For centuries before the Russian empire was consolidated by the wisdom,
the enterprise, and the conquests of Peter the Great, the Russians cast
longing eyes on Constantinople as the prize most precious and most
coveted in their sight.
From Constantinople, the capital of the Greek empire when the Turks were
a wandering and unknown Tartar tribe in the northern part of Asia, had
come the religion that was embraced by the ancient czars and the
Slavonic races which they ruled. To this Greek form of Christianity the
Russians were devotedly attached. They were semi-barbarians, and yet
bigoted Christians. In the course of centuries their priests came to
possess immense power,--social and political, as well as ecclesiastical.
The Patriarch of Moscow was the second personage of the empire, and the
third dignitary in the Greek Church. Religious forms and dogmas bound
the Russians with the Greek population of the Turkish empire in the
strongest ties of sympathy and interest, even when that empire was in
the height of its power. To get possession of those principalities under
Turkish dominion in which the Greek faith was the prevailing religion
had been the ambition of all the czars who reigned either at Moscow or
at St. Petersburg. They aimed at a protectorate over the Christian
subjects of the Porte in Eastern Europe; and the city where reigned the
first Christian emperor of the old Roman world was not only sacred in
their eyes, and had a religious prestige next to that of Jerusalem, but
was looked upon as their future and certain possession,--to be obtained,
however, only by bitter and sanguinary wars.
Turkey, in a religious point of view, was the certain and inflexible
enemy of Russia,--so handed down in all the traditions and teachings of
centuries. To erect again on the lofty dome of St. Sophia the cross,
which had been torn down by Mohammedan infidels, was probably one of the
strongest desires of the Russian nation; and this desire was shared in a
still stronger degree by all the Russian monarchs from the time of Peter
the Great, most of whom were zealous defenders of what they called the
Orthodox faith. They remind us of the kings of the Middle Ages in the
interest they took in ecclesiastical affairs, in their gorgeous
religious ceremonials, and in their magnificent churches, which it was
their pride to build. Alexander I. was, in his way, one of the most
religious monarchs who ever swayed a sceptre,--more like an ancient
Jewish king than a modern political sovereign.
But there was another powerful reason why the Russian czars cast their
wistful glance on the old capital of the Greek emperors, and resolved
sooner or later to add it to their dominions, already stretching far
into the east,--and this was to get possession of the countries which
bordered on the Black Sea, in order to have access to the Mediterranean.
They wanted a port for the southern provinces of their empire,--St.
Petersburg was not sufficient, since the Neva was frozen in the
winter,--but Poland (a powerful kingdom in the seventeenth century)
stood in their way; and beyond Poland were the Ukraine Cossacks and the
Tartars of the Crimea. These nations it was necessary to conquer before
the Muscovite banners could float on the strongholds which controlled
the Euxine. It was not until after a long succession of wars that Peter
the Great succeeded, by the capture of Azof, in gaining a temporary
footing on the Euxine,--lost by the battle of Pruth, when the Russians
were surrounded by the Turks. The reconquest of Azof was left to Peter's
successors; but the Cossacks and Tartars barred the way to the Euxine
and to Constantinople. It was not until the time of Catherine II. that
the Russian armies succeeded in gaining a firm footing on the Euxine by
the conquest of the Crimea, which then belonged to Turkey, and was
called Crim Tartary. The treaties of 1774 and 1792 gave to the Russians
the privilege of navigating the Black Sea, and indirectly placed under
the protectorate of Russia the territories of Moldavia and
Wallachia,--provinces of Turkey, called the Danubian principalities,
whose inhabitants were chiefly of the Greek faith.
Thus was Russia aggrandized during the reign of Catherine II., who not
only added the Crimea to her dominions,--an achievement to which Peter
the Great aspired in vain,--but dismembered Poland, and invaded Persia
with her armies. "Greece, Roumelia, Thessaly, Macedonia, Montenegro, and
the islands of the Archipelago swarmed with her emissaries, who preached
rebellion against the hateful Crescent, and promised Russian support,
Russian money, and Russian arms." These promises however were not
realized, being opposed by Austria,--then virtually ruled by Prince
Kaunitz, who would not consent to the partition of Poland without the
abandonment of the ambitious projects of Catherine, incited by Prince
Potemkin, the most influential of her advisers and favorites. She had to
renounce all idea of driving the Turks out of Turkey and founding a
Greek empire ruled over by a Russian grand duke. She was forced also to
abandon her Greek and Slavonic allies, and pledge herself to maintain
the independence of Wallachia and Moldavia. Eight years later, in 1783,
the Tartars lost their last foothold in the Crimea by means of a
friendly alliance between Catherine and the Austrian emperor Joseph II.,
the effect of which was to make the Russians the masters of the
Black Sea.
Catherine II., of German extraction, is generally regarded as the ablest
female sovereign who has reigned since Semiramis, with the exception
perhaps of Maria Theresa of Germany and Elizabeth of England; but she
was infinitely below these princesses in moral worth,--indeed, she was
stained by the grossest immoralities that can degrade a woman. She died
in 1796, and her son Paul succeeded her,--a prince whom his imperial
mother had excluded from all active participation in the government of
the empire because of his mental imbecility, or partial insanity. A
conspiracy naturally was formed against him in such unsettled times,--it
was at the height of Napoleon's victorious career,--resulting in his
assassination, and his son Alexander I. reigned in his stead.
Alexander was twenty-four when, in 1801, he became the autocrat of all
the Russias. His reign is familiar to all the readers of the wars of
Napoleon, during which Russia settled down as one of the great Powers.
At the Congress of Vienna in 1814 the duchy of Warsaw, comprising
four-fifths of the ancient kingdom of Poland, was assigned to Russia.
During fifty years Russia had been gaining possession of new
territory,--of the Crimea in 1783, of Georgia in 1785, of Bessarabia and
a part of Moldavia in 1812. Alexander added to the empire several of the
tribes of the Caucasus, Finland, and large territories ceded by Persia.
After the fall of Napoleon, Alexander did little to increase the
boundaries of his empire, confining himself, with Austria and Prussia,
to the suppression of revolutionary principles in Europe, the weakening
of Turkey, and the extension of Russian influence in Persia. In the
internal government of his empire he introduced many salutary changes,
especially in the early part of his reign; but after Napoleon's final
defeat, his views gradually changed. The burdens of absolute government,
disappointments, the alienation of friends, and the bitter experiences
which all sovereigns must learn soured his temper, which was naturally
amiable, and made him a prey to terror and despondency. No longer was he
the frank, generous, chivalrous, and magnanimous prince who had called
out general admiration, but a disappointed, suspicious, terrified, and
prematurely old man, flying from one part of his dominions to another,
as if to avoid the assassin's dagger. He died in 1825, and was
succeeded by his brother,--the Grand Duke Nicholas.
The throne, on the principles of legitimacy, properly belonged to his
elder brother,--the Grand Duke Constantine. Whether this prince shrank
from the burdens of governing a vast empire, or felt an incapacity for
its duties, or preferred the post he occupied as Viceroy of Poland or
the pleasures of domestic life with a wife to whom he was devoted, it is
not clear; it is only certain that he had in the lifetime of the late
emperor voluntarily renounced his claim to the throne, and Alexander had
left a will appointing Nicholas as his successor.
Nicholas had scarcely been crowned (1826) when war broke out between
Russia and Persia; and this was followed by war with Turkey, consequent
upon the Greek revolution. Silistria, a great fortress in Bulgaria, fell
into the hands of the Russians, who pushed their way across the Balkan
mountains and occupied Adrianople. In the meantime General Paskievitch
followed up his brilliant successes in the Asiatic provinces of the
Sultan's dominions by the capture of Erzeroum, and advanced to
Trebizond. The peace of Adrianople, in September, 1829, checked his
farther advances. This famous treaty secured to the Russians extensive
territories on the Black Sea, together with its navigation by Russian
vessels, and the free passage of Russian ships through the Dardanelles
and Bosphorus to the Mediterranean. In addition, a large war indemnity
was granted by Turkey, and the occupancy of Moldavia, Wallachia, and
Silistria until the indemnity should be paid. Moreover, it was agreed
that the hospodars of the principalities should be elected for life, to
rule without molestation from the Porte upon paying a trilling tribute.
A still greater advantage was gained by Russia in the surrender by
Turkey of everything on the left bank of the Danube,--cities,
fortresses, and lands, all with the view to their future annexation
to Russia.
The territory ceded to Russia by the peace of Adrianople included the
Caucasus,--a mountainous region inhabited by several independent races,
among which were the Circassians, who acknowledged allegiance neither to
Turkey nor Russia. Nicholas at first attempted to gain over the
chieftains of these different nations or tribes by bribes, pensions,
decorations, and military appointments. He finally was obliged to resort
to arms, but without complete success.
Such, in brief, were the acquisitions of Russia during the reign of
Nicholas down to the time of the Crimean war, which made him perhaps the
most powerful sovereign in the world. As Czar of all the Russias there
were no restraints on his will in his own dominions, and it was only as
he was held in check by the different governments of Europe, jealous of
his encroachments, that he was reminded that he was not omnipotent.
For fifteen years after his accession to the throne Nicholas had the
respect of Europe. He was moral in his domestic relations, fond of his
family, religious in his turn of mind, bordering on superstition, a
zealot in his defence of the Greek Church, scrupulous in the performance
of his duties, and a man of his word. The Duke of Wellington was his
admiration,--a model for a sovereign to imitate. Nicholas was not so
generous and impulsive as his brother Alexander, but more reliable. In
his personal appearance he made a fine impression,--over six feet in
height, with a frank and open countenance, but not expressive of
intellectual acumen. His will, however, was inflexible, and his anger
was terrible. His passionate temper, which gave way to bursts of wrath,
was not improved by his experiences. As time advanced he withdrew more
and more within himself, and grew fitful and jealous, disinclined to
seek advice, and distrustful of his counsellors; and we can scarcely
wonder at this result when we consider his absolute power and
unfettered will.
Few have been the kings and emperors who resembled Marcus Aurelius, who
was not only master of the world, but master of himself. Few indeed have
been the despots who have refrained from acts of cruelty, or who have
uniformly been governed by reason. Even in private life, very successful
men have an imperious air, as if they were accustomed to submission and
deference; but a monarch of Russia, how can he be otherwise than
despotic and self-conscious? Everybody he sees, every influence to which
he is subjected, tends to swell his egotism. What changes of character
marked Saul, David, and Solomon! So of Nicholas, as of the ancient
Caesars. With the advance of years and experience, his impatience grew
under opposition and his rage under defeat. No man yet has lived,
however favored, that could always have his way. He has to yield to
circumstances,--not only to those great ones which he may own to have
been determined by Divine Providence, but also to those unforeseen
impediments which come from his humblest instruments. He cannot prevent
deceit, hypocrisy, and treachery on the part of officials, any easier
than one can keep servants from lying and cheating. Who is not in the
power, more or less, of those who are compelled to serve; and when an
absolute monarch discovers that he has been led into mistakes by
treacherous or weak advisers, how natural that his temper should
be spoiled!
Thus was Nicholas in the latter years of his reign. He was thwarted by
foreign Powers, and deceived by his own instruments of despotic rule.
He found himself only a man, and like other men. He became suspicious,
bitter, and cruel. His pride was wounded by defeat and opposition from
least expected quarters. He found his burdens intolerable to bear. His
cares interfered with what were once his pleasures. The dreadful load of
public affairs, which he could not shake off, weighed down his soul with
anxiety and sorrow. He realized, more than most monarchs, the truth of
one of Shakespeare's incomparable utterances,--
"Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown."
The mistakes and disappointments of the Crimean war finally broke his
heart; and he, armed with more power than any one man in the world, died
with the consciousness of a great defeat.
It would be interesting to show how seldom the great rulers of this
world have had an unchecked career to the close of their lives. Most of
them have had to ruminate on unexpected falls,--like Napoleon, Louis
Philippe, Metternich, Gladstone, Bismarck,--or on unattained objects of
ambition, like the great statesmen who have aspired to be presidents of
the United States. Nicholas thought that the capital of the "sick man"
was, like ripe fruit, ready to fall into his hands. After one hundred
years of war, Russia discovered that this prize was no nearer her
grasp. Nicholas, at the head of a million of disciplined troops, was
defeated; while his antagonist, the "sick man," could scarcely muster a
fifth part of the number, and yet survived to plague his thwarted will.
The obstacles to the conquest of Constantinople by Russia are, after
all, very great. There are only three ways by which a Russian general
can gain this coveted object of desire. The one which seems the easiest
is to advance by sea from Sebastopol, through the Black Sea, to the
Bosphorus, with a powerful fleet. But Turkey has or had a fleet of equal
size, while her allies, England and France, can sweep with ease from the
Black Sea any fleet which Russia can possibly collect.
The ordinary course of Russian troops has been to cross the Pruth, which
separates Russia from Moldavia, and advance through the Danubian
provinces to the Balkans, dividing Bulgaria from Turkey in Europe. Once
the Russian armies succeeded, amid innumerable difficulties, in
conquering all the fortresses in the way, like Silistria, Varna, and
Shumla; in penetrating the mountain passes of the Balkans, and making
their way to Adrianople. But they were so demoralized, or weakened and
broken, by disasters and privations, that they could get no farther than
Adrianople with safety, and their retreat was a necessity. And had the
Balkan passes been properly defended, as they easily could have been,
even a Napoleon could not have penetrated them with two hundred thousand
men, or any army which the Russians could possibly have brought there.
The third way open to the Russians in their advance to Constantinople is
to march the whole extent of the northern shores of the Black Sea, and
then cross the Caucasian range to the south, and advance around through
Turkey in Asia, its entire width from east to west, amidst a hostile and
fanatical population ready to die for their faith and country,--a way so
beset with difficulties and attended with such vast expense that success
would be almost impossible, even with no other foes than Turks.
The Emperor Nicholas was by nature stern and unrelenting. He had been
merciless in his treatment of the Poles. When he was friendly, his
frankness had an irresistible charm. During his twenty-seven years on
the throne he had both "reigned and governed." However, he was military,
without being warlike. With no talents for generalship, he bestowed
almost incredible attention upon the discipline of his armies. He
oppressively drilled his soldiers, without knowledge of tactics and
still less of strategy. Half his time was spent in inspecting his
armies. When, in 1828, he invaded Turkey, his organizations broke down
under an extended line of operations. For a long time thereafter he
suffered the Porte to live in repose, not being ready to destroy it,
waiting for his opportunity.
When the Pasha of Egypt revolted from the Sultan, and his son Ibrahim
seriously threatened the dismemberment of Turkey, England and France
interfered in behalf of Turkey; and in 1840 a convention in London
placed Turkey under the common safeguard of the five great
Powers,--England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia,--instead of the
protectorate exercised by Russia alone. After the fall of Hungary, a
number of civil and military leaders took refuge in Turkey, and Russia
and Austria demanded the expulsion of the refugees, which was
peremptorily refused by the Sultan. In consequence, Russia suspended all
diplomatic intercourse with Turkey, and sought a pretext for war. In
1844 the Czar visited England, doubtless with the purpose of winning
over Lord Aberdeen, then foreign secretary, and the Duke of Wellington,
on the ground that Turkey was in a state of hopeless decrepitude, and
must ultimately fall into his hands. In this event he was willing that
England, as a reward for her neutrality, should take possession
of Egypt.
It is thus probable that the Emperor Nicholas, after the failure of his
armies to reach Constantinople through the Danubian provinces and across
the Balkans, meditated, after twenty years of rest and recuperation,
the invasion of Constantinople by his fleet, which then controlled the
Black Sea.
But he reckoned without his host. He was deceived by the pacific
attitude of England, then ruled by the cabinet of Lord Aberdeen, who
absolutely detested war. The premier was almost a fanatic in his peace
principles, and was on the most friendly terms with Nicholas and his
ministers. The Czar could not be made to believe that England, under the
administration of Lord Aberdeen, would interfere with his favorite and
deeply meditated schemes of conquest. He saw no obstacles except from
the Turks themselves, timid and stricken with fears; so he strongly
fortified Sebastopol and made it impregnable by the sea, and quietly
gathered in its harbor an immense fleet, with which the Turkish
armaments could not compare. The Turkish naval power had never recovered
from the disaster which followed the battle of Navarino, when their
fleet was annihilated. With a crippled naval power and decline in
military strength, with defeated armies and an empty purse, it seemed to
the Czar that Turkey was crushed in spirit and Constantinople
defenceless; and that impression was strengthened by the representation
of his ambassador at the Porte,--Prince Mentchikof, who almost openly
insulted the Sultan by his arrogance, assumptions, and threats.
But a very remarkable man happened at that time to reside at
Constantinople as the ambassador of England, one in whom the Turkish
government had great confidence, and who exercised great influence over
it. This man was Sir Stratford Canning (a cousin of the great Canning),
who in 1852 was made viscount, with the title Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe. He was one of the ablest diplomatists then living, or that
England had ever produced, and all his sympathies were on the side of
Turkey. Mentchikof was no match for the astute Englishman, who for some
time controlled the Turkish government, and who baffled all the schemes
of Nicholas.
England--much as she desired the peace of Europe, and much as Lord
Aberdeen detested war--had no intention of allowing the "sick man" to
fall into the hands of Russia, and through her ambassador at
Constantinople gave encouragement to Turkey to resist the all-powerful
Russia with the secret promise of English protection; and as Lord
Stratford distrusted and disliked Russia, having since 1824 been
personally engaged in Eastern diplomacy and familiar with Russian
designs, he very zealously and with great ability fought the diplomatic
battles of Turkey, and inspired the Porte with confidence in the event
of war. It was by his dexterous negotiations that England was gradually
drawn into a warlike attitude against Russia, in spite of the
resolutions of the English premier to maintain peace at any cost.
In the meantime the English people, after their long peace of nearly
forty years, were becoming restless in view of the encroachments of
Russia, and were in favor of vigorous measures, even if they should lead
to war. The generation had passed away that remembered Waterloo, so that
public opinion was decidedly warlike, and goaded on the ministry to
measures which materially conflicted with Lord Aberdeen's peace
principles. The idea of war with Russia became popular,--partly from
jealousy of a warlike empire that aspired to the possession of
Constantinople, and partly from the English love of war itself, with its
excitements, after the dulness and inaction of a long period of peace
and prosperity. In 1853 England found herself drifting into war, to the
alarm and disgust of Aberdeen and Gladstone, to the joy of the people
and the satisfaction of Palmerston and a majority of the cabinet.
The third party to this Crimean contest was France, then ruled by Louis
Napoleon, who had lately become head of the State by a series of
political usurpations and crimes that must ever be a stain on his fame.
Yet he did not feel secure on his throne; the ancient nobles, the
intellect of the country, and the parliamentary leaders were against
him. They stood aloof from his government, regarding him as a traitor
and a robber, who by cunning and slaughter had stolen the crown. He was
supposed to be a man of inferior intellect, whose chief merit was the
ability to conceal his thoughts and hold his tongue, and whose power
rested on the army, the allegiance of which he had seduced by bribes and
promises. Feeling the precariousness of his situation, and the
instability of the people he had deceived with the usual Napoleonic
lies, which he called "ideas," he looked about for something to divert
their minds,--some scheme by which he could gain _éclat_; and the
difficulties between Russia and Turkey furnished him the occasion he
desired. He determined to employ his army in aid of Turkey. It would be
difficult to show what gain would result to France, for France did not
want additional territory in the East. But a war would be popular, and
Napoleon wanted popularity. Moreover, an alliance with England,
offensive and defensive, to check Russian encroachments, would
strengthen his own position, social as well as political. He needed
friends. It was his aim to enter the family of European monarchs, to be
on a good footing with them, to be one of them, as a legitimate
sovereign. The English alliance might bring Victoria herself to Paris as
his guest. The former prisoner of Ham, whom everybody laughed at as a
visionary or despised as an adventurer, would, by an alliance with
England, become the equal of Queen Victoria, and with infinitely greater
power. She was a mere figure-head in her government, to act as her
ministers directed; he, on the other hand, had France at his feet, and
dictated to his ministers what they should do.
The parties, then, in the Crimean war were Russia, seeking to crush
Turkey, with France and England coming to the rescue,--ostensibly to
preserve the "balance of power" in Europe.
But before considering the war itself, we must glance at the
preliminaries,--the movements which took place making war inevitable,
and which furnished the pretext for disturbing the peace of Europe.
First must be mentioned the contest for the possession of the sacred
shrines in the Holy Land. Pilgrimages to these shrines took place long
before Palestine fell into the hands of the Mohammedans. It was one of
the passions of the Middle Ages, and it was respected even by the Turks,
who willingly entered into the feelings of the Christians coming to
kneel at Jerusalem. Many sacred objects of reverence, if not idolatry,
were guarded by Christian monks, who were permitted by the government to
cherish them in their convents. But the Greek and the Latin convents,
allowed at Jerusalem by the Turkish government, equally aspired to the
guardianship of the Holy Sepulchre and other sacred shrines in
Jerusalem. It rested with the Turkish government to determine which of
the rival churches, Greek or Latin, should have the control of the
shrines, and it was a subject of perpetual controversy,--Russia, of
course, defending the claims of the Greek convents, who at this time had
long been the appointed guardians, and France now taking up those of the
Latin; although Russia was the more earnest in the matter, as holding a
right already allowed.
The new President of the French republic, in 1851, on the lookout for
subjects of controversy with Russia, had directed his ambassador at
Constantinople to demand from the Porte some almost forgotten grants
made to the Latin Church two or three hundred years before. This demand,
which the Sultan dared not refuse, was followed by the Turks' annulling
certain privileges which had long been enjoyed by the Greek convents;
and thus the ancient dispute was reopened. The Greek Church throughout
Russia was driven almost to frenzy by this act of the Turkish
government. The Czar Nicholas, himself a zealot in religion, was
indignant and furious; but the situation gave him a pretext for insults
and threats that would necessarily lead to war, which he desired as
eagerly as Louis Napoleon. The Porte, embarrassed and wishing for peace,
leaned for advice on the English ambassador, who, as has been said,
promised the mediation of England.
Then followed a series of angry negotiations and pressure made by Russia
and France alternately on the Sultan in reference to the guardianship of
the shrines,--as to who should possess the key of the chief door of the
Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem and of the church at Bethlehem, Greek or
Latin monks.
As the pressure made by France was the most potent, the Czar in his rage
ordered one of his _corps d'armée_ to advance to the frontiers of the
Danubian provinces, and another corps to hold itself in
readiness,--altogether a force of one hundred and forty-four thousand
men. The world saw two great nations quarrelling about a key to the door
of a church in Palestine; statesmen saw, on the one hand, the haughty
ambition of Nicholas seeking pretence for a war which might open to him
the gates of Constantinople, and, on the other hand, the schemes of the
French emperor--for the ten-year president elected in 1851 had in just
one year got himself "elected" emperor--to disturb the peace of Europe,
which might end in establishing more securely his own usurpation.
The warlike attitude of Russia in 1853 alarmed England, who was not
prepared to go to war. As has been said, Mentchikof was no match in the
arts of diplomacy for Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and an angry and
lively war of diplomatic notes passed between them. The Czar discovered
that the English ambassador had more influence with the Porte than
Mentchikof, and became intensely angry. Lord Stratford ferreted out the
schemes of the Czar in regard to the Russian protectorate of the Greek
Church, which was one of his most cherished plans, and bent every energy
to defeat it. He did not care about the quarrels of the Greek and Latin
monks for the guardianship of the sacred shrines; but he did object to
the meditated protectorate of the Czar over the Greek subjects of
Turkey, which, if successful, would endanger the independence of the
Sultan, so necessary for the peace of Europe. All the despatches from.
St. Petersburg breathed impatience and wrath, and Mentchikof found
himself in great difficulties. The Russian ambassador even found means
to have the advantage of a private audience with the Sultan, without the
knowledge of the grand vizier; but the Sultan, though courteous,
remained firm. This ended the mission of the Russian ambassador, foiled
and baffled at every turn; while his imperial master, towering into
passion, lost all the reputation he had gained during his reign for
justice and moderation.
Within three days of the departure of Prince Mentchikof from
Constantinople, England and France began to concert measures together
for armed resistance to Russia, should war actually break out, which
seemed inevitable, for the Czar was filled with rage; and this in spite
of the fact that within two weeks the Sultan yielded the point as to the
privileges of Greek subjects in his empire,--but beyond that he stood
firm, and appealed to England and France.
The Czar now meditated the occupation of the Danubian principalities, in
order to enable his armies to march to Constantinople. But Austria and
Prussia would not consent to this, and the Czar found himself opposed
virtually by all Europe. He still labored under the delusion that
England would hold aloof, knowing the peace policy of the English
government under the leadership of Lord Aberdeen. Under this delusion,
and boiling over with anger, he suddenly, without taking counsel of his
ministers or of any living soul, touched a bell in his palace. The
officer in attendance received an order for the army to cross the Pruth.
On the 2d of July, 1853, Russia invaded the principalities. On the
following day a manifesto was read in her churches that the Czar made
war on Turkey in defence of the Greek religion; and all the fanatical
zeal of the Russians was at once excited to go where the Czar might send
them in behalf of their faith. Nothing could be more popular than such
a war.
But the hostile attitude taken by all Europe on the invasion of the
principalities, and by Austria in particular, was too great an obstacle
for even the Czar of all the Russias to disregard, especially when he
learned that the fleets of France and England were ordered to the
Dardanelles, and that his fleet would be pent up in an inland basin of
the Black Sea. It became necessary for Russia to renew negotiations. At
Vienna a note had been framed between four of the great Powers, by which
it was clear that they would all unite in resisting the Czar, if he did
not withdraw his armies from the principalities. The Porte promptly
determined on war, supported by the advice of a great Council, attended
by one hundred and seventy-two of the foremost men of the empire, and
fifteen days were given to Russia to withdraw her troops from the
principalities. At the expiration of that term, the troops not being
withdrawn, on October 5 war was declared by Turkey.
The war on the part of Turkey was defensive, necessary, and popular. The
religious sentiment of the whole nation was appealed to, and not in
vain. It is difficult for any nation to carry on a great war unless it
is supported by the people. In Turkey and throughout the scattered
dominions of the Sultan, religion and patriotism and warlike ardor
combined to make men arise by their own free-will, and endure fatigue,
danger, hunger, and privation for their country and their faith. The
public dangers were great; for Russia was at the height of her power and
prestige, and the Czar was known to have a determined will, not to be
bent by difficulties which were not insurmountable.
Meanwhile the preachers of the Orthodox Greek faith were not behind the
Mohammedans in rousing the martial and religious spirit of nearly one
hundred millions of the subjects of the Russian autocrat. In his
proclamation the Czar urged inviolable guaranties in favor of the sacred
rights of the Orthodox Church, and pretended (as is usual with all
parties in going to war) that he was challenged to the fight, and that
his cause was just. He then invoked the aid of Almighty Power. It was
rather a queer thing for a warlike sovereign, entering upon an
aggressive war to gratify ambition, to quote the words of David: "In
thee, O Lord, have I trusted: let me not be confounded forever."
Urged on and goaded by the French emperor, impatient of delay, and
obtuse to all further negotiations for peace, which Lord Aberdeen still
hoped to secure, the British government at last gave orders for its
fleet to proceed to Constantinople. The Czar, so long the ally of
England, was grieved and indignant at what appeared to him to be a
breach of treaties and an affront to him personally, and determined on
vengeance. He ordered his fleet at Sebastopol to attack a Turkish fleet
anchored near Sinope, which was done Nov. 30, 1853. Except a single
steamer, every one of the Turkish vessels was destroyed, and four
thousand Turks were killed.
The anger of both the French and English people was now fairly roused by
this disaster, and Lord Aberdeen found himself powerless to resist the
public clamor for war. Lord Palmerston, the most popular and powerful
minister that England had, resigned his seat in the cabinet, and openly
sided with the favorite cause. Lord Aberdeen was compelled now to let
matters take their course, and the English fleet was ordered to the
Black Sea; but war was not yet declared by the Western Powers, since
there still remained some hopes of a peaceful settlement.
Meanwhile Prussia and Austria united in a league, offensive and
defensive, to expel the Russians from the Danubian provinces, which
filled the mind of Nicholas with more grief than anger; for he had
counted on the neutrality of Austria and Prussia, as he had on the
neutrality of England. It was his misfortune to believe what he wished,
rather than face facts.
On the 27th of March, 1854, however, after a winter of diplomacy and
military threatenings and movements, which effected nothing like a
settlement, France and England declared war against Russia; on the 11th
of April the Czar issued his warlike manifesto, and Europe blazed with
preparations for one of the most needless and wicked contests in modern
times. All parties were to blame; but on Russia the greatest odium rests
for disturbing the peace of Europe, although the Czar at the outset had
no idea of fighting the Western Powers. In a technical point of view the
blame of beginning the dispute which led to the Crimean war rests with
France, for she opened and renewed the question of the guardianship of
the sacred shrines, which had long been under the protection of the
Greek Church; and it was the intrigues of Louis Napoleon which entangled
England. The latter country was also to blame for her jealousy of
Russian encroachments, fearing that they would gradually extend to
English possessions in the East. Had Nicholas known the true state of
English public opinion he might have refrained from actual hostilities;
but he was misled by the fact that Lord Aberdeen had given assurances of
a peace policy.
Although France and England entered upon the war only with the intention
at first of protecting Turkey, and were mere allies for that purpose,
yet these two Powers soon bore the brunt of the contest, which really
became a strife between Russia on the one side and England and France on
the other. Moreover, instead of merely defending Turkey against Russia,
the allied Powers assumed the offensive, and thus took the
responsibility for all the disastrous consequences of the war.
The command of the English army had been intrusted to Lord Raglan, once
known as Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who lost an arm at the battle of
Waterloo while on the staff of Wellington; a wise and experienced
commander, but too old for such service as was now expected of him in an
untried field of warfare. Besides, it was a long time since he had seen
active service. When appointed to the command he was sixty-six years
old. From 1827 to 1852 he was military secretary at the Horse
Guards,--the English War Office,--where he was made master-general of
the Ordnance, and soon after became a full general. He was taciturn but
accessible, and had the power of attracting everybody to him; averse to
all show and parade; with an uncommon power for writing both good
English and French,--an accomplished man, from whom much was expected.
The command of the French forces was given to Marshal Saint-Arnaud, a
bold, gay, reckless, enterprising man, who had distinguished himself in
Algeria as much for his indifference to human life as for his
administrative talents,--ruthless, but not bloodthirsty. He was only
colonel when Fleury, the arch-conspirator and friend of Louis Napoleon,
was sent to Algeria to find some officer of ability who could be bribed
to join in the meditated _coup d'état_. Saint-Arnaud listened to his
proposals, and was promised the post of minister of war, which would
place the army under his control, for all commanders would receive
orders from him. He was brought to Paris and made minister of war, with
a view to the great plot of the 2d of December, and later was created a
Marshal of France. His poor health (the result of his excesses) made him
unfit to be intrusted with the forces for the invasion of the Crimea;
but his military reputation was better than his moral, and in spite of
his unfitness the emperor--desirous still further to reward his partisan
services--put him in command of the French Crimean forces.
The first military operations took place on the Danube. The Russians
then occupied the Danubian principalities, and had undertaken the siege
of Silistria, which was gallantly defended by the Turks, before the
allied French and English armies could advance to its relief; but it was
not till the middle of May that the allied armies were in full force,
and took up their position at Varna.
Nicholas was now obliged to yield. He could not afford to go to war with
Prussia, Austria, France, England, and Turkey together. It had become
impossible for him to invade European Turkey by the accustomed route.
So, under pressure of their assembling forces, he withdrew his troops
from the Danubian provinces, which removed all cause of hostilities from
Prussia and Austria. These two great Powers now left France and England
to support all the burdens of the war. If Prussia and Austria had not
withdrawn from the alliance, the Crimean war would not have taken place,
for Russia would have made peace with Turkey. It was on the 2d of
August, 1854, that the Russians recrossed the Pruth, and the Austrians
took possession of the principalities.
England might now have withdrawn from the contest but for her alliance
with France,--an entangling alliance, indeed; but Lord Palmerston,
seeing that war was inevitable, withdrew his resignation, and the
British cabinet became a unit, supported by the nation. Lord Aberdeen
still continued to be premier; but Palmerston was now the leading
spirit, and all eyes turned to him. The English people, who had
forgotten what war was, upheld the government, and indeed goaded it on
to war. The one man who did not drift was the secretary for foreign
affairs, Lord Palmerston, who went steadily ahead, and gained his
object,--a check upon Russia's power in the East.
This statesman was a man of great abilities, with a strong desire for
power under the guise of levity and good-nature. He was far-reaching,
bold, and of concentrated energy; but his real character was not fully
comprehended until the Crimean war, although he was conspicuous in
politics for forty years. His frank utterances, his off-hand manner, his
ready banter, and his joyous eyes captivated everybody, and veiled his
stern purposes. He was distrusted at St. Petersburg because of his
alliance with Louis Napoleon, his hatred of the Bourbons, and his
masking the warlike tendency of the government which he was soon to
lead, for Lord Aberdeen was not the man to conduct a war with Russia.
At this point, as stated above, the war might have terminated, for the
Russians had abandoned the principalities; but at home the English had
been roused by Louis Napoleon's friends and by the course of events to a
fighting temper, and the French emperor's interests would not let him
withdraw; while in the field neither the Turkish nor French nor English
troops were to be contented with less than the invasion of the Russian
territories. Turkey was now in no danger of invasion by the Russians,
for they had been recalled from the principalities, and the fleets of
England and France controlled the Black Sea. From defensive measures
they turned to offensive.
The months of July and August were calamitous to the allied armies at
Varna; not from battles, but from pestilence, which was fearful. On the
26th of August it was determined to re-embark the decimated troops,
sail for the Crimea, and land at some place near Sebastopol. The capture
of this fortress was now the objective point of the war. On the 13th of
September the fleets anchored in Eupatoria Bay, on the west coast of the
Crimean peninsula, and the disembarkation of the troops took place
without hindrance from the Russians, who had taken up a strong position
on the banks of the Alma, which was apparently impregnable. There the
Russians, on their own soil and in their intrenched camp, wisely awaited
the advance of their foes on the way to Sebastopol, the splendid
seaport, fortress, and arsenal at the extreme southwestern point of
the Crimea.
There were now upon the coasts of the Crimea some thirty-seven thousand
French and Turks with sixty-eight pieces of artillery (all under the
orders of Marshal Saint-Arnaud), and some twenty-seven thousand English
with sixty guns,--altogether about sixty-four thousand men and one
hundred and twenty-eight guns. It was intended that the fleets should
follow the march of the armies, in order to furnish the necessary
supplies. The march was perilous, without a base of supplies on the
coast itself, and without a definite knowledge of the number or
resources of the enemy. It required a high order of military genius to
surmount the difficulties and keep up the spirits of the troops. The
French advanced in a line on the coast nearest the sea; the English
took up their line of march towards the south, on the left, farther in
the interior. The French were protected by the fleets on the one hand
and by the English on the other. The English therefore were exposed to
the greater danger, having their entire left flank open to the enemy's
fire. The ground over which the Western armies marched was an undulating
steppe. They marched in closely massed columns, and they marched in
weariness and silence, for they had not recovered from the fatal
pestilence at Varna. The men were weak, and suffered greatly from
thirst. At length they came to the Alma River, where the Russians were
intrenched on the left bank. The allies were of course compelled to
cross the river under the fire of the enemies' batteries, and then
attack their fortified positions, and drive the Russians from
their post.
All this was done successfully. The battle of the Alma was gained by the
invaders, but only with great losses. Prince Mentchikof, who commanded
the Russians, beheld with astonishment the defeat of the troops he had
posted in positions believed to be secure from capture by assault. The
genius of Lord Raglan, of Saint-Arnaud, of General Bosquet, of Sir Colin
Campbell, of Canrobert, of Sir de Lacy Evans, of Sir George Brown, had
carried the day. Both sides fought with equal bravery, but science was
on the side of the allies. In the battle, Sir Colin Campbell greatly
distinguished himself leading a Highland brigade; also General
Codrington, who stormed the great redoubt, which was supposed to be
impregnable. This probably decided the battle, the details of which it
is not my object to present. Its great peculiarity was that the Russians
fought in solid column, and the allies in extended lines.
After the day was won, Lord Raglan pressed Saint-Arnaud to the pursuit
of the enemy; but the French general was weakened by illness, and his
energies failed. Had Lord Raglan's counsels been followed, the future
disasters of the allied armies might have been averted. The battle was
fought on the 20th of September; but the allied armies halted on the
Alma until the 23d, instead of pushing on directly to Sebastopol,
twenty-five miles to the south. This long halt was owing to
Saint-Arnaud, who felt it was necessary to embark the wounded on the
ships before encountering new dangers. This refusal of the French
commander to advance directly to the attack of the forts on the north of
Sebastopol was unfortunate, for there would have been but slight
resistance, the main body of the Russians having withdrawn to the south
of the city. All this necessitated a flank movement of the allies, which
was long and tedious, eastward, across the north side of Sebastopol to
the south of it, where the Russians were intrenched. They crossed the
Belbec (a small river) without serious obstruction, and arrived in sight
of Sebastopol, which they were not to enter that autumn as they had
confidently expected. The Russian to whom the stubborn defence of
Sebastopol was indebted more than to any other man,--Lieut.-Colonel
Todleben,--had thoroughly and rapidly fortified the city on the north
after the battle of the Alma.
It was the opinion of Todleben himself, afterward expressed,--which was
that of Lord Raglan, and also of Sir Edmund Lyons, commanding the
fleet,--that the Star Fort which defended Sebastopol on the north,
however strong, was indefensible before the forces that the allies could
have brought to bear against it. Had the Star Fort been taken, the whole
harbor of Sebastopol would have been open to the fire of the allies, and
the city--needed for refuge as well as for glory--would have fallen into
their hands.
The condition of the allied armies was now critical, since they had no
accurate knowledge of the country over which they were to march on the
east of Sebastopol, nor of the strength of the enemy, who controlled the
sea-shore. On the morning of the 25th of September the flank march
began, through tangled forests, by the aid of the compass. It was a
laborious task for the troops, especially since they had not regained
their health from the ravages of the cholera in Bulgaria. Two days'
march, however, brought the English army to the little port of
Balaklava, on the south of Sebastopol, where the land and sea
forces met.
Soon after the allied armies had arrived at Balaklava, Saint-Arnaud was
obliged by his fatal illness to yield up his command to Marshal
Canrobert, and a few days later he died,--an unprincipled, but a brave
and able man.
The Russian forces meanwhile, after the battle of the Alma, had
retreated to Sebastopol in order to defend the city, which the allies
were preparing to attack. Prince Mentchikof then resolved upon a bold
measure for the defence of the city, and this was to sink his ships at
the mouth of the harbor, by which he prevented the English and French
fleets from entering it, and gained an additional force of eighteen
thousand seamen to his army. Loath was the Russian admiral to make this
sacrifice, and he expostulated with the general-in-chief, but was
obliged to obey. This sinking of their fleet by the Russians reminds one
of the conflagration of Moscow,--both desperate and sacrificial acts.
The French and English forces were now on the south side of Sebastopol,
in communication with their fleet at Balaklava, and were flushed with
victory, while the forces opposed to them were probably inferior in
number. Why did not the allies at once begin the assault of the city?
It was thought to be prudent to wait for the arrival of their siege
guns. While these heavy guns were being brought from the ships,
Todleben--the ablest engineer then living--was strengthening the
defences on the south side. Every day's delay added to the difficulties
of attack. Three weeks of precious time were thus lost, and when on the
17th of October the allies began the bombardment of Sebastopol, which
was to precede the attack, their artillery was overpowered by that of
the defenders. The fleets in vain thundered against the solid sea-front
of the fortress. After a terrible bombardment of eight days the defences
of the city were unbroken.
Mentchikof, meanwhile, had received large reinforcements, and prepared
to attack the allies from the east. His point of attack was Balaklava,
the defence of which had been intrusted to Sir Colin Campbell. The
battle was undecisive, but made memorable by the sacrifice of the "Light
Brigade,"--about six hundred cavalry troops under the command of the
Earl of Cardigan. This arose from a misunderstanding on the part of the
Earl of Lucan, commander of the cavalry division, of an order from Lord
Raglan to attack the enemy. Lord Cardigan was then directed by Lucan to
rescue certain guns which the enemy had captured. He obeyed, in the face
of batteries in front and on both flanks. The slaughter was
terrible,--in fact, the brigade was nearly annihilated. The news of this
disaster made a deep impression on the English nation, and caused grave
apprehensions as to the capacity of the cavalry commanders, neither of
whom had seen much military service, although both were over fifty years
of age and men of ability and bravery. The "Heavy Brigade" of cavalry,
commanded by General Scarlett, who also was more than fifty years old
and had never seen service in the field, almost redeemed the error by
which that commanded by Lord Cardigan was so nearly destroyed. With six
hundred men he charged up a long slope, and plunged fearlessly into a
body of three thousand Russian cavalry, separated it into segments,
disorganized it, and drove it back,--one of the most brilliant cavalry
operations in modern times.
The battle of Balaklava, on the 25th of October, was followed, November
5, by the battle of Inkerman, when the English were unexpectedly
assaulted, under cover of a deep mist, by an overwhelming body of
Russians. The Britons bravely stood their ground against the massive
columns which Mentchikof had sent to crush them, and repelled the enemy
with immense slaughter; but this battle made the capture of Sebastopol,
as planned by the allies, impossible. The forces of the Russians were
double in number to those of the allies, and held possession of a
fortress against which a tremendous cannonade had been in vain. The
prompt sagacity and tremendous energy of Todleben repaired every breach
as fast as it was made; and by his concentration of great numbers of
laborers at the needed points, huge earthworks arose like magic before
the astonished allies. They made no headway; their efforts were in vain;
the enterprise had failed. It became necessary to evacuate the Crimea,
or undertake a slow winter siege in the presence of superior forces,
amid difficulties which had not been anticipated, and for which no
adequate provision had been made.
The allies chose the latter alternative; and then began a series of
calamities and sufferings unparalleled in the history of war since the
retreat of Napoleon from Moscow. First came a terrible storm on the 14th
of November, which swept away the tents of the soldiers encamped on a
plateau near Balaklava, and destroyed twenty-one vessels bringing
ammunition and stores to the hungry and discouraged army. There was a
want of everything to meet the hardships of a winter campaign on the
stormy shores of the Black Sea,--suitable clothing, fuel, provisions,
medicines, and camp equipage. It never occurred to the minds of those
who ordered and directed this disastrous expedition that Sebastopol
would make so stubborn a defence; but the whole force of the Russian
empire which could be spared was put forth by the Emperor Nicholas, thus
rendering necessary continual reinforcements from France and England to
meet armies superior in numbers, and to supply the losses occasioned by
disease and hardship greater than those on the battlefield. The horrors
of that dreadful winter on the Crimean peninsula, which stared in the
face not only the French and English armies but also the Russians
themselves, a thousand miles from their homes, have never been fully
told. They form one of the most sickening chapters in the annals of war.
Not the least of the misfortunes which the allies suffered was the loss
of the causeway, or main road, from Balaklava to the high grounds where
they were encamped. It had been taken by the Russians three weeks
before, and never regained. The only communication from the camp to
Balaklava, from which the stores and ammunition had to be brought, was a
hillside track, soon rendered almost impassable by the rains. The wagons
could not be dragged through the mud, which reached to their axles, and
the supplies had to be carried on the backs of mules and horses, of
which there was an insufficient number. Even the horses rapidly perished
from fatigue and hunger.
Thus were the French and English troops pent up on a bleak promontory,
sick and disheartened, with uncooked provisions, in the middle of
winter. Of course they melted away even in the hospitals to which they
were sent on the Levant. In those hospitals there was a terrible
mortality. At Scutari alone nine thousand perished before the end of
February, 1855.
The reports of these disasters, so unexpected and humiliating, soon
reached England through the war correspondents and private letters, and
produced great exasperation. The Press was unsparing in its
denunciations of the generals, and of the ministry itself, in not
providing against the contingencies of the war, which had pent up two
large armies on a narrow peninsula, from which retreat was almost
impossible in view of the superior forces of the enemy and the dreadful
state of the roads. The armies of the allies had nothing to do but fight
the elements of Nature, endure their unparalleled hardships the best way
they could, and patiently await results.
The troops of both the allied nations fought bravely and behaved
gallantly; but they fought against Nature, against disease, against
forces vastly superior to themselves in number. One is reminded, in
reading the history of the Crimean war, of the ancient crusaders rather
than of modern armies with their vast scientific machinery, so numerous
were the mistakes, and so unexpected were the difficulties of the
attacking armies. One is amazed that such powerful and enlightened
nations as the English and French could have made so many blunders. The
warning voices of Aberdeen, of Gladstone, of Cobden, of Bright, against
the war had been in vain amid the tumult of military preparations; but
it was seen at last that they had been thy true prophets of their day.
Nothing excited more commiseration than the dreadful state of the
hospitals in the Levant, to which the sick and wounded were sent; and
this terrible exigency brought women to the rescue. Their volunteered
services were accepted by Mr. Sidney Herbert, the secretary-at-war, and
through him by the State. On the 4th of November Florence Nightingale,
called the "Lady-in-Chief," disembarked at Scutari and began her useful
and benevolent mission,--organizing the nurses, and doing work for which
men were incapable,--in those hospitals infected with deadly poisons.
The calamities of a questionable war, made known by the Press, at last
roused public indignation, and so great was the popular clamor that Lord
Aberdeen was compelled to resign a post for which he was plainly
incapable,--at least in war times. He was succeeded by Lord
Palmerston,--the only man who had the confidence of the nation. In the
new ministry Lord Panmure (Fox Maule) succeeded the Duke of Newcastle
as minister of war.
After midwinter the allied armies began to recover their health and
strength, through careful nursing, better sanitary measures, and
constant reinforcements, especially from France. At last a railway was
made between Balaklava and the camps, and a land-transport corps was
organized. By March, 1855, cattle in large quantities were brought from
Spain on the west and Armenia on the east, from Wallachia on the north
and the Persian Gulf on the south. Seventeen thousand men now provided
the allied armies with provisions and other supplies, with the aid of
thirty thousand beasts of burden.
It was then that Sardinia joined the Western Alliance with fifteen
thousand men,--an act of supreme wisdom on the part of Cavour, since it
secured the friendship of France in his scheme for the unity of Italy. A
new plan of operations was now adopted by the allies, which was for the
French to attack Sebastopol at the Malakoff, protecting the city on the
east, while the English concentrated their efforts on the Redan, another
salient point of the fortifications. In the meantime Canrobert was
succeeded in the command of the French army by Pélissier,--a resolute
soldier who did not owe his promotion to complicity in the
_coup d'état_.
On the 18th of June a general assault was made by the combined
armies--now largely reinforced--on the Redan and the Malakoff, but they
were driven back by the Russians with great loss; and three months more
were added to the siege. Fatigue, anxiety, and chagrin now carried off
Lord Raglan, who died on the 28th of June, leaving the command to
General Simpson. By incessant labors the lines of the besiegers were
gradually brought nearer the Russian fortifications. On the 16th of
August the French and Sardinians gained a decisive victory over the
Russians, which prevented Sebastopol from receiving further assistance
from without. On September 9 the French succeeded in storming the
Malakoff, which remained in their hands, although the English were
unsuccessful in their attack upon the Redan. On the fall of the Malakoff
the Russian commander blew up his magazines, while the French and
English demolished the great docks of solid masonry, the forts, and
defences of the place. Thus Sebastopol, after a siege of three hundred
and fifty days, became the prize of the invaders, at a loss, on their
part, of a hundred thousand men, and a still greater loss on the part of
the defenders, since provisions, stores, and guns had to be transported
at immense expense from the interior of Russia. In Russia there was no
free Press to tell the people of the fearful sacrifices to which they
had been doomed; but the Czar knew the greatness of his losses, both in
men and military stores; and these calamities broke his heart, for he
died before the fall of the fortress which he had resolved to defend
with all the forces of his empire. Probably three hundred thousand
Russians had perished in the conflict, and the resources of Russia were
exhausted.
France had now become weary of a war which brought so little glory and
entailed such vast expense. England, however, would have continued the
war at any expense and sacrifice if Louis Napoleon had not secretly
negotiated with the new Czar, Alexander II.; for England was bent on
such a crippling of Russia as would henceforth prevent that colossal
power from interfering with the English possessions in the East, which
the fall of Kars seemed to threaten. The Czar, too, would have held out
longer but for the expostulation of Austria and the advice of his
ministers, who pointed out his inability to continue the contest with
the hostility of all Europe.
On the 25th of February, 1856, the plenipotentiaries of the great Powers
assembled in Paris, and on the 30th of March the Treaty of Paris was
signed, by which the Black Sea was thrown open to the mercantile marine
of all nations, but interdicted to ships of war. Russia ceded a portion
of Bessarabia, which excluded her from the Danube; and all the Powers
guaranteed the independence of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of
fourteen years, the downfall of Louis Napoleon enabled Russia to declare
that it would no longer recognize the provisions of a treaty which
excluded its war-ships from the Black Sea. England alone was not able to
resist the demands of Russia, and in consequence Sebastopol arose from
its ruins as powerful as ever.
The object, therefore, for which England and France went to war--the
destruction of Russian power on the Black Sea--was only temporarily
gained. From three to four hundred thousand men had been sacrificed
among the different combatants, and probably not less than a thousand
million dollars in treasure had been wasted,--perhaps double that sum.
France gained nothing of value, while England lost military prestige.
Russia undoubtedly was weakened, and her encroachments toward the East
were delayed; but to-day that warlike empire is in the same relative
position that it was when the Czar sent forth his mandate for the
invasion of the Danubian principalities. In fact, all parties were the
losers, and none were the gainers, by this needless and wicked
war,--except perhaps the wily Napoleon III., who was now firmly seated
on his throne.
The Eastern question still remains unsettled, and will remain unsettled
until new complications, which no genius can predict, shall re-enkindle
the martial passions of Europe. These are not and never will be
extinguished until Christian civilization shall beat swords into
ploughshares. When shall be this consummation of the victories of peace?