_In what does Scepticism differ from the Academic
Philosophy?_
Some say further that the Academic philosophy is the same as 220
Scepticism, therefore it seems appropriate to me to treat of
that also. There have been, as the most say, three
Academies--the most ancient one, that of Plato and his
followers; the second and middle one, that of Arcesilaus and his
followers, Arcesilaus being the pupil of Polemo; the third and
new Academy, that of Carneades and Clitomachus and their
followers; some add also a fourth, that of Philo and Charmides,
and their followers; and some count even a fifth, that of
Antiochus and his followers. Beginning then from the old
Academy, let us consider the difference between the schools of
philosophy mentioned. Now some have said that Plato was a 221
Dogmatic, others that he was a Sceptic, and others that he was
in some things a Sceptic and in some things a Dogmatic. For in
the fencing dialogues, where Socrates is introduced as either
making sport of someone or contending against the Sophists,
Plato has, they say, a fencing and sceptical character, but he
is dogmatic when he expresses himself seriously, either through
Socrates or Timaeus or any such person. In regard to those 222
who say that he is a Dogmatic, or a Dogmatic in some things and
a Sceptic in others, it would be superfluous, it seems to me, to
speak now, for they themselves grant that he is different from
us. The question as to whether he was really a Sceptic or not we
treat more fully in the Memoranda, but here we state briefly
that according to Menodotus and Aenesidemus (for these
especially defended this position) Plato dogmatises when he
expresses himself regarding ideas, and regarding the existence
of Providence, and when he states that the virtuous life is more
to be chosen than the one of vice. If he assents to these things
as true, he dogmatises; or even if he accepts them as more
probable than otherwise he departs from the sceptical character,
since he gives a preference to one thing above another in
trustworthiness or untrustworthiness; for how foreign this is to
us is evident from what we have said before. Even if when he 223
performs mental gymnastics, as they say, he expresses some
things sceptically, he is not because of this a Sceptic. For he
who dogmatises about one thing, or, in short, gives preference
to one mental image over another in trustworthiness or
untrustworthiness in respect to anything that is unknown, is a
Dogmatic in character, as Timon shows by what he said of
Xenophanes. For after having praised Xenophanes in many 224
things, and even after having dedicated his Satires to him, he
made him mourn and say--
"Would that I also might gain that mind profound,
Able to look both ways. In a treacherous path have
I been decoyed,
And still in old age am with all wisdom unwed.
For wherever I turned my view
All things were resolved into unity; all things, alway
From all sources drawn, were merged into nature the same."
Timon calls him somewhat, but not entirely, free from
vanity, when he said--
"Xenophanes somewhat free from vanity, mocker of
Homeric deceit,
Far from men he conceived a god, on all sides equal,
Above pain, a being spiritualised, or intellect."
In saying that he was somewhat free from vanity, he meant that
he was in some things free from vanity. He called him a mocker
of the Homeric deceit because he had scoffed at the deceit in
Homer. Xenophanes also dogmatised, contrary to the assumptions 225
of other men, that all things are one, and that God is grown
together with all things, that He is spherical, insensible,
unchangeable, and reasonable, whence the difference of
Xenophanes from us is easily proved. In short, from what has
been said, it is evident that although Plato expresses doubt
about some things, so long as he has expressed himself in
certain places in regard to the existence of unknown things, or
as preferring some things to others in trustworthiness, he
cannot be, it seems to me, a Sceptic. Those of the New Academy,
although they say that all things are incomprehensible, 226
differ from the Sceptics, perhaps even in saying that all things
are incomprehensible (for they assert decidedly in regard to
this, but the Sceptic thinks it possible that some things may be
comprehended), but they differ evidently still further from us
in their judgment of good and evil. For the Academicians say
that there is such a thing as good and evil, not as we say it,
but more with the conviction that that which they call good
exists than that it does not; and likewise in regard to the
evil, while we do not say anything is good or evil with the
conviction that it is probably so, but we live our lives in an
unprejudiced way in order not to be inactive. Moreover, we say
that our ideas are equal to each other in trustworthiness 227
and untrustworthiness, as far as their nature goes, while they
say that some are probable and others improbable. They make a
difference also between the improbable ones, for they believe
that some of them are only probable, others probable and
undisputed, still others probable, undisputed, and tested. As
for example, when a coiled rope is lying in a somewhat dark
room, he who comes in suddenly gets only a probable idea of it,
and thinks that it is a serpent; but it appears to be a rope 228
to him who has looked carefully around, and found out that it
does not move, and that it is of such a color, and so on,
according to an idea which is probable and undisputed. The
tested idea is like this: It is said that Hercules led Alcestis
after she was dead back again from Hades and showed her to
Admetus, and he received an idea that was probable and
undisputed regarding Alcestis. As, however, he knew that she was
dead, his mind drew back from belief and inclined to disbelief.
Now those belonging to the New Academy prefer the idea which 229
is probable and undisputed to the simply probable one. To both
of these, however, they prefer that which is probable,
undisputed, and tested. If, however, both those of the Academy
and the Sceptics say that they believe certain things, there is
an evident difference between the two schools of philosophy even
in this; for "to believe" is used in a different sense, 230
meaning, on the one hand, not to resist, but simply to accept
without strong inclination and approval, as the child is said to
believe the teacher; on the other hand, "to believe" is used to
signify assenting to something with choice, and, as it were,
with the sympathy that accompanies strong will, as the prodigal
follows the one who chooses to live a luxurious life. Therefore,
since Carneades, Clitomachus, and their followers say that they
are strongly inclined to believe that a thing is probable, and
we simply allow that it may be so without assent, we differ 231
from them, I think, in this way. We differ from the New Academy
likewise in things concerning the aim; for while the men who say
that they govern themselves according to that School avail
themselves of the idea of the probable in life, we live
according to the laws and customs, and our natural feelings, in
an unprejudiced way. We could say more regarding the distinction
between the two schools if we did not aim at brevity.
Nevertheless, Arcesilaus, who as we said was the leader and 232
chief of the Middle Academy, seems to me to have very much in
common with the Pyrrhonean teachings, so that his school and
ours are almost one. For neither does one find that he expressed
an opinion about the existence or non-existence of anything, nor
does he prefer one thing to another as regards trustworthiness
or untrustworthiness; he suspends his judgment regarding all
things, and the aim of his philosophy is [Greek: epochê], which
is accompanied by [Greek: ataraxia], and this agrees with what
we have said. But he calls the particular instances of 233
[Greek: epochê] _bona_, and the particular instances of assent
_mala_. The difference is that we say these things according to
what appears to us, and not affirmatively, while he says them as
if speaking of realities, that is, he says that [Greek: epochê]
is in itself good, and assent an evil. If we are to believe also
the things that are said about him, he appeared at first 234
sight to be a Pyrrhonean, but he was in truth a Dogmatic, for he
used to test his companions by the method of doubt to see
whether they were gifted enough to take in Plato's dogmas, so
that he appeared to be a Sceptic, but at the same time he
communicated the doctrines of Plato to those of his companions
who were gifted. Hence Ariston also said about him--
"Plato in front, Pyrrhon behind, Diodorus in the middle,"
because he availed himself of the dialectic of Diodorus, but was 235
wholly a Platonist. Now Philo and his followers say that as
far as the Stoic criterion is concerned, that is to say the
[Greek: phantasia katalêptikê], things are incomprehensible, but
as far as the nature of things is concerned, they are
comprehensible. Antiochus, however, transferred the Stoa to the
Academy, so that it was even said of him that he taught the
Stoic philosophy in the Academy, because he tried to show that
the Stoic doctrines are found in Plato. The difference,
therefore, between the Sceptical School and the Fourth and Fifth
Academy is evident.