have invented a dividing line, with such specific details, without
having sufficient grounds for believing that it had been thus determined
by the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht. It is also believed
that Douglass' Summary (not at this moment within my reach) adverts to
the portion of the line from the coast of Labrador to the Saguenay.
Finally, the allusion to the 49th parallel, as a boundary fixed in
consequence of the treaty of Utrecht, had been repeatedly made in the
course of preceding negotiations, as well as in the conferences of that
of the year 1826; and there is no apparent motive, if the assertion was
known by the British negotiators not to be founded in fact, why they
should not have at once denied it. It may be, however, that the
question having ceased to be of any interest to Great Britain since the
acquisition of Canada, they had not investigated the subject. It is of
some importance, because, if authenticated, the discussion would be
converted from questions respecting undefined claims, into one
concerning the construction of a positive treaty or convention.
It is sufficiently clear that, under all the circumstances of the case,
an amicable division of the territory, if at all practicable, must be
founded in a great degree on expediency. This of course must be left to
the wisdom of the two Governments. The only natural, equitable, and
practicable line which has occurred to me, is one which, running through
the middle of Fuca Straits, from its entrance to a point on the main,
situated south of the mouth of Frazer's river, should leave to the
United States all the shores and harbors lying south, and to Great
Britain all those north of that line, including the whole of Quadra and
Vancouver's Island. It would be through Fuca's Straits a nearly easterly
line, along the parallel of about 48½ degrees, leaving to England the
most valuable and permanent portion of the fur trade, dividing the
sea-coast as nearly as possible into two equal parts, and the ports in
the most equitable manner. To leave Admiralty Inlet and its Sounds to
Great Britain, would give her a possession in the heart of the American
portion of the territory. Whether from the point where the line would
strike the main, it should be continued along the same parallel, or run
along the 49th, is a matter of secondary importance.
If such division should take place, the right of the inhabitants of the
country situated on the upper waters of the Columbia to the navigation
of that river to its mouth, is founded on natural law; and the principle
has almost been recognized as the public law of Europe. Limited to
commercial purposes, it might be admitted, but on the express condition
that the citizens of the United States should in the same manner, and to
the same extent, have the right to navigate the river St. Lawrence.
But I must say that, whatever may be the ultimate destinies of the
Oregon territory, I would feel great regret in seeing it in any way
divided. An amicable division appears to me without comparison
preferable to a war for that object between the two countries. In every
other view of the subject it is highly exceptionable. Without adverting
for the present to considerations of a higher nature, it may be
sufficient here to observe, that the conversion of the northern part of
the territory into a British colony would in its effects make the
arrangement very unequal. The United States are forbidden by their
Constitution to give a preference to the ports of one State over those
of another. The ports within the portion of territory allotted to the
United States would of course remain open to British vessels; whilst
American vessels would be excluded from the ports of the British colony,
unless occasionally admitted by special acts depending on the will of
Great Britain.
FOOTNOTE:
[2] Grotius, however, sustains the right of occupation by a maxim of the
Civil Roman Code.
NUMBER III.
Beyond the naked assertion of an absolute right to the whole territory,
so little in the shape of argument has been adduced, and so much warmth
has been exhibited in the discussion of the subject, that it cannot be
doubted that the question has now become, on both sides, one of feeling
rather than of right. This, in America, grows out of the fact that, in
this contest with a European nation, the contested territory is in
America and not in Europe. It is identical with the premature official
annunciation, that the United States could not acquiesce in the
establishment of any new colony in North America by any European nation.
This sentiment was already general at the time when it was first
publicly declared; and now that it has been almost universally avowed,
there can be no impropriety in any private citizen to say, as I now do,
that I share in that feeling to its full extent. For the Americans,
Oregon is or will be home: for England, it is but an outpost, which may
afford means of annoyance, rather than be a source of real power. In
America all have the same ultimate object in view; we differ only with
respect to the means by which it may be attained.
Two circumstances have had a tendency to nourish and excite these
feelings. The British fur companies, from their position, from their
monopolizing character, from their natural influence upon the Indians,
and from that, much greater than might have been expected, which they
have constantly had upon the British Government in its negotiations with
the United States, have for sixty years been a perpetual source of
annoyance and collisions. The vested interests of the Hudson Bay Company
are at this moment the greatest obstacle to an amicable arrangement. It
is at the same time due to justice to say that, as far as is known, that
company has acted in Oregon in conformity with the terms of the
convention, and that its officers have uniformly treated the Americans,
whether visitors or emigrants, not only courteously, but with great
kindness.
If the British colonies on the continent of America were an independent
country, or were they placed in their commercial relations, at least
with the United States, on the same footing as the British possessions
in Europe, these relations would be regulated by the reciprocal
interests and wants of the parties immediately concerned. Great Britain
has an undoubted right to persist in her colonial policy; but the result
has been extremely vexatious, and to the United States injurious. All
this is true. But feelings do not confer a right, and the indulgence of
excited feelings is neither virtue nor wisdom.
The Western States have no greater apparent immediate interest in the
acquisition of Oregon than the States bordering on the Atlantic. These
stand in greater need of an outlet for their surplus emigrating
population, and to them exclusively, will for the present, the benefit
accrue of ports on the Pacific, for the protection of the numerous
American ships employed in the fisheries and commerce of that ocean. It
is true that in case of war the inhabitants of the Western States will
not, if a naval superiority shall be obtained on the Upper Lakes, feel
those immediate calamities of war to which the country along the
seashore is necessarily exposed; but no section of the United States
will be more deeply affected, by the impossibility of finding during the
war a market for the immense surplus of its agricultural products. It
must also be remembered that a direct tax has heretofore been found as
productive as the aggregate of all the other internal taxes levied by
the General Government; that, in case of war, it must necessarily be
imposed; and that, as it must, in conformity with the Constitution, be
levied in proportion to the respective population of the several States,
it will be much more oppressive on those which have not yet accumulated
a large amount of circulating or personal capital. The greater degree of
excitement which prevails in the West is due to other and more powerful
causes than a regard for self-interest.
Bordering through the whole of their northern frontier on the British
possessions, the Western people have always been personally exposed to
the annoyances and collisions already alluded to; and it may be that the
hope of getting rid of these by the conquest of Canada has some
influence upon their conduct. Independent of this, the indomitable
energy of this nation has been and is nowhere displayed so forcibly as
in the new States and settlements. It was necessarily directed towards
the acquisition of land and the cultivation of the soil. In that respect
it has performed prodigies. Three millions of cultivators of the soil
are now found between the Lakes and the Ohio, where, little more than
fifty years before, save only three or four half Indian French
settlements, there was not a single white inhabitant. Nothing now seems
impossible to those men; they have not even been sobered by fresh
experience. Attempting to do at once, and without an adequate capital,
that which should have been delayed five-and-twenty years, and might
have then been successfully accomplished, some of those States have had
the mortification to find themselves unable to pay the interest on the
debt they had contracted, and obliged to try to compound with their
creditors. Nevertheless, undiminished activity and locomotion are still
the ruling principles: the Western people leap over time and distance;
ahead they must go; it is their mission. May God speed them, and may
they thus quietly take possession of the entire contested territory!
All this was as well known to the British Government as to ourselves. A
public and official declaration by the President of the United States
was unnecessary and at least premature. Mr. Rush's correspondence of
1824 bears witness of its unfortunate effect on the negotiations of that
year. These feelings had gradually subsided. But, whatever may be the
cause, the fact that an extraordinary excitement on this subject has
manifested itself, and does now exist on both sides, cannot be denied.
Time is absolutely necessary in order that this should subside. Any
precipitate step now taken by either Government would be attended with
the most fatal consequences. That which, if done some years ago, might
have been harmless, would now be highly dangerous, and should at least
be postponed for the present.
The first incipient step recommended by the Executive is, to give the
notice that the convention of 1827 shall expire at the end of one year.
This measure at this time, and connected with the avowed intention of
assuming exclusive sovereignty over the whole territory, becomes a
question of peace or war.
The conventions of 1818 and 1827, whilst reserving the rights of both
parties, allowed the freedom of trade and navigation throughout the
whole territory to remain common to both; and the citizens or subjects
of both powers were permitted to occupy any part of it. The
inconveniences of that temporary arrangement were well understood at the
time. The British fur companies had established factories on the banks,
and even south of the river Columbia, within the limits of that portion
of the country which the United States had, whenever the subject was
discussed, claimed as belonging exclusively to them. The conditions of
the agreement were nominally reciprocal; but, though they did not give,
yet they did in fact leave the British company in the exclusive
possession of the fur trade. This could not be prevented otherwise than
by resorting to actual force: the United States were not then either
ready or disposed to run the risks of a war for that object; and it was
thought more eligible, that the British traders should remain on the
territory of the United States, by virtue of a compact and with their
consent, than in defiance of their authority. It is but very lately that
the Americans have begun to migrate to that remote country: a greater
number will certainly follow; and they have under the convention a
perfect right to occupy and make settlements in any part of the
territory they may think proper, with the sole exception of the spots
actually occupied by the British company.
What is then the object in view, in giving the notice at this time? This
has been declared without reserve by the President: "At the end of the
year's notice, should Congress think it proper to make provision for
giving that notice, we shall have reached a period when the national
rights in Oregon must either be abandoned or firmly maintained. That
they cannot be abandoned without a sacrifice of both national honor and
interests, is too clear to admit of doubt." And it must be recollected
that this candid avowal has been accompanied by the declaration that
"our title to the whole Oregon territory had been asserted and, as was
believed, maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments." Nothing can
be more plain and explicit. The exclusive right of the United States to
absolute sovereignty over the whole territory must be asserted and
maintained.
It may not be necessary for that purpose to drive away the British fur
company, nor to prevent the migration into Oregon of British emigrants
coming from the British dominions. The company may, if deemed expedient,
be permitted to trade as heretofore with the Indians. British emigrants
may be treated in the same manner as the other sixty or eighty thousand
who already arrive yearly in the United States. They may at their option
be naturalized, or remain on the same footing as foreigners in other
parts of the Union. In this case they will enjoy no political rights;
they will not be permitted to own American vessels and to sail under the
American flag; the permission to own real property seems, so long as
Oregon remains a territory, to depend on the will of Congress. Thus far
collision may be avoided.
But no foreign jurisdiction can be permitted, from the moment when the
sovereignty of the United States over the whole territory shall be
asserted and maintained. To this, all those who reside in the territory
must submit. After having taken the decisive step of giving the notice,
the United States cannot, as the President justly states, abandon the
right of sovereignty without a sacrifice of national honor.
It had been expressly agreed by the convention that nothing contained in
it should affect the claims of either party to the territory. The
all-important question of sovereignty remained therefore in abeyance.
Negotiations for a division of the territory have failed: the question
of sovereignty remains undecided, as it was prior to the convention. If
the United States exercise the reserved right to put an end to the
convention, and if, from the time when it shall have expired, they
peremptorily assume the right of sovereignty over the whole, it cannot
be doubted that Great Britain will at once resist. She will adhere to
the principle she had asserted prior to the Nootka convention, and has
ever since maintained, that actual occupancy can alone give a right to
the country. She will not permit the jurisdiction of the United States
to be extended over her subjects: she will oppose the removal, arrest,
or exercise of any other legal process, against her justices of the
peace, against any other officers who directly or indirectly act under
her authority, against any of her subjects; and she will continue to
exercise her jurisdiction over all of them throughout the whole
territory. Whatever either Power asserts must be maintained: military
occupation and war must necessarily ensue.
A portion of the people, both in the West and elsewhere, see clearly
that such must be the consequence of giving the notice. Such men openly
avow their opinions, prefer war to a longer continuation of the present
state of things, are ready to meet all the dangers and calamities of the
impending conflict, and to adopt at once all the measures which may
ensure success. With them, the discussion brings at once the question to
its true issue: Is war necessary for the object they have in view? Or
may it not be attained by peaceable means? It is a question of war or
peace, and it is fairly laid before the nation.
But many respectable men appear to entertain hopes that peace may still
be preserved after the United States shall have assumed, or attempted to
assume, exclusive sovereignty. The reverse appears to me so clear, so
obvious, so inevitable, that I really cannot understand on what grounds
these hopes are founded.
Is it thought that the President will not, after the assent of Congress
has been obtained (and whether immediately or at the end of this
session, is quite immaterial), give the notice which he has asked
Congress to authorize? Or is it supposed that a change in the form
which, in order to avoid responsibility, would give him a discretionary
power, could lead to a different result, or be anything else but a
transfer by Congress to the Executive of the power to declare war?
Can it be presumed that when, after the expiration of the term of
notice, the convention shall have been abrogated, the President will not
assert and maintain the sovereignty claimed by the United States? I have
not the honor of a personal acquaintance with him; I respect in him the
First Magistrate of the Nation; and he is universally represented as of
irreproachable character, sincere, and patriotic. Every citizen has a
right to differ with him in opinion: no one has that of supposing that
he says one thing and means another. I feel an intimate conviction of
his entire sincerity.
Is it possible that any one, who does not labor under a singular
illusion, can believe that England will yield to threats and defiance
that which she has refused to concede to our arguments? Reverse the
case: Suppose for a moment that Great Britain was the aggressor, and had
given the notice; declaring, at the same time, that, at the expiration
of the year, she would assume exclusive sovereignty over the whole
country, and oppose the exercise of any whatever by the United States:
is there any American, even amongst those who set the least value on the
Oregon territory, and are most sincerely desirous of preserving peace,
who would not at once declare that such pretension on the part of Great
Britain was outrageous and must be resisted?
It is not certainly the interest of Great Britain to wage war against
the United States, and it may be fairly presumed that the British
Government has no such wish. But England is, as well as the United
States, a great, powerful, sensitive, and proud nation. Every effusion
of the British press which displays hostility to the United States,
produces an analogous sentiment, and adds new fuel to excitement in
America. A moment's reflection will enable us to judge of the inevitable
effect of an offensive and threatening act, emanating from our
Government; an act which throws, in the face of the world, the gauntlet
of defiance to Great Britain. Her claims and views, as laid down in her
statement of December, 1826, remove every doubt respecting the steps she
will take. "Great Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any
portion of that territory. Her present claim, not in respect to any
part, but to the whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy in
common with other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in
abeyance. * * * * The pretensions of Great Britain tend to the mere
maintenance of her own rights, _in resistance to the exclusive
character_ of the pretensions of the United States. * * * * These rights
embrace the right to navigate the waters of those countries, _the right
to settle in and over any part of them_, and the right freely to trade
with the inhabitants and occupiers of the same. It is fully _admitted_
that the _United States possess the same rights_. But beyond these
rights, they possess none. To the interests and establishments which
British industry and enterprise have created Great Britain owes
protection. _That protection will be given_, both as regards settlement
and freedom of trade and navigation, with every attention not to
infringe the co-ordinate rights of the United States."
Thus, the United States declare that they give notice of the abrogation
of the convention, with the avowed determination of asserting their
assumed right of absolute and _exclusive sovereignty_ over the whole
territory of Oregon. And Great Britain has explicitly declared that her
pretensions were, _in resistance_ to the _exclusive_ character of those
of the United States; and that protection will be given both as regards
settlement and freedom of trade and navigation to the interests and
establishments which British industry and enterprise have created.
How war can be avoided, if both Powers persist in their conflicting
determinations, is incomprehensible. Under such circumstances
negotiation is morally impossible during the year following the notice.
To give that notice, with the avowed determination to assume exclusive
sovereignty at the end of the year, is a decisive, most probably an
irretrievable, step. "After that period the United States cannot abandon
their right of sovereignty without a sacrifice of national honor."
The question of sovereignty has never been decided. Simply to give
notice of the abrogation of the convention, would leave the question in
the same situation: it would remain in abeyance. But when the President
has recommended that the notice should be given with the avowed object
of assuming exclusive sovereignty, an Act of Congress, in compliance
with his recommendation, necessarily implies an approbation of the
object for which it is given. If the notice should be given, the only
way to avoid that implication and its fatal consequences, is to insert
in it, an explicit declaration, that the sovereignty shall not be
assumed. But then why give the notice at all? A postponement is far
preferable, unless some other advantage shall be obtained by the
abrogation of the convention. This must be examined, and it is necessary
to inquire whether any and what measures may be adopted, without any
violation of the convention, that will preserve the rights and
strengthen the position of the United States.
NUMBER IV.
The acts which the government of the United States may do, in conformity
with the convention, embrace two objects: the measures applicable to the
territory within their acknowledged limits which may facilitate and
promote migration; and those which are necessary for the protection of
their citizens residing in the Oregon territory.
It is a remarkable fact that, although the convention has now been in
force twenty-seven years, Congress has actually done nothing with
respect to either of those objects. Enterprising individuals have,
without any aid or encouragement by Government, opened a wagon-road
eighteen hundred miles in length, through an arid or mountainous region,
and made settlements on or near the shores of the Pacific, without any
guaranty for the possession of the land improved by their labors. Even
the attempt to carry on an inland trade with the Indians of Oregon has
been defeated, by the refusal to allow a drawback of the high duties
imposed on the importation of foreign goods absolutely necessary for
that commerce. Thus the fur trade has remained engrossed by the Hudson
Bay Company; missionaries were, till very lately, almost the only
citizens of the United States to be found in Oregon; the United States,
during the whole of that period, have derived no other advantage from
the convention than the reservation of their rights, and the express
provision that these should in no way be affected by the continuance of
the British factories in the territory. And, now that the tide of
migration has turned in their favor, they are suddenly invited to assume
a hostile position, to endure the calamities and to run the chances and
consequences of war, in order to gain an object which natural and
irresistible causes, if permitted to operate, cannot fail ultimately to
attain.