THE PEACE PARLEYS
The issuance of the Austrian ultimatum precipitated a grave crisis.
_It did not, however, present any insoluble problem._ Peace could and
should have been preserved. Its preservation is always possible when
nations, which may be involved in a controversy, are inspired by a
reasonably pacific purpose. Only when the masses of the people are
inflamed with a passionate desire for war, and in a time of popular
hysteria responsible statesmen are helplessly borne along the turgid
flow of events as bubbles are carried by the swift current of a
swollen river, is peace a visionary dream.
It is the peculiarity of the present crisis that no such popular
hysteria existed. No popular demand for war developed until after it
was virtually precipitated. Even then large classes of workingmen,
both in Germany and France, protested.
The peoples of the various countries had scant knowledge of the issues
which had been raised by their diplomats and had little, if any,
interest in the Servian trouble. The chief exception to this was in
Austria, where unquestionably popular feeling had been powerfully
excited by the murder of the Archduke and where there had been,
especially in Vienna, popular manifestations in favor of war. In
Russia also there was not unnaturally a strong undercurrent of popular
sympathy for Servia.
The writer was in the Engadine at the time referred to, and
cosmopolitan St. Moritz, although a little place, was, in its
heterogeneous population, Europe in microcosmic form. There the
average man continued to enjoy his mid-summer holiday and refused to
believe that so great a catastrophe was imminent until the last two
fateful days in July. The citizens of all nations continued to
fraternize, and were one in amazement that a war could be precipitated
on causes in which the average man took so slight an interest.
Unembarrassed by any popular clamor, this war could have been
prevented, and the important question presents itself to the Supreme
Court of Civilization as to the moral responsibility for the failure
of the negotiations.
Which of the two groups of powers sincerely worked for peace and which
obstructed those efforts?
In reaching its conclusion our imaginary Court would pay little
attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an
individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art
thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be
betrayed by a Judas-kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of
diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.
No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending
that his nation wished nothing but peace, and invoking divine aid for
its murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a
noted occasion, when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of "honor," it
might be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the
question.
The writer will so far anticipate the conclusions, which he thinks
these records indisputably show, as to suggest the respective
attitudes of the different groups of diplomats and statesmen as
revealed by these papers. If the reader will realize fully the policy
which from the first animated Germany and Austria, then the documents
hereinafter quoted will acquire new significance.
Germany and Austria had determined to impose their will upon Servia,
even though it involved a European war. From the outset they clearly
recognized such a possibility and were willing to accept the
responsibility.
The object to be gained was something more than a neutralization of
the pro-Slav propaganda. It was to subject Servia to such severe
punitive measures that thereafter her independence of will and moral
sovereignty would be largely impaired, if not altogether destroyed.
To do this it was not enough to have Servia take measures to prevent
pro-Slav agitation within her borders. Austria neither wanted nor
expected the acceptance of her impossible ultimatum.
It planned to submit such an ultimatum as Servia could not possibly
accept and, to make this result doubly sure, it was thought desirable
to give not only Servia but Europe the minimum time to take any
preventive measures. Giving to Servia only forty-eight hours within
which to reach a decision and to Europe barely twenty-four hours to
protect the peace of the world, it was thought that Servia would do
one of two things, either of which would be of incalculable importance
to Germany and Austria.
If Servia accepted the ultimatum for lack of time to consider it, then
its self-respect was hopelessly compromised and its independence
largely destroyed. Thenceforth she would be, at least morally, a mere
vassal of Austria.
If, however, Servia declined to accept the ultimatum, then war would
immediately begin and Servia would be, as was thought, speedily
subjected to punitive measures of such a drastic character that the
same result would be attained.
From the commencement, both Germany and Austria recognized the
possibility that Russia might intervene to protect Servia. To prevent
this it was important that Russia and her allies of the Triple Entente
should be given as little time as possible to consider their action,
and it was thought that this would probably lead to Russia's
acquiescence in the punishment of Servia and, if so, France and
England, having no direct interest in Servia, would also undoubtedly
acquiesce.
If, however, slow-moving Russia, instead of acquiescing, as she did
in 1908 in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should take up the
gauntlet which Germany and Austria had thrown down, _then it was all
important to Germany and Austria that Russia should seem to be the
aggressor_.
For this there were two substantial reasons: the one was Italy and the
other was England. Germany and Austria desired the cooperation of
Italy and could not claim it as of right under the terms of the
Triple Alliance, unless they were attacked. Upon the other hand, if
England believed that Russia and France had declared war upon Germany
and Austria, there was little probability of her intervention. For
these reasons it was important that Germany and Austria should impress
both England and Italy that their purposes were sincerely pacific and
that on the other hand they should so clearly provoke Russia and
France that those nations would declare war.
If the reader will keep this Janus-faced policy steadily in mind,
he will understand the apparent inconsistencies in the diplomatic
representations of the German Foreign Office. He will understand why
Germany and Austria, while at times flouting Russia in the most
flagrant manner and refusing her the common courtesies of diplomatic
intercourse, were at the same time giving to England the most emphatic
assurance of pacific intentions.
With this preliminary statement, let the record speak for itself. We
have seen that the first great, and as events proved, fatal obstacle
to peace which Germany interposed was practically contemporaneous with
the issuance of the ultimatum. Germany did not wait for any efforts at
conciliation. On the contrary, it attempted to bar effectually all
such efforts by serving notice upon France, England, and Russia almost
simultaneously with the issuance of the Austrian ultimatum,
that the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian
Government cannot but be looked upon as justified;
and the communication concluded:
We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any
intervention of any Power on account of the various alliance
obligations would bring consequences impossible to
measure.[15]
[Footnote 15: German _White Paper_, Annex, 1 B.]
This had only one meaning. Austria was to be left to discipline
Servia at will, or there would be war. Germany did not even wait
for any suggestion of intervention, whether conciliatory or otherwise,
but sought to interpose to any plan of peace, short of complete
submission, an insuperable barrier by this threat of war. With this
pointed threat to Europe, the next move was that of Russia, and it may
be remarked that throughout the entire negotiations Russian diplomacy
was more than equal to that of Germany.
Russia contented itself in the first instance by stating on the
morning of July 24th, that Russia could not remain indifferent to the
Austro-Servian conflict. This attitude could not surprise any one, for
Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known and its legitimate
concern in the future of any Slav state was, as Sir Edward Grey had
said in Parliament in March, 1913, "a commonplace in European
diplomacy in the past."
With this simple statement of its legitimate interest in a matter
affecting the balance of power in Europe, Russia, instead of issuing
an ultimatum or declaring war, as Germany and Austria may have hoped,
joined with England in asking for a reasonable extension of time for
all the Powers to concert for the preservation of peace. On July 24th,
the very day that the Austrian ultimatum had reached St. Petersburg,
the Russian Foreign Minister transmitted to the Austrian Government
through its Charge in Vienna the following communication:
The communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the
Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum to
Belgrade _leaves to the Powers a delay entirely insufficient
to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening
out of the complications that have arisen_. To prevent the
incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all the
Powers, which can follow the method of action of the
Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us
that above all the delay given to Servia to reply should be
extended. _Austria-Hungary, declaring herself disposed to
inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which
the Imperial and Royal Government bases its accusations,
should at least give them also the time to take note of them
(de s'en rendre compte)._ In this case, if the Powers should
convince themselves of the well-groundedness of certain of
the Austrian demands _they would find themselves in a
position to send to the Servian Government consequential
advice_. A refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum
would deprive of all value the step taken by the
Austro-Hungarian Government in regard to the Powers and
would be in contradiction with the very bases of
international relations.[16]
[Footnote 16: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 4.]
Could any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of
the world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done
to preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the
uttermost.
Germany had only to intimate to Austria that "a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind," as well as common courtesy to great and friendly
nations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia,
but to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially
as the period was one of mid-summer dullness, and many of the leading
rulers and statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.
_If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of
peace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world._ A word from
Berlin to Vienna would have given the additional time which, with
sincerely pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation
of peace. Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that
word.
England had already anticipated the request of Russia that a
reasonable time should be given to all interested parties. When the
Austrian Minister in London handed the ultimatum to Sir Edward Grey on
July the 24th, the following conversation took place, which speaks for
itself:
In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I (Sir
Edward Grey) remarked that it seemed to me a matter for
great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at
that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the
proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the
circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused
sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, _but at the same
time I had never before seen one State address to another
independent State a document of so formidable a character_.
Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might
never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the
murder of the Archduke. Servia had, however, shown no sign
of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed
since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was
essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part.
I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying a time
limit could have been introduced later; _but, as things now
stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by
Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a
demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from
its presentation_.
Unfortunately both Russia and England's requests for time were
refused, on the plea that they had reached the Austrian Foreign
Minister too late, although it has never yet been explained why, even
if Count Berchtold were unable to take up the requests before the
expiration of the ultimatum, the matter might not have been reopened
for a few days by a corresponding extension of the time limit.
In the absence of some explanation, which as yet remains to be
made, the absence of the Austrian Premier from Vienna at the time
intervening between the issuance of the _ultimatum_ and the expiration
of the time limit seems like an extraordinarily petty piece of
diplomatic finesse. He had without any warning to the great Powers of
Europe, launched a thunderbolt, and if there ever was a time when a
pacific foreign minister should have been at his post and open to
suggestions of peace, it was in those two critical days. And yet,
after issuing the ultimatum, he immediately takes himself beyond reach
of personal parleys by going to Ischl, and this was taken by the
German Foreign Office as a convenient excuse for an anticipated
failure to extend this courtesy to Russia and England. Upon this we
have the testimony of the English Ambassador at Berlin, who in his
report to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, says:
[The German] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says
that on receipt of a telegram at ten o'clock this morning
from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed
German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to the Austrian
Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion, for an
extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency
about it. Unfortunately it appeared from the press that
Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought
that in these circumstances there would be delay and
difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of
State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had
ready on the spot, _but he admitted quite freely that
Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a
lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also
admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain
of the Austro-Hungarian demands...._
A like excuse is found in a conversation with the Russian Charge at
Berlin, in which Bethmann-Hollweg expressed the fear "that in
consequence of the absence of Berchtold at Ischl, and seeing the lack
of time, his (Bethmann-Hollweg's telegrams suggesting delay) will
remain without result."[17]
[Footnote 17: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 14.]
These conversations are most illuminating. They refer to instructions
to the German Ambassador in Vienna, _which are not found in the German
White Paper_, although they would have thrown a searchlight upon the
sincerity with which Germany "passed on" the most important request of
England and Russia for a little time to save the peace of Europe, and
it strongly suggests the possibility that Count Berchtold's most
inopportune absence in Ischl was to be the excuse for the gross
discourtesy of refusing to give any extension of time.
Kudachef, the Russian Charge at Vienna, did not content himself with
submitting the request to the Acting Foreign Minister (Baron Macchio)
but to deprive Austria of the flimsy excuse of Berchtold's absence at
Ischl, the Russian Charge went over the head of the Austrian Acting
Foreign Minister and telegraphed the request for time to Count
Berchtold at Ischl. Let the record tell for itself how this most
reasonable request was made and refused.
The Russian Charge sent on July 25th the two following telegrams to
the Russian Foreign Minister:
Count Berchtold is at Ischl. Seeing the impossibility of
arriving there in time, I have telegraphed him our proposal
to extend the delay of the ultimatum, and I have repeated it
verbally to Baron Macchio. This latter promised me to
communicate it in time to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
_but added that he could predict with assurance a
categorical refusal_.[18]
[Footnote 18: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 11.]
Sequel to my telegram of to-day. Have just received from
Macchio the negative reply of the Austro-Hungarian
Government to our proposal to prolong the delay of the
note.[19]
[Footnote 19: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 12.]
It is evident from the Russian _Orange Paper_ that that country had no
illusions as to the possibility of a peaceful outcome. Germany has
contended that on July the 24th, before Count Berchtold made his
inopportune visit to Ischl, he sent for the Russian Charge at Vienna
and assured him that the punitive measures which Austria had
determined to take against Servia at all costs would not involve any
territorial acquisitions.
Of this interview the chief evidence comes indirectly from two
sources, which are not entirely in accord.
In a telegram from the German Ambassador at Vienna to the German
Chancellor, dated July 24th, it is said:
Count Berchtold to-day summoned the Russian Charge
d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in
friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Servia.
After going over the historical developments of the last few
years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy
did not wish to appear against Servia in the role of a
conqueror. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no
territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure
against Servian machinations; that Austria-Hungary felt
herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly
behavior of Servia toward the monarchy; that he had no
intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of
power in the Balkans. The Charge d'Affaires, who as yet had
no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the explanations
of the Minister _ad referendum_ adding that he would
immediately transmit them to Sazonof.[20]
[Footnote 20: German _White Paper_, No. 3.]
In a report of the same interview from the English Ambassador at
Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, it is said:
Russian Charge d'Affaires was received this morning by
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own
personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form
rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that
it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister of
Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under
instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were
accepted integrally by 4 P.M. to-morrow. His Excellency
added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at
stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction
throughout the country. He did not think that objections to
what had been done could be raised by any power.[21]
[Footnote 21: English _White Papers_, No. 7.]
It will be noted that in the report of the English Ambassador there is
no suggestion of any disclaimer of an intention to take Servian
territory.
In the Russian _Orange Paper_, we find no report from its
representative at Vienna of any such interview and Austria has never
produced any document or memorandum either of such an interview or of
such a concession to Russia. It is probable that such a concession was
made, as Germany contends, and if so, Russian diplomacy was far too
keen to be led upon a false trail by this empty promise and as the
evidences multiplied that Austria would not consider either an
extension of time or any modification of its terms and that Germany
was acting in complete accord and cooperated with her Ally, the
probability of war was unmistakable.
Sazonof at once sent for the English and French Ambassadors, and the
substance of the conference is embodied in the telegram from the
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July
24th, which throws a strong light upon the double effort of Russia and
France to preserve the peace and also as an obvious necessity to
prepare for the more probable issue of war:
Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was
both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken
such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of
her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped
that his Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim
their solidarity with Russia and France.
The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France
would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance
with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia
strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.
I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what
their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of
course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but
personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of
solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail
an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia
and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in
Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would
never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M.
Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general
European question was involved, the Servian question being
but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not
afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.
In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from
what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great
Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to
the effect that active intervention by her in the internal
affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing
Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military
measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was
it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to
declare war on Austria?
M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian
mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but
a council of ministers was being held this afternoon to
consider the whole question. A further council would be
held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would
preside, when a decision would be come to....
Had England then followed the sagacious suggestion of Sazonof, would
war have been averted?
Possibly, perhaps probably. Germany's principal fear was the
intervention of England. In view of its supremacy on the seas this was
natural. It was England's intimation in the Moroccan crisis of 1911,
made in Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, which at that time
induced Germany to reverse the engines. Might not the same intimation
in 1914 have had a like effect upon the mad counsels of Potsdam? The
answer can only be a matter of conjecture. It depends largely upon how
deep-seated the purpose of Germany may have been to provoke a European
war at a time when Russia, France, or England were not fully prepared.
It does not follow that if Sazonof was right, Sir Edward Grey was
necessarily wrong in declining to align England definitely with Russia
and France at that stage. He was the servant of a democratic nation
and could not ignore the public opinion of his country as freely as
the Russian Foreign Minister. To take such a course, it would have
been necessary for Grey to submit the matter to Parliament, and while
with a large liberal majority his policy might have been endorsed, yet
it would have been after such an acrimonious discussion and such
vehement protests that England would have stood before the world "as
a house divided against itself."
Both Sazonof and Sir Edward Grey from their respective standpoints
were right. Neither made a single false step in the great controversy.
As a result of this interview, Russia, England, and France, after the
request for time had been abruptly refused, next proceeded in the
interests of peace to persuade Servia to make as conciliatory a reply
to the impossible ultimatum as was possible without a fatal compromise
of her political independence.
While the lack of time prevented France and Russia from making any
formal communication to Servia on the question, yet Sazonof had a
conference with the Servian Minister and discussed the wisdom of
avoiding an attack on Belgrade by having the Servian forces withdrawn
to the interior and then appealing to the Powers, and Russia thereupon
made the broad and magnanimous suggestion that if Servia should appeal
to the Powers, _Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave
the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy_.
This interview, as reported by the British Ambassador at St.
Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, is as follows:
I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and
communicated to his Excellency the substance of your
telegram of to-day to Paris, and this afternoon, I discussed
with him the communication which the French Ambassador
suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as
recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade....
The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite
ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved
to be guilty, but that no independent State could be
expected to accept the political demands which had been put
forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a
conversation which he had with the Servian Minister
yesterday, that in the event of the Austrians attacking
Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and
withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at
the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His
Excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He
would like to see the question placed on an international
footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to
which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were
given not to Austria, but to the Powers.
_If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be
quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the
hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was
possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to
submit the question to arbitration._
Pursuant to this policy of conciliation Sir Edward Grey in direct
communication with the Servian Minister at London, Mr. Crackenthorpe,
the British Ambassador at Belgrade, in direct communication with the
Servian Foreign Ministry, and Sazonof in interviews with the Servian
Minister at St. Petersburg, all brought direct influence upon Servia
to make a conciliatory reply.
Thus Sir Edward Grey instructed Crackenthorpe:
Servia ought to promise that if it is proved that Servian
officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices
in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give
Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to
express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government
must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in
Servian interests.
It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria
when time limit expires can be averted by anything but
unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance
appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying
favorably to as many points as the time limit allows....
I have urged upon the German Ambassador that Austria should
not precipitate military action.[22]
[Footnote 22: English _White Paper_, No. 12.]
In response to these suggestions, Mr. Crackenthorpe communicated Sir
Edward Grey's pacific suggestions to the Servian Minister and received
the following reply, as reported in Crackenthorpe's report to Sir
Edward Grey, dated July 25th.
The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to
the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory
and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as
is possible....
The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian
Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content
with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.[23]
[Footnote 23: English _White Paper_, No. 21.]
These pacific suggestions to Servia met with complete success, and as
a result that country on July 25th, and before the expiration of the
ultimatum, made a reply to Austria which astonished the world with its
spirit of conciliation and for a short time gave rise to optimistic
hopes of peace.
At some sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign State, it
accepted substantially the demands of Austria, with a few minor
reservations, which it expressed its willingness to refer either to
arbitration at The Hague Tribunal or to a conference of the
Powers.[24]
[Footnote 24: English _White Paper_, No. 39.]
Neither Germany nor Austria seriously contended that the reply was not
on its face a substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian
demands. They contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of
the assurances, calling the concessions "shams." Unless Austria, in
asking assurances from Servia, were content to accept them as made in
good faith and allow their sincerity to be determined by future deeds,
why should the ultimatum, calling for such assurances, have been made?
If Germany and Austria had accepted Servia's reply as sufficient, and
Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises in the utmost
good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and no
general war. Russia and England pledged their influence to compel
Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of Austria.
The principal outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate
or leave to the Powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in
the Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem.
Austria's professed desire for an impartial investigation could have
been easily attained by having the Powers appoint a commission of
neutral jurists to make such investigation.
In any event, Austria could have accepted the very substantial
concessions of Servia and without prejudice to its rights proceeded to
The Hague Tribunal or to a concert of the Powers as to the few and
comparatively simple open points. When one recalls the infinite
treasure of property and life, which would thus have been saved the
world, had Germany and Austria accepted this reasonable and pacific
course, one can only exclaim, "_But oh, the pity of it!_"
It is significant that while the entire official German press gave
ample space to the Austrian ultimatum and rejoiced in Austria's
energetic attitude, it withheld from the German people any adequate
information as to the conciliatory nature of the Servian reply, for
the Russian Charge at Berlin telegraphed to Sazonof:
The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian
response which was communicated to it. Up to this moment
this note has not appeared _in extenso_ in any of local
journals, which according to all the evidence do not wish to
give it a place in their columns, understanding the calming
effect which this publication would produce upon the German
readers.[25]
[Footnote 25: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 46.]
Instead of getting the truth, the Berlin populace proceeded to make
riotous demonstrations against the Russian and Servian Embassies.
The time limit on the ultimatum expired on July the 25th at six
o'clock in the evening.
There is no more significant and at the same time discreditable
feature of an infinitely discreditable chapter in history than that
the Austrian Government, _without giving the Servian answer the
consideration even of a single hour_, immediately severed all
diplomatic intercourse with Belgrade and at 6.30 P.M. the Minister
of Austria
informed the Servian Government by note that, not having
received within the delay fixed a satisfactory response, he
is leaving Belgrade with the whole personnel of the
legation.
On the same night Austria ordered the mobilization of a considerable
part of its army.
Notwithstanding these rebuffs, England, France, and Russia continued
to labor for peace, and made further pacific suggestions, all of which
fell upon deaf ears.
On July 25th, Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four Powers (England,
France, Italy, and Germany) should unite
in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross
the frontier and to give time for the four Powers, acting at
Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If
Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and
ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly
cooperate.[26]
[Footnote 26: English _White Paper_, Nos. 24 and 25.]
To this reasonable request the German Chancellor replied:
The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the
Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct.
We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first
and last, we take the ground that this question must be
localized by the abstention of all the Powers from
intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that
Russia will refrain from any active intervention, conscious
of her responsibility and of the seriousness of the
situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are
ready, with the reservation of our known duties as Allies,
to cooperate with the other great Powers in mediation
between Russia and Austria.[27]
[Footnote 27: German _White Paper_, Exhibit 13.]
This distinction is hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the
difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's current
difference with Austria concerned the attempt of the latter to
crush Servia without interference. Russia claimed such right of
intervention. Germany would not interfere in the former matter, but
would abstractly but not concretely mediate between Russia and Austria
in the latter. Mediate about what? To refuse to mediate over the
Servian question was to refuse to mediate at all. For all practical
purposes the two things were indistinguishable.
All that Germany did on July 25th, so far as the record discloses,
was to "pass on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but
subsequent events indicate that it was "passed on" without any
endorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its
ally's request for more time if it had ever been made? Here again we
note with disappointment the absence from the record of Germany's
message to Austria, "passing on" the reasonable request for an
extension of time. The result indicates that the request received,
if any endorsement, the "faint praise" which is said to "damn."
Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A
little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to
preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.
_A snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging diplomats._ The
peace of the world was to be torpedoed by submarine diplomacy. The
Austrian Government could wait nearly three months to try the
assassin, who admittedly slew the Austrian Archduke, but could not
wait even a few hours before condemning Servia to political death. It
could not grant Russia any time to consider a matter gravely affecting
its interests, even if the peace of Europe and the happiness of the
world depended on it. It would be difficult to find in recorded
history a greater discourtesy to a friendly Power, for Austria was not
at war with Russia.
Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France,
and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily
arresting military proceedings until further efforts toward
conciliation could be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany,
France, Russia, and Italy that they should unite in asking Austria and
Servia not to cross the frontier "until we had had time to try and
arrange matters between them," but the German Ambassador read Sir
Edward Grey a telegram that he had received from the German Foreign
Office saying
that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no
more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the
Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that
note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said,
however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between
Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to
accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to
this suggestion.
It will be noted that Germany thus gave to England, as it had
already given to Russia and France in the most unequivocal terms, a
disclaimer of any responsibility for the Austrian ultimatum, but we
have already seen that when the German Foreign Office prepared its
statement for the German nation, which was circulated in the Reichstag
on August 4th, Germany confessed the insincerity of these assurances
by admitting that before the ultimatum was issued the Austrian
Government had advised the German Foreign Office of its intentions and
asked its opinion and that
we were able to assure our ally most heartily of our
agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her
that any action that she might consider it necessary to take
... would receive our approval.
Here again it is to be noted that the telegram, which the German
Foreign Office sent to Prince Lichnowsky, and which that diplomat
simply read to Sir Edward Grey, is not set forth in the exhibits to
the German _White Paper_.
As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought
in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession until
after the Kaiser's return from Norway and then only if we accept the
assurances of its Foreign Office which are not supported by official
documents. Its attitude was shown by the declaration of its
Ambassador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which,
while again disclaiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian
ultimatum, yet added that Germany "approved" its point of view,
and that certainly, the arrow once sent, Germany could not
allow herself to be guided except by her duty as ally.[28]
[Footnote 28: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 19.]
This seemed to be the fatal error of Germany, that its duties to
civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria,
whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it
carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual
war without respect to the justice of the quarrel may be defensible,
but to support it in a time of peace in an iniquitous demand and a
policy of gross discourtesy to friendly States offends every sense of
international morality.
On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter
into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in
common of some clauses of the Austrian ultimatum. _To this Austria
never even replied._
The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion to the German
Minister for Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he would
"find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this did
not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador
in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
submitted the following formal declaration:
"Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek
territorial acquisitions, and that she does not threaten the
integrity of Servia. Her only object is to insure her own
tranquillity. Consequently it rests with Russia to avoid
war. Germany feels herself at one with France in her keen
desire to preserve the peace, and strongly hopes that France
will use her influence at St. Petersburg in the direction of
moderation." _The [French] Minister observed that Germany
could on her side take similar steps at Vienna, especially
in view of the conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown.
The Ambassador answered that that was not possible, in
view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the
Austro-Servian conflict._ Thereupon the Minister asked if
the four Powers--England, Germany, Italy, and France--were
not able to take steps at St. Petersburg and Vienna, since
the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict
between Russia and Austria. The Ambassador pleaded the
absence of instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to
adhere to the German proposal.[29]
[Footnote 29: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 28.]
This significant interview states the consistent attitude of Germany.
The burden is put upon France to induce its ally to desist from any
intervention and thus give Austria a free hand, while Germany
emphatically declines to promote the same pacific object by suggesting
to Austria a more conciliatory course.
On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in
London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe,
and to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved that peace,
the German Secretary of State, after conferring with the British
Ambassador at Berlin, replied that the conference
would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could
not, in his opinion, be called together except at the
request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall
in with your [Sir Edward Grey's] suggestion, desirous though
he was to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. I [Sir E.
Goschen] said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do
with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four
nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest
means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He [von Jagow]
maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed
was not practicable.[30]
[Footnote 30: English _White Paper_, No. 43.]
Germany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the Powers even
for their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that
on the same day the German Ambassador at London quoted the German
Secretary of State as saying
that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia
could hardly be expected to accept,
thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part,
unjust. Sir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention
to the fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia
and marched into that country
it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all
costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be
involved.
He added that the Servian reply
should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and
pause,
and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna but,
as we have already seen, the German Secretary of State had already
replied that such a conference "was not practicable," and that it
"would practically amount to a court of arbitration," and could not,
in his opinion, be called together "except at the request of Austria
and Russia."[31]
[Footnote 31: English _White Paper_, No. 16.]
That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew
that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had
already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had
actually commenced its military operations.
Germany's attitude is again clearly indicated by the letter of the
Russian Minister in Germany to the Russian Foreign Office in which he
states that on July 27th he called at the German Foreign Office and
asked it,
to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up
this line of conciliation. Von Jagow replied that he could
not advise Austria to yield.[32]
[Footnote 32: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 38.]
Why not? Russia and its allies had advised Servia to yield and Servia
had conceded nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign
Office advise Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its
desire for peace were sincere?
Before this interview took place, the French Ambassador had called at
the German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English
suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany,
Russia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that
Austria and Servia
should abstain from any act which might aggravate the
situation at the present hour.
By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no
invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. _To this
the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal._
On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had "a long and
earnest conversation" with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that
something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.
Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a
skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the
Servians had been aggressors.
The Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it
could to keep the Servians quiet, "and even to fall back before an
Austrian advance in order to gain time."
He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be
furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that
could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power.
The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be
submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.[33]
[Footnote 33: English _White Paper_, No. 56.]
On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the
French Foreign Office and "_strongly insisted on the exclusion
of all possibility of mediation or a conference_"[34]; and yet
contemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London
that he had
started the efforts towards mediation in Vienna, immediately
in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further
communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of
the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna.
[Footnote 34: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 34.]
What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the German Foreign
Office, after stating its conviction
that an act of mediation could not take into consideration
the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an
Austro-Hungarian affair,
claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further
suggestion to Vienna, in which Austro-Hungary was urged
either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient
or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations;
but the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the role of the wicked
partner of the combination--"in full appreciation of our mediatory
activity" (so says the German _White Paper_ with sardonic humor),
replied to this proposition that, coming after the opening of
hostilities, "_it was too late_."
Can it be fairly questioned that if Germany had done something more
than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria
would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that
Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had
given any intimation of such a wish?
On the following day, July 28th, the door was further closed on any
possibility of compromise, when the Austrian Minister for Foreign
Affairs
said, quietly, but firmly, _that no discussion could be
accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would
be declared to-day, and that the well-known pacific
character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own,
might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just
and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled
directly between the two parties immediately concerned.
To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept
the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness
of Austria's quarrel, the British Ambassador suggested "the larger
aspect of the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this
"larger aspect," which should have given any reasonable official some
ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he
had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to
oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at
territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be
postponed.[35]
[Footnote 35: English _White Paper_, No. 62.]
The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus
failed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to
preserve its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28th had a
further conference with Berchtold and again earnestly pleaded for
peace on the basis of friendly relations not only between Austria and
Servia but between Austria and Russia. The conversation in the light
of present developments is so significant that it bears quotation _in
extenso_:
I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it
was desirable to find a solution which, while consolidating
the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia,
should give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy serious
guarantees for its future relations with Servia.
_I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all the
dangers to the peace of Europe_ which would be brought about
by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.
Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well
the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a
frank explanation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. _He
told me that on the other hand the Austro-Hungarian
Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the
energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, could
now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note._
Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute
and that public opinion had been excited to such a degree
that the Government, even if it desired, could no longer
consent to it, all the less, he said to me, because the very
reply of Servia gave proof of the lack of sincerity in its
promises for the future.
On the same day, July 28th, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for
the English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposed
conference of the neutral Powers, on the ground that he did not think
it would be effective,
because such a conference would, in his opinion, have the
appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of
each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining
Powers.
After engaging in this narrow and insincere quibble, and, being
reminded of Servia's conciliatory reply,
his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the
Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he
agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely
Austrian concern, _with which Russia had nothing to do_.[36]
[Footnote 36: English _White Paper_, No. 71.]
At this stage of the controversy it will be noted that every proposal
to preserve peace had come from the Triple Entente and that every such
proposal had met with an uncompromising negative from Austria, and
either that or obstructive quibbles from Germany.