STATESMANSHIP AND STRATEGY[16]
[Footnote 16: The important military authorities are
Napoleon's own letters and bulletins. Dumolin: Precis
d'histoire militaire. Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon als
Feldherr. Jomini: Histoire critique et militaire des guerres
de la Revolution, 1792-1803. Dodge: Napoleon. Clausewitz:
Werke. For other material see Thugut's letters, Marbot's
memoirs, Thiebault's Journal of the Blockade of Genoa, Valmy:
Histoire de la Campagne de 1800, Alison's Castlereagh,
Woronzow's Archives, and Bailleu: Essays in the Historische
Zeitschrift, vols. 77 and 81; Cugnac: Campagne de l'armee de
reserve en 1800, La campagne de Marengo; Gachot: La deuxieme
campagne d'Italie; Neipperg: Apercu sur la bataille de
Marengo; Hueffer: Quellen zur Geschichte des Zeitalters der
franzoesischen Revolution; Picard: Bonaparte et Moreau.]
Bonaparte's Plan of Campaign -- His Relation to Moreau -- The
Reserve Army -- The Movements of Moreau -- The Austrians Defeated
-- Further Advance of Moreau -- Bonaparte with the Army -- The
Italian Campaign -- Position of the Austrians -- The St. Bernard
-- Passage of the Alps -- Military Problems -- Grand Strategy --
Bonaparte's Preparation.
By an article of the new French constitution the First Consul might
not be also commander-in-chief of the forces; but, as he said to Miot
de Melito, nothing forbade him to be present with the army.
Nevertheless, his military greatness was now for the first time to
display its stupendous proportions. Hitherto, superb as had been his
achievements, they had been won as a subordinate carrying out one part
of a large plan, and securing prominence for his own ideas only by
disregarding those of nominal superiors. Now he had charge of a great
war in its entirety. There was but one obstacle--Moreau's ability and
jealousy. With the superiority of true greatness, Bonaparte at once
took in the military situation, and, disregarding all the vexing
details which would pass for essentials with men of less ability,
analyzed it into its large and simple elements. If Kray were beaten,
the French army could reach Vienna, and dictate peace before Melas
could produce an effect in Italy. His plan, therefore, was to unite
near Schaffhausen the various portions of the reserve army which he
had quietly been organizing, and, covered by the Rhine, to effect a
junction with Moreau; then by overwhelming superiority of numbers to
turn Kray's left flank, cut off his connections, and, taking his army
in the rear, either capture or annihilate it. Moreover, a detachment
of this victorious force could then cross the easy lower passes of the
Alps, and attack the Austrian army in Italy from the rear, even if in
the interval that force should have been victorious. In this one great
combination lies the proof of its author's genius. Its five great
strategic principles are these: one line of operation, with one
offensive; the massing of the army as the first aim; the line of
operation on the enemy's flank verging toward his rear; the
surrounding of the enemy's wing so as to jeopardize his connections;
and lastly, the defense of your own connections. Standing in sharpest
contrast with those of his great predecessor Frederick, these
principles have not yet been overthrown even by modern science, nor by
the revolutionary change which has taken place in the material of war
and in the number of men engaged in modern conflicts.
But the idea was too great for the conditions. Moreau would not serve
as second in command, and Bonaparte was perfectly aware that he
himself was not yet sufficiently firm in his political seat to
alienate a rival so influential. In fact, on March sixteenth, he wrote
a private letter to Moreau, in which he said: "General (p.~164)
Dessoles will tell you that no one is more interested than I am in
your personal glory and in your happiness. The English are embarking
in force. What do they want? I am to-day a sort of manikin which has
lost its liberty and its happiness. Greatness is fine, but only in
memory and in imagination. I envy your happy lot. You are going to do
great things with brave men. I would gladly exchange my consular
purple for the epaulets of a brigade commander under your orders." All
the First Consul's military conceptions had to be carefully
propounded; that for a campaign in central Germany was not carried out
until several years later. Moreau, conscious of his own powers, would
not even accept Bonaparte's suggestions for conducting the passage of
the Rhine. He was therefore left perforce to act independently except
for instructions from Paris that he should take the offensive at once,
and drive the enemy into Bavaria behind the Lech, so as to intercept
his direct communication with Milan by way of Lake Constance and the
Grisons. Lecourbe, with twenty thousand men, was to watch the higher
Alpine passes. The dangerous rival was then left entirely to himself,
and the destination of the reserve army was changed to Italy. This, of
course, was done in order that such success as Moreau would certainly
have won with its aid might not endanger the political situation in
Paris. He must not be permitted to retrieve a reputation sullied both
by his suspected connection with Pichegru's conspiracy, and by his
participation, contrary to lifelong professions, in the revolution of
Brumaire.
Early in March the existence of the hitherto hidden army was revealed
by an order for its advance toward Zurich to prepare for crossing the
Alps. Switzerland, having fallen into French hands through Massena's
operations of the previous year, and being therefore no (p.~165)
longer neutral, its territory was open for use in offensive operations
against the foe. Massena had received his first instructions a few
days earlier. They were to concentrate the Army of Italy in order to
defend Genoa and the entrance to France. Melas would surely follow the
well-worn Austrian plan of advancing in three columns for a concentric
attack. The French general was to avoid two, and meet the third with
all his strength. In April, however, he was informed of the new
combination, and told to stand on the defensive until the reserve army
had crossed the Alps. "The art of war," Bonaparte always said, "is to
gain time when your strength is inferior." This Massena, with
brilliant capacity, undertook to do when, on April sixth, the brave
and veteran Melas attacked him with sixty thousand men. But in spite
of repeated successes against superior numbers, before the end of the
month active resistance became impossible, and the whole French center
was compelled to withdraw on April twenty-first behind the walls of
Genoa, the situation of which now became precarious, for it was
blockaded by the English fleet, and provisions were growing very
scanty, not more than sufficient stores for a month being available.
Suchet, with the left of Massena's army, ten thousand strong,
retreated along the coast, pursued by Melas with twenty-eight
thousand, until on May fourteenth the former crossed the Var. Ott,
with twenty-four thousand men, was left to beleaguer Genoa, in which
Massena held out until June fourth--a siege considered one of the most
stubborn in history.
Such had been the wretched management of the previous year in the
department of war at Paris that Moreau's force was not properly
supplied in any particular, and he would not move until a month after
the time arranged. It was not until April twenty-fifth, (p.~166)
after an urgent request from Bonaparte, that he ventured to carry out
his own cautious plan for the passage of the Rhine in four divisions
instead of in one united body, as the First Consul had suggested. Less
was risked, and probably less was won; but the complicated movement
was prosperous. Making a feint as if to occupy the Black Forest, he
completely misled Kray as to his real intentions, and induced him to
abandon his strong position at Donaueschingen. By a series of clever
countermarches, in which the Rhine was crossed and recrossed several
times by various French corps, the whole of Moreau's command was
finally united beyond the Black Forest, having successfully outflanked
not only that dangerous mountain-range, but also the enemy, which was
still occupied in guarding its eastern exits.
The movement was brought to a fortunate conclusion by the French
advance, before which the Austrians withdrew to secure a position. In
the last days of April Moreau found himself with only twenty-five
thousand men facing the mass of the Austrians under Kray at Engen. In
the rear, on his left, but beyond reach, was a division of his own
army under Saint-Cyr. On May second, expecting their speedy arrival,
he joined battle with his inadequate force. The reinforcements did not
arrive; but after a desperate fight, with serious loss, he defeated
the enemy. Next day Saint-Cyr came in, and the Austrians, having
learned that Stockach with its abundant stores had fallen into the
hands of the French division under Lecourbe, withdrew northeastward
toward the Danube. Moreau's success was unqualified. Kray could no
longer retreat toward the Tyrol by Switzerland and the Vorarlberg; he
had also lost a large supply of munitions most precious to their
captors, besides five thousand prisoners and three thousand killed.
Nevertheless, he was still undismayed, and two days later made a stand
at Messkirch. After an embittered and sanguinary conflict on May fifth
he was again defeated. The victory of Moreau would have been
overwhelming but for a second inexplicable failure of Saint-Cyr to
bring his division into action. Investigation revealed that while that
division general had displayed no zeal and had evinced no good will in
the interpretation of orders, he had strictly obeyed their letter. His
laxity was therefore overlooked. It was soon found that the Austrians
were again gathered to defend their depots at Biberach. This time
Saint-Cyr was ardent, and with conspicuous fire he led his inferior
numbers against the enemy's center, driving them from their position.
Still aglow with victory, he then called in a second division under
Richepanse, and attacking again the main body of the enemy's army,
which was drawn up on the slopes of the Mettenberg, dislodged them
from that position also. Two days later Lecourbe captured Memmingen
with eighteen hundred prisoners, and on the tenth the Austrians
withdrew to make a determined stand on a fortified camp at Ulm. It is
probable that in two days Moreau would have driven them from that
position if his force had been left intact; but Carnot had come in
person to ask for the detachment of Lecourbe's corps to serve in
Italy, and a request from such a man could not well be denied.
The First Consul had studied the situation of France as carefully as
he had analyzed that of Europe. Bernadotte was chief in command of all
the soldiers within the confines of the republic. He was bound in the
most solemn way to treat every faction with the utmost consideration
and gentleness far and near throughout the land; above all, to lull
the West into repose. To the judicious Cambaceres was intrusted the
supreme power at Paris: "during the absence of the First Consul," his
orders ran. His duty was to repress without pity every symptom of
disturbance by the aid of the police under Fouche and the soldiery
under Dubois. The news was carefully spread about that Bonaparte would
soon return, very shortly in fact; there was uneasiness among the
best-disposed at the thought of his absence, of his carefully balanced
machinery left to the care of others. His departure was carefully
arranged. The partizans of Massena were alert that the fortunes of
their hero should not be sacrificed. The news, true though inaccurate,
that Kleber had capitulated in Egypt made little stir, but the fact
was rather ugly. "Have it understood," were Bonaparte's later
instructions to Talleyrand, "that had I remained in Egypt that superb
colony would have been ours, just as, had I remained in France, we
would not have lost Italy." Desaix, of whose eminent ability and
vigorous character Bonaparte had formed the highest opinion, was
already on the way, and for him a letter was left urging his presence
at the earliest moment in Italy. The glorious news of Moreau's
brilliant successes was read from the stage of the opera, where the
First Consul led the enthusiastic cheering, and that very night,
having sent a message of congratulation to the conqueror, "glory and
thrice glory," he departed for Dijon. Next day Paris was reassured,
gay and brilliant. It so continued until his own triumphant return.
Resting for a short day at Dijon, he hurried on to Geneva, where he
remained for three days in consultation with Necker. Thence he passed
to Lausanne, where Carnot arrived with the news of his successful
mission. Moreau had been flattered by the great consideration implied
in such an embassy. From every side the news was satisfactory.
Berthier's work of organization was thorough and complete: the raw
recruits were drilled to efficiency. The generals were resplendent in
health, spirits, and fine uniforms. The First Consul, clad in the blue
frock of his civil office, wearing at times his rather shabby gray
overcoat, with a slim sword at his side and a soft cocked hat on his
head, was a very inconspicuous figure indeed. He was with the army,
but not apparently in formal command.
Bonaparte's earlier plan for using the reserve army was that it should
take up the division of Lecourbe, cross from Zurich by the Spluegen
into Italy, where, absorbing Massena's force, it would finally number
over a hundred thousand, and be sufficiently strong to conquer Melas.
But the latter's immense superiority of numbers throughout April had
enabled him in the mean while to cut off all communication with
Massena, and the worst was feared. It was determined, therefore, to
cross the Alps much farther to the westward; and Berthier was ordered
to study first the St. Gotthard and the Simplon, then both the Great
and Little St. Bernard passes, the former of which was still
erroneously held to be Hannibal's route. This easy adaptation to
changing conditions was another sign of the First Consul's military
greatness. The idea of a march to Milan was likewise quickly abandoned
in order to relieve Massena the sooner by way of Tortona. By May ninth
all was in order. By "general's reckoning, not that of the office," as
Berthier's words were, there were forty-two thousand men on or near
the Lake of Geneva. When Bonaparte arrived at Lausanne on the tenth,
Lannes was at the foot of the Great St. Bernard, with eight thousand
infantry; four other divisions, comprising twenty-five thousand men,
stood between Lausanne and the head of the lake; another, of five
thousand men, under Chabran, was in Savoy at the foot of the Little
St. Bernard. Besides these, Turreau, with five thousand men who had
originally formed part of Massena's left wing, was at the southern end
of the Mont Cenis pass; and the fifteen thousand men detached from
Moreau were already marching under Moncey toward the northern entrance
of the St. Gotthard.
The situation of the Austrians and the French in Italy had not
materially changed on May thirteenth, and was of course still to the
advantage of the former. Massena was in Genoa with twelve thousand
available troops and sixteen thousand sick or wounded. Ott was
conducting the siege with twenty-four thousand men. Melas, with his
twenty-eight thousand men, was still on the Var, firmly convinced that
the French reserve army would unite with Suchet's ten thousand in
Provence and attack from the front. Five days later he was informed of
the truth, and leaving a corps of seventeen thousand to guard the
Riviera, hurried with the rest back to Turin, which he reached on the
twenty-fifth. Ten thousand Austrians were watching the St. Gotthard at
Bellinzona, three thousand were in the valley of the Dora Baltea to
observe the southern exit from the St. Bernard range, while five
thousand were on the Dora Riparia and one thousand on the Stura for
similar purposes regarding the Mont Cenis. Six thousand were marching
from Tuscany to reinforce Melas, and three thousand remained there;
while in the Romagna, in Istria, and in various garrisons of upper
Italy, were sixteen thousand more.
On May fourteenth began what has been justly considered one of
Bonaparte's most daring and brilliant moves. Even at the present day
and after extensive improvement of grade, the road over the Great St.
Bernard is for a long stretch barely passable for wheeled vehicles; it
was then a wretched mule-track, more like the bed of a mountain
torrent than a highway, and at that season of the year storms of snow
and sleet often rage about the hospice and on the higher reaches of
the path. The First Consul had carefully considered the great outlines
of his strategy; the detail had wisely been left to able lieutenants.
One by one the successive divisions, with that of Lannes at the front,
climbed the steeps, crossed the yoke, and passed down on the other
side to Aosta. There was, of course, some snow, and there was in any
case no track for the gun-carriages; the cannon were therefore
dismounted, laid in sledges of hollowed logs, and dragged by sheer
human force along the rough highway.
The passage into the upper vale of Aosta was commonplace enough, and
on the sixteenth the head of Chabran's column also arrived there
safely by way of the Little St. Bernard. But every enterprise has its
crisis. Lower down, on an abrupt and perpendicular rock, was Fort
Bard, which entirely controlled the valley. It proved to be
impregnable. Lannes hesitated for a day. Berthier wrote him that the
fate of Italy, perhaps of the republic, hung upon its capture. This
proved to be a pardonable exaggeration. The French van took a rude
mountain-path which lay to the northward over Monte Albaredo, and,
leaving their artillery behind, advanced, or rather climbed across,
toward Ivrea. Bonaparte himself came up two days later, and, hearing
that Melas had now left the Var, ordered the path to be improved.
Lannes, in the interval, attacked Ivrea, but failed for want of
cannon. Marmont, the chief of artillery, could not wait for the
engineers to complete the new road, but, wrapping all his wheels in
hay, and strewing the streets of the hamlet at the foot of Fort Bard
with dung, carried all the guns safely past under cover of night. The
Austrians could not fire in a plumb-line downward, and, though aware
of the movement, they were helpless. The garrison held out for a time,
but surrendered on June first. Ivrea fell at once; the three thousand
Austrians in the valley were scattered; and the Italian plains lay
open to the daring adventurers, many of whom, having once outflanked
the Alps under the same leader, had now attacked and surmounted them.
Their enemy was first incredulous, then surprised and undecided; his
forces were so scattered that it seemed as if he could no longer hold
Tortona. Should that fortress fall into French hands, Genoa could be
promptly relieved.
Bonaparte at once became perfectly aware not only of the Austrian
position, but also of the favorable opportunity it opened for him. His
ideas began immediately to expand and change. Why not take advantage
of the time which must intervene before the Austrians could
concentrate for a decisive action, leave Massena to hold Genoa a few
days longer, himself march to Milan and secure Lombardy, then cross
the Po, and, after having cut off all Melas's connections, offer him
battle? That a single battle might decide the fate of Italy was the
conception of a strategist. The inverse order of defeating Melas,
relieving Genoa, taking Milan, and driving the enemy behind the Adda,
would have meant a long campaign. This was the first appearance of
this keen conception, which recurs twice more in Napoleon's life--in
1809 and in 1813.
Before the end of the month every portion of the army had done its
work. Turreau was over Mont Cenis, and had driven in the Austrian
guards. Moncey had passed the St. Gotthard in safety, and was ready at
Bellinzona. A side column under Bethencourt had crossed the Simplon
and was near Domo d'Ossola. On June second the united French force had
crossed the Ticino in safety, and the vanguard entered Milan as the
Austrian garrison withdrew first to Lodi and then to Crema. Murat was
despatched with his cavalry to drive the retreating columns so far
that they could not interfere with the next serious operation, the
crossing of the Po. Bonaparte celebrated his return not only by the
reestablishment of the Cisalpine Republic and by great civic
festivals, but by a religious solemnity at which he declared his
respect for the Holy Father and his attachment to the faith. The great
cathedral was his special charge. Among the statues of saints which
adorn its myriad pinnacles, one of the best is his own portrait.