_Do the Sceptics deny Phenomena?_
Those who say that the Sceptics deny phenomena appear to me to 19
be in ignorance of our teachings. For as we said before, we do
not deny the sensations which we think we have, and which lead
us to assent involuntarily to them, and these are the phenomena.
When, however, we ask whether the object is such as it appears
to be, while we concede that it appears so and so, we question,
not the phenomenon, but in regard to that which is asserted of
the phenomenon, and that is different from doubting the
phenomenon itself. For example, it appears to us that honey is
sweet. This we concede, for we experience sweetness through 20
sensation. We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason of
its essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but of
that which is asserted of the phenomenon. Should we, however,
argue directly against the phenomena, it is not with the
intention of denying their existence, but to show the rashness
of the Dogmatics. For if reasoning is such a deceiver that it
well nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes, how
should we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown,
so as not to rashly follow it?