"THE RETURN OF THE HERO"[10]
[Footnote 10: The fullest accounts are those of Sorel and
Vandal. Further authorities are the memoirs of Duport de
Cheverny, of Larevelliere-Lepeaux, of Lafayette, of Mme. de
Chastenay, and of Pasquier, the works of Roederer, the
studies of Aulard, the contemporary journals and reviews.
Also, E. and I. de Goncourt: Histoire de la Societe Francaise
pendant le Directoire. Stenger: La Societe Francaise pendant
le Consulat. Rocquain: L'Etat de la France au 18 Brumaire.]
The Second Coalition -- Failures and Defeats of the Directory --
The Rastadt Congress -- Murder of the French Plenipotentiaries --
The Crisis in France -- The Revolution of Prairial -- The
Conscription -- The Schemes of the Directors -- The Successes of
the Bonapartists -- The Attitude of Paris -- "The Return of the
Hero" -- The Man of Destiny.
The situation of affairs in Europe at the close of 1799 was, as
Bonaparte had anticipated, by no means simple. England having been
scorned in the propositions for peace which she made in 1797 at Lille,
a second coalition of France's enemies was formed in 1798, largely
through the efforts of Paul I, the new Czar of Russia. The
organization of the Helvetian Republic in Switzerland had brought the
Revolution into the very heart of central Europe, and thus had further
estranged the trembling dynasties of both Austria and Prussia. The
organization on February eighteenth, 1798, of the Roman Republic had
brought the Revolution to the frontiers of Naples; when her king,
having joined the coalition, renewed hostilities and inaugurated a
general war by throwing an army into Rome, the French troops in Italy
were divided, and a portion of them, under Championnet, overturned the
Neapolitan throne in a kind of pleasure excursion. In January, 1799,
the Parthenopean Republic was proclaimed. By a skilfully devised
complot in which Lucien Bonaparte was active, the Directory charged
the feeble King of Sardinia with unfriendliness, the Cisalpine
Republic picked a quarrel with him, Tuscany became involved in the
ensuing disorders, and Charles Emmanuel IV was compelled on December
ninth, 1798, to abandon all his territories on the mainland, while the
Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand III, fled shortly after, in 1799, to
his relatives in the court of Vienna, leaving his dominions
temporarily at the disposal of France.
It was doubtless a pleasant delusion for sincere republicans to
imagine that in these events free governments were rising on the wreck
of absolutism; but unfortunately the fact was otherwise: every one of
these so-called free states was founded, not in the hearts of its
people, but in the power of French arms. With the waning of this
military ascendancy, they must of necessity lose all vitality.
Bonaparte had stated to the Directory, in defense of his own conduct,
and of course both repeatedly and emphatically, that to divide the
Army of Italy and leave the Austrians on the Adige would be to lose
Italy. And yet this was precisely the blunder the directors made in
sending Championnet to Naples. Angered by the unexpected renewal of
hostilities, their preparations for the coming war, though vigorous
and energetic, were made unadvisedly and in haste. Brune was sent to
command in Holland, Bernadotte to the middle Rhine, Jourdan into
central Germany, Massena to Switzerland, Macdonald to Naples, and
Scherer to upper Italy. Two hundred thousand men were raised under
the new conscription law, and these conscripts-a word then used in
that sense for the first time-were sent to fill the depleted ranks of
the respective armies. Brune and Massena were destined to show ability
and win success; the others were marked for overwhelming defeat: the
crowning example of folly was the appointment of the incapable Scherer
to the post of greatest importance. He had once before shown his
inability to master the rudiments of warfare in Italy, and this time
his command was as inefficient as might have been expected. Jourdan,
having been defeated toward the close of March, by the Archduke
Charles, both at Ostrach and at Stockach, was succeeded by Lenouf, who
was at once compelled to retreat behind the Rhine. On the heels of
this disaster, Scherer was driven first behind the Mincio, then to the
Oglio; he was shamefully beaten at Magnano in April, and then
voluntarily made way for Moreau, laying down his command amid the
jeers of his disgusted troops.
Meantime the congress at Rastadt had been keeping up the forms of
negotiation, its proceedings being in the main perfunctory, and its
sessions deriving their interest mainly from the attempts of the
French plenipotentiaries to overawe their colleagues. In this they
were largely successful, because they had in their possession the
clearest evidence of Austria's earlier determination to secure her
importance by the dismemberment of Bavaria. They were now three in
number: two of them, Roberjot and Bonnier, were honest supporters of
the Directory; the third, Debry, was an old friend of Bonaparte's, and
had never swerved from his allegiance. As chief of the embassy he had
attracted great attention, and having displayed a spirit far from
conciliatory, he gave some cause for the special dislike in which he
was held, not only by the other delegates, but even by his (p.~089)
own colleagues. There was the utmost tension in the congress when
hostilities were renewed. With the successes of Charles, Austria grew
so bold that she determined to break off all negotiation. Already one
imperial representative had withdrawn in dudgeon; the others were
ready to follow. Aware that war was imminent, both French and Austrian
troops had begun early in 1799 to scour the suburbs of Rastadt, and
had in frequent forays not merely attacked each other, but had
molested the citizens and even the ambassadors. Finally, in April, the
imperial troops beset the town, and ordered the remaining members of
the congress to leave within a term which, according to usage, was to
be fixed by the assembly itself.
The French ministers, in obedience to orders received from Paris,
waited until the very last, leaving with their train only at nightfall
on April twenty-eighth. In a few moments, and almost before the gates,
they were surrounded and hustled, by whom is not altogether certain,
though at the time some were believed to be Austrian hussars. In the
ensuing tumult the three plenipotentiaries were dragged from their
carriages and furiously assaulted; Roberjot and Bonnier were killed,
Debry escaped. Next morning he appeared in Rastadt wounded and bloody,
but not seriously injured. This murder has become one of the standing
historical puzzles. Some have attributed its instigation to the
British cabinet, some to Bonaparte, some again to Caroline of Naples,
and some to the French emigres. Many claim that the blows were struck
by Debry himself, who, it is thought, was one of those Bonapartist
agents, like Garat in Naples and Ginguene in Turin, whose business, as
is claimed, was to bring on anarchy at any price, and discredit the
Directory. The royalists, supported by the declarations of Mme.
Roberjot, who was in the carriage with her husband, asserted this at
the time, and the numerous hewers at the greatness of Napoleon have
again repeated it in our day. There are circumstances which could be
twisted into corroborative evidence if even the slightest positive
proof existed; but no satisfactory testimony has ever been offered
from Austrian sources to prove that these attacks, like others of the
time and in other lands, were not instigated by the authorities, and
made both to conceal inconvenient shortcomings, and to bring on the
war for which Austria was now thoroughly prepared.[11]
[Footnote 11: There is a small library of books and pamphlets
devoted to the subject. The latest is that of the Austrian
officer, Criste, to which reference has already been made: he
searched the Vienna archives to learn, if possible, the
truth, and confesses that he cannot find it, though he
discusses all the theories and asserts the innocence of
Austria. Even finer, however, is the volume of Helfert: Der
Rastadter Gesandten Mord. The other sources are Gentz: Ueber
die Ermordung der Franzoesisch Congress-gesandten, a
contemporary opinion, 1799; Boehtlingk's three discussions in
Napoleon, Seine Jugend and Sein Emporkommen; Napoleon
Bonaparte und der Rastadter Gesandten Mord; Der Rastadter
Gesandten Mord vor dem Karlsruher Schoeffengericht; Hueffer:
Der Rastadter Gesandten Mord. By Mueller,
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and von Reichelin Meldegg, there are
monographs of the same title. Further material is contained
in Schlitz: Denkwuerdigkeiten; Obser: Politische Correspondenz
Carl Friederich's von Baden; Delaure: Esquisses historiques;
Gohier: Memoirs; Arnault: Souvenirs d'un Sexagenaire;
Vivenot: Zur Geschichte des Rastadter Congresses; Jomini: Vie
politique et militaire de Napoleon; Erzherzog Karl:
Ausgewaehlte Schriften.]
The second coalition was stronger than the first, because, although
Prussia remained neutral for reasons already mentioned, it included
not only England and Austria, but also both Turkey and Russia, with
Portugal and Naples. The long frontier, from Holland to Naples, which
France was called on to defend in the absence of her best troops and
generals in Egypt, made her weak and vulnerable as never before.
England appeared in Holland with an Anglo-Russian army; the Russians
poured into Switzerland and Italy; the Austrians were again on the
Rhine and the Adige; while Turkey was showing unexpected energy in
repelling the invaders from lands which, slack as was the tie, she
still considered her own. Worse than all, the false position of the
French republic and the Church with reference to each other had kept
alive smoldering coals of discontent, and as a result civil war again
broke out in Brittany and Vendee. To meet this appalling emergency
there was needed either a capable, homogeneous administration heartily
supported by the nation, or else a military despotism such as was the
logical result of Vendemiaire and Fructidor. The former did not exist.
Instead of gaining strength by wise self-denial, the Directory had
grown steadily weaker, usurping authority of every kind, and actually
seating in the councils of 1798, by the basest arts, creatures of
their own as representatives of no less than forty-nine departments.
The May elections of 1799 expressed the popular discontent in an
uprising of extreme Jacobinism, which sent an opposition delegation
into the councils too strong to be thus supplanted or overthrown.
The new legislature met the executive, and at once, with their own
weapons. Aided by public clamor, and by the influence of a widely read
pamphlet which Carnot had written in justification of his course, they
obtained in June a virtual reconstruction of the Directory. Barras,
who had become known as a weak trimmer, was suffered to remain.
Rewbell, as a supporter of the unsuccessful Scherer and the
pertinacious associate of Rapinat, a dishonest contractor connected
with the Army of Italy, had been himself suspected of peculation,
although unjustly, and his time having expired, he was not reelected.
The others went as a matter of course; Merlin and Larevelliere were
permitted to resign because, although troublesome, they were
nonentities; Treilhard, though honest and able, could not make himself
felt, and a flaw in his election was used as a pretext to replace him
by Gohier, who, though he had been formerly minister of justice, was a
feeble creature. Sieyes was put in Rewbell's place in order to secure
a better constitution. He carried into his new sphere the same habits
of supercilious mystery which he had always had, continuing likewise
the scheming for radical change which he had so long carried on. He
looked to Joubert as the popular general most likely to become an easy
tool, and formed an intimacy with him. The two other places were
filled by utter mediocrities: Roger-Ducos, a moderate, and Moulins, a
radical. This revolution of the thirtieth of Prairial, another "day,"
was held to be a Jacobin counterstroke to that of the eighteenth of
Fructidor. The legislature had shown itself as lawless as the
Directory; the constitution was proved to be worthless: another must
be enacted. With Fouche at the head of the police, and other
Robespierrians restored to office, it appeared to the majority of the
nation as if all constitutional government were jeopardized, as if the
Terror were to be revived, as if such madness could be repressed only
by military force.
But where was the general? Championnet had disgraced himself by
permitting unbridled license among his soldiery after the capture of
Naples on January twenty-third, 1799, and his army fell into a state
of disreputable disorganization. Macdonald had gathered together and
reorganized the remnants, but only to be defeated by Suvoroff with his
Russians on the Trebbia. The army of Joubert, who succeeded Moreau,
had been overwhelmed, and its leader killed, by an Austro-Russian
force at Novi, on August fifteenth. Mantua was already lost. Moreau,
having saved some remnants of Joubert's troops, made a successful
stand in the Apennines, where his army still was. Massena was defeated
at Zurich, in June, by the Austrians under the archduke Charles; but
on September twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth he routed the Russians
under Korsakoff at the same place. Brune had defeated on September
nineteenth, at Bergen, an Anglo-Russian army under the Duke of York,
who was forced to capitulate at Alkmaar on October tenth, and to
evacuate the Batavian Republic. Bernadotte was the new secretary of
war, more successful in that office than as a diplomat. Although he
was Joseph Bonaparte's brother-in-law, he was not a Bonapartist, being
first, last, and always a Bernadottist. Under his administration
Jourdan had devised and carried out the new conscription measure which
filled once more the empty army lists. This sweeping measure was the
extreme development of the system introduced by Carnot, whereby all
able-bodied French citizens were declared liable to military service,
and drafts were made only when voluntary enlistment failed. The
conscription law was passed on September fifth, 1798, and compelled
the service of all young men, or at least of as many as the government
saw fit to draw, between the ages of twenty and twenty-five. This
procedure differed but little from that now universal in modern
Europe, and created the Napoleonic armies as distinguished from those
of the republic. Organized into divisions, brigades, and half-brigades
as before, the new ranks appear to have been quite as enthusiastic as
the old, for the young of the nation now looked to war as the quickest
road to glory. Bernadotte expressed the common conviction of all
ambitious young men when he said: "Children, there are certainly great
captains among you." The treasury was replenished by a (p.~094)
forced loan disguised under the form of an arbitrary tariff. Besides
all this, a frightful measure had been passed, known as the Hostage
Law, which made the innocent relatives of every Chouan or emigrant
responsible for his conduct.
These measures were indicative of a dangerous and rising tide of the
new Jacobinism, which was represented by a majority in the Five
Hundred, in the Directory by Gohier and Moulins, and outside by a
recognized club of terrorists, which began to sit in the famous
riding-school where the Convention had held its sessions. The
well-to-do men like Talleyrand, Regnault de St.-Jean-d'Angely, and
Roederer, the philosophers Cambaceres, Semonville, Benjamin Constant,
and even Daunou, were outraged at the thought of a new Terror, and
looked to Sieyes and Barras to prevent it. In view of these disturbing
circumstances, many also asked, Where is the statesman? The Jacobins,
as of old, had perfect faith that the chapter of accidents would
reveal a statesman; a general they had either in the calm Jourdan or
in the hotspur Augereau. Their policy was to repeat republican
victories, and fortify democracy in the coming constitution, whatever
shape it should take. Sieyes and his friends naturally would have
turned to the conqueror of Italy, with whom they had already plotted;
but he was absent, and, besides, they wanted a tool, not a master.
They actually tried Moreau with the offer of a dictatorship to be
equally shared with Bonaparte; but he was already under the spell of
royalism, and proved coy. It has been suggested that but for the
arrival of Bonaparte himself, Massena, who much resembled Monk in
character, might have repeated that general's role in France.
Certainly the advocates of a limited monarchy would, in the extremity,
have welcomed even the Bourbons as a constitutional dynasty, and this
although they were so distrustful that Sieyes, when ambassador in
Prussia, had dreamed of choosing a foreign royal house for that
purpose, selecting as his own preference that of Brunswick.
Such, then, was the complicated web of defeat and victory in war, of
plot and counterplot in politics, of cross-purposes everywhere, which
was displayed to Bonaparte on his return to the capital. Should he,
the hitherto avowed republican whose devoted soldiers still believed
themselves to be fighting for freedom's cause, continue the farce
still further, and throw in his fate with the Jacobins? Or should he
put down the mask? It soon became clear to him that Paris and the
people would never again tolerate a Terror, and that success in the
long run lay in an alliance with them. If they would accept his
leadership, the game was won. But was this possible? The cool heads,
like Baron de Pasquier, had noted the real character of the Egyptian
and Syrian campaigns; but even they had an admiration for an
adventurer's effrontery, and they were too few to make much impression
upon the masses. By large numbers of the hitherto indifferent it was
now believed that Bonaparte and his army had been deported to Egypt
from jealousy on the part of the Directory; and to some of the
conservatives he was a martyr returning from exile, yet bringing new
trophies to his country. This rumor was not only never contradicted,
but was rather increased by the significant hints of those among the
Bonaparte family who were now in the thick of events. Joseph, having
three years previously been elected to the Five Hundred, had risen
high in the public esteem; and Lucien for two years past had likewise
been one of the most influential members. Both were changed men.
Polished, at least superficially, and apparently devoted to letters,
they were known as solid citizens. Their social gifts had made their
homes, like that of Mme. Bonaparte herself, centers of influence among
many important people of the capital. Hers, however, was far more
exclusive, and affected a lofty superiority to all others. Between it
and the other two there existed intense jealousy concerning the
general's favor, but all were heartily united in furthering his
interests.
The people of Paris did not, like those of Lyons, run to meet
Bonaparte as if he were already a sovereign; but they received him
warmly. In particular the malcontents who were plotting in his behalf,
as if under his personal direction, welcomed him with effusion.
Without a moment's delay he took charge of their councils. Sieyes had
lost his mainstay in Joubert, and his prestige by the defeat at Novi.
With the help of Talleyrand and Roederer he was soon brought to terms,
and under Bonaparte's immediate direction the careful, daring plan for
a complete change both in the constitution and in the administration
which had been already discussed by Sieyes and his followers, the
so-called reformists, was revised and finished. It was on its face a
determined attempt to remedy the radical defects of the constitution
of the year III, and to organize a strong constitutional government.
In fact, its author had already shown a certain executive ability in
preparing the way. Waving the red signal of the Terror, he had by a
series of arbitrary measures suppressed the Jacobin papers and
banished their editors. Jourdan at this crisis demanded from the
assemblies a vote that the "country was in danger," but his appeal
fell flat. Then came the stirring news that under Massena and Brune
the armies of France were renewing their pristine glories, and that
the Rhine and the Alps at least were safe. A few days later a
messenger from the executive read to the councils, in solemn state,
the despatch, composed by Bonaparte for the purpose, containing his
exaggerated narrative of the battle of Aboukir. Tremendous enthusiasm
swept over both chambers. Gohier, who had fallen a victim to the
charms of Josephine in her frequent visits to his flattered wife, was
the president of the Directory. To him Bonaparte had paid his first
official visit, and on the following day the Directory received in
formal audience the general, who, as he himself declared to Gohier,
had "left his army to come and share the national perils," reports of
which had so disquieted him in Egypt.
The official and the popular good will were therefore before long
alike intense: Paris was within a few days as much dazzled by
Bonaparte's return as the country had been. The "Return of the Hero"
was the catchword of the nation. Recent events had shattered parties
into fragments: here was a leader who had never been identified with
any one of them. The newspapers took up the paean of his virtues.
Meanness and mediocrity were to disappear; the French people, avid of
great things, had found again the favorite of fortune who alone could
accomplish them. First Talleyrand, then Sieyes, then all the other
well-known men, from Gohier down, openly joined in the train of
admirers. The shifty course of large numbers who, like Roederer, were
opportunists at heart had become wearisome to the moneyed classes, and
they also soon arrayed themselves under Bonaparte's banner. Doubtful
or distant persons of influence were courted, and, as in the case of
Moreau, were by consummate art often won. Roederer thought the
revolution virtually completed by October thirtieth; the work, he
said, was three quarters done. Next day Lucien Bonaparte was elected
president of the Five Hundred, among whom, though the majority were
vacillating and uncomprehending, there was a strong minority of
unreconstructed Jacobins. Within the fortnight the defeated general
had drawn together at Paris a court more powerful than that which he
had had at Montebello in the hour of victory. His personal demeanor
was much the same as then--quiet and reserved, but conciliatory,
simple, and frank. He affected the simple garb of the civilian,
sometimes wearing an Oriental scarf with a small scimitar; frequented
the Institute, of which he had been made a member; and associated by
preference with men like Volney, discussing questions of philosophy
and science. Soon it was whispered that his plans were maturing. What
could they be? The answer was not long in suspense. The pear was ripe.
We felt ourselves the associates of an all-powerful destiny, wrote
Marmont, concerning the voyage from Egypt. Bonaparte himself was the
author of this sentiment, which for long was to be the controlling
thought of millions. The Orient had quickened in him a latent
conviction as to the value of a destiny and a star. When, in
threatening crises, others forgot it, the great adventurer reminded
them of it, meaning thereby his own clear vision, unclouded by
adversity, penetrating in the confusion of circumstances. In no sense
was he an Oriental fatalist; on the contrary, his destiny was the
power to discern and to dare which resided in himself. It was his
presence in France which was to dispel doubts, restore confidence,
control events. "My presence," he had said on shipboard, "by raising
their spirits will restore to the army its lacking self-reliance, and
to good citizens the hope of a better future. There will be a movement
of opinion to the benefit of France. We must struggle to arrive, and
we shall arrive." To Kleber, the ablest of his generals, he had left
the command and with it a masterly set of directions for the guidance
of affairs. He could not be charged with failure, for the end was not
yet; disaster could not be retrieved in Egypt: he had hastened to the
scene where alone succor could be found, and he had arrived with a
heart ready for the decision, under conditions the most favorable,
with a definite goal and a clear, simple plan for its attainment. To
outsiders and to posterity the result has appeared a happy chance. It
was not so, though unforeseen circumstances contributed. It was a
foregone conclusion.