in the hands of the monarch to restrain popular

agitation and maintain order. Through his influence the king refused the

imperial crown offered by the Frankfort parliament, because he conceived

that the parliament had no right to give it, that its acceptance would

be a recognition of national instead of royal sovereignty, and that it

would be followed probably by civil war. As time went on he became more

and more the leader of the conservatives. I need not enumerate the

subjects which came up for discussion in the new Prussian parliament, in

which Bismarck exhibited with more force than eloquence his loyalty to

the crown, and a conservatism which was branded by the liberals as

mediaeval. But his originality, his boldness, his fearlessness, his

rugged earnestness, his wit and humor, his biting sarcasm, his

fertility of resources, his knowledge of men and affairs, and his

devoted patriotism, marked him out for promotion.

In 1851 Bismarck was sent as first secretary of the Prussian embassy to

the Diet of the various German States, convened at Frankfort, in which

Austria held a predominating influence. It was not a parliament, but an

administrative council of the Germanic Confederation founded by the

Congress of Vienna in 1815. It made no laws, and its sittings were

secret. It was a body which represented the League of Sovereigns, and

was composed of only seventeen delegates,--its main function being to

suppress all liberal movements in the various German States; like the

Congress of Vienna itself. The Diet of Frankfort was pretentious, but

practically impotent, and was the laughingstock of Europe. It was full

of jealousies and intrigues. It was a mere diplomatic conference. As

Austria and Prussia controlled it, things went well enough when these

two Powers were agreed; but they did not often agree. There was a

perpetual rivalry between them, and an unextinguishable jealousy.

There were many sneers at the appointment of a man to this diplomatic

post whose manners were brusque and overbearing, and who had spent the

most of his time, after leaving the university, among horses, cattle,

and dogs; who was only a lieutenant of militia, with a single

decoration, and who was unacquainted with what is called diplomacy. But

the king knew his man, and the man was conscious of his powers.

Bismarck found life at Frankfort intolerably dull. He had a contempt for

his diplomatic associates generally, and made fun of them to his few

intimate friends. He took them in almost at a glance, for he had an

intuitive knowledge of character; he weighed them in his balance, and

found them wanting. In a letter to his wife, he writes: "Nothing but

miserable trifles do these people trouble themselves about. They strike

me as infinitely more ridiculous with their important ponderosity

concerning the gathered rags of gossip, than even a member of the Second

Chamber of Berlin in the full consciousness of his dignity.... The men

of the minor States are mostly mere caricatures of periwig diplomatists,

who at once put on their official visage if I merely beg of them a light

to my cigar."

His extraordinary merits were however soon apparent to the king, and

even to his chief, old General Rochow, who was soon transferred to St.

Petersburg to make way for the secretary. The king's brother William,

Prince of Prussia, when at Frankfort, was much impressed by the young

Prussian envoy to the Bund, and there was laid the foundation of the

friendship between the future soldier-king and the future chancellor,

between whom there always existed a warm confidence and esteem. Soon

after, Bismarck made the acquaintance of Metternich, who had ruled for

so long a time both the Diet and the Empire. The old statesman, now

retired, invited the young diplomatist to his castle at Johannisberg.

They had different aims, but similar sympathies. The Austrian statesman

sought to preserve the existing state of things; the Prussian, to make

his country dominant over Germany. Both were aristocrats, and both were

conservative; but Metternich was as bland and polished as Bismarck was

rough and brusque.

Nothing escaped the watchful eye of Bismarck at Frankfort as the

ambassador of Prussia. He took note of everything, both great and small,

and communicated it to Berlin as if he were a newspaper correspondent.

In everything he showed his sympathy with absolutism, and hence

recommended renewed shackles on the Press and on the universities,--at

that time the hotbed of revolutionary ideas. His central aim and

constant thought was the ascendency of Prussia,--first in royal strength

at home, then throughout Germany as the rival of Austria. Bismarck was

not only a keen observer, but he soon learned to disguise his thoughts.

Nobody could read him. He was frank when his opponents were full of

lies, knowing that he would not be believed. He became a perfect master

of the art of deception. No one was a match for him in statecraft. Even

Prince Gortschakoff became his dupe. By his tact he kept Prussia from

being entangled by the usurpation of Napoleon III., and by the Crimean

war. He saw into the character of the French emperor, and discovered

that he was shallow, and not to be feared. At Frankfort, Bismarck had

many opportunities of seeing distinguished men of all nations; he took

their gauge, and penetrated the designs of cabinets. He counselled his

master to conciliate Napoleon, though regarding him as an upstart; and

he sought the friendship of France in order to eclipse the star of

Austria, whom it was necessary to humble before Prussia could rise. In

his whole diplomatic career at Frankfort it was Bismarck's aim to

contravene the designs of Austria, having in view the aggrandizement of

Prussia as the true head and centre of German nationality. He therefore

did all he could to prevent Austria from being assisted in her war with

Italy, and rejoiced in her misfortunes. In the meantime he made frequent

short visits to Holland, Denmark, Italy, and Hungary, acquired the

languages of these countries, and made himself familiar with their

people and institutions, besides shrewdly studying the characters,

manners, and diplomatic modes of the governing classes of European

nations at large. Cool, untiring, self-possessed, he was storing up

information and experience.

At the end of eight years, in 1859, Bismarck was transferred to St.

Petersburg as the Prussian ambassador to Alexander II. He was then

forty-three years of age, and was known as the sworn foe of Austria. His

free-and-easy but haughty manners were a great contrast to those of his

stiff, buttoned-up, and pretentious predecessors; and he became a great

favorite in Russian court circles. The comparatively small salary he

received,--less than twenty thousand dollars, with a house,--would not

allow him to give expensive entertainments, or to run races in

prodigality with the representatives of England, France, or even

Austria, who received nearly fifty thousand dollars. But no parties were

more sought or more highly appreciated than those which his sensible and

unpretending wife gave in the high society in which they moved. With the

empress-dowager he was an especial favorite, and was just the sort of

man whom the autocrat of all the Russias would naturally like,

especially for his love of hunting, and his success in shooting deer and

bears. He did not go to grand parties any more than he could help,

despising their ostentation and frivolity, and always feeling the

worse for them.

On the 2d of January, 1861, Frederick William IV., who had for some time

been insane, died, and was succeeded by the Prince Regent, William I.,

already in his sixty-fifth year, every inch a soldier and nothing else.

Bismarck was soon summoned to the councils of his sovereign at Berlin,

who was perplexed and annoyed by the Liberal party, which had the

ascendency in the lower Chamber of the general Diet. Office was pressed

upon Bismarck, but before he accepted it he wished to study Napoleon and

French affairs more closely, and was therefore sent as ambassador to

Paris in 1862. He made that year a brief visit to London, Disraeli being

then the premier, who smiled at his schemes for the regeneration of

Germany. It was while journeying amid the Pyrenees that Bismarck was

again summoned to Berlin, the lower Chamber having ridden rough-shod

over his Majesty's plans for army reform. The king invested him with the

great office of President of the Ministry, his abilities being

universally recognized.

It was now Bismarck's mission to break the will of the Prussian

parliament, and to thrust Austria out of the Germanic body. He

considered only the end in view, caring nothing for the means: he had no

scruples. It was his religion to raise Prussia to the same ascendency

that Austria had held under Metternich. He had a master whose will and

ambition were equal to his own, yet whose support he was sure of in

carrying out his grand designs. He was now a second Richelieu, to whom

the aggrandizement of the monarchy which he served and the welfare of

Fatherland were but convertible terms. He soon came into bitter

conflict, not with nobles, but with progressive liberals in the Chamber,

who detested him and feared him, but to whom he did not condescend to

reveal his plans,--bearing obloquy with placidity in the greatness of

the end he had in view. He was a self-sustained, haughty, unapproachable

man of power, except among the few friends whom he honored as boon

companions, without ever losing his discretion,--wearing a mask with

apparent frankness, and showing real frankness in matters which did not

concern secrets of state, especially on the subjects of education and

religion. Like his master, he was more a Calvinist than a Lutheran. He

openly avowed his dependence on Almighty God, and on him alone, as the

hope of nations. In this respect we trace a resemblance to Oliver

Cromwell rather than to Frederic the Great. Bismarck was a compound of

both, in his patriotism and his unscrupulousness.

The first thing that King William and his minister did was to double the

army. But this vast increase of military strength seemed unnecessary to

the Liberal party, and the requisite increase of taxes to support it was

unpopular. Hence, Bismarck was brought in conflict with the lower

Chamber, which represented the middle classes. He dared not tell his

secret schemes without imperilling their success, which led to grave

misunderstandings. For four years the conflict raged between the crown

and the parliament, both the king and Bismarck being inflexible; and the

lower House was equally obstinate in refusing to grant the large

military supplies demanded. At last, Bismarck dissolved the Chambers,

and the king declared that as the Three Estates could not agree, he

should continue to do his duty by Prussia without regard to "these

pieces of paper called constitutions." The next four sessions of the

Chamber were closed in the same manner. Bismarck admitted that he was

acting unconstitutionally, but claimed the urgency of public necessity.

In the public debates he was cool, sarcastic, and contemptuous. The

Press took up the fight, and the Press was promptly muzzled. Bismarck

was denounced as a Catiline, a Strafford, a Polignac; but he retained a

provoking serenity, and quietly prepared for war,--since war, he

foresaw, was sooner or later inevitable. "Nothing can solve the

question," said he, "but blood and iron."

At last an event occurred which showed his hand. In November, 1863,

Frederick VII., the king of Denmark, died. By his death the

Schleswig-Holstein question again burst upon distracted Europe,--Who was

to reign over the two Danish provinces? The king of Denmark, as Duke of

Schleswig and Holstein, had been represented in the Germanic Diet. By

the treaty of London, in 1852, he had undertaken not to incorporate the

duchies with the rest of his monarchy, allowing them to retain their

traditional autonomy. In 1863, shortly before his death, Frederick VII.

by a decree dissolved this autonomy, and virtually incorporated

Schleswig, which was only partly German, with the Danish monarchy,

leaving the wholly German Holstein as before. Bismarck protested against

this violation of treaty obligations. The Danish parliament nevertheless

passed a law which incorporated the province with Denmark; and Christian

IX., the new monarch, confirmed the law.

But a new claimant to the duchies now appeared in the person of

Frederick of Augustenburg, a German prince; and the Prussian Chamber

advocated his claims, as did the Diet itself; but the throne held its

opinion in reserve. Bismarck contrived (by what diplomatic tricks and

promises it is difficult to say) to induce Austria to join with Prussia

in seizing the provinces in question and in dividing the spoil between

them. As these two Powers controlled the Diet at Frankfort, it was easy

to carry out the programme. An Austro-Prussian army accordingly invaded

Schleswig-Holstein, and to the scandal of all Europe drove the Danish

defenders to the wall. It was regarded in the same light as the seizure

of Silesia by Frederic the Great,--a high-handed and unscrupulous

violation of justice and right. England was particularly indignant, and

uttered loud protests. So did the lesser States of Germany, jealous of

the aggrandizement of Prussia. Even the Prussian Chamber refused to

grant the money for such an enterprise.

But Bismarck laughed in his sleeve. This arch-diplomatist had his

reasons, which he did not care to explain. He had in view the weakening

of the power of the Diet, and a quarrel with Austria. True, he had

embraced Austria, but after the fashion of a bear. He knew that Austria

and Prussia would wrangle about the division of the spoil, which would

lead to misunderstandings, and thus furnish the pretext for a war, which

he felt to be necessary before Prussia could be aggrandized and German

unity be effected, with Prussia at its head,--the two great objects of

his life. His policy was marvellously astute; but he kept his own

counsels, and continued to hug his secret enemy.

On the 30th of October, 1864, the Treaty of Vienna was signed, by which

it was settled that the king of Denmark should surrender

Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg to Austria and Prussia, and he bound

himself to submit to what their majesties might think fit as to the

disposition of these three duchies. Probably both parties sought an

occasion to quarrel, since their commissioners had received opposite

instructions,--the Austrians defending the claims of Frederick of

Augustenburg, as generally desired in Germany, and the Prussians now

opposing them. Prussia demanded the expulsion of the pretender; to which

Austria said no. Prussia further sounded Austria as to the annexation of

the duchies to herself, to which Austria consented, on condition of

receiving an equivalent of some province in Silesia. "What!" thought

Bismarck, angrily, "give you back part of what was won for Prussia by

Frederic the Great? Never!" Affairs had a gloomy look; but war was

averted for a while by the Convention of Gastein, by which the

possession of Schleswig was assigned to Prussia, and Holstein to

Austria; and further, in consideration of two and a half millions of

dollars, the Emperor Francis Joseph ceded to King William all his rights

of co-proprietorship in the Duchy of Lauenburg.

But the Chamber of Berlin boldly declared this transaction to be null

and void, since the country had not been asked to ratify the treaty. It

must be borne in mind that the conflict was still going on between

Bismarck, as the defender of the absolute sovereignty of the king, and

the liberal and progressive members of the Chamber, who wanted a freer

and more democratic constitution. Opposed, then, by the Chamber,

Bismarck dissolved it, and coolly reminded his enemies that the Chamber

had nothing to do with politics,--only with commercial affairs and

matters connected with taxation. This was the period of his greatest

unpopularity, since his policy and ultimate designs were not

comprehended. So great was the popular detestation in which he was held

that a fanatic tried to kill him in the street, but only succeeded in

wounding him slightly.

In the meantime Austria fomented disaffection in the provinces which

Prussia had acquired, and Bismarck resolved to cut the knot by the

sword. Prussian troops marched to the frontier, and Austria on her part

also prepared for war. It is difficult to see that a real _casus belli_

existed. We only know that both parties wanted to fight, whatever were

their excuses and pretensions; and both parties sought the friendship of

Russia and France, especially by holding out delusive hopes to Napoleon

of accession of territory. They succeeded in inducing both Russia and

France to remain neutral,--mere spectators of the approaching contest,

which was purely a German affair. It was the first care of Prussia to

prevent the military union of her foes in North Germany with her foes in

the south,--which was effected in part by the diplomatic genius of

Bismarck, and in part by occupying the capitals of Hanover, Saxony, and

Hesse-Cassel with Prussian troops, in a very summary way.

The encounter now began in earnest between Prussia and Austria for the

prize of ascendency. Both parties were confident of success,--Austria as

the larger State, with proud traditions, triumphant over rebellious

Italy; and Prussia, with its enlarged military organization and the new

breech-loading needle-gun.

Count von Moltke at this time came prominently on the European stage as

the greatest strategist since Napoleon. He was chief of staff to the

king, who was commander-in-chief. He set his wonderful machinery in

harmonious action, and from his office in Berlin moved his military

pawns by touch of electric wire. Three great armies were soon

centralized in Bohemia,--one of three corps, comprising one hundred

thousand men, led by Prince Charles, the king's nephew; the second, of

four corps, of one hundred and sixteen thousand men, commanded by the

crown prince, the king's son; and the third, of forty thousand, led by

General von Bittenfield. "March separately; strike together," were the

orders of Moltke. Vainly did the Austrians attempt to crush these armies

in detail before they should combine at the appointed place. On they

came, with mathematical accuracy, until two of the armies reached

Gitschin, the objective point, where they were joined by the king, by

Moltke, by Bismarck, and by General von Roon, the war minister. On the

2d of June, 1866, they were opposite Königgrätz (or Sadowa, as the

Austrians called it), where the Austrians were marshalled. On the 3d of

July the battle began; and the scales hung pretty evenly until, at the

expected hour, the crown prince--"our Fritz," as the people

affectionately called him after this, later the Emperor Frederick

William--made his appearance on the field with his army. Assailed on

both flanks and pressed in the centre, the Austrians first began to

slacken fire, then to waver, then to give way under the terrific

concentrated fire of the needle-guns, then to retreat into ignominious

flight. The contending forces were about equal; but science and the

needle-gun won the day, and changed the whole aspect of modern warfare.

The battle of Königgrätz settled this point,--that success in war

depends more on good powder and improved weapons than on personal

bravery or even masterly evolutions. Other things being equal, victory

is almost certain to be on the side of the combatants who have the best

weapons. The Prussians won the day of Königgrätz by their breech-loading

guns, although much was due to their superior organization and

superior strategy.

That famous battle virtually ended the Austro-Prussian campaign, which

lasted only about seven weeks. It was one of those "decisive battles"

that made Prussia the ascendent power in Germany, and destroyed the

prestige of Austria. It added territory to Prussia equal to one quarter

of the whole kingdom, and increased her population by four and a half

millions of people. At a single bound, Prussia became a first-class

military State.

The Prussian people were almost frantic with joy; and Bismarck, from

being the most unpopular man in the nation, became instantly a national

idol. His marvellous diplomacy, by which Austria was driven to the

battlefield, was now seen and universally acknowledged. He obtained

fame, decorations, and increased power. A grateful nation granted to him

four hundred thousand thalers, with which he bought the estate of

Varzin. General von Moltke received three hundred thousand thalers and

immense military prestige. The war minister, Von Roon, also received

three hundred thousand thalers. These three stood out as the three most

prominent men of the nation, next to the royal family.

Never was so short a war so pregnant with important consequences. It

consolidated the German Confederation under Prussian dominance. By

weakening Austria it led to the national unity of Italy, and secured

free government to the whole Austrian empire, since that government

could no longer refuse the demands of Hungary. Above all, "it shattered

the fabric of Ultramontanism which had been built up by the concordat

of 1853."

It was the expectation of Napoleon III that Austria would win in this

war; but the loss of the Austrians was four to one, besides her

humiliation, condemned as she was to pay a war indemnity, with the loss

also of the provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel,

Nassau, and Frankfort. But Bismarck did not push Austria to the wall,

since he did not wish to make her an irreconcilable enemy. He left open

a door for future and permanent peace. He did not desire to ruin his

foe, but simply to acquire the lead in German politics and exclude

Austria from the Germanic Confederation. Napoleon, disappointed and

furious, blustered, and threatened war, unless he too could come in for

a share of the plunder, to which he had no real claim. Bismarck calmly

replied, "Well, then, let there be war," knowing full well that France

was not prepared, Napoleon consulted his marshals, "Are we prepared,"

asked he, "to fight all Germany?" "Certainly not," replied the marshals,

"until our whole army, like that of Prussia, is supplied with a

breech-loader; until our drill is modified to suit the new weapon; until

our fortresses are in a perfect state of preparedness, and until we

create a mobile and efficient national reserve."

When Carlyle heard the news of the great victories of Prussia, he wrote

to a friend, "Germany is to stand on her feet henceforth, and face all

manner of Napoleons and hungry, sponging dogs, with clear steel in her

hand and an honest purpose in her heart. This seems to me the best news

we or Europe have heard for the last forty years or more."

The triumphal return of the Prussian troops to Berlin was followed on

the 24th of February, 1867, by the opening of the first North German

parliament,--three hundred deputies chosen from the various allied

States by universal suffrage. Twenty-two States north of the Main formed

themselves into a perpetual league for the protection of the Union and

its institutions. Legislative power was to be invested in two

bodies,--the Reichstag, representing the people; and the Bundesrath,

composed of delegates from the allied governments, the perpetual

presidency of which was invested in the king of Prussia. He was also

acknowledged as the commander-in-chief of the united armies; and the

standing army, on a peace footing, was fixed at one per cent of all the

inhabitants. This constitution was drawn by Bismarck himself, not

unwilling, under the unquestioned supremacy of his monarch, to utilize

the spirit of the times, and admit the people to a recognized support of

the crown.

Thus Germany at last acquired a liberal constitution, though not so free

and broad as that of England. The absolute control of the army and navy,

the power to make treaties and declare peace and war, the appointment

of all the great officers of state, and the control of education and

other great interests still remained with the king. The functions of the

lower House seemed to be mostly confined to furnishing the sinews of war

and government,--the granting of money and the regulation of taxes.

Meanwhile, secret treaties of alliance were concluded with the southern

States of Germany, offensive and defensive, in case of war,--another

stroke of diplomatic ability on the part of Bismarck; for the intrigues

of Napoleon had been incessant to separate the southern from the

northern States,--in other words, to divide Germany, which the French

emperor was sanguine he could do. With a divided Germany, he believed

that he was more than a match for the king of Prussia, as soon as his

military preparations should be made. Could he convert these States into

allies, he was ready for war. He was intent upon securing for France

territorial enlargements equal to those of Prussia. He could no longer

expect any thing on the Rhine, and he turned his eyes to Belgium.

The war-cloud arose on the political horizon in 1867, when Napoleon

sought to purchase from the king of Holland the Duchy of Luxemburg,

which was a personal fief of his kingdom, though it was inhabited by

Germans, and which made him a member of the Germanic Confederation if he

chose to join it. In the time of Napoleon I. Luxemburg was defended by

one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, garrisoned by Prussian

troops; it was therefore a menace to France on her northeastern

frontier. As Napoleon III, promised a very big sum of money for this

duchy, with a general protectorate of Holland in case of Prussian

aggressions, the king of Holland was disposed to listen to the proposal

of the French emperor; but when it was discovered that an alliance of

the southern States had been made with the northern States of Germany,

which made Prussia the mistress of Germany, the king of Holland became

alarmed, and declined the French proposals. The chagrin of the emperor

and the wrath of the French nation became unbounded. Again they had been

foiled by the arch-diplomatist of Prussia.

All this was precisely what Bismarck wanted. Confident of the power of

Prussia, he did all he could to drive the French nation to frenzy. He

worked on a vainglorious, excitable, and proud people, at the height of

their imperial power. Napoleon was irresolute, although it appeared to

him that war with Prussia was the only way to recover his prestige after

the mistakes of the Mexican expedition. But Mexico had absorbed the

marrow of the French army, and the emperor was not quite ready for war.

He must find some pretence for abandoning his designs on Luxemburg, any

attempt to seize which would be a plain _casus belli_. Both parties were

anxious to avoid the initiative of a war which might shake Europe to its

centre. Both parties pretended peace; but both desired war.

Napoleon, a man fertile in resources, in order to avoid immediate

hostilities looked about for some way to avoid what he knew was

premature; so he proposed submitting the case to arbitration, and the

Powers applied themselves to extinguish the gathering flames. The

conference--composed of representatives of England, France, Russia,

Austria, Prussia, Holland, and Belgium--met in London; and the result of

it was that Prussia agreed to withdraw her garrison from Luxemburg and

to dismantle the fortress, while the duchy was to continue to be a

member of the German Zollverein, or Customs Union. King William was

willing to make this concession to the cause of humanity; and his

minister, rather than go against the common sentiment of Europe,

reluctantly conceded this point, which, after all, was not of paramount

importance. Thus was war prevented for a time, although everybody knew

that it was inevitable, sooner or later.

The next three years Bismarck devoted himself to diplomatic intrigues in

order to cement the union of the German States,--for the Luxemburg

treaty was well known to be a mere truce,--and Napoleon did the same to

weaken the union. In the meantime King William accepted an invitation of

Napoleon to visit Paris at the time of the Great Exposition; and thither

he went, accompanied by Counts Bismarck and Moltke. The party was soon

after joined by the Czar, accompanied by Prince Gortschakoff, who had

the reputation of being the ablest diplomatist in Europe, next to

Bismarck. The meeting was a sort of carnival of peace, hollow and

pretentious, with fêtes and banquets and military displays innumerable.

The Prussian minister amused himself by feeling the national pulse,

while Moltke took long walks to observe the fortifications of Paris.

When his royal guests had left, Napoleon travelled to Salzburg to meet

the Austrian emperor, ostensibly to condole with him for the unfortunate

fate of Maximilian in Mexico, but really to interchange political ideas.

Bismarck was not deceived, and openly maintained that the military and

commercial interests of north and south Germany were identical.

In April, 1868, the Customs Parliament assembled in Berlin, as the first

representative body of the entire nation that had as yet met. Though

convoked to discuss tobacco and cotton, the real object was to pave the

way for "the consummation of the national destinies."

Bismarck meanwhile conciliated Hanover, whose sovereign, King George,

had been dethroned, by giving him a large personal indemnity, and by

granting home rule to what was now a mere province of Prussia. In

Berlin, he resisted in the Reichstag the constitutional encroachments

which the Liberal party aimed at,--ever an autocrat rather than

minister, having no faith in governmental responsibility to parliament.

Only one master he served, and that was the king, as Richelieu served

Louis XIII. Nor would he hear of a divided ministry; affairs were too

complicated to permit him to be encumbered by colleagues. He maintained

that public affairs demanded quickness, energy, and unity of action; and

it was certainly fortunate for Germany in the present crisis that the

foreign policy was in the hands of a single man, and that man so able,

decided, and astute as Bismarck.

All the while secret preparations for war went on in both Prussia and

France. French spies overran the Rhineland, and German draughtsmen were

busy in the cities and plains of Alsace-Lorraine. France had at last

armed her soldiers with the breech-loading chassepot gun, by many

thought to be superior to the needle-gun; and she had in addition

secretly constructed a terrible and mysterious engine of war called

_mitrailleuse_,--a combination of gun-barrels fired by mechanism. These

were to effect great results. On paper, four hundred and fifty thousand

men were ready to rush as an irresistible avalanche on the Rhine

provinces. To the distant observer it seemed that France would gain an

easy victory, and once again occupy Berlin. Besides her supposed

military forces, she still had a great military prestige. Prussia had

done nothing of signal importance for forty years except to fight the

duel with Austria; but France had done the same, and had signally

conquered at Solferino. Yet during forty years Prussia had been

organizing her armies on the plan which Scharnhorst had furnished, and

had four hundred and fifty thousand men under arms,--not on paper, but

really ready for the field, including a superb cavalry force. The combat

was to be one of material forces, guided by science.

I have said that only a pretext was needed to begin hostilities. This

pretext on the part of the French was that their ambassador to Berlin,

Benedetti, was reported to have been insulted by the king. He was not

insulted. The king simply refused to have further parley with an

arrogant ambassador, and referred him to his government,--which was the

proper thing to do. On this bit of scandal the French politicians--the

people who led the masses--lashed themselves into fury, and demanded

immediate war. Napoleon could not resist the popular pressure, and war

was proclaimed. The arrogant demand of Napoleon, through his ambassador

Benedetti, that the king of Prussia should agree never to permit his

relative, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, to accept the vacant throne of

Spain, to which he had been elected by the provisional government of

that country, was the occasion of King William's curt reception of the

French envoy; for this was an insulting demand, not to be endured. It

was no affair of Napoleon, especially since the prince had already

declined the throne at the request of the king of Prussia, as the head

of the Hohenzollern family. But the French nation generally, the

Catholic Church party working through the Empress Eugenie, and, above

all, the excitable Parisians, goaded by the orators and the Press, saw

the possibility of an extension of the Roman empire of Charles V., under

the control of Prussia; and Napoleon was driven to the fatal course,

first, of making the absurd demand, and then--in spite of a wholesome

irresolution, born of his ignorance concerning his own military

forces--of resenting its declinature with war.

In two weeks the German forces were mobilized, and the colossal

organization, in three great armies, all directed by Moltke as chief of

staff to the commander-in-chief, the still vigorous old man who ruled

and governed at Berlin, were on their way to the seat of war. At

Mayence, the king in person, on the 2d of August, 1870, assumed command

of the united German armies; and in one month from that date Prance was

prostrate at his feet.

It would be interesting to detail the familiar story; but my limits will

not permit. I can only say that the three armies of the German forces,

each embracing several corps, were, one under the command of General

Steinmetz, another under Prince Frederic Charles, and the third under

the crown prince,--and all under the orders of Moltke, who represented

the king. The crown prince, on the extreme left, struck the first blow

at Weissenburg, on the 4th of August; and on the 6th he assaulted

McMahon at Worth, and drove back his scattered forces,--partly on

Chalons, and partly on Strasburg; while Steinmetz, commanding the right

wing, nearly annihilated Frossard's corps at Spicheren. It was now the

aim of the French under Bazaine, who commanded two hundred and fifty

thousand men near Metz, to join McMahon's defeated forces. This was

frustrated by Moltke in the bloody battle of Gravelotte, compelling

Bazaine to retire within the lines of Metz, the strongest fortress in

France, which was at once surrounded by Prince Charles. Meanwhile, the

crown prince continued the pursuit of McMahon, who had found it

impossible to effect a junction with Bazaine. At Sedan the armies met;

but as the Germans were more than twice the number of the French, and

had completely surrounded them, the struggle was useless,--and the

French, with the emperor himself, were compelled to surrender as

prisoners of war. Thus fell Napoleon's empire.

After the battle of Sedan, one of the decisive battles of history, the

Germans advanced rapidly to Paris, and King William took up his quarters

at Versailles, with his staff and his councillor Bismarck, who had

attended him day by day through the whole campaign, and conducted the

negotiations of the surrender. Paris, defended by strong fortifications,

resolved to sustain a siege rather than yield, hoping that something

might yet turn up by which the besieged garrison should be relieved,--a

forlorn hope, as Paris was surrounded, especially on the fall of Metz,

by nearly half a million of the best soldiers in the world. Yet that

memorable siege lasted five months, and Paris did not yield until

reduced by extreme, famine; and perhaps it might have held out much

longer if it could have been provisioned. But this was not to be. The

Germans took the city as Alaric had taken Rome, without much waste

of blood.

The conquerors were now inexorable, and demanded a war indemnity of five

milliards of francs, and the cession of Metz and the two province of

Alsace-Lorraine (which Louis XIV had formerly wrested away), including

Strasburg. Eloquently but vainly did old Thiers plead for better terms;

but he pleaded with men as hard as iron, who exacted, however, no more

than Napoleon III would have done had the fortune of war enabled him to

reach Berlin as the conqueror. War is hard under any circumstances, but

never was national humiliation more complete than when the Prussian flag

floated over the Arc de Triomphe, and Prussian soldiers defiled

beneath it.

Nothing was now left for the aged Prussian king but to put upon his head

the imperial crown of Germany, for all the German States were finally

united under him. The scene took place at Versailles in the Hall of

Mirrors, in probably the proudest palace ever erected since the days of

Nebuchadnezzar. Surrounded by princes and generals, Chancellor Bismarck

read aloud the Proclamation of the Empire, and the new German emperor

gave thanks to God. It was a fitting sequence to the greatest military

success since Napoleon crushed the German armies at Jena and Austerlitz.

The tables at last were turned, and the heavy, phlegmatic, intelligent

Teutons triumphed over the warlike and passionate Celts. So much for the

genius of the greatest general and the greatest diplomatist that Europe

had known for half-a-century.

Bismarck's rewards for his great services were magnificent, quite equal

to those of Wellington or Marlborough. He received another valuable

estate, this time from his sovereign, which gift made him one of the

greatest landed proprietors of Prussia; he was created a Prince; he was

decorated with the principal orders of Europe; he had augmented power as

chancellor of confederated Germany; he was virtual dictator of his

country, which he absolutely ruled in the name of a wearied old man

passed seventy years of age. But the minister's labors and vexations do

not end with the Franco-German war During the years that immediately

follow, he is still one of the hardest-worked men in Europe. He receives

one thousand letters and telegrams a day. He has to manage an

unpractical legislative assembly, clamorous for new privileges, and

attend to the complicated affairs of a great empire, and direct his

diplomatic agents in every country of Europe. He finds that the sanctum

of a one-man power is not a bed of roses. Sometimes he seeks rest and

recreation on one of his estates, but labors and public duties follow

him wherever he goes. He is too busy and preoccupied even for pleasure,

unless he is hunting boars and stags. He seems to care but little for

art of any kind, except music; but once in his life has he ever visited

the Museum of Berlin; he never goes to the theatre. He appears as little

as possible in the streets, but when recognized he is stared at as a

wonder. He lives hospitably but plainly, and in a palace with few

ornaments or luxuries. He enshrouds himself in mystery, but not in

gloom. Few dare approach him, for his manners are brusque and rough, and

he is feared more even than he is honored. His aspect is stern and

haughty, except when he occasionally unbends. In his family he is

simple, frank, and domestic; but in public he is the cold and imperative

dictator. Even the royal family are uncomfortable in his commanding and

majestic presence; everybody stands in awe of him but his wife and

children. He caresses only his dogs. He eats but once a day, but his

meal is enough for five men; he drinks a quart of beer or wine without

taking the cup from his mouth; he smokes incessantly, generally a long

Turkish pipe. He sleeps irregularly, disturbed by thoughts which fill

his troubled brain. Honored is the man who is invited to his table, even

if he be the ambassador of a king; for at table the host is frank and

courteous, and not overbearing like a literary dictator. He is well read

in history, but not in art or science or poetry. His stories are

admirable when he is in convivial mood; all sit around him in silent

admiration, for no one dares more than suggest the topic,--he does all

the talking himself. Bayard Taylor, when United States minister at

Berlin, was amazed and confounded by his freedom of speech and apparent

candor. He is frank in matters he does not care to conceal, and simple

as a child when not disputed or withstood; but when opposed fierce as a

lion,--a spoiled man of success, yet not intoxicated with power. Haughty

and irritable, perhaps, but never vain like a French statesman in

office,--a Webster rather than a Thiers.

Such was the man who ruled the German empire with an iron hand for

twenty years or more,--the most remarkable man of power known to history

for seventy-five years; immortal like Cavour, and for his services even

more than his abilities. He had raised Prussia to the front rank among

nations, and created German unity. He had quietly effected more than

Richelieu ever aspired to perform; for Richelieu sought only to build up

a great throne, while Bismarck had united a great nation in patriotic

devotion to Fatherland, which, so far as we can see, is as invincible as

it is enlightened,--enlightened in everything except in

democratic ideas.

I will not dwell on the career and character of Prince Bismarck since

the Franco-Prussian war. After that he was not identified with any great

national movements which command universal interest. His labors were

principally confined to German affairs,--quarrels with the Reichstag,

settlement of difficulties with the various States of the Germanic

Confederation, the consolidation of the internal affairs of the empire

while he carried on diplomatic relations with other great Powers,

efforts to gain the good-will of Russia and secure the general peace of

Europe. These, and a multitude of other questions too recent to be

called historical, he dealt with, in all of which his autocratic

sympathies called out the censures of the advocates of greater liberty,

and diminished his popularity. For twenty years his will was the law of

the German Confederation; though bitterly opposed at times by the

Liberals, he was always sustained by his imperial master, who threw the

burdens of State on his herculean shoulders, sometimes too great to bear

with placidity. His foreign policy was then less severely criticised

than his domestic, which was alternate success and failure.

The war which he waged with the spiritual power was perhaps the most

important event of his administration, and in which he had not

altogether his own way, underrating, as is natural to such a man,

spiritual forces as compared with material. In his memorable quarrel

with Rome he appeared to the least advantage,--at first rigid, severe,

and arbitrary with the Catholic clergy, even to persecution, driving

away the Jesuits (1872), shutting up schools and churches, imprisoning

and fining ecclesiastical dignitaries, intolerant in some cases as the

Inquisition itself. One-fourth of the people of the empire are

Catholics, yet he sternly sought to suppress their religious rights and

liberties as they regarded them, thinking he could control them by

material penalties,--such as taking away their support, and shutting

them up in prison,--forgetting that conscientious Christians, whether

Catholics or Protestants, will in matters of religion defy the mightiest

rulers. No doubt the policy of the Catholics of Germany was extremely

irritating to a despotic ruler who would exalt the temporal over the

spiritual power; and equally true was it that the Pope himself was

unyielding in regard to the liberties of his church, demanding

everything and giving back nothing, in accordance with the uniform

traditions of Papal domination. The Catholics, the world over, look upon

the education of their children as a thing to be superintended by their

own religious teachers,--as their inalienable right and imperative duty;

and any State interference with this right and this duty they regard as

religious persecution, to which they will never submit without hostility

and relentless defiance. Bismarck felt that to concede to the demands

which the Catholic clergy ever have made in respect to religious

privileges was to "go to Canossa,"--where Henry IV. Emperor of Germany,

in 1077, humiliated himself before Pope Gregory VII. in order to gain

absolution. The long-sighted and experienced Thiers remarked that here

Bismarck was on the wrong track, and would be compelled to retreat,

with all his power. Bismarck was too wise a man to persist in attempting

impossibilities, and after a bitter fight he became conciliatory. He did

not "go to Canossa," but he yielded to the dictates of patriotism and

enlightened policy, and the quarrel was patched up.

His long struggles with the Catholics told upon his health and spirits,

and he was obliged to seek long periods of rest and recreation on his

estates,--sometimes, under great embarrassments and irritations,

threatening to resign, to which his imperial master, grateful and

dependent, would never under any circumstances consent. But the

prince-president of the ministers and chancellor of the empire was

loaded down with duties--in his cabinet, in his office, and in the

parliament--most onerous to bear, and which no other man in Germany was

equal to. His burdens at times were intolerable: his labors were

prodigious, and the opposition he met with was extremely irritating to a

man accustomed to have his own way in everything.

Another thing gave him great solicitude, taxed to the utmost his fertile

brain; and that was the rising and wide-spreading doctrines of

Socialism,--which was to Germany what Nihilism is to Russia and

Fenianism was to Ireland; based on discontent, unbelief, and desperate

schemes of unpractical reform, leading to the assassination even of

emperors themselves. How to deal with this terrible foe to all

governments, all laws, and all institutions was a most perplexing

question. At first he was inclined to the most rigorous measures, to a

war of utter extermination; but how could he deal with enemies he could

neither see nor find, omnipresent and invisible, and unscrupulous as

satanic furies,--fanatics whom no reasoning could touch and no laws

control, whether human or divine? As experience and thought enlarged his

mental vision, he came to the conclusion that the real source and spring

of that secret and organized hostility which he deplored, but was unable

to reach and to punish, were evils in government and evils in the

structure of society,--aggravating inequality, grinding poverty,

ignorance, and the hard struggle for life. Accordingly, he devoted his

energies to improve the general condition of the people, and make the

struggle for life easier. In his desire to equalize burdens he resorted

to indirect rather than direct taxation,--to high tariffs and protective

duties to develop German industry; throwing to the winds his earlier

beliefs in the theories of the Manchester school of political economy,

and all speculative ideas as to the blessings of free-trade for the

universe in general. He bought for the government the various Prussian

railroads, in order to have uniformity of rates and remove vexatious

discriminations, which only a central power could effect. In short, he

aimed to develop the material resources of the country, both to insure

financial prosperity and to remove those burdens which press heavily

on the poor.

On one point, however, his policy was inexorable; and that was to suffer

no reduction of the army, but rather to increase it to the utmost extent

that the nation could bear,--not with the view of future conquests or

military aggrandizement, as some thought, but as an imperative necessity

to guard the empire from all hostile attacks, whether from France or

Russia, or both combined. A country surrounded with enemies as Germany

is, in the centre of Europe, without the natural defences of the sea

which England enjoys, or great chains of mountains on her borders

difficult to penetrate and easy to defend, as is the case with

Switzerland, must have a superior military force to defend her, in case

of future contingencies which no human wisdom can foresee. Nor is it

such a dreadful burden to support a peace establishment of four hundred

and fifty thousand men as some think,--one soldier for every one hundred

inhabitants, trained and disciplined to be intelligent and industrious

when his short term of three years of active service shall have expired:

much easier to bear, I fancy, than the burden of supporting five paupers

or more to every hundred inhabitants, as in England and Scotland.

In 1888, Bismarck made a famous speech in the Reichstag to show the

necessity of Prussia's being armed. He had no immediate fears of Russia,

he said; he professed to believe that she would keep peace with Germany.

But he spoke of numerous distinct crises within forty years, when

Prussia was on the verge of being drawn into a general European war,

which diplomacy fortunately averted, and such as now must be warded off

by being too strong for attack. He mentioned the Crimean war in 1853,

the Italian war in 1858, the Polish rebellion in 1863, the

Schleswig-Holstein embroilment, which so nearly set all Europe by the

ears, the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, the Luxemburg dispute in 1867,

the Franco-German war of 1870, the Balkan war of 1877, the various

aspects of the Eastern Question, changes of government in France,

etc.,--each of which in its time threatened the great "coalition war,"

which Germany had thus far been kept out of, but which Bismarck wished

to provide against for the future.

"The long and the short of it is," said he, "that we must be as strong

as we possibly can be in these days. We have the capability of being

stronger than any other nation of equal population in the world, and it

would be a crime if we did not use this capability. We must make still

greater exertions than other Powers for the same ends, on account of our

geographical position. We lie in the midst of Europe. We have at least

three sides open to attack. God has placed on one side of us the

French,--a most warlike and restless nation,--and he has allowed the

fighting tendencies of Russia to become great; so we are forced into

measures which perhaps we would not otherwise make. And the very

strength for which we strive shows that we are inclined to peace; for

with such a powerful machine as we wish to make the German army, no one

would undertake to attack us. We Germans fear God, but nothing else in

the world; and it is the fear of God which causes us to love and

cherish peace."

Such was the avowed policy of Bismarck,--and I believe in his

sincerity,--to foster friendly relations with other nations, and to

maintain peace for the interests of humanity as well as for Germany,

which can be secured only by preparing for war, and with such an array

of forces as to secure victory. It was not with foreign Powers that he

had the greatest difficulty, but to manage the turbulent elements of

internal hostilities and jealousies, and oppose the anarchic forces of

doctrinaires, visionary dreamers, clerical aggressors, and socialistic

incendiaries,--foes alike of a stable government and of

ultimate progress.

In the management of the internal affairs of the empire he cannot be

said to have been as successful as was Cavour in Italy. He was not in

harmony with the spirit of the age, nor was he wise. His persistent

opposition to the freedom of the Press was as great an error as his

persecution of the Catholics; and his insatiable love of power, grasping

all the great offices of State, was a serious offence in the eyes of a

jealous master, the present emperor, whom he did not take sufficient

pains to conciliate. The greatness of Bismarck was not as administrator

of an empire, but rather as the creator of an empire, and which he

raised to greatness by diplomatic skill. His distinguishable excellence

was in the management of foreign affairs; and in this power he has never

been surpassed by any foreign minister.

Contrary to all calculations, this great proud man who has ruled Germany

with so firm a hand for thirty years, and whose services have been

unparalleled in the history of statesmen, was not too high to fall. But

he fell because a young, inexperienced, and ambitious sovereign,--apt

pupil of his own in the divine right of monarchs to govern, and yet

seemingly inspired by a keen sensitiveness to his people's wants and the

spirit of the age,--could not endure his commanding ascendency and

haughty dictation, and accepted his resignation offered in a moment of

pique. He fell even as Wolsey fell before Henry VIII.,--too great a man

for a subject, yet always loyal to the principles of legitimacy and the

will of his sovereign. But he retired at the age of seventy-five, with

princely estates, unexampled honors, and the admiration and gratitude

of his countrymen; with the consciousness of having elevated them to the

proudest position in continental Europe. The aged Emperor William I.

died in 1888, full of years and of honors. His son the Emperor Frederick

died a few months later, leaving a deep respect and a genuine sorrow.

The grandson, the present Emperor William II., has been called "a modern

man, notwithstanding certain proclivities which still adhere to him,

like pieces of the shell of an egg from which the bird has issued." He

is yet an unsolved problem, but may be regarded not without hope for a

wise, strong, and useful reign.

The builder of his country's greatness, however, was too deeply

enshrined in the hearts of his countrymen to remain in shadow. After

more than three years of retirement, Bismarck received from the young

emperor on January 26,1894, an invitation to visit the imperial palace

in Berlin. His journey and reception in the capital were the occasion of

tumultuous public rejoicings, and when the emperor met him, the

reconciliation was complete. The time-worn veteran did not again assume

office, but he was the frequent recipient of appreciative mention by the

kaiser in public rescripts and speeches, and on his seventy-ninth

birthday, April 1,1894, he received from the emperor a greeting by

letter and a steel cuirass, "as a symbol of the German gratitude." On

the same day the castle at Friederichsruh was filled with rare and

costly presents from all over Germany, and "Bismarck banquets" were held

in all the principal cities. It was well that before this grand figure

passed away forever "the German gratitude" to him should have found

expression again, especially from the sovereign who owed to the great

chancellor his own peculiar eminence in the earth.

As for Prince Bismarck, with all his faults,--and no man is perfect,--I

love and honor this courageous giant, who has, under such vexatious

opposition, secured the glory of the Prussian monarchy and the unity of

Germany; who has been conscientious in the discharge of his duties as he

has understood them, in the fear of God,--a modern Cromwell in another

cause, whose fame will increase with the advancing ages.[3]

[Footnote 3: Bismarck died July 30, 1898, mourned by his nation, his

obsequies honored by the Emperor.]

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