CHAPTER XXVII.

_The Formula "To place an equal Statement in opposition

to every Statement."_

Furthermore, when we say "Every statement may have an equal 202

statement placed in opposition to it," by "every," we mean all

the statements that we have examined; we do not use the word

"statement" simply, but for a statement which seeks to prove

something dogmatically about things that are unknown, and not at

all one that shows a process of reasoning from premises and

conclusions, but something which is put together in any sort of

way. We use the word "equal" in reference to trustworthiness or

untrustworthiness. "Is placed in opposition" we use instead of

the common expression "to conflict with," and we supply "as it

appears to me." When therefore one says, "It seems to me 203

that every statement which I have examined, which proves

something dogmatically, may have another statement placed in

opposition to it which also proves something dogmatically, and

which is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,"

this is not asserted dogmatically, but is an expression of human

feeling as it appears to the one who feels it. Some Sceptics 204

express the formula as follows: "Every statement should have an

equal one placed in opposition to it," demanding it

authoritatively thus: "Let us place in opposition to every

statement that proves something dogmatically another conflicting

statement which also seeks to prove something dogmatically, and

is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness."

Naturally this is directed to the Sceptics, but the infinitive

should be used instead of the imperative, that is, "to oppose"

instead of "let us oppose." This formula is recommended to the 205

Sceptic, lest he should be deceived by the Dogmatists and

give up his investigations, and rashly fail of the [Greek:

ataraxia] which is thought to accompany [Greek: epochê] in

regard to everything, as we have explained above.

Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism · 第 27 / 34 章