THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE[19]
[Footnote 19: Daudet: Les Bourbons et la Russie; the letters
of Rostopchin in Woronzoff's Archives, Vol. VIII; articles by
Tatistcheff in the Revue d'histoire diplomatique, 1889; by
Buchholz in Preussische Jahrbuecher, 1896; Rambaud: Histoire
de Russie; Czartoryski: Memoires; De Maistre (Joseph):
Memoires et correspondance; Teche: Les origines du Concordat;
Sloane: The French Revolution and Religious Reform; Boulay de
la Meurthe: Negotiation du Concordat; Theiner: Histoire des
deux Concordats; Mahan: Life of Nelson; Schiemann: Die
Ermordung Pauls; Langeron: Memoirs; likewise those of
Norvins, Barante, and Moriolles; Brueckner: Kaiser Pauls Ende
(von R. R.); Bowman: Preliminary Stages of the Peace of
Amiens; Fauchille: Du blocus maritime.]
Russia, Italy, and Spain -- The Kingdom of Etruria -- The
Consulate and Royalty -- The Church in France -- The Concordat --
Affairs in England -- France and Russia -- The Battle of
Copenhagen -- Preliminaries of Peace -- Terms of the Agreement --
France and the United States.
[Sidenote: 1801]
The genius of Bonaparte was all-embracing, because it made one forward
step follow close upon another, and that with no appearance of
compulsion; for this reason he went so far. The treaty of Luneville
was the first move toward a general pacification. What was to be done
with the rest of Italy, with Spain and with Portugal, in order to
secure his preponderance in western Europe? To the blandishments of
the Consulate, the Czar gave a hearty response. He suggested some sort
of demonstration against Great Britain, not alone in the Orient but on
her very shores; he advised Prussia to seize Hanover, turned the
pretender, Louis XVIII, and his court away from Mittau in midwinter,
and dismissed the Bourbon emissary from St. Petersburg. To checkmate
Austria he espoused the cause of Piedmont and the Two Sicilies,
suggested the Rhine as the French frontier and the restitution of
Egypt to Turkey. His Oriental plan was corollary to the armed
neutrality he organized to checkmate England. To give respectful heed
and retain the good will of Russia, which thus interceded for a
monarchical Naples, nothing was said about restoring the Parthenopean
Republic. Instead, Ferdinand IV, though compelled to evacuate the
Papal States, and to restore the pictures and other booty which in the
manner of the time he had removed to his capital, was left in full
possession of his crown. English ships were to be forbidden his ports,
and the expenses of a French army corps, which should lie, under
Soult, at Tarentum, were to be borne by his treasury.
The affairs of Spain had reached a crisis in the low intrigues of her
court. Marengo destroyed the influence of the anti-French party at
Madrid. Godoy, styled "Prince of the Peace" from his having negotiated
the treaty of Basel, had been made prime minister through the
influence of Queen Louisa, whom he had infatuated. Though successful
in being both the Queen's lover and the King's intimate friend, he was
nevertheless an incapable statesman. In 1796 he made Spain still more
subservient to France by the first treaty of San Ildefonso; and such
was the public resentment that he had to resign. Through Bonaparte's
influence he was restored to power, and in a second treaty of San
Ildefonso Spain became the servile ally of the Consulate. By the terms
of this compact, as already partly expressed in the treaty of
Luneville, not only were Parma and Elba left in the hands of France,
but Louisiana was ceded to her, the French colonies in South America
were enlarged, and a combined force of French and Spanish troops was
organized, which compelled Portugal to abandon the English alliance
and accept Bonaparte's terms. The little but important realm was also
to shut her harbors to English ships, and pay twenty-five million
francs to France. In return, Tuscany was to be erected into a kingdom,
with the name of Etruria, for Louis, the heir of Ferdinand of Parma.
The latter was a son of Don Philip of Spain, and as his son, the young
King, had married the daughter of the ruling sovereigns of Spain, the
new royal family was virtually Spanish, their infant boy having only
one remote strain of Austrian blood.
When, shortly after, an actor in Paris recited from the stage, in
Bonaparte's presence, the line, "J'ai fait des rois, madame, et n'ai
pas voulu l'etre," the house rocked with applause. The young King was
also brought to Paris and paraded as an attendant in the First
Consul's antechamber. A few felt the unworthiness of such a game, but
the national vanity was tickled. Attendant republics already revolved
about the great central French republic; were kingdoms, too, beginning
to join the round? It will be seen that, in comparison with the
radical anti-royalist policy of the Directory three years before,
these arrangements must be considered moderate. To abandon the Roman
and Parthenopean republics, and to constitute a new kingdom for a
Bourbon, were actions of great significance to the courts of Europe.
But a still more pregnant step was the relation established between
the Consulate and the papacy. Among all the institutions erected by
Bonaparte, none proved more valuable than that which restored the
French Church to Rome. The "civil constitution" of the Jacobin
republic virtually created a voluntary Gallican Church, because all
the conforming priesthood, of whom it will be remembered that Madame
Mere's half-brother Fesch was one, became dependent on the state in
support and allegiance. By the laws of 1790 the old diocesan
boundaries were wiped out, bishops and priests were chosen by the
people, and the celibacy of the clergy was abolished. In consequence,
there had at first been bitter resistance and stern repression. But
during the last years of the Directory both liberty of conscience and
freedom of religion reigned in theory throughout France. There was,
however, continuous social disturbance, bickering between sectaries
both Christian and infidel, license of speech and conduct; in short, a
condition pregnant with possibilities of disaster. Napoleon passed
through a stage of rampant unbelief in his youth, and wrote a thesis
in which he compared the Saviour unfavorably with Apollonius of Tyana.
But with advancing years the dimensions of the papacy impressed his
imagination, while ripening political wisdom convinced him of its
power. As his ambitions became dominant he defied the Directory, and
in 1797 left standing the framework of the papal edifice, because he
already saw that the French people had returned to papal allegiance.
In spite of the course imposed upon him by the events of Fructidor, he
understood that no reunion of all elements in the population was
possible except under the favor of Rome.
Shortly after Bonaparte's inauguration as First Consul there began to
be circulated a moving tale of how the great man was frequently and
visibly affected as he listened to the village chimes from his windows
at Malmaison, evidently recalling the hallowed influences of his
mother's faith. The act of the Consulate in ordering the performance
of funeral obsequies for Pius VI was a recognition of the popular
movement. After an interregnum of eight months a new pope, Pius VII,
was elected at Venice on March thirteenth, 1800. This was done under
the auspices of Austria and after long, fierce contention by the
fugitive members of an incomplete conclave, yet soon afterward
Bonaparte informed the Pontiff that, excepting the legations which
Austria still occupied, the territories of his predecessors were under
certain conditions at his disposal. The papal secretary, Cardinal
Consalvi, set out for Paris, after what was considered a becoming
delay; and before the middle of July, 1801, the treaty known as the
Concordat was concluded. The First Consul conceded that the laws of
1790 should be abolished, and that the Pope should be officially
recognized by the State as head of the Church. The appointments of
archbishops and bishops made by the government were not to be valid
until confirmed at Rome. In return the Pope was to end the conflict of
State and Church in France, rally all good Catholics to the support of
the republic, accept the loss of the confiscated ecclesiastical
estates in return for a subsidy of fifty million francs, and recognize
the clergy as civil officials in the pay of the State. Thus, at a
single stroke, the measure of religious liberty which revolutionary
atheism had unwittingly established was destroyed and the French
nation relegated to a modified control by Rome; but on the other hand,
the strongest support of the Bourbons was struck down, the existing
order recognized, and Bonaparte felt assured, as he declared at St.
Helena, that in view of France's overwhelming influence in Italy, the
Pope, as a petty Italian prince, would become entirely subservient to
himself. As is the case in all instances of that judicious compromise
which is the foundation of statesmanship, no party or clique in either
France or Rome was entirely satisfied. The Pope and his councilors
chafed under a series of "organic articles" which, though integral to
the treaty, emanated from the secular authority alone and interpreted
the treaty in a sense favorable to the secular power. The
free-thinkers of France sneered, the philosophers smiled
sarcastically, the military authorities were shocked, the returned
emigrants outraged. But the great French nation was consolidated in a
twinkling, and the Concordat stood for more than a century. The Pope
felt that the church in France had been saved as by fire, and forced
the treaty upon his unwilling associates, while Bonaparte was even
more peremptory and high-handed with his recalcitrant officials. Both
knew that it was this or religious anarchy.
But a spectacle even stranger was soon to be offered to the world.
Whatever form the struggle between France and England for ascendancy
had taken throughout the long centuries it had lasted, it was ever and
always bitter and envenomed. The French Revolution had offered the
English Tories an opportunity, as they believed, finally and literally
to crush France, even to the extent which Lord Chatham had always
declared necessary for enduring peace. The younger Pitt inherited his
father's idea, and the conquering policy of the republic had enforced
his position, so that since the beginning of the present struggle
between the two countries the British nation had reposed unbounded
confidence in him. Unfortunately, he used this popular feeling to
retain power after his convictions had changed. But successful as the
war had been, it seemed to many as if there were no limits to its
duration, and to timid minds the payment of lavish subsidies to the
successive coalitions, combined with the expensive mismanagement of
the naval establishment, augured bankruptcy. Pitt fell from power on
the question of Catholic emancipation in Ireland, a matter in which he
disagreed with George III, the unnerved, feeble King; the Addington
ministry which succeeded was popular because it was understood to be
above all else a peace ministry.
When, in 1799, Russia, furious at the perfidy of Austria and weary of
the tyranny exercised by England over the seas, had instigated a
renewal of the armed neutrality, and banished the French pretender,
the delicate attentions and substantial offers of Bonaparte, already
enumerated, completely won the heart of the Czar. Early in 1800 a
confidential Russian agent appeared in Paris, and urged the First
Consul to declare himself King. He also proposed to arrange terms for
an alliance of the two rulers in order to destroy English power in
India, according to plans already outlined by the Czar. An agreement
was quickly reached, which early in 1801 resulted in a proposition by
Paul for two expeditions: one Russian, by way of the Don and across
the carry to the Volga, thence through the Ural Mountains to the
Indus, and from the Indus to the Ganges; the other Franco-Russian, to
proceed by the Danube, the Black Sea, the Don, and the Volga to
Astrakhan and Persia, where it was to combine with the former. The
plan for the latter was worked out in the minutest detail, and every
item was carefully commentated by Bonaparte.
England's reply to the armed neutrality of the Northern powers was the
despatch to the Baltic of a powerful fleet, which reached Copenhagen
late in March, 1801. Negotiations were opened by Sir Hyde Parker, who,
because of his diplomatic abilities, had been made first in command,
and lasted for some days, but failed. On April second, Nelson, who was
next in command, opened fire on the lines of defense erected before
the city. His success was only partial. During the intervals of a
parley opened by him, ostensibly in the interest of humanity, he
withdrew his crippled ships out of danger and accepted an
inconclusive armistice. England's object, however, was reached in
another way. During the night of March twenty-third, 1801, Paul was
assassinated in his bed, not without suspicion of connivance on the
part of his son Alexander, who succeeded him. The murder was done by a
band of drunken brutes, officers of important regiments who had been
wrought to a pitch of frenzy. A clique of conspirator nobles had
persuaded themselves and the assassins that Paul was crazy and was
leading the country to ruin. Like the rest of Europe, the empire was
divided into French and English parties, the latter comprising all who
lived at ease on government places or inherited fortunes. The mass of
the nation and the troops worshiped their Czar for his defiance of
Great Britain, his French sympathy, and the reversal of Catherine's
policy. It was a palace clique which, as again and again in Russian
history, did to death a monarch thwarting the plans of aristocrats and
placemen. The new Czar, whatever his share in the compact which set
him on the throne, behaved at least like an agent of the conspirators,
for he did not continue his father's policy. On the contrary, he
immediately liberated the English ships in his harbors, and, further,
waived all claim to Malta. The league of Northern neutrals fell by its
own weight. For all this, however, Great Britain was still left
without a supporting Continental coalition in the face of Marengo and
Luneville.
The death of Paul likewise affected the position of France, which
again became insecure. This disposed the First Consul more than ever
to yield to the universal clamor for peace. Addington's overtures had
at first been coldly received, for Bonaparte wanted the restoration of
all the colonial conquests England had made during the long war. But
the death of the Czar and the attitude of his successor changed the
situation. Still further came news that since Kleber's death one
disaster after another had overtaken Menou in Egypt. He had been
compelled to surrender Cairo in June, and the fall of Alexandria was
only a question of time. Negotiations with England were thereupon
seriously resumed. Both sides being equally eager for peace,
arrangements were completed within a reasonable time, and on October
first, 1801, the resulting preliminaries were ratified. The news was
received in London with joyous acclamations.
England bound herself by the preliminaries of London to restore all
her colonial conquests except Trinidad and Ceylon, and to withdraw
from Malta and the other Mediterranean ports which she had seized.
France was to restore Egypt to the Porte, to withdraw her troops from
Naples, and to guarantee the integrity of Portugal, which the First
Consul had intended to incorporate with Spain for his further
purposes. A week later a secret treaty between France and Russia was
signed: the two powers were to settle the affairs of Germany and Italy
in concert. The idea of perpetual intervention in the German empire by
France originated with Richelieu; no Russian monarch since the time of
Peter the Great could feel his dignity secure without the same
privilege. Such an agreement was, therefore, a final seal to France's
new alliance. With Turkey likewise the old relations of amity were
reestablished by a new treaty. Bavaria was appeased by promises.
There would have been one other war-cloud on the distant horizon had
it not wisely been dispelled in time. The United States had suffered
much from the pretensions of the Directory to control its commerce in
the French interest, on the plea of gratitude. The declaration of
neutrality made by Washington in 1793 was ill received in Paris; the
treaty of commerce concluded with England in the following year was
regarded by the French government as a breach of neutrality, and the
Directory suspended diplomatic relations. Their insolent agents in the
United States had so embroiled the question of the relations of that
nation with the two countries respectively that a rupture with France
was threatened, especially when Talleyrand's unblushing effrontery in
demanding enormous bribes from the American envoys was made public.
Great as their obligations were, the United States had no intention of
becoming tributary to France. The recognition by England of their
neutrality had given them the whole colonial trade of France, Holland,
and Spain. Their principle was virtually that of the armed neutrality
of 1780: that neutral ships made neutral goods, "free ships, free
goods." For this they were ready to fight. The First Consul had
recognized the value for his own schemes of a great neutral maritime
state, and on September thirty, 1800, had concluded a convention
regulating commerce which for the time removed all sources of friction
between his government and that at Washington. It was reciprocally
agreed that the flag protects the goods, and that merchantmen under
convoy may not be searched.