TRAFALGAR AND AUSTERLITZ[33]
[Footnote 33: In addition to the references given, see the
works of Burke, also the volumes of Alembert and Colin, of
Schoenhals, and of Ruestow on the war of 1805; the Diaries of
Sir G. Jackson; Bernhardi: "Denkwuerdigkeiten" of Count Toll;
Friant: Vie militaire du Lieutenant-General Comte Friant;
Chenier: Histoire de la vie militaire, politique et
administrative du Marechal Davout; Bernard: Art de la Guerre;
Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon als Feldherr; Dodge:
Napoleon.]
The English Navy -- Villeneuve's Plight -- Preliminary Manoeuvers
-- The Attack off Trafalgar -- Victory of the English -- Suicide
of Villeneuve -- The Effects of the Battle -- Prussia and the
Continental Campaign -- Napoleon's March to Vienna -- The Combat
near Hollabrunn -- Napoleon's Situation -- The Czar Decides for
Battle -- The Struggle for Position -- Plans of the Antagonists
-- The Eve of Conflict -- The Battle-field of Austerlitz -- The
Struggle for Pratzen -- The Allies Overwhelmed -- Napoleon and
Francis -- Conduct of the Czar -- The Fighting at Austerlitz --
The New Tactics.
In spite of Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz, Great Britain was by no
means sure of her naval superiority. The French had fought bravely at
the battle of the Nile; Nelson, though not exactly outwitted in the
chase to the West Indies and back, had failed to catch his opponent,
who had escaped a second time without serious loss. In the
administration of the admiralty there had been great slackness, except
during Barham's short term; and it is now generally agreed that the
navy was not highly efficient. Every official except Admiral
Collingwood was totally in the dark as to the enemy's plans, and even
he was correct only in one surmise, the firm belief that Villeneuve
would return at once from the West Indies; he was wrong in his
conviction that Ireland was Napoleon's mark. The united French and
Spanish fleets made a fine appearance in the accounts which reached
the admiralty, and the activity of the French dockyards was alarming.
England's naval ascendancy appeared to the English to be seriously
jeopardized.
Villeneuve and his subordinates were apparently the only ones who
positively knew that the show made by the allied fleets was deceptive.
They complained bitterly, as has been said, of the deficiencies in the
equipment of both, and had good cause to do so. That Napoleon was not
altogether unaware of this is sufficiently proved by the fact that
some one less despondent than Villeneuve was not put in his place. In
justice to the French admiral it should be remembered that after his
return from the West Indies he displayed great ability. It was a
series of masterly movements in which he withdrew from before Calder,
entered Ferrol, sailed thence and beat up against a storm to enter the
Channel until he was informed that a powerful British fleet was in his
path. Many of his ill-equipped craft were much damaged by the gale,
and recalling the Emperor's alternative orders, he ran for Cadiz,
entering the harbor with thirty-five ships. Collingwood drew off his
little blockading squadron, but immediately returned to hover before
the port, reinforcements being already on their way from England.
Villeneuve remained at anchor. On September twenty-fifth he received
orders which had been issued on the fourteenth to weigh anchor, pass
through the Strait of Gibraltar, take up the ships lying at Cartagena,
and proceed to Naples, in order to cooperate with the army under
Saint-Cyr. He was to engage the enemy wherever found. The wretched
admiral was in despair; for lack of stores he had been unable to
improve his equipment, and the number of his ships was an
embarrassment rather than a source of strength. He prepared to obey,
but sent home a remonstrance. On the very heels of his first order,
Napoleon despatched Rosily to supersede Villeneuve, who was to return
immediately to Paris and answer charges preferred by Napoleon himself.
The news outran Rosily's speed. Villeneuve, hearing of the disgrace
which had overtaken him, hastened his preparations, and sailed on
October nineteenth with thirty-three ships of the line, five frigates,
and two brigs. It is easy to see what a tremendous effect the presence
of such a naval power in the Mediterranean would have had upon the
grand campaign Napoleon had arranged against Austria.
Meantime the total number of ships of the line in the blockading fleet
had been raised to thirty-three. On September twenty-eighth Nelson
himself came to take command, Collingwood remaining as second. The
great admiral hoped for nothing short of absolutely annihilating the
naval power of the allies. But he was compelled to send his vessels to
Gibraltar for water in detachments, and consequently had only
twenty-seven present and available when called on to fight. These were
disposed southwestwardly from Cadiz toward Cape Spartel, the main body
being fifty miles away when Villeneuve sailed, believing that there
were only twenty confronting him. On October tenth Nelson published to
his fleet the plan of the coming battle, but in order not to terrify
his enemy he hovered at a long distance from the shore. On the
twentieth he advanced toward the northwest, having learned from his
frigates, which had been watching Cadiz, that the allies had started.
Next morning at daybreak his watch descried the enemy sailing
southeasterly, just north of Cape Trafalgar. The French fleet,
simultaneously descrying the English, at once turned northward so as
to be ready for retreat toward Cadiz; and Villeneuve, skilful but ever
despondent, drew up his ships for battle in two long lines parallel
with the shore, those of the rear covering the spaces between those of
the first, so as to make the whole virtually a single compact curved
line, concave toward the enemy, and therefore prepared to deliver a
cross-fire.
It was a bright morning, with a light westerly breeze, but a heavy
ocean swell, as the British, with the advantage of the wind, slowly
advanced in two columns, one led by Nelson in the _Victory_, the other
by Collingwood in the _Royal Sovereign_. All was silent when at the
appointed moment the famous signal fluttered from the flag-ship:
"England expects every man to do his duty." Responsive cheers burst
from ship after ship, and the French admiral murmured, "All is lost!"
Nelson had given a stirring order: "In case signals cannot be seen or
clearly understood, no captain can do wrong if he places his ship
alongside that of an enemy." Villeneuve's was scarcely less so: "Any
captain not under fire is not at his post, and a signal to recall him
would be a disgrace." It was a splendid audacity on Nelson's part
which, fearing lest the light wind might make an engagement
impossible, offered each of his ships in two attacking columns, one
after the other, to the fire of a whole fleet. Collingwood's line--the
southern--came into action first, just at noon, and broke through the
enemy's ranks, as was expected; but although this was by
prearrangement with Nelson, yet the _Royal Sovereign_, having
outsailed her consorts, went too far, and was isolated for twenty
minutes, being exposed to the fire of all the enemy's ships which
could reach her, and was nearly lost before she could manoeuver or
her consorts come to her assistance.
The _Victory_ hastened on against the _Bucentaure_, which carried the
standard of Villeneuve, as fast as the treacherous breeze would permit,
and in turn attacked on the north. She too was in advance of her
consorts, and was riddled before they could come to her relief. For a
time the _Redoutable_ withstood the onset both of the _Victory_ and the
next in line; but three more British vessels coming up, the five finally
broke through, capturing the _Bucentaure_, the _Redoutable_, and the
_Santissima Trinidad_. Both the English flag-ships were saved, but the
fighting was terrific on both sides. To the over-confidence of the
British was opposed a dull timidity in their opponents, and in the end
this began to tell. The allied van failed to use their guns with either
rapidity or precision, while their inner line drifted away to leeward
and was enveloped by the enemy. It was about half-past one when Nelson
received a mortal wound from the maintop of the _Redoutable_, but he
lived to hear the news of victory. He was a victim to his own system,
which subordinated caution and every other idea to the single one of
success. His men loved him just as Napoleon's did, and fought
desperately for his approval. He was still in his prime, and in many
minds his loss offset the victory. Of the whole armada, eleven
ships--five French and six Spanish--escaped under Gravina; four put to
sea under Dumanoir, but were eventually captured.
That night there was a violent storm. It continued throughout the
twenty-third, and on the twenty-fourth three of the eleven vessels
which had escaped under Admiral Gravina, having put out to cut off
prizes from the British, were dashed to pieces on the shore; all but
four of the English prizes were wrecked, and of Villeneuve's (p.~375)
proud squadron only eleven were finally left. He himself was taken
prisoner, and released on parole. Early in the following April he
landed at Morlaix, and, proceeding to Rennes, asked for an opportunity
to plead his cause before the Emperor. What the reply was is not
known, but on the twenty-second he was found dead in his room, stabbed
in several places, the knife embedded in the last wound. The
reproaches Napoleon had heaped upon him must have been in the main
undeserved, for he was never degraded; but they broke his spirit, and
he doubtless committed suicide.
The effect of Trafalgar in England was enormous. No doubt of her
superiority on the seas could now remain, for the navies of her foes
were wiped out. She had been freed from the fear of invasion by
Napoleon's great countermarch, and, in spite of the tremendous
subsidies paid on the Continent, might now hope for a revival of
industry and trade on whatever shores the oceans rolled. Napoleon's
career was one long, thick shadow which hung menacingly over English
life. The victory of Trafalgar was a great rift in the cloud. It ended
French maritime aggressions for the duration of the war, but it
scarcely changed the eventual course of affairs on land, and it in no
way interfered with Napoleon's operations for the moment. It did not
necessitate, as has been claimed, the notorious continental system,
for that system was already in existence; it merely hastened the
effort to enforce it rigorously enough to lame England by attacking
her commerce. Her naval supremacy had been from the beginning a factor
in determining French policy; it became after Trafalgar the most
powerful element in molding Napoleon's policy, though it was not the
only one. The continental allies of England, while of course they
rejoiced, felt that, after all, the effects of Nelson's (p.~376)
victory were remote. For the moment Austria and Russia were engaged in
a struggle which even Trafalgar did not influence to their advantage.
Napoleon's simple but characteristic remark on receiving the news was,
"I cannot be everywhere." He began at once the reconstruction of a
navy for the purpose of destroying commerce, but he never again
assigned it any other share in his plans. In France there was a
stunned feeling, but it quickly passed away under the influence of
another event which marked nearly the highest point ever reached by
the imperial power. The one most noticeable result of Trafalgar was
the quick dejection it produced in Napoleon's grand army; this was
symptomatic of an evil still in its initiatory stages, which, though
easily cured for the moment, became in a short time periodic, and
finally fatal.
[Illustration: Napoleon Exposition, 1895
NAPOLEON, FIRST CONSUL, BY INGRES
Belonging to M. Germain Bapst.]
He was almost immediately confronted by a new foe, but there is no
link between the destruction of his sea power and that fact. While the
French had been crossing from the valley of the Rhine into that of the
Danube, they had treated the minor German states with scant courtesy,
using their territories as those of either conquered people or
dependent allies. This ruthless treatment did not, however, awaken a
spirit of resentment among them. But Prussia, still considering
herself a great power, grew furious when Bernadotte rashly violated
her neutrality and marched over her lands at Ansbach. The Czar, who
had already directed his troops toward the Prussian frontier in order
to coerce Frederick William into joining the coalition, and intended,
if necessary, to violate Prussian neutrality as Napoleon had done,
appeared in Berlin about the middle of October. The court party,
headed by Queen Louisa, sympathized with the coalition, and used the
French ruthlessness to arouse public opinion for itself. Aided by
Alexander's presence, it then gained a temporary victory in the treaty
with Russia, signed at Potsdam on November third, which virtually
ended the policy of neutrality so carefully cherished for ten years by
Frederick William, and in the pursuit of which Prussia had lost her
vigor and her political importance. The wavering king finally bound
himself to armed mediation, to put his army on a war footing, and then
either to secure from the Emperor of the French the liberties of
Naples, Holland, and Switzerland, with the separation of the crown of
Italy from that of France, and an indemnification for the King of
Sardinia, or else to enter the coalition with one hundred and eighty
thousand men. The Russian troops might occupy or cross Prussian
territory whenever needful. It was believed that the necessary
negotiations with Napoleon would turn one way or the other by the
middle of December. Shortly afterward the two monarchs, who had
wrought themselves into an exalted fervor, swore eternal friendship
over the tomb of Frederick the Great. Their dramatic oath initiated
the policy of secret dealing in everything pertaining to the imperial
usurper who had defied all Europe, and with whom no faith in any
literal sense could be kept. There was some momentary compensation to
the Emperor of the French for the serious blow he had received by this
new alliance in the fact that he could now openly consolidate his
power in western and southern Germany, relying on the interested
friendship of the three electors who had gained so much by the
enactment of the imperial delegates, so called, in 1803--those,
namely, of Baden, Wuertemberg, and Bavaria. The grateful Elector of
Bavaria personally thanked Napoleon for his condescension, and again
occupied Munich, from which the Austrians had driven him. His visit
was short, for Napoleon was in haste; in fact, his position was
critical. As to the immediate future, Russia and Austria were in
front, and if he should give unsatisfactory answers to the envoy from
Berlin, Prussia would be in his rear. All depended, therefore, on a
quick and decisive struggle with the two allied empires.
During his advance to Vienna, Napoleon, without a single conflict
which might justly be called a pitched battle, had manoeuvered both
Austrians and Russians out of his way. By serious inadvertence he had
suffered the division of Mortier, left isolated on the left bank of
the Danube, to be annihilated at Duerrenstein; and through Murat's
vainglorious stubbornness, Kutusoff had escaped with the Russian
contingent. Nevertheless, as has been told, the main French army had,
by the most amazing marches, reached Vienna on November fourteenth,
and the same day Napoleon had established his headquarters in the
neighboring palace of Francis at Schoenbrunn. Murat was hurrying
forward with his cavalry, and the divisions of Suchet and Lannes were
close on the heels of Murat. If these should attack one Russian flank
while a second army turned the other, Kutusoff's force could be
dispersed. But two important duties demanded immediate attention. The
troops had been scattered over a wide territory to live on the
country; now they must be gathered in to strike. It was consequently
essential that regular provision-trains be organized and supplied.
Both these tasks were pursued with untiring zeal. "They say I have
more talent than some others," Napoleon wrote to Marmont on November
fifteenth, "and yet to defeat an enemy whom I am accustomed to beat I
feel I can never have enough troops. I am calling in all I can unite."
Murat pushed onward after the retreating Russians, and in spite of
their tremendous marches overtook them on the fifteenth. Kutusoff's
men were so weary that they could proceed no farther without a rest,
and from Schrattenthal he sent back a subordinate, Bagration, to
Hollabrunn, with six thousand of the freshest troops, to check the
French advance, if possible. Believing the main army of Kutusoff to be
before him, the French leader felt unable to engage. Accordingly he
despatched a messenger under a flag of truce with the statement,
purely fictitious, though speciously based on certain irrelevant
facts, that negotiations had been opened for a general armistice.
Kutusoff, pretending to be familiar with the details of the falsehood,
heartily entered into a proposition to negotiate, using the time thus
gained to prepare his further retreat. A paper was duly drawn up,
signed, and sent to Napoleon at Schoenbrunn, where the bearer arrived
on the sixteenth. The Emperor, seeing how Murat had been outwitted,
immediately sent off an adjutant to him with peremptory orders to
attack at once. When this command arrived at Hollabrunn, Soult had
come in with three divisions, but Kutusoff with his army was far away
on the highroad to Znaim. Murat fought bravely, but Bagration's vastly
inferior force resisted with equal stubbornness until eleven at night,
when, their purpose of gaining time having been accomplished, they
followed the main army. Napoleon had by this time come up to take
charge in person, but it was too late: Murat had "destroyed the fruits
of a campaign." Near Bruenn, Kutusoff met the Vienna garrison, and at
Wischau the united force of forty-five thousand men joined the first
detachment, fourteen thousand strong, of a second Russian army, which
was advancing under Buxhoewden. The second detachment of this army, ten
thousand strong, was found next day, November twentieth, at Prossnitz.
The great fortress of Olmuetz was just beyond, with a garrison of
about fifteen thousand; Alexander had arrived with his imperial guard;
and Bennigsen, one of Paul's assassins, who had been preferred to high
command by Alexander, was already marching from Breslau with another
army of forty-five thousand. The Archduke Ferdinand was in Bohemia
with an Austrian corps to guard the right, and the Archduke Charles
was on his way to Vienna with the Austrian army from Italy--the two
together about eighty thousand strong.
At first sight it appears as if Napoleon were outnumbered, his
detachments scattered, and his communications endangered; and these
charges have been brought in order to attribute his subsequent success
to good fortune alone. But a scrutiny of the Emperor's grand strategy
will show that he could be perfectly secure. From far and near his
scattered but well-trained divisions were moving on. Massena had left
Italy; Ney, having swept the enemy from the Tyrol, was coming up; and
all about the southern line divisions were moving to guard strategic
points, to stop the hurrying Austrians, and yet be within "marching
distance." With this comfortable assurance, the great captain advanced
to the Moravian capital, and there established his headquarters on the
nineteenth. Once again, by his amazing power of combination, he had
gained the advantage, his troops being so disposed that in one day he
could call in fifty-four thousand men; in two, seventy-five thousand;
in four, eighty-five thousand; and his line of retreat was secure. If
compelled to withdraw, he could fall back on Davout, Mortier, and
Klein, assemble one hundred thousand men, and again make a stand. If
Kutusoff and Charles should march straight to Vienna to effect a
junction, he could oppose to their combined army of a hundred and
sixty-nine thousand troops a hundred and seventy-two thousand of his
own. The defensive position of his foes was virtually impregnable,
but they could not unite for attack as swiftly or advantageously as
he. His own defensive position was less strong, because he had for
some distance about and behind him a hostile country. What the allies,
therefore, needed was time; what Napoleon wanted was a battle.
But where and how? There would be little advantage and much danger in
simply attacking the foe to drive them farther back into their own
lands. The battle must be swift and conclusive, or else the year, with
all the prestige of Ulm, would be lost. In this juncture what Napoleon
chose to call his fate or destiny signally favored him; in reality it
was his own calm assurance which misled his opponents. The Austrians
had too often felt the weight of Napoleon's hand, and all their
officers except Colonel Weirother, a favorite of Alexander's, were
cautious; the Russians, recalling that Napoleon had never fought with
them, were eager to destroy his renown. Czartoryski, though he had
resigned his post of foreign minister, was again at Alexander's side.
"Our true policy--and this I told to every one who would listen," he
wrote, in 1806, "was to wear out the foe with skirmishes and keep the
main army out of reach, secure Hungary, and unite with the Archduke
Charles." But the Czar's other advisers were the more intent because
there was no love lost between them and Austria. Francis had already
despatched two able agents, Gyulaei and Stadion, to cooeperate with the
Prussian envoy Haugwitz in negotiating with Napoleon for peace. These
negotiations, if successful, would greatly diminish Russia's
importance. Moved, therefore, by a characteristic pride, Alexander
harkened to those who clamored for battle, and, taking the momentous
decision on his own account, began to prepare. Napoleon could
scarcely realize the possibility of such rashness, and received the
news with delight. Haugwitz and the Austrian diplomats were directed
toward Vienna, where Talleyrand was to conduct the negotiations;
Napoleon's adjutant, Savary, was sent direct to Alexander himself,
nominally to see whether he would consider a partition of Turkey, in
reality to observe the state of the Russian forces. The crafty
disposition of the diplomats was the never-failing second bow-string,
in case the decision of arms should be doubtful; Savary's mission was
a feint to gain time and information.
Napoleon heard on November twenty-seventh, from a deserter, that the
enemy was actually advancing, but he could not believe it. Next day
the news was confirmed by his own cavalry, and in such a way as to
indicate the method of attack--a flank movement against the French
right. That night his own plan was completed and the outlying
divisions were summoned. They came so promptly that the very next
morning found him on the heights above Austerlitz, twelve miles to the
east of southeast from Bruenn, and ready to meet the enemy. Bernadotte
accomplished what seemed impossible, and on December first was in
position across the highway between Bruenn and Olmuetz. Davout was close
behind, and the same night reached the cloister of Great Raigern,
seven miles south of Bruenn, and about twelve from Austerlitz. There
are on record no such feats of marching as those performed by French
troops, with incredible swiftness, on the days preceding Austerlitz.
Friant's division marched from Leopoldsdorf through Nikolsburg to
Raigern, seventy-eight miles, in exactly forty-two hours!! And after
six hours' rest, they marched five miles further, engaged the columns
of the allied left wing and fought against terrific odds for eight
hours!!! There are records of other similar feats in the same campaign
by single brigades, but nothing approaching this in the annals of
warfare.[34] But the enemy was not yet visible in force on November
twenty-ninth, and it was only when Savary returned from the Russian
camp with complete and precious information that there seemed no
longer room for doubt. Accordingly the French were withdrawn during
that day in a line southwesterly from Austerlitz, to take up a
position stronger than that in which they stood. To preserve the
appearance of sincerity, Savary was sent back in hot haste to
Alexander with a second meaningless proposition. As a return move
Prince Dolgoruki was sent on the thirtieth with a like message from
Alexander to Napoleon. The prince was utterly hoodwinked, and some
have thought that the Russian decision to fight was due to his report
that the French were on the point of retreat.
[Footnote 34: See Huidekoper in Mil. Service Journal,
July-September, 1906.]
On the highest hilltop between Bruenn and Austerlitz, still known as
"Napoleon's Mount," the Emperor bivouacked during the night of
November thirtieth. Having been aware since morning that the enemy's
slowness would give him yet another day, he had carefully examined the
land in front and far to his right. The result was a daring
resolution. The Czar's advisers had determined to turn the right wing
of the French: this Napoleon had now learned through a traitor in the
Russian camp. It would be easy to thwart them by occupying a high
plateau to the right, on which stood the hamlet of Pratzen, with his
right wing on the Littawa stream; in which case he would win "an
ordinary battle," to use his own phrase. But it was not such a victory
that he wished: his aim was nothing less than the annihilation of the
coalition. So he determined to leave this apparently commanding
position, feeling sure that his over-confident foe would occupy it as
a manifest vantage-ground.
On December first the hostile army appeared, marching in five columns,
and before night the two divisions of the center were drawn up, on and
behind the plateau of Pratzen; the three which composed the left were
on and before its southern slopes. Their movements and their position
convinced the experienced observer that his information was exact.
Late in the afternoon was held a council of war in which every general
received the most minute directions. Soult especially was carefully
instructed as to the "manoeuver of the day"--an advance in echelon,
right shoulder forward. Nicely poised combinations need careful
attention, and the uneasy but confident Emperor spent the night
passing from watch-fire to watch-fire, encouraging and observing his
men. With noisy enthusiasm they besought him not to expose his life on
the morrow, and promised to bring him a suitable bouquet for the
anniversary of his coronation. For a time the whole camp was
illuminated with extemporized torches of hay. But, though excited, the
troops, as well as their general, were confident; they understood his
casually uttered but carefully considered words, which passed from
mouth to mouth: "While they are marching to surround my right, they
will offer me their flank." For a time, also, he rode in the darkness
to reconnoiter the enemy's position, and being convinced that no
movement was to be made before morning, he returned to his tent about
three and slept until dawn. He has been charged with having for the
first time shown cowardice at Austerlitz. This is because in a
proclamation he promised not to risk his life, as his men had
requested; but this promise was expressly conditioned on their doing
their duty, and he kept his word because they kept theirs. General
Bonaparte had led his soldiers where danger was greatest, but Napoleon
the Emperor, having won his stake, had no need to take such risks;
having more to lose, he now for the first time used the ordinary
caution of a man whose life is worth that of many common men. It was
only what every great royal and imperial general is accustomed to do.
The early hours of December second, 1805, were misty, although there
was a sharp frost; but by seven the sun had dimly risen, and soon the
thick fog lay only along the streams. At that hour the Russians and
Austrians began their marching. Those behind the Pratzen heights
passed swiftly up, and, uniting with those already there, marched in
the general direction of the forest near Turas, intending to cross the
intervening Goldbach and with their own left, which stood at Telnitz
and Sokolnitz, surround Napoleon's right wing. The battle-field of
Austerlitz is approximately an isosceles triangle, the short base
extending north and south between Raigern and Bruenn, a distance of
about seven miles, and the equal sides, twelve miles in length,
converging in Austerlitz to the eastward. About half-way on a
perpendicular let fall from the apex, and parallel with the base, the
Goldbach flows on the west side of the Pratzen plateau, nearly due
south, the villages of Schlapanitz, Puntowitz, Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz,
and Telnitz being at about equidistant intervals from north to south
on its banks. A mile north of Schlapanitz the road from Bruenn to
Olmuetz forms the north side of the triangle; the forest of Turas lies
about two miles to the west of Puntowitz, on a high plain. In a line
eastward of Schlapanitz, about a mile from that village and from each
other, are the villages of Girzikowitz and Blasowitz. Napoleon's
bivouac was on the high hill northwest of Schlapanitz, at the base of
which, on the other side, was Bellowitz. North of the Olmuetz road is
a commanding hill, dubbed by the veterans of the Egyptian expedition
with an Egyptian name, Santon, from a fancied resemblance of the
little spire which crowned it to a minaret. This was to be the pivot
of the battle, and Napoleon fortified it with a redoubt and eighteen
pieces of cannon. South of it stood the left wing under Lannes; next
toward the south stood the cavalry under Murat; then the center under
Bernadotte; and Soult with the right was west of Puntowitz. Oudinot
was eastward, in front of the imperial bivouac, with ten battalions;
and ten battalions of the guard, with forty field-pieces, were
westward behind it. Davout, having arrived the night before, was at
Raigern. Legrand stood between him and Sokolnitz, on a pond lying
southeast of that village.
At five in the morning Davout marched from Raigern, and about nine
joined Legrand to engage the enemy's left. Meantime, at a quarter to
eight, Soult began to climb the Pratzen slopes with the divisions of
Vandamme and Saint-Hilaire. In about twenty minutes--the exact time in
which he had declared he could do so--he had made good his position,
and was fiercely engaged with the column of Kollowrath, which formed
the enemy's center, and with which Kutusoff was present in person. The
latter, realizing for the first time what the loss of Pratzen would
mean, endeavored to concentrate toward the right; but his efforts were
unavailing: he could only stand and fight. The two Austro-Russian
columns on his left swooped down to the Goldbach, and seized both
Telnitz and Sokolnitz. Simultaneously with Soult's advance, Bernadotte
and Murat moved forward, encountering between Girzikowitz and
Blasowitz the enemy's cavalry under Prince Lichtenstein, and the
Russian imperial guard under the Grand Duke Constantine. (p.~387)
Napoleon advanced to observe the conflict, and a little before eleven,
at the critical moment, when the regiment of his brother Joseph was on
the verge of being engulfed and lost, he threw in the cavalry of his
own guard, under Bessieres and Rapp, upon the Russian guard, turned
the scale against them, and with his own eyes saw Constantine
withdraw. The Russian vanguard under Bagration had meantime come in
from Bosenitz, and was hotly engaged with a portion of the French
left. The entire cavalry mass of Lichtenstein and Murat was commingled
in bitter conflict. With the retreat of Constantine began the rout of
the whole Austro-Russian right wing. Lannes, supported by the Santon
redoubt, had stood like a rock until then; at once he precipitated
himself, with the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli, upon Bagration,
and drove him back. Lichtenstein, who, up to that moment, had at least
held his own,--if, indeed, he had not shown himself the
stronger,--could no longer stand, and late in the afternoon he too
began to yield.
Between eleven and twelve Soult had cleared the Pratzen heights, and
pushing ever toward the right, had finally, just as the sun burst in
splendor through the clouds, separated the enemy's left wing from its
center. The latter had been sadly weakened both by detachments to
strengthen the left and by its losses in conflict. At noon it began to
retreat, and Napoleon, having satisfied himself that all was well on
his left to the north, rode south to join Soult, and in passing
despatched Drouot's division against the fugitive Kutusoff, whose
column was thus overpowered and thrown into utter confusion. Since
nine in the morning Davout had stood on the west shore of the
Goldbach, flinging back the successive charges of the enemy's
overgrown left. The continuous struggles had been terrific; the
stream literally flowed blood as the soldiers of both sides crashed
through the ice, and, unable to disengage themselves from the muddy
bottom, stood fighting until they died. By two o'clock, however, his
labors were over: the great move of the day, Soult's echelon march,
right shoulder forward, was complete; Saint-Hilaire and Vandamme had
recaptured the villages of Sokolnitz and Aujezd; the three
southernmost Austro-Russian columns were entirely surrounded, and only
a few from each escaped to join the remnants of their right, center,
and reserve, running for life across frozen ponds and ditches, by
dikes, and over rough-plowed fields toward Austerlitz. About five
thousand of the fugitives, mostly Russians under Doctoroff and
Langeron, had risked themselves on the ice of the Satschan lake and
were hurrying across when Napoleon arrived. He ordered the
field-pieces to be turned on the ice so that the balls weakened and
cracked it.[35] In a few moments it gave way; with shrieks and groans
many sank into the slowly rising waters and disappeared under the
tossing icefloes. According to the account of the bulletins,
frequently doubted but never refuted, nearly two thousand of them were
drowned: when the ponds were drained after the battle forty Russian
guns and many corpses were found. The fighting strength of the
coalition was destroyed; so likewise was their moral courage. Shortly
after Kutusoff's retreat, General Toll found Alexander seated weeping
by the wayside, and accompanied by only a single adjutant.
[Footnote 35: This statement is merely a deduction from the
events as they occurred and were narrated by eye-witnesses.
The Emperor's fate was even more at stake than the general's:
it was consonant with the character of the man to disregard
all considerations of mercy in such a crisis. Many of his men
and officers claimed later that the crushing of the ice was
incidental to the cannonading, and recounted acts of French
courtesy in rescuing the drowning.]
Hostilities were scarcely ended for the day before Francis despatched
Lichtenstein with proposals for an armistice. Napoleon received the
envoy while making his round of the battle-field, but refused to treat
for two days. He intended to reap the fruits of victory, and ordered a
skilful, thorough pursuit. Such was the rout of the allies that the
position of the shattered columns of Austria and Russia was not known
until the fourth of December. The Czar was in such danger of being
captured that early in the day he sent to Davout a flag of truce and a
hastily penciled note declaring that the Austrian emperor had been in
conference with Napoleon since six that morning, and that a truce had
been arranged. This falsehood enabled Alexander to escape across the
river March and avoid being made a prisoner of war. It was only in the
afternoon that the Emperor Francis was received by Napoleon in a tent
near Holitsch, and it was not before the sixth that the campaign was
ended by Austria's acceptance of such terms for an armistice as the
Emperor of the French chose to impose.
Considering the character of the battle, the terms first suggested
were not hard: No loss of territory for Austria if the Russian emperor
would withdraw to his own territories and shut out England from his
harbors; otherwise Napoleon would take Venetia for Italy and Tyrol for
Bavaria. Alexander would not listen to the embargo project, nor to
Francis's desperate suggestion that they should continue the war. On
the sixth, having, according to Savary, exchanged fulsome compliments
with Napoleon, he marched away for Russia, leaving his ally to take
the consequences of what was really his own rashness. This was a
complete rupture of the coalition: its weightiest stipulation was that
none of the members should make a separate peace. The only hope of
Austria for endurable terms now lay in Prussian cooeperation. But
Haugwitz could no longer offer the ultimatum agreed upon at Potsdam;
the battle had of course utterly changed the situation. Napoleon now
demanded nothing less from Prussia than the long-desired alliance
offensive and defensive. On December fifteenth Frederick William's
envoy assented provisionally, and set out for Berlin to secure the
royal assent, if possible. His master was to keep Hanover and close
her ports to the English; to give Cleves, Wesel, and Neuchatel to
France; to cede Ansbach to Bavaria; and to acknowledge the latter as a
kingdom, with such eastern boundaries as Austria would agree to yield.
For an instant Napoleon thought of continuing the war to annihilate
Austria forever. Talleyrand's hand, however, had been crossed, as no
one doubted, with an enormous bribe from Austrian sources, and he
persuaded the Emperor not to follow the bad advice of his generals,
but to "rise higher as a statesman" and make peace. With his assent to
this went ever larger and harder demands, until Francis actually
contemplated a renewal of the desperate and unequal struggle alone and
unassisted. He had in all probability a fighting chance, but his
longing for peace prevailed. When the treaty was signed, on December
twenty-sixth, 1805, at Presburg, Austria surrendered Venice, with
Friuli, Istria, and Dalmatia, to Italy; ceded Tyrol to Bavaria;
consented to the banishment of the Bourbons from Naples; accepted all
the new arrangements which had recently been made by Napoleon in
Italy, and agreed to pay a war indemnity of forty million francs. The
contributions laid on Austrian lands in irregular ways during the
progress of the campaign had been probably more than as much again.
The recognition of Bavaria as an independent kingdom, and the
rearrangement of German territories, put an end to the (p.~391)
empire; Francis, having in 1804 assumed the title Emperor of Austria,
was heartily tired of the rather bedraggled imperial Roman style which
he still wore. Wuertemberg received five cities on the Danube, the
counties of Hohenems and Wellenburg, with part of the Breisgau, and
became a kingdom like Bavaria; Baden got the rest of the Breisgau,
together with Ortenau, Mainau, and the city of Constance; Bavaria
received not only Tyrol, with the Vorarlberg, but Brixen, Trent,
Passau, Eichstaedt, Burgau, Lindau, and other minor possessions, to
round out her new frontier. In scanty amends Salzburg and
Berchtesgaden were assigned to the Austrian Empire.
The fighting on both sides at Austerlitz was in the main superb. "My
people," said the Emperor to his soldiers--"my people will see you
again with delight; and if one of you shall say, 'I was at
Austerlitz,' every one will respond, 'Here stands a hero.'" The
legions of the Empire had indeed fought with unsurpassed bravery, as
had likewise the Austrians. The Russians were not so steadfast. In
their first experience of the "furia Francesa" their old notions of
courage were wiped out. "Those who saw the battle-field," said the
"Moniteur," "will testify that it lay strewn with Austrians where the
fight was thickest, while elsewhere it was strewn with Russian
knapsacks." Such was the effect upon his men that not only did
Alexander leave his ally in the lurch and march back into Poland, but
he felt called on to publish a bulletin asserting the valor of his
own, and the timidity of the Austrian troops. But the "Battle of
Austerlitz," as it is called in French phrase, the "Fight of the Three
Emperors," as the Germans designate the day, was epochal, not merely
for the courage displayed, but for the tactical revolution it wrought.
It was the first true Napoleonic battle. Thenceforward the greatest
conflicts were arranged on its commanding principle--a principle
which had long been used, but was then for the first time fully
developed and accepted.
Throughout the preceding period of warfare an army was set in motion
as a whole, every portion being from first to last in the commander's
hand ready for manoeuvering. If any division was hemmed in, or any
portion of the line was broken, the result was defeat. From 1805
onward any single part, center or either wing, could be annihilated,
and the victory still be won elsewhere by the other parts. For this
two things are essential: first, fresh troops to throw into the proper
place at the proper time; second, a line of retreat, with a new basis
for operations, previously prepared. The highest military authorities
go so far as to say that in a well-arranged battle one portion of the
line should even be sacrificed to the enemy in order to secure victory
with the others. The pursuit after Austerlitz was as fine as the
attack, and so colossal and comprehensive was Napoleon's genius that
he had made complete arrangements for withdrawing in case of defeat,
not, as the enemy thought, toward Vienna, but through Bohemia to
Passau. The total numbers engaged were, on the side of the allies,
about ninety thousand; on that of the French, about eighty thousand.
The Austrians and Russians lost fifteen thousand killed and wounded,
with twenty thousand taken prisoners, while the French had seven
thousand killed and wounded in the long and dreadful stand made at the
Goldbach by their right, and about five thousand elsewhere. The
Emperor thought it a small price to pay for the hegemony of Europe,
and his favorite title was "Victor of Austerlitz." "Soldiers," he
cried at Borodino, as the sun burst through the dun clouds, "it is the
sun of Austerlitz!" and his flagging army revived its drooping
spirits.