CHAPTER XVII.

_What are the Tropes for the overturning of Aetiology?_

In the same manner as we teach the Tropes of [Greek: epochê], 180

some set forth Tropes through which we oppose the Dogmatics,

by expressing doubt in regard to the aetiology of which they are

especially proud. So Aenesidemus teaches eight Tropes, by which

he thinks that he can prove all the dogmatic aetiology useless.

The first of these Tropes, he said, relates to the character 181

of aetiology in general, which does not give incontestable

testimony in regard to phenomena, because it treats of unseen

things. The second Trope states that although abundant resources

exist by which to investigate the cause of a thing in question,

some Dogmatics investigate it in one way only. The third Trope 182

states that the Dogmatics assign causes which do not show

any order for things which have taken place in an orderly

manner. The fourth Trope states that the Dogmatics, accepting

phenomena as they take place, think that they also understand

how unseen things take place, although perhaps the unseen things

have taken place in the same way as the phenomena, and perhaps

in some other way peculiar to themselves. The fifth Trope states 183

that they all, so to speak, assign causes according to their

own hypotheses about the elements, but not according to any

commonly accepted methods. The sixth states that they often

explain things investigated according to their own hypotheses,

but ignore opposing hypotheses which have equal probability. The

seventh states that they often give reasons for things that 184

not only conflict with phenomena, but also with their own

hypotheses. The eighth states that although that which seems

manifest, and that which is to be investigated, are often

equally inscrutable, they build up a theory from the one about

the other, although both are equally inscrutable. It is not

impossible, Aenesidemus said also, that some Dogmatics 185

should fail in their theories of causality from other

combinations of reasons deducible from the Tropes given above.

Perhaps also the five Tropes of [Greek: epochê] are sufficient

to refute aetiology, for he who proposes a cause will propose

one which is either in harmony with all the sects of philosophy,

with Scepticism, and with phenomena, or one that is not.

Perhaps, however, it is not possible that a cause should be in

harmony with them, for phenomena and unknown things altogether

disagree with each other. If it is not in harmony with them, the

reason of this will also be demanded of the one who proposed 186

it; and if he accepts a phenomenon as the cause of a phenomenon,

or something unknown as the cause of the unknown, he will be

thrown into the _regressus in infinitum_; if he uses one cause

to account for another one, into the _circulus in probando_; but

if he stops anywhere, he will either say that the cause that he

proposes holds good so far as regards the things that have been

said, and introduce relation, abolishing an absolute standpoint;

or if he accepts anything by hypothesis, he will be attacked by

us. Therefore it is perhaps possible to put the temerity of the

Dogmatics to shame in aetiology by these Tropes.

Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism · 第 17 / 34 章