Prince Louis Napoleon, or, as he afterward became, Emperor Napoleon
III., is too important a personage to be omitted in the sketch of
European history during the nineteenth century. It is not yet time to
form a true estimate of his character and deeds, since no impartial
biographies of him have yet appeared, and since he died less than thirty
years ago. The discrepancy of opinion respecting him is even greater
than that concerning his illustrious uncle.
No one doubts that the first Napoleon was the greatest figure of his
age, and the greatest general that the world has produced, with the
exception alone of Alexander and Caesar. No one questions his
transcendent abilities, his unrivalled fame, and his potent influence on
the affairs of Europe for a quarter of a century, leaving a name so
august that its mighty prestige enabled his nephew to steal his sceptre;
and his character has been so searchingly and critically sifted that
there is unanimity among most historians as to his leading traits,--a
boundless ambition and unscruplous adaptation of means to an end: that
end his self-exaltation at any cost. His enlarged and enlightened
intellect was sullied by hypocrisy, dissimulation, and treachery,
accompanied by minor faults with which every one is familiar, but which
are often overlooked in the immense services he rendered to his country
and to civilization.
Napoleon III., aspiring to imitate his uncle, also contributed important
services, but was not equal to the task he assumed, and made so many
mistakes that he can hardly be called a great man, although he performed
a great _rôle_ in the drama of European politics, and at one time
occupied a superb position. With him are associated the three great
international wars which took place in the interval between the
banishment of Napoleon I. to St. Helena and the establishment of the
French Republic on its present basis,--a period of more than fifty
years,--namely, the Crimean war; the war between Austria, France, and
Italy; and the Franco-Prussian war, which resulted in the humiliation of
France and the exaltation of Prussia.
When Louis Napoleon came into power in 1848, on the fall of Louis
Philippe, it was generally supposed that European nations had sheathed
the sword against one another, and that all future contests would be
confined to enslaved peoples seeking independence, with which contests
other nations would have nothing to do; but Louis Napoleon, as soon as
he had established his throne on the ruins of French liberties, knew no
other way to perpetuate his dominion than by embroiling the nations of
Europe in contests with one another, in order to divert the minds of the
French people from the humiliation which the loss of their liberties had
caused, and to direct their energies in new channels,--in other words,
to inflate them with visions of military glory as his uncle had done, by
taking advantage of the besetting and hereditary weakness of the
national character. In the meantime the usurper bestowed so many
benefits on the middle and lower classes, gave such a stimulus to trade,
adorned his capital with such magnificent works of art, and increased so
manifestly the material prosperity of France, that his reign was
regarded as benignant and fortunate by most people, until the whole
edifice which he had built to dazzle the world tumbled down in a single
day after his disastrous defeat at Sedan,--the most humiliating fall
which any French dynasty ever experienced.
Louis Napoleon offers in his own person an example of those extremes of
fortune which constitute the essence of romantic conditions and appeal
to the imagination. The third son of Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland
(brother of Napoleon), and Hortense Beauharnais, daughter of the Empress
Josephine by her first marriage, he was born in Paris, in the palace of
the Tuileries, April 20, 1808. Living in Switzerland, with his mother
and brother (Napoleon Louis), he was well-educated, expert in all
athletic sports,--especially in riding and fencing,--and trained to the
study and practice of artillery and military engineering. The two
brothers engaged in an Italian revolt in 1830; both fell ill, and while
one died the other was saved by the mother's devotion. In 1831 the Poles
made an insurrection, and offered Louis Napoleon their chief command and
the crown of Poland; but the death, in 1832, of the only son of his
uncle aroused Louis's ambition for a larger place, and the sovereignty
of France became his "fixed idea." He studied hard, wrote and published
several political and military works, and in 1836 made a foolish attempt
at a Napoleonic revolt against Louis Philippe. It ended in humiliating
failure, and he was exiled to America, where he lived in obscurity for
about a year; but he returned to Switzerland to see his dying mother,
and then was obliged to flee to England. In 1838 he published his
"Napoleonic Ideas;" in 1840 he made, at Boulogne, another weak
demonstration upon the French throne, and was imprisoned in the
fortress of Ham. Here he did much literary work, but escaped in 1848 to
Belgium, whence he hurried back to Paris when the revolution broke out.
Getting himself elected a deputy in the National Assembly, he took
his seat.
The year 1848, when Louis Napoleon appeared on the stage of history, was
marked by extraordinary political and social agitations, not merely in
France but throughout Europe. It saw the unexpected fall of the
constitutional monarchy in France, which had been during eighteen years
firmly upheld by Louis Philippe, with the assistance of the ablest and
wisest ministers the country had known for a century,--the policy of
which was pacific, and the leading political idea of which was an
alliance with Great Britain. The king fled before the storm of
revolutionary ideas,--as Metternich was obliged to do in Vienna, and
Ferdinand in Naples,--and a provisional government succeeded, of which
Lamartine was the central figure. A new legislative assembly was chosen
to support a republic, in which the most distinguished men of France, of
all opinions, were represented. Among the deputies was Louis Napoleon,
who had hastened from England to take part in the revolution. He sat on
the back benches of the Chamber neglected, silent, and despised by the
leading men in France, but not yet hated nor feared.
When a President of the Republic had to be chosen by the suffrages of
the people, Louis Napoleon unexpectedly received a great majority of the
votes. He had been quietly carrying on his "presidential campaign"
through his agents, who appealed to the popular love for the name
of Napoleon.
The old political leaders, amazed and confounded, submitted to the
national choice, yet stood aloof from a man without political
experience, who had always been an exile when he had not been a
prisoner. Most of them had supposed that Bonapartism was dead; but the
peasantry in the provinces still were enthralled by the majesty and
mighty prestige of that conqueror who had been too exalted for envy and
too powerful to be resisted. To the provincial votes chiefly Louis
Napoleon owed his election as President,--and the election was fair. He
came into power by the will of the nation if any man ever did,--by the
spontaneous enthusiasm of the people for the name he bore, not for his
own abilities and services; and as he proclaimed, on his accession, a
policy of peace (which the people believed) and loyalty to the
Constitution,--Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality, the watchwords of the
Revolution,--even more, as he seemed to represent the party of order, he
was regarded by such statesmen as Thiers and Montalembert as the least
dangerous of the candidates; and they gave their moral support to his
government, while they declined to take office under him.
The new President appointed the famous De Tocqueville as his first prime
minister, who after serving a few months resigned, because he would not
be the pliant tool of his master. Louis Napoleon then had to select
inferior men for his ministers, who also soon discovered that they were
expected to be his clerks, not his advisers. At first he was regarded by
the leading classes with derision rather than fear,--so mean was his
personal appearance, so spiritless his address, so cold and dull was his
eye, and so ridiculous were his antecedents. "The French," said Thiers,
long afterward, "made two mistakes about Louis Napoleon,--the first,
when they took him for a fool; the second, when they took him for a man
of genius." It was not until he began to show a will of his own, a
determination to be his own prime minister, that those around him saw
his dangerous ambition, his concealed abilities, and his unscrupulous
character.
Nothing of importance marked the administration of the President, except
hostility to the Assembly, and their endless debates on the
constitution. Both the President and the Assembly feared the influence
of the ultra-democrats and Red Republicans,--socialists and anarchists,
who fomented their wild schemes among the common people of the large
cities. By curtailing the right of suffrage the Assembly became
unpopular, and Louis Napoleon gained credit as the friend of order
and law.
As the time approached when, by the Constitution, he would be obliged to
lay down his office and return to private life, the President became
restless, and began to plot for the continuance of his power. He had
tasted its sweets, and had no intention to surrender it. If he could
have been constitutionally re-elected, he probably would not have
meditated a _coup d'état_, for it was in accordance with his indolent
character to procrastinate. With all his ambition, he was patient,
waiting for opportunities to arise; and yet he never relinquished an
idea or an intention,--it was ever in his mind: he would simply wait,
and quietly pursue the means of success. He had been trained to
meditation in his prison at Ham; and he had learned to disguise his
thoughts and his wishes. The power which had been developed in him in
the days of his obscurity and adversity was cunning. As a master of
cunning he saw the necessity of reserve, mistrust, and silence.
The first move of the President to gain his end was to secure a revision
of the Constitution. The Assembly, by a vote of three-fourths, could by
the statutes of 1848 order a revision; a revision could remove the
clause which prohibited his re-election, and a re-election was all he
then pretended to want. But the Assembly, jealous of its liberties,
already suspicious and even hostile, showed no disposition to smooth his
way. He clearly saw that some other means must be adopted. He naturally
turned to the army; but the leading generals distrusted him, and were in
the ranks of his enemies. They were all Orléanists or Republicans.
The ablest general in France was probably Changarnier, who had greatly
distinguished himself in Algeria. He had been called, on the change of
government, to the high post of commander of the National Guards and
general of the first military division, which was stationed at Paris. He
had been heard to say that if Louis Napoleon should undertake a _coup
d'état_, he would conduct him as a prisoner to Vincennes. This was
reported to the President, who at once resolved to remove him, both from
hostility and fear. On Changarnier's removal the ministry resigned.
Their places were taken by tools still more subservient.
Nothing now remained but to prepare for the meditated usurpation. The
first thing to be done was to secure an able and unscrupulous minister
of war, who could be depended upon. As all the generals received their
orders from the minister of war, he was the most powerful man in France,
next to the President. Such was military discipline that no subordinate
dared to disobey him.
There were then no generals of ability in France whom Louis Napoleon
could trust, and he turned his eyes to Algeria, where some one might be
found. He accordingly sent his most intimate friend and confidant, Major
Fleury, able but unscrupulous, to Algeria to discover the right kind of
man, who could be bribed. He found a commander of a brigade, by name
Saint-Arnaud, extravagant, greatly in debt, who had done some brave and
wicked things. It was not difficult to seduce a reckless man who wanted
money and preferment. Fleury promised him the high office of minister of
war, when he should have done something to distinguish himself in the
eyes of the Parisians. Saint-Arnaud, who proved that he could keep a
secret, was at once promoted, and a campaign was arranged for him in the
summer of 1851, in which he won some distinction by wanton waste of
life. His exploits were exaggerated, the venal Press sounded his
praises, and he was recalled to Paris and made minister of war; for the
President by the Constitution could nominate his ministers and appoint
the high officers of State. Other officers were brought from Algeria and
made his subordinates. The command of the army of Paris was given to
General Magnan, who was in the secret. The command of the National
Guards was given to a general who promised not to act, for this body was
devoted to the Assembly. M. Maupas, another conspirator, of great
administrative ability, was made prefect of police.
Thus in September, 1851, everything was arranged; but Saint-Arnaud
persuaded the President to defer the _coup d'état_ until winter, when
all the deputies would be in Paris, and therefore could be easily
seized. If scattered over France, they might rally and create a civil
war; for, as we have already said, the Assembly contained the leading
men of the country,--statesmen, generals, editors, and great lawyers,
all hostile to the ruler of the Republic.
So the President waited patiently till winter. Suddenly, without
warning, in the night of the 2d of December, all the most distinguished
members of the Assembly were arrested by the police controlled by
Maupas, and sent to the various prisons,--including Changarnier,
Cavaignac, Thiers, Bedeau, Lamoricière, Barrot, Berryer, De Tocqueville,
De Broglie, and Saint-Hilaire. On the following morning strong bodies of
the military were posted at the Palais Bourbon (where the Assembly held
its sessions), around all the printing-presses, around the public
buildings, and in the principal streets. In the meantime, Morny was made
minister of the interior. Manifestoes were issued which announced the
dissolution of the Assembly and the Council of State, the restoration of
universal suffrage, and a convocation of the electoral college to elect
the Executive. A proclamation was also made to the army, containing
those high-sounding watchwords which no one was more capable of using
than the literary President,--eloquent, since they appealed to
everything dear to the soldiers' hearts, and therefore effective. Louis
Napoleon's short speeches convinced those for whom they were intended.
He was not so fortunate with his books.
The military and the police had now the supreme control of Paris, while
the minister of the interior controlled the municipalities of the
various departments. All resistance was absurd; and yet so tremendous an
outrage on the liberties of the nation provoked an indignation,
especially among the Republicans, which it was hard to suppress. The
people rallied and erected barricades, which of course were swept away
by the cannon of General Magnan, accompanied by needless cruelties and
waste of blood, probably with the view to inspire fear and show that
resistance was hopeless.
Paris and its vicinity were now in the hands of the usurper, supported
by the army and police, and his enemies were in prison. The Assembly was
closed, as well as the higher Courts of Justice, and the Press was
muzzled. Constitutional liberty was at an end; a despot reigned
unopposed. Yet Louis Napoleon did not feel entirely at his ease. Would
the nation at the elections sustain the usurpation? It was necessary to
control the elections; and it is maintained by some historians that
every effort to that end was made through the officials and the police.
Whether the elections were free or not, one thing astonished the
civilized world,--seven millions of votes were cast in favor of Louis
Napoleon; and the cunning and patient usurper took possession of the
Tuileries, re-elected President to serve for ten years. Before the year
closed, in December, 1852, he was proclaimed Emperor of the French by
the vote and the will of the people. The silent, dull, and heavy man had
outwitted everybody; and he showed that he understood the French people
better than all the collected statesmen and generals who had served
under Louis Philippe with so much ability and distinction.
What shall we say of a nation that so ignominiously surrendered its
liberties? All we can say in extenuation is that it was powerless. Such
men as Guizot, Thiers, Cousin, Changarnier, Cavaignac, Molé, Broglie,
Hugo, Villemain, Lamartine, Montalembert, would have prevented the fall
of constitutional government if their hands had not been tied. They were
in prison or exiled. Some twenty-five thousand people had been killed or
transported within a few weeks after the _coup d'état_, and fear seized
the minds of those who were active in opposition, or suspected even of
being hostile to the new government. France, surprised, perplexed,
affrighted, must needs carry on a war of despair, or succumb to the
usurpation. The army and the people alike were governed by terror.
But although France had lost her freedom, it was only for a time; and
although Louis Napoleon ruled as an absolute monarch, his despotism,
sadly humiliating to people of intelligence and patriotism, was not like
that of Russia, or even like that of Prussia and Austria. The great men
of all parties were too numerous and powerful to be degraded or exiled.
They did not resist his government, and they held their tongues in the
cafés and other assemblies where they were watched by spies; but they
talked freely with one another in their homes, and simply kept aloof
from him, refusing to hold office under him or to attend his court,
waiting for their time. They knew that his government was not permanent,
and that the principles of the Revolution had not been disseminated and
planted in vain, but would burst out in some place or other like a
volcano, and blaze to heaven. Men pass away, but principles are
indestructible.
Louis Napoleon was too thoughtful and observant a man not to know all
this. His residence in England and intercourse with so many
distinguished politicians and philosophers had taught him something. He
feared that with all his successes his throne would be overturned
unless he could amuse the people and find work for turbulent spirits.
Consequently he concluded on the one hand to make a change in the
foreign policy of France, and on the other to embellish his capital and
undertake great public works, at any expense, both to find work for
artisans and to develop the resources of the country.
When Louis Napoleon made his first attack on the strong government of
Louis Philippe, at Strasburg, he was regarded as a madman; when he
escaped from Ham, after his failure at Boulogne, he was looked upon by
all Europe as a mere adventurer; and when he finally left England, which
had sheltered him, to claim his seat in the National Assembly of
republican France, and even when made President of the republic by the
suffrages of the nation, he was regarded as an enigma. Some thought him
dull though bold, and others looked upon him as astute and long-headed.
His heavy look, his leaden eye, his reserved and taciturn ways, with no
marked power but that of silence and secrecy, disarmed fear. Neither
from his conversations nor his writings had anybody drawn the inference
that he was anything remarkable in genius or character. His executive
abilities were entirely unknown. He was generally regarded as simply
fortunate from the name he bore and the power he usurped, but with no
striking intellectual gifts,--nothing that would warrant his supreme
audacity. He had never distinguished himself in anything; but was
admitted to be a thoughtful man, who had written treatises of
respectable literary merit. His social position as the heir and nephew
of the great Napoleon of course secured him many friends and followers,
who were attracted to him by the prestige of his name, and who saw in
him the means of making their own fortune; but he was always, except in
a select and chosen circle, silent, non-committal, heavy, reserved, and
uninteresting.
But the President--the Emperor--had been a profound student of the
history of the first Napoleon and his government. He understood the
French people, too, and had learned to make short speeches with great
effect, in which adroitness in selecting watchwords--especially such as
captivated the common people--was quite remarkable. He professed liberal
sentiments, sympathy with the people in their privations and labors, and
affected beyond everything a love of peace. In his manifestoes of a
policy of universal peace, few saw that love of war by which he intended
to rivet the chains of despotism. He was courteous and urbane in his
manners, probably kind in disposition, not bloodthirsty nor cruel,
supremely politic and conciliating in his intercourse with statesmen and
diplomatists, and generally simple and unstilted in his manners. He was
also capable of friendship, and never forgot those who had rendered him
services or kindness in his wanderings. Nor was he greedy of money like
Louis Philippe, but freely lavished it on his generals. Like his uncle,
he had an antipathy to literary men when they would not condescend to
flatter him, which was repaid by uncompromising hostility on their part.
How savage and unrelenting was the hatred of Victor Hugo! How unsparing
his ridicule and abuse! He called the usurper "Napoleon the Little,"
notwithstanding he had outwitted the leading men of the nation and
succeeded in establishing himself on an absolute throne. A small man
could not have shown so much patience, wisdom, and prudence as Louis
Napoleon showed when President, or fought so successfully the
legislative body when it was arrayed against him. If the poet had called
him "Napoleon the Wicked" it would have been more to the point, for only
a supremely unscrupulous and dishonest man could have meditated and
executed the _coup d'état_. His usurpation and treachery were gigantic
crimes, accompanied with violence and murder. Even his crimes, however,
were condoned in view of the good government which he enforced and the
services he rendered; showing that, if he was dishonest and treacherous,
he was also able and enlightened.
But it is not his usurpation of supreme power for which Louis Napoleon
will be most severely judged by his country and by posterity. Cromwell
was a usurper, and yet he is regarded as a great benefactor. It was the
policy which Napoleon III. pursued as a supreme ruler for which he will
be condemned, and which was totally unlike that of Cromwell or Augustus.
It was his policy to embroil nations in war and play the _rôle_ of a
conqueror. The policy of the restored Bourbons and of Louis Philippe was
undeniably that of peace with other nations, and the relinquishment
of that aggrandizement which is gained by successful war. It
was this policy,--upheld by such great statesmen as Guizot and
Thiers,--conflicting with the warlike instincts of the French people,
which made those monarchs unpopular more than their attempts to suppress
the liberty of the Press and the license of popular leaders; and it was
the appeal to the military vanity of the people which made Napoleon III.
popular, and secured his political ascendency.
The quarrel which was then going on between the Greek and Latin monks
for the possession of the sacred shrines at Jerusalem furnished both the
occasion and the pretence for interrupting the peace of Europe, as has
been already stated in the Lecture on the Crimean war. The French
usurper determined to take the side of the Latin monks, which would
necessarily embroil him with the great protector of the Greek faith,
even the Emperor Nicholas, who was a bigot in all matters pertaining to
his religion. He would rally the French nation in a crusade, not merely
to get possession of a sacred key and a silver star, but to come to the
assistance of a power no longer dangerous,--the "sick man," whom
Nicholas had resolved to crush. Louis Napoleon cared but little for
Turkey; but he did not want Constantinople to fall into the hands of the
Russians, and thus make them the masters of the Black Sea. France, it is
true, had but little to gain whoever possessed Constantinople; she had
no possessions or colonies in the East to protect. But in the eye of her
emperor it was necessary to amuse her by a war; and what war would be
more popular than this,--to head off Russia and avenge the march
to Moscow?
Russia, moreover, was the one power which all western Europe had cause
to dread. Ever since the Empress Catherine II., the encroachments and
territorial aggrandizement of this great military empire had been going
on. The Emperor Nicholas was the most powerful sovereign of the world,
having a million of men under arms, ready to obey his nod, with no check
whatever on his imperial will. He had many fine qualities, which
commanded esteem; but he was fitful, uncertain, ambitious, and warlike.
If an aggressive war to secure the "balance of power" could ever be
justified, it would seem to have been necessary in this case. It was an
aggressive war on the part of France, since the four great
Powers--Austria, Prussia, France, and England--were already united to
keep the Czar in check, and demanded his evacuation of the Danubian
provinces which he had invaded. Nicholas, seeing this powerful
combination against him, was ready to yield, and peace might have been
easily secured, and thus the Crimean war been avoided; but Louis
Napoleon did not want peace, and intrigued against it.
Resolved then on war, the real disturber of the peace of Europe, and
goaded on by his councillors,--the conspirators of the 2d of December,
Morny, Fleury, Maupas, etc.,--Louis Napoleon turned around to seek an
ally; for France alone was not strong enough to cope with Russia.
Austria having so much to lose, did not want war, and was afraid of
Nicholas. So was Prussia. It was the policy of both these Powers to keep
on good terms with Nicholas. It always will be the policy of Germany to
avoid a war with Russia, unless supported by England and France. The
great military organization which Bismarck and Moltke effected, the
immense standing army which Germany groans under, arises not from
anticipated dangers on the part of France so much as from fear of
Russia, although it is not the policy of German statesmen to confess it
openly. If France should unite with Russia in a relentless war, Germany
would probably be crushed, unless England came to the rescue. Germany,
placed between two powerful military monarchies, is obliged to keep up
its immense standing army, against its will, as a dire necessity. It is
Russia she is most anxious to conciliate. All the speeches of Bismarck
show this.
In view of this policy, Louis Napoleon turned his eyes to England as his
ally in the meditated war with Russia, notwithstanding the secret
hostilities and jealousies between these nations for five hundred years.
Moreover, the countries were entirely dissimilar: England was governed
by Parliament, based on free institutions; France was a military
despotism, and all who sought to establish parliamentary liberties and
government were banished when their efforts became dangerous or
revolutionary. Louis Napoleon showed great ability for intrigue in
forcing the English cabinet to adopt his warlike policy, when its own
policy was pacific. It was a great triumph to the usurper to see England
drifting into war against the combined influence of the premier, of
Gladstone, of the Quakers, and of the whole Manchester school of
political economists; and, as stated in the Lecture on the Crimean war,
it was an astounding surprise to Nicholas.
But this misfortune would not have happened had it not been for the
genius and intrigues of a statesman who exercised a commanding influence
over English politics; and this was Lord Palmerston, who had spent his
life in the foreign office, although at that time home secretary. But he
was the ruling spirit of the cabinet,--a man versatile, practical,
amiable, witty, and intensely English in all his prejudices. Whatever
office he held, he was always in harmony with public opinion. He was not
a man of great ideas or original genius, but was a ready debater,
understood the temper of the English people, and led them by adopting
their cause, whatever it was. Hence he was the most popular statesman of
the day, but according to Cobden the worst prime minister that England
ever had, since he was always keeping England in hot water and stirring
up strife on the Continent. His supreme policy, with an eye to English
interests on the Mediterranean and in Asia, was to cripple Russia.
Such a man, warlike, restless, and interfering in his foreign policy,
having in view the military aggrandizement of his country, eagerly
adopted the schemes of the French emperor; and little by little these
two men brought the English cabinet into a warlike attitude with Russia,
in spite of all that Lord Aberdeen could do. Slight concessions would
have led to peace; but neither Louis Napoleon nor Palmerston would allow
concessions, since both were resolved on war. Never was a war more
popular in England than that which Louis Napoleon and Palmerston
resolved to have. This explains the leniency of public opinion in
England toward a man who had stolen a sceptre. He was united with Great
Britain in a popular war.
The French emperor, however, had other reasons for seeking the alliance
of England in his war with Russia. It would give him a social prestige;
he would enter more easily into the family of European sovereigns; he
would be called _mon frère_ by the Queen of England, which royal name
Nicholas in his disdain refused to give him. If the Queen of England was
his friend and ally, all other sovereigns must welcome him into their
royal fraternity in spite of his political crimes, which were
universally detested. It is singular that England, after exhausting her
resources by a war of twenty years to dethrone Napoleon I., should
become the firmest ally and friend of Napoleon III., who trampled on all
constitutional liberty. But mutual interests brought them together; for
when has England turned her back on her interests, or what she supposed
to be her interests?
So war became inevitable. Napoleon III. triumphed. His co-operation with
England was sincere and hearty. Yea, so gratified and elated was he at
this stroke of good fortune, that he was ready to promise anything to
his ally, even to the taking a subordinate part in the war. He would
follow the dictation of the English ministers and the English generals.
It was the general opinion that the war would be short and glorious. At
first it was contemplated only to fight the Russians in Bulgaria, and
prevent their march across the Balkans, and thence to Constantinople.
The war was undertaken to assist the Turks in the defence of their
capital and territories. For this a large army was not indispensable;
hence the forces which were sent to Bulgaria were comparatively small.
When Nicholas discovered that he could not force his way to
Constantinople over the Balkans, and had withdrawn his forces from the
Danubian principalities, peace then might have been honorably declared
by all parties. France perhaps might have withdrawn from the contest,
which had effected the end at first proposed. But England not only had
been entangled in the war by the French alliance, but now was resolved
on taking Sebastopol, to destroy the power of Russia on the Euxine; and
France was compelled to complete what she had undertaken, although she
had nothing to gain beyond what she had already secured. To the credit
of Louis Napoleon, he proved a chivalrous and faithful ally, in
continuing a disastrous and expensive war for the glory of France and
the interests of England alone, although he made a separate peace as
soon as he could do so with honor.
It is not my purpose to repeat what I have already written on the
Crimean war, although the more I read and think about it the stronger is
my disapproval, on both moral and political grounds, of that needless
and unfortunate conflict,--unfortunate alike to all parties concerned.
It is a marvel that it did not in the end weaken the power and prestige
of both Palmerston and Napoleon III. It strengthened the hands of both,
as was foreseen by these astute statesmen. Napoleon III. after the war
was regarded as a far-seeing statesman, as well as an able
administrator. People no longer regarded him as a fool, or even a knave.
Success had shut the mouths of his enemies, except of a few obdurate
ones like Thiers and Victor Hugo,--the latter of whom in his voluntary
exile in Guernsey and Jersey still persisted in calling him "Napoleon
the Little." Thiers generally called him _Celui-ci,_--"That fellow."
This illustrious statesman, in his restless ambition and desire of
power, probably would have taken office under the man whom he both
despised and hated; but he dared not go against his antecedents, and was
unwilling to be a mere clerk, as all Louis Napoleon's ministers were,
whatever their abilities. He was supported by the army and the people,
and therefore was master of the situation. This was a fact which
everybody was compelled to acknowledge. It was easy to call him usurper,
tyrant, and fool,--anything; but he both "reigned and governed."
"When peace was finally restored, the empire presented the aspect of a
stable government, resting solidly upon the approval of a contented and
thriving people." This was the general opinion of those who were well
acquainted with French affairs, and of those who visited Paris, which
was then exceedingly prosperous. The city was filled with travellers,
who came to see the glory of success. Great architectural improvements
were then in progress, which gave employment to a vast number of men
theretofore leading a precarious life. The chief of these were the new
boulevards, constructed with immense expense,--those magnificent but
gloomy streets, which, lined with palaces and hotels, excited universal
admiration,--a wise expenditure on the whole, which promoted both beauty
and convenience, although to construct them a quarter of the city was
demolished. The Grand Opera-House arose over the _débris_ of the
demolished houses,--the most magnificent theatre erected in modern
times. Paris presented a spectacle of perpetual fêtes, reviews of
troops, and illuminations, which both amused and distracted the people.
The Louvre was joined to the Tuileries by a grand gallery devoted
chiefly to works of art. The Champs Elysées and the Bois de Boulogne
were ornamented with new avenues, fountains, gardens, flowers, and
trees, where the people could pursue their pleasure unobstructed. The
number of beautiful equipages was vastly increased, and everything
indicated wealth and prosperity. The military was wisely kept out of
sight, except on great occasions, so that the people should not be
reminded of their loss of liberties; the police were courteous and
obliging, and interfered with no pleasures and no ordinary pursuits; the
shops blazed with every conceivable attraction; the fashionable churches
were crowded with worshippers and strangers to hear music which rivalled
that of the opera; the priests, in their ecclesiastical uniform, were
seen in every street with cheerful and beaming faces, for the government
sought their support and influence; the papers were filled with the
movements of the imperial court at races, in hunting-parties, and visits
to the _châteaux_ of the great. The whole city seemed to be absorbed in
pleasure or gain, and crowds swarmed at all places of amusement with
contented faces: there was no outward sign of despotism or unhappiness,
since everybody found employment. Even the idlers who frequented the
crowded cafés of the boulevards seemed to take unusual pleasure at their
games of dominoes and at their tables of beer and wine. Visitors
wondered at the apparent absence of all restraint from government and at
the personal liberty which everybody seemed practically to enjoy. For
ten years after the _coup d'état_ it was the general impression that the
government of Louis Napoleon was a success. In spite of the predictions
and hostile criticisms of famous statesmen, it was, to all appearance at
least, stable, and the nation was prosperous.
The enemies that the emperor had the most cause to dread were these
famous statesmen themselves. Thiers, Guizot, Broglie, Odillon Barrot,
had all been prime ministers, and most of the rest had won their laurels
under Louis Philippe. They either declined to serve under Napoleon III.
or had been neglected by him; their political power had passed away.
They gave vent, whenever they could with personal safety, to their
spleen, to their disappointment, to their secret hostility; they all
alike prophesied evil; they all professed to believe that the emperor
could not maintain his position two years,--that he would be carried off
by assassination or revolution. And joined with them in bitter hatred
was the whole literary class,--like Victor Hugo, Lamartine, and
Cousin,--who hurled curses and defiance from their retreats, or from the
fashionable _salons_ and clubs which they frequented. The old noblesse
stood aloof. St. Germain was like a foreign city rather than a part of
Paris. All the traders among the Legitimists and Orléanists continued in
a state of secret hostility, and threw all the impediments they could
against the government.
The situation of Louis Napoleon was indeed extremely difficult and
critical. He had to fight against the combined influences of rank,
fashion, and intellect,--against an enlightened public opinion; for it
could not be forgotten that his power was usurped, and sustained by
brute force and the ignorant masses. He would have been nothing without
the army. In some important respects he showed marvellous astuteness and
political sagacity,--such, for instance, as in converting England from
an enemy to a friend. But he won England by playing the card of common
interests against Russia.
The emperor was afraid to banish the most eminent men in his empire; so
he tolerated them and hated them,--suspending over their heads the sword
of Damocles. This they understood, and kept quiet except among
themselves. But France was a hotbed of sedition and discontent during
the whole reign of Louis Napoleon, at least among the old government
leaders,--Orléanists, Legitimists, and Republicans alike.
Considering the difficulties and hatreds with which Napoleon III. had to
contend, I am surprised that his reign lasted as long as it did,--longer
than those of Louis XVIII. and Charles X. combined; longer than that of
Louis Philippe, with the aid of the middle classes and the ablest
statesmen of France,--an impressive fact, which indicates great ability
of some kind on the part of the despot. But he paid dearly for his
passion for power in the enormous debts entailed by his first war of
prestige, and in the death of more than a hundred thousand men in the
camps, on the field of battle, and in the hospitals. If he had had any
conscience he would have been appalled; but he had no conscience, any
more than his uncle, when anything stood in his way. The gratification
of his selfish ambition overmastered patriotism and real fame, and
prepared the way for his fall and the ignominy which accompanied it.
Had either of the monarchs who ruled France since the Revolution of 1791
been animated with a sincere desire for the public good, and been
contented to rule as a constitutional sovereign, as they all alike swore
to rule, I do not see why they might not have transmitted their thrones
to their heirs. Napoleon I. certainly could have perpetuated his empire
in his family had he not made such awful blunders as the invasion of
Spain and Russia, which made him unable to contend with external
enemies. Charles X. might have continued to reign had he not destroyed
all constitutional liberty. Louis Philippe might have transmitted his
power to the House of Orléans had he not sacrificed public interests to
his greediness for money and to his dynastic ambition. And Napoleon III.
might have reigned until he died had he fulfilled his promises to the
parties who elevated him; but he could have continued to reign in the
violation of his oaths only so long as his army was faithful and
successful. When at last hopelessly defeated and captured, his throne
instantly crumbled away; he utterly collapsed, and was nothing but a
fugitive. What a lesson this is to all ambitious monarchs who sacrifice
the interest of their country to personal aggrandizement! So long as a
nation sees the monarch laboring for the aggrandizement and welfare of
the country rather than of himself, it will rally around him and
venerate him, even if he leads his subjects to war and enrolls them in
his gigantic armies,--as in the case of the monarchs of Prussia since
Frederic II., and even those of Austria.
Napoleon III. was unlike all these, for with transcendent cunning and
duplicity he stole his throne, and then sacrificed the interests of
France to support his usurpation. That he was an adventurer--as his
enemies called him--is scarcely true; for he was born in the Tuileries,
was the son of a king, and nephew of the greatest sovereign of modern
times. So far as his usurpation can be palliated,--for it never can be
excused,--it must be by his deep-seated conviction that he was the heir
of his uncle, that the government of the empire belonged to him as a
right, and that he would ultimately acquire it by the will of the
people. Had Thiers or Guizot or Changarnier seized the reins, they would
have been adventurers. All men are apt to be called adventurers by their
detractors when they reach a transcendent position. Even such men as
Napoleon I., Cromwell, and Canning were stigmatized as adventurers by
their enemies. A poor artist who succeeds in winning a rich heiress is
often regarded as an adventurer, even though his ancestors have been
respectable and influential for four generations. Most successful men
owe their elevation to genius or patience or persistent industry rather
than to accidents or tricks. Louis Napoleon plodded and studied and
wrote for years with the ultimate aim of ruling France, even though he
"waded through slaughter to a throne;" and he would have deserved his
throne had he continued true to the principles he professed. What a name
he might have left had he been contented only to be President of a great
republic; for his elevation to the Presidency was legitimate, and even
after he became a despot he continued to be a high-bred gentleman in the
English sense, which is more than can be said of his uncle. No one has
ever denied that from first to last Louis Napoleon was courteous,
affable, gentle, patient, and kind, with a control over his feelings and
thoughts absolutely marvellous and unprecedented in a public man,--if we
except Disraeli. Nothing disturbed his serenity; very rarely was he seen
in a rage; he stooped and coaxed and flattered, even when he sent his
enemies to Cayenne.
The share taken by Napoleon III. in the affairs of Italy has already
been treated of, yet a look from that point of view may find place here.
The interference of Austria with the Italian States--not only her own
subjects there, but the independent States as well--has been called "a
standing menace to Europe." It was finally brought to a crisis of
conflict by the King of Sardinia, who had already provided himself with
a friend and ally in the French emperor; and when, on the 29th of April,
1859, Austria crossed the river Ticino in hostile array, the combined
French and Sardinian troops were ready to do battle. The campaign was
short, and everywhere disastrous to the Austrians; so that on July 6 an
armistice was concluded, and on July 12 the peace of Villa Franca ended
the war, with Lombardy ceded to Sardinia, while Nice and Savoy were the
reward of the French,--justifying by this addition to the territory and
glory of France the emperor's second war of prestige.
Louis Napoleon reached the culmination of his fame and of real or
supposed greatness--I mean his external power and grandeur, for I see no
evidence of real greatness except such as may be won by astuteness,
tact, cunning, and dissimulation--when he returned to Paris as the
conqueror of the Austrian armies. He was then generally supposed to be
great both as a general and as an administrator, when he was neither a
general nor an administrator, as subsequent events proved. But his court
was splendid; distinguished foreigners came to do him homage; even
monarchs sought his friendship, and a nod of his head was ominous. He
had delivered Italy as he had humiliated Russia; he had made France a
great political power; he had made Paris the most magnificent city of
the world (though at boundless expense), and everybody extolled the
genius of Hausmann, his engineer, who had created such material glories;
his fêtes were beyond all precedent; his wife gave the law to fashions
and dresses, and was universally extolled for her beauty and graces; the
great industrial exhibition in 1855, which surpassed in attractiveness
that of London in 1851, drew strangers to his capital, and gave a
stimulus to art and industry. Certainly he seemed to be a most fortunate
man,--for the murmurs and intrigues of that constellation of statesmen
which grew up with the restoration of the Bourbons, and the antipathies
of editors and literary men, were not generally known. The army
especially gloried in the deeds of a man whose successes reminded them
of his immortal uncle; while the lavish expenditures of government in
every direction concealed from the eyes of the people the boundless
corruption by which the services of his officials were secured.
But this splendid exterior was deceptive, and a turn came to the
fortunes of Napoleon III.,--long predicted, yet unexpected. Constantly
on the watch for opportunities to aggrandize his name and influence, the
emperor allowed the disorders of civil war in Mexico--resulting in many
acts of injustice to foreigners there--to lead him into a combination
with England and Spain to interfere. This was in 1861, when the United
States were entering upon the terrific struggles of their own civil war,
and were not able to prevent this European interference, although
regarding it as most unfriendly to republican institutions. Within a
year England and Spain withdrew. France remained; sent more troops;
declared war on the government of President Juarez; fought some battles;
entered the City of Mexico; convened the "Assembly of Notables;" and, on
their declaring for a limited hereditary monarchy, the French emperor
proposed for their monarch the Archduke Maximilian,--younger brother of
Francis Joseph the Austrian emperor. Maximilian accepted, and in June,
1864, arrived,--upheld, however, most feebly by the "Notables," and
relying chiefly on French bayonets, which had driven Juarez to the
northern part of the country.
But against the expectation of Napoleon III, the great rebellion in the
United States collapsed, and this country became a military power which
Europe was compelled to respect: a nation that could keep in the field
over a million of soldiers was not to be despised. While the civil war
was in progress the United States government was compelled to ignore the
attempt to establish a French monarchy on its southern borders; but no
sooner was the war ended than it refused to acknowledge any government
in Mexico except that of President Juarez, which Louis Napoleon had
overthrown; so that although the French emperor had bound himself with
solemn treaties to maintain twenty-five thousand French troops in
Mexico, he was compelled to withdraw these forces and leave Maximilian
to his fate. He advised the young Austrian to save himself by
abdication, and to leave Mexico with the troops; but Maximilian felt
constrained by his sense of honor to remain, and refused. In March,
1867, this unfortunate prince was made prisoner by the republicans, and
was unscrupulously shot. His calamities and death excited the compassion
of Europe; and with it was added a profound indignation for the man who
had unwittingly lured him on to his ruin. Louis Napoleon's military
prestige received a serious blow, and his reputation as a statesman
likewise; and although the splendor of his government and throne was as
great as ever, his fall, in the eyes of the discerning, was near
at hand.
By this time Louis Napoleon had become prematurely old; he suffered
from acute diseases; his constitution was undermined; he was no longer
capable of carrying the burdens he had assumed; his spirits began to
fail; he lost interest in the pleasures which had at first amused him;
he found delight in nothing, not even in his reviews and fêtes; he was
completely ennuied; his failing health seemed to affect his mind; he
became vacillating and irresolute; he lost his former energies. He saw
the gulf opening which was to swallow him up; he knew that his situation
was desperate, and that something must be done to retrieve his fortunes.
His temporary popularity with his own people was breaking, too;--the
Mexican _fiasco_ humiliated them. The internal affairs of the empire
were more and more interfered with and controlled by the Catholic
Church, through the intrigues and influence of the empress, a bigoted
Spanish Catholic,--and this was another source of unpopularity, for
France was not a priest-ridden country, and the emperor was blamed for
the growing ecclesiastical power in civil affairs. He had invoked war to
interest the people, and war had saved him for a time; but the
consequences of war pursued him. As he was still an overrated man, and
known to be restless and unscrupulous, Germany feared him, and quietly
armed, making preparations for an attack which seemed only too probable.
His negotiation with the King of Holland for the cession of the Duchy of
Luxemburg, by which acquisition he hoped to offset the disgrace which
his Mexican enterprise had caused, excited the jealousy of Prussia; for
by the treaties of 1815 Prussia obtained the right to garrison the
fortress,--the strongest in Europe next to Gibraltar,--and had no idea
of permitting it to fall into the hands of France.
The irresistible current which was then setting in for the union of the
German States under the rule of Prussia, and for which Bismarck had long
been laboring, as had Cavour for the unity of Italy, caused a great
outcry among the noisy but shallow politicians of Paris, who deluded
themselves with the idea that France was again invincible; and not only
they, but the French people generally, fancied that France was strong
enough to conquer half of Europe, The politicians saw in a war with
Prussia the aggrandizement of French interests, and did all they could
to hasten it on. It was popular with the nation at large, who saw only
one side; and especially so with the generals of the army, who aspired
to new laurels. Napoleon III. blustered and bullied and threatened,
which pleased his people; but in his heart he had his doubts, and had no
desire to attack Prussia so long as the independence of the southern
States of Germany was maintained. But when the designs of Bismarck
became more and more apparent to cement a united Germany, and thus to
raise up a most formidable military power, Louis Napoleon sought
alliances in anticipation of a conflict which could not be much
longer delayed.
First, the French emperor turned to Austria, whom he had humiliated at
Solferino and incensed by the aid which he had given to Victor Emmanuel
to break the Austrian domination in Italy, as well as outraged its
sympathies by his desertion of Maximilian in Mexico. No cordial alliance
could be expected from this Power, unless he calculated on its hostility
to Prussia for the victories she had lately won. Count Beust, the
Austrian chancellor, was a bitter enemy to Prussia, and hoped to regain
the ascendency which Austria had once enjoyed under Metternich. So
promises were made to the French emperor; but they were never kept, and
Austria really remained neutral in the approaching contest, to the great
disappointment of Napoleon III. He also sought the aid of Italy, which
he had reason to expect from the service he had rendered to Piedmont;
but the Garibaldians had embroiled France with the Italian people in
their attempt to overthrow the Papal government, which was protected by
French troops; and Louis Napoleon by the reoccupation of Rome seemed to
bar the union of the Italian people, passionately striving for national
unity. Thus the Italians also stood aloof from France, although Victor
Emmanuel personally was disposed to aid her.
In 1870 France found herself isolated, and compelled, in case of war
with Prussia, to fight single-handed. If Napoleon III. had exercised the
abilities he had shown at the beginning of his career, he would have
found means to delay a conflict for which he was not prepared, or avoid
it altogether; but in 1870 his intellect was shattered, and he felt
himself powerless to resist the current which was bearing him away to
his destruction. He showed the most singular incapacity as an
administrator. He did not really know the condition of his army; he
supposed he had four hundred and fifty thousand effective troops, but
really possessed a little over three hundred thousand, while Prussia had
over one-third more than this, completely equipped and disciplined, and
with improved weapons. He was deceived by the reports of his own
generals, to whom he had delegated everything, instead of looking into
the actual state of affairs himself, as his uncle would have done, and
as Thiers did under Louis Philippe. More than a third of his regiments
were on paper alone, or dwindled in size; the monstrous corruptions of
his reign had permeated every part of the country; the necessary arms,
ammunition, and material of war in general were deplorably deficient; no
official reports could be relied upon, and few of his generals could be
implicitly trusted. If ever infatuation blinded a nation to its fate, it
most signally marked France in 1870.
Nothing was now wanting but the spark to kindle the conflagration; and
this was supplied by the interference of the French government with the
nomination of a German prince to the vacant throne of Spain. The
Prussian king gave way in the matter of Prince Leopold, but refused
further concessions. Leopold was sufficiently magnanimous to withdraw
his claims, and here French interference should have ended. But France
demanded guarantees that no future candidate should be proposed without
her consent. Of course the Prussian king,--seeing with the keen eyes of
Bismarck, and armed to the teeth under the supervision of Moltke, the
greatest general of the age, who could direct, with the precision of a
steam-engine on a track, the movements of the Prussian army, itself a
mechanism,--treated with disdain this imperious demand from a power
which he knew to be inferior to his own. Count Bismarck craftily lured
on his prey, who was already goaded forward by his home war-party, with
the empress at their head; negotiations ceased, and Napoleon III. made
his fatal declaration of hostilities, to the grief of the few statesmen
who foresaw the end.
Even then the condition of France was not desperate if the government
had shown capacity; but conceit, vanity, and ignorance blinded the
nation. Louis Napoleon should have known, and probably did know, that
the contending forces were uneven; that he had no generals equal to
Moltke; that his enemies could crush him in the open field; that his
only hope was in a well-organized defence. But his generals rushed madly
on to destruction against irresistible forces, incapable of forming a
combination, while the armies they led were smaller than anybody
supposed. Napoleon III. hoped that by rapidity of movement he could
enter southern Germany before the Prussian armies could be massed
against him; but here he dreamed, for his forces were not ready at the
time appointed, and the Prussians crossed the Rhine without obstruction.
Then followed the battle of Worth, on the 6th of August, when Marshal
McMahon, with only forty-five thousand men, ventured to resist the
Prussian crown-prince with a hundred thousand, and lost consequently a
large part of his army, and opened a passage through the northern Vosges
to the German troops. On the same day Frossard's corps was defeated by
Prince Frederic Charles near Saarbrücken, while the French emperor
remained at Metz irresolute, infatuated, and helpless. On the 12th of
August he threw up the direction of his armies altogether, and appointed
Marshal Bazaine commander-in-chief,--thus proclaiming his own incapacity
as a general. Bazaine still had more than two hundred thousand men under
his command, and might have taken up a strong position on the Moselle,
or retreated in safety to Chalons; but he fell back on Gravelotte, when,
being defeated on the 18th, he withdrew within the defences of Metz. He
was now surrounded by two hundred and fifty thousand men, and he made no
effort to escape. McMahon attempted to relieve him, but was ordered by
the government at Paris to march to the defence of that city. On this
line, however, he got no farther than Sedan, where all was lost on
September 1,--the entire army and the emperor himself surrendering as
prisoners of war. The French had fought gallantly, but were outnumbered
at every point.
Nothing now remained to the conquerors but to advance to the siege of
Paris. The throne of Napoleon III. was overturned, and few felt sympathy
for his misfortunes, since he was responsible for the overwhelming
calamities which overtook his country, and which his country never
forgave. In less than a month he fell from what seemed to be the
proudest position in Europe, and stood out to the eye of the world in
all the hateful deformity of a defeated despot who deserved to fall. The
suddenness and completeness of his destruction has been paralleled only
by the defeat of the armies of Darius by Alexander the Great. All
delusions as to Louis Napoleon's abilities vanished forever. All his
former grandeur, even his services, were at once forgotten. He paid even
a sadder penalty than his uncle, who never lost the affections of his
subjects, while the nephew destroyed all rational hopes of the future
restoration of his family, and became accursed.
It is possible that the popular verdict in reference to Louis Napoleon,
on his fall, may be too severe. This world sees only success or failure
as the test of greatness. With the support of the army and the
police--the heads of which were simply his creatures, whom he had
bought, or who from selfish purposes had pushed him on in his hours of
irresolution and guided him--the _coup d'état_ was not a difficult
thing, any more than any bold robbery; and with the control of the vast
machinery of government,--that machinery which is one of the triumphs of
civilization,--an irresistible power, it is not marvellous that he
retained his position in spite of the sneers or hostilities of statesmen
out of place, or of editors whose journals were muzzled or suppressed;
especially when the people saw great public improvements going on, had
both bread and occupation, read false accounts of military successes,
and were bewildered by fêtes and outward grandeur. But when the army was
a sham, and corruption had pervaded every office under government; when
the expenses of living had nearly doubled from taxation, extravagance,
bad example, and wrong ideas of life; when trusted servants were turned
into secret enemies, incapable and false; when such absurd mistakes were
made as the expedition to Mexico, and the crowning folly of the war
with Prussia, proving the incapacity and folly of the master-hand,--the
machinery which directed the armies and the bureaus and all affairs of
State itself, broke down, and the catastrophe was inevitable.
Louis Napoleon certainly was not the same man in 1870 that he was in
1850. His burdens had proved too great for his intellect. He fell, and
disappeared from history in a storm of wrath and shame, which also hid
from the eyes of the people the undoubted services he had rendered to
the cause of order and law, and to that of a material prosperity which
was at one time the pride of his country and the admiration of the
whole world.
But a nation is greater than any individual, even if he be a miracle of
genius. When the imperial cause was lost, and the armies of France were
dispersed or shut up in citadels, and the hosts of Germany were
converging upon the capital, Paris resolved on sustaining a
siege--apparently hopeless--rather than yield to a conqueror before the
last necessity should open its gates. The self-sacrifices which its
whole population, supposed to be frivolous and enervated, made to
preserve their homes and their works of art; their unparalleled
sufferings; their patience and self-reliance under the most humiliating
circumstances; their fertility of resources; their cheerfulness under
hunger and privation; and, above everything else, their submission to
law with every temptation to break it,--proved that the spirit of the
nation was unbroken; that their passive virtues rivalled their most
glorious deeds of heroism; that, if light-headed in prosperity, they
knew how to meet adversity; and that they had not lost faith in the
greatness of their future.
Perhaps they would not have made so stubborn a resistance to destiny if
they had realized their true situation, but would have opened their
gates at once to overwhelming foes, as they did on the fall of the first
Napoleon. They probably calculated that Bazaine would make his escape
from Metz with his two hundred thousand men, find his way to the banks
of the Loire, rally all the military forces of the south of France, and
then march with his additional soldiers to relieve Paris, and drive back
the Germans to the Rhine.
But this was not to be, and it is idle to speculate on what might have
been done either to raise the siege of Paris--one of the most memorable
in the whole history of the world--or to prevent the advance of the
Germans upon the capital itself. It is remarkable that the Parisians
were able to hold out so long,--thanks to the genius and precaution of
Thiers, who had erected the formidable forts outside the walls of Paris
in the reign of Louis Philippe; and still more remarkable was the rapid
recovery of the French nation after such immense losses of men and
treasure, after one of the most signal and humiliating overthrows which
history records. Probably France was never stronger than she is to-day
in her national resources, in her readiness for war, and in the apparent
stability of her republican government,--which ensued after the collapse
of the Second Empire. She has been steady, persevering, and even patient
for a hundred years in her struggles for political freedom, whatever
mistakes she has made and crimes she has committed to secure this
highest boon which modern civilization confers. A great hero may fall, a
great nation may be enslaved; but the cause of human freedom will in
time triumph over all despots, over all national inertness, and all
national mistakes.