THE TARIFF.
Argentina is professedly a protectionist country. It is also professedly
Republican, with a philosophic ideal of the greatest good of the
greatest number. The two ideas, however, have not achieved a complete
harmony. This was perhaps inevitable. Curiously enough, the vital
industries of the country have not been favoured in any way by the
fiscal system, which has been used to foster exotics and economic
growths hardly suited to the conditions of the country.
In the Argentine there can be no question of "Back to the Land"; there
has never been any departure. But until the present chief of the
Department of Commerce began his campaign for a rational tariff, there
seems to have been a tacit assumption that factories constituted wealth.
That the country should remain permanently agricultural was never
advised. It was assumed that it must manufacture, and on this assumption
the national policy was directed. As a matter of fact, there was
probably no reasoned determination at all. Some industries existed
originally before communication was established on the present great
scale with the rest of the world. As time went on these suffered from
outside competition, and protection was invoked and secured. Other
industries were then started speculatively and for them similar
protection was granted. If prevailing opinion is of any value, it was
even impossible for an industry to succeed except by political jobbery.
Even now the evil appears to be very far from removed, and the
difficulties experienced by the English Railway companies are partly
attributable to this cause. These have consistently refused to bribe,
and it may be said that almost without exception they have adhered
to this rule. The nearest approach to this form of persuasion is the
nomination of influential Argentines to the local board of the company,
and the retention of prominent lawyers for nominal services at a fixed
yearly fee. Except for this no attempt is made to secure support in
congress, and in all probability no payment has ever been made or
promised by an English company in return for particular support for
a definite proposal. The great privileges which the railways enjoy,
especially in the matter of tariff, were granted in pursuit of a
declared policy of encouragement to railway enterprise--a policy which
no one there has reason to regret, as without it the country would
never have emerged from its former lethargy.
With the exception of railway material, which for the most part, comes
in duty free, all manufactured articles pay a very heavy duty indeed.
But, whereas in almost every other country of note, some portion at
least of the raw material is procurable locally, or at least from no
great distance, in the Argentine the most elementary of basic materials
have to be imported. With the exception of wool, grain, cattle, a
special quality of timber, and sugar, there are no raw materials at all
available for industrial purposes. There are no minerals; cotton is a
negligible quantity at present; and fuel is as expensive as labour. Coal
does not exist (at least to a workable extent, if at all); petroleum,
though reported in parts of the Cordillera, is non-existent for all
practical purposes; while wood is found in any quantity only in the
forests in the North, North East, in Entre Rios, and in parts of Córdoba
and San Luis. The expense of carrying this to the capital would be
prohibitive except by boat from the riverine forests. And, in any case,
the wood being slow-growing and intensely hard, it would be manifestly
uneconomical to use anything but the trimmings as firewood.
We have, then, a country with a highly protective tariff compelled to
import by far the greater part of its fuel, which, though admitted
free, is necessarily burdened with freights prohibitive to economic
industrial development. The Argentine, indeed, may be said to be placed,
geographically, in the worst position possible for such a purpose.
Keeping, then, the question of fuel in mind, the possible advantage
(from the purely economic point of view) must be examined of reducing at
home to the state of finished commodities the raw materials mentioned
above.
In every case of manufacture, the two obvious economic reasons are
either the ability to produce better or the ability to produce cheaper.
The former is out of the question in the Argentine, because there is no
hereditary or traditional skill, nor special climatic conditions as in
Manchester; the latter, for the same reason, can only be a question of
freight. Any article to be consumed at home, and produced mainly from
native raw material should, _prima facie_, be capable of production at
home for that consumption, granted an adequate supply of labour. But,
for export, general conditions being at best only equal to those in
the importing countries, the only circumstances which could render
home-manufacture profitable would be greater liability to deterioration
in transit in the raw material than in the finished article, or a great
saving in bulk or weight in the latter.
Taking the raw materials, therefore, in the order given above, the wool
produced or procurable in Argentina is greatly in excess of the present
local requirements. What skill there is in the country for spinning
and weaving is insignificant for practical purposes, the articles
produced being either extremely crude, or quite exceptionally
fine, and consequently expensive. Both are the work of Indians, or
half-castes--who are rapidly becoming a smaller and smaller proportion
of the total population. Passing by as inconsiderable, therefore, the
advantage of home production on the score of special skill, there
remains the question of cheapness. For some goods, special lines of
purely local popularity, which European houses would not make for other
customers, there are points in favour of local production. But in
such things as socks and articles of general clothing, that command a
universal market (with differences only in design), it is found cheaper
to import. It must be added that there is comparatively little demand
for woollen goods at all in the Argentine itself. Though the tariff,
therefore, does not impose a great burden on the people, from its
protective aspect it is encouraging an unprofitable industry.
The duties are as follows: On spun wool about 1½d. per lb., valued at
about 7d. per lb., on washed wool 1s. 7d. per lb., the customs valuation
being 7d.; on stockings and socks (all classes) about 50%, on woollen
cloth (pure) about 40%, and on wool and cotton mixed, over 30%.
Passing over grain, the main manufactured product of which, flour, is
not imported at all, and cattle, which in the frozen meat trade and its
attendant industries form one of the main items of export, there are
left wood and sugar. Of the former, the country produces little for
constructional and industrial purposes, all the natural timber being
employed either for railway sleepers, fencing posts, or for tanning
extract. It is an extremely important business, but there could be no
question of importation, except for intermediate fencing bars (those not
planted in the ground) and for sleepers. Even so the only circumstances
which could render it possible are the inability of the home supply to
cope with the demand, and the consequent rise in price. Recently poplar
has been planted on the islands of the Tigre near the mouth of the
Paraná with great success. But the available space is limited there,
though it is quite possible that planting might be continued on
the Paraná and Uruguay rivers. The duty on imported soft woods is
comparatively small.
The one article of home-production left, which was open to foreign
competition, is sugar. The erratic development of this industry in
conjunction with the tariff has been so eventful, and so instructive
from the economic point of view, that a rather lengthy review may be
pardoned. This is practically a paraphrase and condensation of the
extremely interesting, though, at times, somewhat exclamatory article
written by M. Ricardo Pillado, the head of the Division of Commerce
in the Argentine Ministry of Agriculture, 1906. Unfortunately, in
attempting to follow some of the author's calculations it has been found
quite impossible to verify his results or to see how he arrived at them.
In some cases the figures are so obviously impossible in the light of
the data that the only explanation seems to be a misprint. In order not
to sacrifice the continuity of his account, these figures have been
given as they stand. The fact that the article in question appears in a
collection, derived from various sources, and republished officially at
the Ministry of Agriculture, seemed to give additional justification for
its presentation here without emendation.
Writing at end of 1903, when the Brussels Convention had just condemned
Bounties, and when the original heavy import duties and export drawbacks
were still in force, he makes this preface to a general discussion of
the whole working of the exaggerated protection of the Sugar Industry.
"The fiscal protection of the Sugar industry, instituted in the year
1883, and maintained up to the present moment in all its intensity,
has been the source of the gravest evils to the Republic, not merely
through its immediate effect and its having admitted and secured the
maintenance of an economic system so detrimental to the country, but
also, in the sphere of credit, through the complications of which it
has been the indirect cause. Every effort, therefore, tending to destroy
to their very foundations the fallacies which have been the mainspring
and origin of its birth and continuance up to the present day ought to
be considered, in my opinion, as an act of patriotism and duty."
M. Pillado is far from being a free-trader in the accepted English
sense. "The protection which reasonably may be and, I will even say,
ought to be afforded to national industries cannot," he goes on to
say, "be identified with the favours which were lavished on the
sugar industry." Although he is in favour of a moderate and strictly
protective Tariff, he cannot reconcile the prevailing system with any
economic theory whatever.
The Sugar plantations and refineries are situated in the remote North
West of the country, and the latter were practically in the hands of
two powerful concerns. Owing to the expense of rail transport, under no
circumstances could the sugar be transported to the coast to compete on
equal terms with the imported ocean-borne article, and certainly not,
with the additional freight, in European markets.
The initial error lay in the assumption that these Northern Districts
round Tucuman were especially adapted by climate and other conditions to
the cultivation of cane. No such natural privilege exists. The origin of
the industry, on the contrary, is to be found in that very distance from
a port which renders its present condition anomalous. Sugar-cultivation
was instituted solely with a view to the satisfaction of local
requirements, and the idea of competition with foreign produce in the
capital was probably never dreamed of. This view is the more probable
when it is remembered that Tucuman lies nearly a thousand miles
from Buenos Aires, while railway communication was not established
until 1888 or even later.
At that time, however, protection was already in full force. Although
full communication was not established until 1892, and till then goods
had to be transported by cartage, or whatever means the state of the
roads (such as they were) permitted, so early as 1883 the duty was
raised from the existing rate of 25% _ad volorem_, to a specific tax of
5 cents per kilo, at a time when there was only one currency. The impost
being irrespective of quality, the actual burdens resulted as follows:
On refined Sugar valued by the customs at 19 c. the kilo, 26½%; on white
or granulated with a valuation of 14 c., 35¾%, on raw of 11½ c. per
kilo, 43½%. It is obvious says the writer, that the greatest burden fell
on the lower grades, the only ones which the local refineries were in a
position to produce and to offer in competition with imported sugars.
The year 1885 marked the next stage in the development. Owing to
facilities of transport being absent, Tucuman was in no better position
than before, while the issue in the same year of the decree authorising
a paper currency with the consequent premium upon gold, resulted in a
natural increase in the restrictions on importation. The increase in the
duty was nominally from 5 to 7 c. per kilo irrespective of quality. But
the actual increase resulted in a total of 90% on refined sugar and 108%
on the lower grades.
The third increase took place three years later, in 1888, when the
import charge was raised to 9 c. gold per kilo on refined sugar, other
qualities being taxed at the old figure. On M. Pillado's estimate this
meant a difference of 268% between the cost of that sugar in bond and
its price to the importer.[7]
[7] The percentage seems to work out at 219, while the premium
on gold in that year (1888), as given in another official
publication of 1906, was in reality 150 roughly, which would
mean 184%. But the absence of reliable data makes an amateur
result untrustworthy.
The foregoing is a brief account of the course of taxation introduced
for purposes of protection as described by M. Pillado. At this point he
takes occasion to moralise on the iniquity of the system, and exclaims
that it is a matter of congratulation that the promoters of the industry
did not think fit to produce even further from the great centres,
somewhere on the borders of Bolivia. In emphasising these existing
burdens, however, the writer is merely making a dramatic pause
preparatory to enlarging on the further excess in the institution of
bounties on export.
The immediate result of this tariff was naturally an immense rise in
the price of all sugar, and subsequently the practical exclusion of the
imported article. The figures cited in the work speak for themselves. In
1884 the total imports of sugar of all classes were 35,000 tons. In 1902
they had fallen to 155 tons. While the next year saw an importation of
some hundred tons of refined sugar, the other grades were represented by
a total of about 300 lbs.
We now come to the real interest of the question--the effect namely
which this policy had upon the industry itself and the devices which
the latter adopted to regulate prices.
In the first instance an unparalleled boom took place. In 1884 the
production was 75,000 tons. In 1895 it was 109,000. In the following
year the sum of 134,417 tons was reached--a production quite in excess
of the country's requirements. The result was that in the words of
M. Pillado, "the refiners began to cry to heaven and to earth for any
solution whatever to rescue them from the asphyxiation which threatened
to overwhelm at one and the same time themselves and their system."
For the planters, however, Tucuman had become a veritable Eldorado. Two
years sufficed to give a net return four times as great as the capital
invested. As a natural consequence it followed that labour and capital
flowed into the Sugar districts, creating an unprecedented boom and
denuding the other agricultural industries not only of the province
but of the rest of the republic as well of their very necessities of
existence. The effect was felt, apparently even in the capital, so
that "lawyers deserted their profession, workmen their tools, to throw
themselves with a regular fever into an occupation so full of promise."
Works sprang up as if by magic. Palaces were constructed to house the
staffs. Capital was lavished on the industry by individuals and banking
houses alike. No one, in short, took the slightest pains to investigate
the stability of the trade, and investments were made with complete
recklessness.
While fortunes were being created in the cultivation of sugar cane,
orchards, orange-groves, pasturage, arable land--everything else, in
short--were being either transformed or neglected, and the public
generally was compelled to pay an exorbitant price for its sugar. The
moment had, therefore, arrived for a reduction in the import duties,
and in the price of the article. That, however, was not the view of the
interested parties. "If," they said, "by any misfortune this year's
harvest should prove so good as the last" a worse evil would befall.
Considering that private mortgages amounted to some five million
dollars and that the total indebtedness of the industry, in spite of
its abnormal prosperity, was no less than twenty million, the gravity of
the situation was not exaggerated. A bad harvest would be insufficient
to satisfy the claims of creditors. A good harvest would cause a
tremendous fall in prices and consequent disaster.
It is not surprising that there was formed in 1895 the "Union
Azucavera," or Sugar Trust, with the avowed object of taking over
the entire production of all the refineries and determining prices
for home consumption and export.
Unfortunately, however, for the success of the venture, some concerns
were not in the precarious state to which the majority had been reduced.
By dint of better management and through other causes they still
succeeded in maintaining substantial returns. These refused to enter
the Trust--or Kartel more strictly--and the result was a more or less
complete failure.
Two combines were instituted, nevertheless, the above mentioned
"Union" (in a modified form, no doubt) and a body known as the "Centro
Azucarevo." These concerns devoted themselves with energy to the
solution of the problem of the surplus, and, as was to be expected, the
easiest seemed to be that supplied by political means, the president
of the "Union" being also president of the Chamber of Deputies. So
successful were their efforts that in 1897 a bounty of 12 c. per kilo
was sanctioned, raised for the next year to 16 c. To pay for this bounty
an Inland Revenue tax of six cents paper per kilo was declared on all
sugar home or imported. As in countries nearer home, the bounty system
was an attempt, a costly attempt, to market a commodity which in normal
circumstances was absolutely incapable of meeting its competitors.
Argentine sugar under the most favourable conditions could not, and
never was expected to, compete in the open market with that of other
countries. In the circumstances it must be admitted that the whole
scheme was merely an organised exploitation of the public in the
interests of a weak industry and certain speculative financiers. "What
public interests," exclaims Mr. Pillado, "what benefit for the community
could be cited to warrant a contribution from the country at large of
$40,000,000 in five years as a gift to the exporters of sugar?"
Of the $39,850,000 levied, $25,250,000 were given as a free gift to the
exporters, only $14,600,000 finding their way into the exchequer.
Statistical Appendix.
IMPORTS, UNDER PRINCIPAL HEADS--VALUE IN $1000 GOLD.
1890. 1895. 1900. 1905.
Live-stock 400 611 364 1,307
Food stuffs
Animal foods } 984 1,755 2,242
Vegetable foods and fruits } 539 633 960
Spices and condiments } 1,053 590 866
Legumes and cereals } 1,607 1,701 2,556
Substances for infusions and } 16,411
hot beverages } 5,801 5,335 6,093
Flour, macaroni, fancy breads, }
fecula } 428 436 820
Tobacco and applications 2,554 2,293 3,147 4,455
Drinks--Wines } 7,304 5,637 6,596
Spirits and liquors } 12,990 1,301 1,284 2,159
Sundries } 211 356 411
Textiles, raw and manufactured
Silk } 1,254 2,485 2,602
Wool } 7,650 7,141 10,967
Cotton } 30,024 20,309 19,536 27,066
Sundries } 8,238 8,433 5,582
Oils--Vegetable, mineral, etc. -- 3,193 4,194 5,556
Chemical, medicinal, and pharmaceutical
substances and products } 3,875 2,429 3,760 6,275
Paints and dyes -- 789 865 1,441
Timber: In bulk } 3,295 5,500 11,799
Wrought } 7,399 739 1,540 2,368
Paper and applications
Paper and pasteboard } 1,335 1,924 2,272
Applications } 3,628 678 1,001 1,861
Leather and applications 1,704 641 1,244 1,796
Iron and applications
Raw material } 5,696 9,088 14,814
Machinery and agricultural } 48,109
implements } 1,202 1,861 --
Iron and steel manufactures } 4,701 8,104 11,357
Agriculture -- -- -- 16,532
Locomotion and Conveyances -- -- -- 23,362
Other metals
Unwrought -- 594 1,262 1,896
Manufactured -- 846 2,080 3,998
Stone, clay, glass
Raw material } 6,375 7,120 14,355
Manufactured } 10,385 1,102 1,772 3,111
Electrical supplies -- -- -- 2,034
Sundry articles and manufactures 4,955 1,881 3,321 5,428
------- ------ ------- ------
Totals 142,402 95,096 113,485 205,154
EXPORTS, UNDER PRINCIPAL HEADS--VALUE IN $1000 GOLD.
1890. 1895. 1900. 1905.
Live-stock products } 74,620 71,253 141,042
Live-stock } 9,052 5,942 7,189
Meat, hides, wool, etc. } 61,306 60,352 61,084 122,026
Manufactured animal products } 4,367 3,568 10,148
By-products } 857 659 1,642
Agricultural products } 41,448 77,426 170,235
Raw material } 39,085 73,045 161,188
Manufactured products } 34,590 1,960 2,952 5,584
By-products } 402 1,428 3,462
Woodland products 1,413 2,161 3,508 7,125
Products of the chase 346 272 990 790
Mineral products 673 338 262 261
Other products and sundries 2,488 1,316 1,158 3,388
------- ------- ------- -------
Totals 100,818 120,067 154,600 322,843
EXPORTS OF FROZEN MEAT AND JERKED BEEF.
Other frozen and
Preserved Meat
JERKED BEEF. FROZEN BEEF. FROZEN MUTTON. and Tongues.
Value Value Value Value
Years. Tons. $1000 Tons. $1000 Tons. $1000 Tons. $1000
gold. gold. gold. gold.
1896 45,907 3,217 2,997 119 45,105 1,804 3,288 356
1897 36,238 2,466 4,241 169 50,894 2,035 2,414 255
1898 22,242 2,116 5,867 234 50,833 2,393 3,154 313
1899 19,164 2,038 9,079 950 56,627 2,265 3,322 334
1900 16,449 1,979 24,590 2,458 56,412 4,512 3,175 415
1901 24,296 2,879 44,904 4,490 63,013 5,041 3,047 391
1902 22,304 2,647 70,018 7,001 80,073 6,405 4,729 496
1903 12,991 1,542 85,520 8,151 78,149 6,251 7,354 720
1904 11,726 1,391 97,744 9,774 88,816 7,089 7,249 704
1905 25,288 3,738 152,857 15,285 78,351 6,268 8,488 760
EXPORTS OF CATTLE, SKINS, AND WOOL.
CATTLE. SHEEPSKINS.
Value 1000 Value
Years. 1000's. $1000 gold. Tons. $1000 gold.
1896 382 6,543 36 4,061
1897 238 5,018 37 4,094
1898 359 7,690 42 6,194
1899 312 6,824 41 9,308
1900 150 3,678 37 7,472
1901 119 1,980 41 7,339
1902 118 2,848 41 8,487
1903 181 4,437 41 10,132
1904 129 2,852 37 8,676
1905 262 5,160 30 9,483
SALTED CATTLE DRY CATTLE
WOOL. HIDES. HIDES.
1000 Value 1000 Value 1000 Value
Years. tons. $1000 gold. tons. $1000 gold. tons. $1000 gold.
1896 187 33,516 29 4,598 21 6,600
1897 205 37,450 27 4,605 29 8,596
1898 221 45,534 29 5,171 23 6,887
1899 237 71,283 28 5,334 23 8,001
1900 101 27,991 26 5,285 24 8,159
1901 228 44,666 28 5,281 26 8,848
1902 197 45,810 35 6,384 26 8,822
1903 192 50,424 28 5,360 23 7,787
1904 168 48,355 29 5,267 22 8,256
1905 191 64,312 49 9,147 24 9,929
EXPORTS OF WHEAT, MAIZE, AND LINSEED.
WHEAT. MAIZE. LINSEED.
1000 Value 1000 Value 1000 Value
Years. tons. $1000 gold. tons. $1000 gold. tons. $1000 gold.
1896 523 12,830 1,570 15,594 229 6,856
1897 101 3,470 374 5,478 162 4,996
1898 645 22,368 717 9,274 158 5,420
1899 1,713 38,078 1,116 13,042 217 7,402
1900 1,929 48,627 713 11,933 223 10,674
1901 904 26,240 1,112 18,887 338 16,513
1902 644 18,584 1,192 22,994 340 17,840
1903 1,681 41,323 2,104 33,147 593 21,239
1904 2,303 66,947 2,469 44,391 880 28,359
1905 2,868 85,883 2,222 46,537 654 26,233
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY 1895-1905.
CULTIVATED AREA IN THOUSAND HECTARES.[8]
Other
Years. Wheat. Linseed. Maize. Hay. cultivations. Total.
1895 2,049 387 1,244 713 497 4,892
1896 2,500 360 1,400 800 510 5,570
1897 2,600 350 1,000 900 522 5,372
1898 3,200 332 850 1,067 533 5,983
1899 3,250 355 1,009 1,268 545 6,427
1900 3,379 607 1,255 1,511 557 7,311
1901 3,296 782 1,405 1,631 567 7,683
1902 3,695 1,307 1,801 1,730 580 9,114
1903 4,320 1,487 2,100 2,172 606 10,685
1904 4,903 1,082 2,287 2,503 648 11,424
1905 5,675 1,022 2,717 2,983 682 13,081
[8] One hectare = 2·47114 acres.
THE CULTIVATED AREA IN THE YEARS 1895-1905 COMPARED.
Census, Agricultural
1895. Statistic, 1905. Increase.
Products. 1000 hectares. 1000 hectares. %
Wheat 2,049 5,675 176·9
Linseed 387 1,022 164·0
Maize 1,244 2,717 118·4
Barley 54 58 7·7
Hay 713 2,983 318·4
Tobacco 15 19 22·7
Sugar cane 61 65 7·3
Vineyards 33 53 59·0
Cotton 1 4 397·4
Pea nut 13 29 119·0
Potatoes 21 40 91·0
Beans 20 24 18·3
Vegetables } 39 }
Tapioca } 48 5 } 1·8
Spurge } 3 }
---- ----
Rice } 3 }
Oats } 51 }
Common rye } 2 }
Canary-seed} 156 21 } 57·4
Coffee } 0 }
Forests } 166 }
Fruits 71 87 21·9
Sundries -- 3 --
----- ------ -----
Total 4,892 13,081 167·4
Index
A
Agricultural implements:
Importation of English, 36
United States, 36
Agricultural machinery:
English importation of, 36
United States importation of, 36
Agriculture, Effects of undeveloped economic system on, 23, 24
'Alfalfa,' Cultivation of, 2
Antilles, Trade with, 27
Axes and small tools, U.S. importation of, 34
B
Bahia Blanca, 33
Bahia Blanca, Docks at, 10
Banks, Employment in, 22
Belgium, Trade with, 27
Boer colony, 24
Bogus companies, 4
Bolivia, Trade with, 27
British houses, Decrease in the number of, 37
Breweries, 13
Buenos Aires, 1, 10, 33
Congestion of port of, 9
Province of, 4
Business Houses, Employment in, 22
Brazil, Trade with, 27, 28
British and Northern immigrants: their wants not studied, 31
British exporters, Slackness of, 32
C
Canals, 4
Capital, Influx of foreign, 33
Cereals, growth of, 2
Chaco district, 12
Chaco, The, 3
Chicken farming, 24
Chili, Trade with, 27
China, Trade with, 28
Chubut, Welsh colony in, 24
'Colonists,' 2
Concentration of Trade in Buenos Aires, 1
Congress, Tone of, 7
Consular reports, Moreno, Dr. Francisco on, 25, 26
Córdoba, Province of, 3
Corrientes, 3
Cotton goods, Italian importation of, 36
Cotton growing, 3
Credit, exaggerated, 38
Credit, Soundness of National, 18
Cultivated area in Argentina, Amount of, 56
Cutlery, English loss of market for, 37
D
Drainage system, 4
E
'Empresas,' The, 6
Englishmen, Prospects for, 20, 21, 22
Entre Rios, 3
Estancias, 2, 3
Estancias, employment on, 21
Estancieros, 2
Exports, Value of, 54, 55
F
Flour mills, 12
Foreign capital, Important part played by, 16
Foreign influences, Jealousy of, 7
France, Trade with, 27, 28
Fruit cultivation, 3
Fuel, Scarcity of, 42, 43
G
Gaucho, The, 12
Gauchos, 2
Gauges, Diversity of, on Argentine railways, 10
German houses, Increase in the number of, 37
Germany, Trade with, 27
Gold in the Argentine, Scarcity of, 4
Government management, character of, 7
Government, want of stability of, 17
H
Hard-woods, growth of, 3, 42, 44
Havana, Trade with, 28
Holland, Trade with, 27
Housing-accommodation, 14
I
Immediate delivery, Expectation of, 39
Immigrants, Attempts to attract, 20
Immigrants, Nationalities of, 28
Immigration of agriculturalists with capital needed, 2
Immigration, Preponderance of Latin races, 31
Importation, Tendency in the direction of increased, 12
Imports, Value of, 53
Inadequacy of rolling stock, 9
Interests, Rates of, 6
Inundations of the Argentine, 4
Italian immigrants, attempts to attract, 20
Prospects for, 23
Their employment in industries, 12, 13
Italy, Trade with, 27
J
Jobbery, Political, its necessity for success of any enterprise, 41, 42
L
Literature, Scarcity of, on the Argentine, 24
La Plata, 33
Loans, Argentine, easily raised, 18
Their distribution, 19
Their size, 19
Locusts, 3
M
Mar del Plata, 10
Matches, Manufacture of, a monopoly, 13, 15
Monopolies, Railway, Effect of, 8, 9
Morality, Public, low standard of, 16
Municipal loans, a speculative investment, 18
N
Non-partisans unmolested, 17
P
Paraná, 33
Paraguay, Trade with, 27
Paraná, River, 4
Peon, The, 12
Piedmontese and Basque 'colonists,' 2
Pillado, M., his disagreement with present economic policy, 46
his estimate of amount of tax on sugar, 47
of its effects on the sugar industry, 48, 49, 50
'Ponchos,' Importation of, 13
Ports, Construction of, 33
Portugal, Trade with, 27
Precarious nature of business in the Argentine, Effect of, 1
Preference on colonial produce as affecting the Argentine, 19
Prices, Inflation of, in the Argentine, 1
Property, Division of, 3
Proprietary articles, British trade in, 39
Protective tariff, Origin of, 41
Public debt, Laxity of morality as regards, 17
Its causes, 18
Public works, Demands of, 32
Mistakes in connexion with, 33
Q
Quebracho trade, employment of Indian labour in the, 12
R
Railways, Dividends of, 6
Railways, Employment on, --
Railways, Growth of, 29
Relative importance of, 30
Railways, Growth of British owned, 30, 31
Railway material, Importation of English, 34, 35
United States, 34, 35
Railway system, 4
Raw material, Argentine naturally exclusively a producer of, 7
Raw materials, Scarcity of manufactures, 42
Rents, Rise of, in Buenos Aires, 1
Rivers, Absence of navigable, 4
S
Samborombon, Bay of, project of new port in, 10
San Nicolas, 33
Santa Fé, 33
Shoe-factories, canvas, 13
South Africa, Trade with, 27
Spain, Trade with, 27
Store-keepers, Power of the, 23
Strikes, 13, 14, 15
Cause of frequency of, 15
Sugar industry, The, 3
Sugar, manufacture of, 45, 46, 47
Sugar Trust, The, 49, 50
T
Tariff, Effect of high protective, 3, 12
Timber, Production of, 44
Traction engines, Supremacy of Lincoln firms in, 36
Trade, British, losing of ground, 26
Trade, Difficulty of obtaining information about British, 25
Tramway material, Importation of English, 35
United States, 35
Travellers, Exclusion of, 38, 39
Travellers, Inadequate equipment of English, 39
Tucuman, Centre of sugar manufacture, 46
U
Under-population of the Argentine, 2
United Kingdom, Trade with, 27, 28
United States, Trade with, 27, 28
Uruguay, River, 4, 10
Uruguay, Trade with, 27
W
Wealth, Natural, of the country, 11
Welsh Colony, 24
Wool manufacture, 43, 44
* * * * *
Transcriber's Note: The following amendments were made to the text:
Page Original Word(s) Amendment
---- ---------------- ---------
2 the the the
4 Parana Paraná
10 Parana Paraná
23 accomodating accommodating
23 monoply monopoly
26 1896 1895
29 Commuuicacion Communicacion
31 emphasiased emphasised
33 Santo Santa
34 that the that of the
36 monoply monopoly
41 industuries industries
42 Cordoba Córdoba
49 mortages mortgages
49 sitnation situation
60 Cordoba Córdoba
62 Parana Paraná
63 Santo Santa
End of Project Gutenberg's The Argentine as a Market, by N. L. Watson