THE WAR WITH PRUSSIA[37]
[Footnote 37: Gentz: Ausgewaehlte Schriften; Garden: Traites;
Bailleu: Frankreich und Preussen; Hardenberg's
Denkwuerdigkeiten; Czartoryski: Memoires; Foucart: Campagne de
Prusse; Fitzmaurice: Duke of Brunswick; Hohenlohe: Letters on
Strategy (Eng. ed.); Lettow-Vorbeck: Der Krieg von 1806-07;
Desvernois: Memoires; Hansing: Hardenberg und die Dritte
Coalition; Bonnal: La Manoeuvre de Jena; Gourgaud: Sainte
Helene; Lecestre: Lettres inedites; Davout: Correspondance,
etc., Operations du 3e Corps, 1806-07; the works of Oncken
and Rocquain.]
The Prussian Despotism -- State of Society -- The Patriots -- The
Liberals -- The Execution of Palm -- The Prussian Court and the
Nation -- Demoralization of the Army -- The Conduct of Napoleon
-- War Inevitable -- The French Army -- Napoleon's Strategic Plan
-- Prussian Feebleness -- Napoleon's System of Travel -- His Life
in the Field -- Another Campaign of Marching -- The Affair at
Schleiz -- The Prussians Outflanked -- French Soldiers in the
Leash -- The Battle of Jena -- Davout and Bernadotte -- The
Battle of Auerstaedt -- Rout of the Prussian Army.
[Sidenote: 1806]
Frederick William I of Prussia built up a system of admirable
simplicity and economy in civil administration, which enabled him to
lavish proportionately large sums on the finest army of the day. This
instrument his brilliant son, Frederick the Great, used to increase
the Prussian territories by an area of seventy-five thousand square
miles; and when he died, having pursued his father's policy, he left
his country without a debt, with a reserve of nearly forty-five
million dollars in her treasury, and with a greatly increased income.
His nephew and successor, Frederick William II, was also a despot,
but a feeble one. Under him throve the disgraceful system of
irresponsible cabinet government whereby both religious and
intellectual liberty were necessarily diminished, if not destroyed. By
a shameful subserviency to Austria he increased his territories,
securing a small share in the disreputable partitions of Poland; but
on his death in 1797 the people were sluggish, the nation was in debt,
and the army was disorganized. Frederick William III was a good
citizen, but a poor king. Inheriting the policy of neutrality, he had
obstinately clung to it, surrounding himself with irregular privy
councilors who hampered the ministers in their functions, and
prevented the king from putting confidence in his legal advisers; his
court was rent by factions, and but for one circumstance, shortly to
be noted, would have been utterly out of touch with the nation.
In 1806, therefore, Prussia had not come under the influence of modern
ideas to any appreciable degree. Serfdom of a degrading sort still
existed, although not in its worst forms; the old estates of the
middle ages still existed also, for the law not only upheld the
division of land into noble, burgher, and peasant holdings, but even
drew a corresponding distinction between various occupations,
forbidding any man to pass from one class to the other, or to transfer
real estate from one category to another. The towns still rested on
their respective charter rights; the medieval restrictions of trade
and communication were not yet entirely abolished; the common schools
founded by Frederick William I were as narrow and rigid as either the
craft or cathedral schools of the middle ages. Society in the smaller
towns and in the country was stagnant, and the position of the
individual was immobile, for he was without the spur of ambition. The
land-owners were a caste which, having asserted itself as the
guarantor of public order after the Thirty Years' War, and having
undone the good work of the Reformation by the usurpation of feudal
privilege, still held manorial courts. Though they no longer wrung
their quota of the taxes from the peasants, they were haughty,
exclusive, and tenacious of many petty and annoying privileges.
The one illuminated spot in this picture was small but brilliant. The
young and beautiful Queen Louisa was pious, thoughtful, and
high-spirited. About her was a small court party of intelligent men
and women, who understood the true mission of Prussia, and were
therefore eager for a declaration of war against the aggrandizing
policy of Napoleon. Many of them were young and ardent, like the
princes Louis and Henry; others were mature and cautious like
Hardenberg and Stein, to whose efforts as alternating heads of
Frederick William's cabinet Germany eventually owed her regeneration.
Besides them, there were in this reform party Mueller, Humboldt,
Bluecher, the Princess Radziwill, and others of less renown. The
efforts of this little band were soon seconded by those of a somewhat
larger one. The universities, having been founded in the principles of
liberty, were never entirely mute. Many of the professors appreciated
the backwardness of Germany, and the students formed secret
associations for the destruction of local prejudice and the promotion
of a large patriotism. In the greater cities, which had not entirely
forgotten their former struggles with feudalism, there were also
burghers in considerable number who received such doctrines kindly,
and rendered invaluable service in keeping the embers of liberty from
extinction.
Among the indifferent millions there was also a remnant who, having
been at first enthusiastic for the liberalizing side of the French
Revolution, were now opposed to its conquering and domineering
tendency as represented by the Empire, and looked for the realization
of their ideals in the regeneration of their own country. Early in
1806 their leading men began to be heard: Schleiermacher among the
clergy; Fichte, the sometime admirer of the revolutionary movement,
among the philosophers; E. M. Arndt among the men of letters. By the
middle of 1806 the new doctrines had mildly permeated the whole
nation. The few earnest spirits who still believed in the cosmopolitan
equality of all men as the goal of humanity, who longed for
Augustine's city of God on earth, without the rivalry of nations and
the tumults of exaggerated patriotism, were soon reduced to silence.
If Napoleon were, as thousands believed, the appointed agent for this
end, they might still hope, but they could no longer speak.
The faith of these idealists must have been rudely shaken by various
pieces of news received during the summer. In the very midst of the
seething agitation, Murat, the Grand Duke Joachim I of Berg, dashing
and irresponsible, spoke of a kingdom soon to be his, possibly meaning
the Hanseatic cities; or perhaps he looked for Sweden, whose royal
house, one of the most despotic in Europe, was so hated by Napoleon
that it was merely a question of time when it would cease to reign.
This feeling had recently been intensified by a fatuous attempt to
besiege Hameln and drive the French from Hanover, made in the previous
November by the Duke of Soedermanland, then regent for Gustavus
Adolphus IV, but afterward King Charles XIII. The noisy Augereau, too,
had exasperated the people of Ansbach, where he was in command, by
drinking toasts in public to the success of the French in their coming
war with Prussia. These and a thousand other minor irritations
combined with the occupation of Wesel to raise the tide of popular
feeling still higher. The Emperor of the French was dismayed, but he
could think of no other remedy than severity. Accordingly, Berthier
was instructed to proceed against the authors and publishers of
"political libels" by martial law, on the plea that a commander must
care for his army, and that those who stir up the people against it
are worthy of death. This might be well enough in war, but it was an
absurd and wicked pretext not only in a time of peace, but during an
illegal occupation. A certain Ansbacher, Yelin, had but lately written
a plain, truth-telling pamphlet entitled, "Germany in her Deepest
Humiliation," and it was circulated, though not exactly published, by
Palm, a bookseller of Nuremberg. The author was unknown to the French
authorities, but Palm was arrested, hastily court-martialed, and shot.
He met death with the fortitude of a martyr, conscious that his blood
was the seed of patriots. The news of this murder traveled like
wildfire; excitement and indignation reached their highest pitch, and
the uprising against Napoleon became national in the widest sense. It
was long before the officials of Prussia realized the vital importance
of the popular feeling thus aroused.
For some weeks after ratifying the treaty which Napoleon substituted
for that of Schoenbrunn the Berlin cabinet simply fretted in impotence.
The young officers of the war party were sharpening their swords on
the steps of the French embassy and demanding the disgrace of
Haugwitz; there was even insubordination, and the King, with tears
streaming from his eyes, threatened to abdicate. His cup of bitterness
was more than full. When the Confederation of the Rhine was formed, he
besought the Czar to guarantee the integrity of Turkey, hoping that
this apple of discord between Russia and France being removed, Prussia
would be secure. But Alexander, trusting to gain French neutrality
and carry out his schemes of Oriental aggrandizement by slight
concessions in the Oubril negotiations as to Naples, Sardinia, and
Hanover, refused, vaguely promising to do all in his power to protect
the integrity of Prussia, provided Prussia would not attack Russia
should he go to war with France about Turkey. The privy councilors of
Frederick William, blind to the national feeling which would gladly
support a war against Napoleon's tyranny, proposed thereupon to form
what French diplomacy skilfully suggested, a League of the North. The
King and his advisers at first thought such a federation would be an
offset to the menace of their dangerous neighbor on the West. Although
kept in ignorance of the Russian and English negotiations at Paris,
they heard in August that Hanover had been offered to Great Britain,
and felt that the French occupation of southern Germany was
intolerable. Accordingly the King opened negotiations with Napoleon
for the formation of a North German Confederation to include Saxony,
the two Mecklenburgs, Oldenburg, Hesse-Cassel, the Hanseatic towns,
and a number of minor principalities. The Emperor could not well give
a categorical refusal, and consented on condition that Prussia should
disarm. In this interval Alexander contemptuously rejected the
extraordinary conditions granted by Oubril in a paper which not only
abandoned the Naples Bourbons, the house of Savoy, and the Hanoverian
question, but also guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire!
This attitude of the Czar made the disarmament of Prussia essential to
Napoleon's supremacy in Germany, the more so because, by the demise of
the German-Roman Empire, Russia had lost her right of intervention in
Germany, and would probably seek a new pretext to recover it.
The warlike attitude of England and Russia was a strong support to
Prussia. After the terrible treaty with France, just signed, her army
was more demoralized than ever. Like that of Austria, it had been
resting on old traditions and on laurels won by a former generation.
The antiquated system virtually made slaves of the common soldiers.
Every captain maintained his own company, farming it to the
government. One half of the men must be Prussians, the other were the
scum of Europe; nearly all were secured by forced enlistment or
crimping, and they were all compelled to serve until superannuation
released them, when, instead of a pension, they were given a license
to beg! It was the interest of every captain to secure the highest
efficiency at the least expense, and his soldiers, like costly
chattels, were too precious to be risked except under compulsion. The
companies had no moral cohesion, and the discipline was necessarily
very severe, corporal punishment being inflicted without stint. The
principal officers had become venerable creatures of routine. There
were majors in the hussars not less than sixty years of age. The Duke
of Brunswick, commander-in-chief,--the same who had sold nearly six
thousand mercenaries to George III for use in the war of the American
Revolution,--a spendthrift, a loose liver, and a martinet, was
seventy-one; Moellendorf was over eighty, Kalkreuth was sixty-six, and
even Bluecher, the exception, the most youthful and fiery general of
them all, was over sixty. The staff having occupied itself for years
with an absurd refinement and development of Frederick the Great's
system, there were only a few of the younger officers who understood
Napoleon's revolutionary tactics and strategy. Unfortunately for the
country, the aristocratic pride of their class kept them from setting
a just value on the efficiency of the French democrats.
But, as the summer advanced, the foolish ardor of the war party
combined with the rising sentiment of nationality and the threatening
tenor of Napoleon's language to influence the government. To other
imperial aggressions was added a new one--the seizure of valuable
abbey lands lying on the border of Berg, which had been assigned to
Prussia in 1802, and the cool suggestion that, in order to indemnify
herself, Prussia should stir up strife with Sweden and seize
Pomerania. It was reported that the French were reinforcing the Wesel
garrison and had occupied Wuerzburg; it was even said that they were
advancing against Saxony. At last, when assured that Napoleon had
actually offered Hanover to England, the King yielded to the
solicitations of his people, which grew louder and more angry when
they too heard of Napoleon's perfidy. On August ninth, the same day on
which Lord Lauderdale demanded his passports from the French minister
of war, orders were given to mobilize the Prussian army. Napoleon was
not even yet clear as to his own readiness, and, in view of the Czar's
still uncertain attitude, would ostensibly have been glad to purchase
Prussian disarmament by agreeing to the formation of the North German
Confederation. In Talleyrand's despatch of July twenty-second to the
French envoy at Berlin the suggestion was flatly made that Prussia
should federate the states "still belonging to the Germanic Empire,
and install the imperial crown in the house of Brandenburg." At the
same time the French minister urged the Elector of Saxony to declare
himself an independent prince, and his influence was shown in the fact
that neither the Hanseatic towns nor Hesse-Cassel would give a direct
answer to Prussia.
There is, however, reason to believe that Napoleon still hoped for
peace. As late as August twenty-sixth he wrote to Berthier that he
really intended to evacuate Germany; but a week later the Czar's
rejection of the Oubril treaty, in a note dated August fifteenth, was
formally announced at the same time with the demand of Frederick
William for the evacuation of Germany. The French army was left where
it stood, for it seemed clear to Napoleon that a new coalition must
have been formed. If Prussia was arming merely from fear, she must be
stopped; if she was arming to make ready for war in conjunction with
England and Russia, he must lose no time in order to prevent a united
movement. In reality, matters had not advanced so far, as Prussia was
still nominally at war with Great Britain on account of Hanover, and
there could be no coalition without English subsidies. With his usual
vacillation, Frederick William repented almost immediately of the
course he had taken, and on August twenty-fourth vainly suggested to
his cabinet the revocation of his orders for mobilization. Pending
these hesitancies Napoleon again took up the thread of negotiation
with Lord Lauderdale, who had not yet left Paris. This was a feint to
gain time, for he began to prepare at the utmost speed for a war
which, believing in England's exhaustion and Russia's timidity, he had
not expected, and which he accepted as an almost fatal necessity. As
yet the renown of Frederick the Great's armies had not been forgotten
in France. Moreover, both in 1802 and in 1805 Prussian officers had
been able to observe the outlines of his system, and would be
forewarned. "I believe," he said at the time, "that we have a more
difficult task than with the Austrians; we shall have to move the
earth." "The reputation of the Prussian troops was high," he said
later to Mme. de Remusat; "there was much talk about the excellence of
their cavalry, while ours commanded no respect, and our officers
expected a sturdy resistance."
Accordingly he mustered his arms in double strength--eight army corps
and the guard, a powerful cavalry force under Murat, and an auxiliary
army from Bavaria. At once his officers began to study the possible
roads from central to northern Germany, and the best appeared both to
him and to them to be by the way of Bamberg. By September twenty-fifth
the new levies of a hundred thousand well-drilled recruits were ready,
and on that day the Emperor left Paris for Mainz with all possible
secrecy. On the other hand, the Prussian king knew not whither to
turn. The Bavarian agent in Paris recorded it as his opinion that
Frederick William yielded to the war party in order that, having been
defeated in one battle, his people would understand the impossibility
of resistance and permit him to make the best terms possible. Whether
this be true or not, the unhappy and unready King, unable any longer
either to secure advantage from the misfortune of his neighbors, or to
pursue a policy of weakness and indecision, with England still hostile
and Russia not ardent, finally decided for war. On September
twenty-fourth he arrived at his headquarters in Naumburg, and on
October first the Prussian minister in Paris presented his sovereign's
ultimatum to France. Germany must be evacuated, Wesel restored, and no
obstacle be thrown in the way of a North German Confederation. The
term set for a reply was October eighth. Napoleon received the paper
on October seventh, in Bayreuth, and his columns were already
marching. The answer was, of course, in the facts, which were a quite
sufficient refusal.
In single combat, with equal arms, the prowess of the victor must be
measured by the resistance of his foe. This is not necessarily true in
warfare. Knowing, as we now do, the weakness of Prussia in 1806, it is a
cheap and simple method of belittling Napoleon to belittle his enemy.
But this is unfair as well as unhistoric. Moral courage is more
admirable than physical daring, and considering the high renown of the
Prussian soldiery it was a deed of great bravery to provoke a conflict.
Moreover, skill went hand in hand with pluck, for Napoleon's
preparations were better than any hitherto made, and his strategic plan
was one of the greatest conceptions so far formed by a master in that
department of military science. It is not so striking as some others,
because tremendous geographical obstacles like the Alps play no part in
it: but it is quite as novel as any, and probably shows the best
possible adaptation of means to an end; it has, moreover, the
superlative merit of having been overwhelmingly successful--too much so,
in fact, for its author's reputation, since it appears to illustrate the
proverb of using a sledgehammer to crush an egg-shell. For the sake of
estimating Napoleon's power, it is necessary to apprehend at least the
outlines of his great design, and further still, if possible, to grasp
certain portions of otherwise uninteresting professional detail. In the
first place, the Emperor of the French completely metamorphosed himself
into the commander-in-chief of the French armies, and for a few weeks
gave his undivided attention to the matter in hand. In the second place,
he conceived and sketched a form of advance into Germany so far untried
in the annals of European warfare, and then proceeded to work it out to
the minutest detail. Finally, he developed the principles of Austerlitz
into a scheme of open formation, venturesome to a degree, large in
outline, and dependent for success upon complete knowledge and a perfect
cooerdination of all the parts. We already begin to feel that nothing
less than the Napoleonic concentration of Napoleonic powers could
assure the completion of such a design. Choosing the fortress of
Wuerzburg, and later that of Forchheim, as his point of support, he
determined to concentrate his force on the extreme right of his line and
infold the enemy from the east. To this end he risked abandoning direct
connection with France by way of Mainz, but in return he made sure of an
indirect one by way of Forchheim, Wuerzburg, and Mannheim, reserving as
his line of retreat that into the Danube valley. If unexpectedly the
Prussians should extend their front farther to the eastward, he had in
hand the alternative of driving his own mass through their center--an
old and favorite manoeuver. In order to secure the Rhine, Louis, his
brother, was ordered to throw the strongest possible garrison into
Wesel, and hold himself ready to attack the Prussians in case they
should attempt to turn the French left. As a further safeguard, a corps
of fifteen thousand men under Mortier was to occupy Mainz and to make
demonstrations as far as Frankfort-on-the-Main. The preliminary stages
were all successfully completed before the end of September. The troops
behaved admirably, the officers, though anxious, were obedient and
trustworthy, and Napoleon was confident of success.
The contrast between the majestic, imperial plan of Napoleon and the
petty, inharmonious scheme of Prussia is incredible. On September
thirtieth the aged Duke of Brunswick and the King with his staff were
at Naumburg with the main army, fifty thousand strong. This body was
to be reinforced by twelve thousand more who were coming in, but at a
distance of several days' march. The Prince of Hohenlohe was at
Chemnitz with nineteen thousand men, awaiting the arrival of twenty
thousand Saxons who were not yet even mobilized! General Ruechel was
between Erfurt and Eisenach with a nominal force of eighteen thousand
men, but many of this number had not yet arrived from Westphalia. All
three commanders were alike ignorant of the French positions, and
without an idea as to the enemy's purpose; not one of them had a
trustworthy map of the country. "They are a set of wiseacres" were
Napoleon's own words.
The admirable celerity and accuracy of Napoleon's movements in the
field were due to the excellent arrangements by which they were
governed. His two inseparable companions were the grand marshal Duroc
and Caulaincourt, master of the horse. The latter had always the map
of the country through which they were driving or riding ready for
instant use. The seats of the imperial carriage could be converted
into a couch for the Emperor's frequent night journeys, but ordinarily
Berthier and Murat took turns in sitting at his side, while
Caulaincourt rode close beside the door. Behind, and as near the
wheels as possible, rode seven adjutants, fourteen ordnance officers,
and four pages, who must be ready on the instant to receive and carry
orders. Two of the officers must be familiar with the speech of the
country. Rustan, his Egyptian body-servant, rode with them. There were
also two mounted lackeys, each carrying maps, papers, and
writing-materials. This escort was protected by a body of mounted
chasseurs. In case the Emperor alighted for any purpose, four of these
instantly did likewise, and, surrounding him with fixed bayonets or
loaded pistols pointed outward to the four points of the compass,
preserved this relative position as he moved. Last of all came the
grooms with extra horses; for the Emperor's personal use there were
from seven to nine. These were substantially the arrangements still in
vogue during the Prussian campaign. Thereafter his distrust (p.~426)
of those about him gradually increased, until toward the end of his
career it became acute, and then, as a consequence, the numbers of his
suite were much diminished. Whenever there was need of post-haste the
Emperor found relays of nine saddle-horses or six carriage-horses
prepared at intervals of from seven to ten miles along his route. In
this way he often journeyed at the rate of fourteen miles an hour for
six hours at a time. Similar arrangements on a much smaller scale were
made for the staff.
[Illustration: NAPOLEON BONAPARTE AS FIRST CONSUL
From a marble bas-relief brought to America by Joseph Bonaparte.]
Arriving at his night quarters, the Emperor found his office ready--a
tent or room with five tables, one in the center for himself, and one
at each corner for his private secretaries. On his own was a map
oriented, and dotted with colored pins which marked the position of
each body of his troops. For this campaign he had the only one in
existence, prepared long in advance, by his own orders. As soon as
possible was arranged the Emperor's bed-chamber, across the door of
which Rustan slept, and adjoining it was another for the officers on
duty. Dinner occupied less than twenty minutes, for in the field
Napoleon ate little, and that rapidly. By seven in the evening he was
asleep. At one in the morning the commander-in-chief arose, entered
his office, where the secretaries were already at work, found all
reports from the divisions ready at his hand, and then, pacing the
floor, dictated his despatches and the orders for the coming day.
There is an accepted tradition that he often simultaneously composed
and uttered in alternate sentences two different letters, so that two
secretaries were busy at the same time in writing papers on different
topics. The orders, when completed and revised, were handed to
Berthier. By three in the morning they were on their way, and reached
the separate corps fresh from headquarters just before the soldiers
set out on their march. It was by such perfect machinery that accuracy
in both command and obedience was assured.
Colonel Scharnhorst of the Prussian staff had prepared in advance a plan
whereby his sovereign's forces should cross the Thuringian hills and
secure their position a fortnight before the arrival of the French, in
order to take the offensive, and use their fine cavalry to advantage on
the plains below. The plan was rejected, for the King still feebly hoped
that his ultimatum might be accepted. When at last the reluctant monarch
set out for the seat of war to join Brunswick, he took with him a
numerous suite from the sanguine and even exultant court party. On their
arrival at headquarters an antipodal divergence between the ideas of the
King's followers and those of the conservative Brunswick was instantly
developed, and the latter's command soon became nominal. In spite of the
Queen's noble efforts to infuse spirit into her husband, the divided
councils of his advisers produced in him an infectious incapacity which
spread rapidly throughout the Prussian camp. The results were seen in
the wretched disposition of the forces at the crucial moment. After
considerable wrangling among the staff, their conference lasting three
entire days, the army finally, on October seventh, took position, not on
the southern, but on the northern slopes of the Thuringian
hills--Brunswick with the main army at Erfurt, Hohenlohe at Blankenhain,
and Ruechel, to whose reinforcement Bluecher was advancing from Cassel, at
Eisenach. Pickets were thrown out into the passes in front. This
position was virtually divined by Napoleon on the fifth, and, believing
that the Prussians would mass at Erfurt to strike his left, he
immediately set his troops in motion. There were three columns; on the
eighth the left wing, under Lannes, was at Coburg, with Augereau one
day's march behind; of the center, Murat was already over the hills at
Saalburg, Bernadotte and Davout were in the very heart of them at
Lobenstein and Nordhalben respectively; the guard was at Kronach; and,
of the two divisions of the right, one, under Soult, was at Muenchberg;
the other, with Ney, was at Bayreuth, one day's march behind. By these
movements, the campaign was virtually won on the ninth, and that on the
plan as at first conceived. The connection of the Prussians with their
base of supplies by way of the Elbe was in danger, the process of
turning was well advanced, and it could be a matter of a few days only
before it would be complete.
When Napoleon's whereabouts finally became known in the Prussian camp,
on the ninth, Brunswick and Scharnhorst wished to march eastward and
meet the enemy's powerful right with the whole army; but the King
seems still to have had in mind a flank move toward the west, as
originally contemplated, and would only consent that Hohenlohe should
advance to check the French. The first hostile meeting, therefore,
occurred on that day, at Schleiz, between Hohenlohe's troops and those
of Bernadotte. The conflict was short, and resulted in the withdrawal
of Hohenlohe to defend the pass through the hills at Saalfeld.
Napoleon was still in comparative ignorance of his enemy's larger
movements; but he was constantly strengthened in his hypothesis that
his right wing was not really opposed by any substantial force. Next
day the advance-guard of Hohenlohe was driven from its post, and the
highway to Erfurt was cleared. The fighting was sharp, for the
confident Prussian soldiery had not yet lost courage; but Prince
Louis, the pride of the army, fell, and his loss was more
disheartening to the men than a great defeat.
Throughout the tenth and the eleventh the French columns continued
their advance northward. As they encountered no resistance, Napoleon
concluded that the Prussian main army was still west of the Saale, and
resolved to advance in that direction. The whole French army suddenly
turned on the twelfth, and began to move westward toward the river
valley. All that day they met no resistance, and pushed rapidly on,
Lannes reaching Jena, crossing the stream, and driving a strong body
of reconnoitering Prussians over the steep heights beyond. A general
halt was ordered for the thirteenth, to give the troops a needed rest.
Throughout the campaign they had been marching at a rate one third
higher than that laid down by the regulations, fighting, as a current
phrase ran, with their legs instead of with their bayonets. Napoleon
himself, however, hurried on to Jena. The Saxons having been forced
into their alliance with Prussia, there were many in that town well
affected toward Napoleon. One of these gladly pointed out a pass up
the heights of the Landgrafenberg available for infantry. A force was
immediately set to work improving it, and the Emperor pushed forward
unaccompanied to within gunshot of the Prussian lines. After a rapid
survey with his telescope, both of their situation and his own
vantage-ground, he determined to fight next morning, and believing the
main Prussian army to be confronting him, he immediately sent orders
to Lefebvre, Soult, Ney, and Augereau to bring up their respective
commands as swiftly as possible. Before morning they were all either
on the battle-field or within easy reach. Davout and Bernadotte were
at Naumburg, Murat with the cavalry near them. All three were to march
toward Jena if they heard the noise of battle. The Prussians were
already nearly surrounded, but it took nine hours' wrangling at the
headquarters in Weimar to make their leaders understand it. Finally
they concluded that Brunswick with the main army should draw back
northward down the Saale toward Freiburg to guard the line of supply,
that Hohenlohe should cover the retreat, and that Ruechel should
concentrate at Weimar. The French having used this long interval of
debate to the utmost advantage, it was then too late to avoid a
collision. Hohenlohe, therefore, was opposite Napoleon; Brunswick came
upon Davout at Auerstaedt.
In the misty dawn of October fourteenth the Emperor put himself at the
head of Lannes's troops, and, calling upon them to remember their
success with Mack the previous year under similar circumstances, began
the attack. As he had correctly estimated, there were between forty
and fifty thousand in the opposing ranks, but owing to the fog there
was much confusion among them. Thinking there might be more in the
mist behind, he was convinced that he had before him the main army of
the Prussians. The response of Lannes's men to his appeal was so
hearty that with the help of Ney's van they were able to engage and
hold the enemy for over two hours. This was a precious interval for
Napoleon, enabling him to secure further reserves and to complete his
careful dispositions for a crushing final attack. It was a
characteristic delay, for, realizing how impotent to control the close
of a battle even he himself would be under his system, he was
correspondingly obdurate in dominating its beginning to the least
detail. To hold straining columns of eager soldiers in a leash for two
hours is serious work. On this occasion, as the Emperor stood by his
guard, a nervous voice from the ranks called out, "Forward!" "That
must be a beardless boy," said he, "who wishes to forestall what I am
about to do. Let him wait until he has commanded in twenty battles
before he dares to give me advice."
Meanwhile Hohenlohe had put his troops in motion to protect
Brunswick's rear; there was much desultory fighting along the
straggling line, with a momentary advantage for Hohenlohe. Nothing in
the least decisive occurred, however, during the morning or early
afternoon. By the arrival of Ruechel at two the Prussian line was
somewhat strengthened, but, on the other hand, it was both weakened
and demoralized by the steady, galling fire of the French, who were
hourly increasing in numbers and deploying their new strength on the
plateau. About midday Napoleon had finally felt strong enough to begin
the real day's work. At that time Soult, Lefebvre, and Augereau were
ordered to advance. For two long hours the Prussians made a brave,
stubborn resistance against tremendous odds; even on Ruechel's arrival,
Hohenlohe's line was so exhausted that the reinforcement was of no
avail. The newcomers were quickly overmatched and compelled to
retreat, for Napoleon was then overwhelmingly superior in point of
numbers. It is estimated that, first and last, he had nearly a hundred
thousand men to oppose to Hohenlohe's forty-five thousand and Ruechel's
twenty-seven thousand. By four in the afternoon the field was won. The
Prussians strove to reform and make a stand at Weimar, but they were
quickly overtaken by Ney's corps with the cavalry reserve that had
just come up. These not only dislodged their opponents, but pursued
them for some distance. In the evening Napoleon returned to Jena with
the conviction that he had destroyed the main body of the Prussian
army.
This was far from the truth; but notwithstanding his misapprehension
as to his enemy, the moral results of what he had really done were
most important. In the early morning of the fourteenth, Brunswick and
the King had brought their troops as far as Auerstaedt, beyond which
they hoped to cross the Saale and make a stand on its right bank to
the eastward. They had thirty-five thousand men, excluding the reserve
of eighteen thousand. Bernadotte, according to Napoleon's orders, was
marching from Gera to Dornburg in order to get in the rear of the
deserted Prussian line; but he had not driven his troops, and was
still in communication with Davout. Davout had received later orders,
based upon Napoleon's conviction that Hohenlohe's was the main
Prussian army, to turn in farther south for the same purpose, and
march with his division of thirty-three thousand to Apolda. There was
a sentence to the effect that if Bernadotte were near by, they could
march together; but the Emperor hoped that the latter had already
reached his station at Dornburg. Bernadotte was accordingly informed;
but recalling the Emperor's dissatisfaction with him the previous year
for his inactivity, he did not feel justified in disregarding the
letter and obeying the spirit of his orders. Keeping the line of march
formally prescribed, he was not only himself absent from both the
battles of the fourteenth, but exposed Davout's single corps to
destruction by the Prussian main army, numbering, with the reserve,
fifty-three thousand.
Napoleon claimed to have sent an order during the night with
directions for Bernadotte to reinforce Davout. This was a
double-meaning statement intended to place the blame for Davout's
exposure on Bernadotte's slow movements. Bernadotte denied having
received any message, and the consequence was an increased bitterness
between him and Napoleon, destined to grow still stronger, and finally
to become of historic importance.
Davout was crossing the river Saale about six o'clock in the morning
of the fourteenth, and was well over with about two thirds of his
corps, when suddenly his advance-guard found itself facing a portion
of the enemy at the hamlet of Hassenhausen. It was the Prussian van.
At first the thick mist concealed the armies from each other, but
Davout hurried his columns forward and deployed them by the right for
a simultaneous attack; those of the Prussians advanced and deployed so
slowly that they came into action successively and lost the advantage
of their superior numbers. The action began by a charge of Bluecher's
cavalry against the French right; but the men, unable to withstand the
steady fire of the French infantry, recoiled and fell back in
confusion. The Prussian right then moved around the French left by the
flank, and drove their opponents into the village for shelter. They
could not, however, dislodge them, and were left standing in the open
field for two hours under a murderous fire. By this time it was noon;
Davout's last companies had crossed the river, and the brave general,
putting himself at their head, charged with them at double quick. The
Duke of Brunswick fell, blinded in both eyes and mortally wounded; the
King, though intervening with energy, could not keep the troops in
line. At the same time his left was also attacked by a fresh force,
and he determined to fall back on the reserve, which, owing to
Brunswick's disability and consequent failure to give the necessary
orders, had remained stationary in the critical moment at Gernstaedt.
The French followed, and the running fight continued through and
beyond Auerstaedt, until at five in the evening Davout called a halt.
Frederick William did not, as was entirely possible, turn back with
the reserve and strive to overwhelm his exhausted foe, but marched
onward, expecting to unite with Hohenlohe and renew the conflict next
day at Weimar.
But it was foes, not friends, that he found; for Bernadotte had passed
Dornburg, and was in control of the Weimar road, having reached Apolda
with his van. The awful disappointment unnerved and demoralized both
the King and his army; throughout the terrible day the Prussian
soldiers had justified their renown, fighting bravely and stubbornly;
but now discipline was at an end, and with one or two exceptions the
squadrons dissolved and turned into a flying horde. Hohenlohe drew off
ten thousand men in good order, marched in swift but dignified retreat
through Nordhausen to Magdeburg, and thence continued by Neu-Ruppin to
Prenzlau. Bluecher escaped with a body of cavalry. The battle of
Auerstaedt was tactically a separate affair from that of Jena, but
strategically and morally they were one. Professional students find in
this campaign almost the first complete realization of the hazardous
and delicate manoeuver known as turning the enemy--common sense shows
that the turner, if careless or slow, is himself liable to be turned.
The campaign as a whole was never for a moment endangered, because the
unprecedented marches of the French made their leader's strategy
impregnable. But Bernadotte's conduct, though technically justifiable,
would, with any less efficiency on Davout's part, have jeopardized the
battle as it was fought. The success of Napoleon was due in part to
the fact that, as he himself said, "while others were taking counsel
the French army was marching," in part to the still undiminished
devotion and capacity of the marshals. Great ventures generally
succeed by narrow margins and fail by broad ones. The Prussian
campaign was a great one; its successors were to be of even larger
dimensions as to conception. When they were successful it was by an
even narrower chance; when disastrous, it was with frightful
completeness.