THE SUPREME BENCH INVADED--ITS DECISIONS REVIEWED.
We are aware that many look upon the final decisions of courts with a
degree of awe and respect which is almost reverential. The railroad
companies of the country, with all their paid attorneys, are now
extremely jealous in their efforts to convince the public that the
supreme court of the United States is a body of the greatest jurists the
world ever produced; that their decisions are pre-eminently able, and
that it is disloyal, if not rank treason, to call them in question, or
to even criticise them. While we feel bound to recognize the decisions
of courts as binding until they are reversed, we claim that it is not
only the right, but the duty of every citizen of the republic to examine
these decisions, and to approve or condemn, as to his judgment shall
seem right. We examine, and approve or condemn, acts of congress and
state legislatures; we discuss the motives of legislators, and when acts
have been passed which are not acceptable, their repeal has been
demanded. Not unfrequently repeals have been effected soon after their
enactment, either because of patent defects, or because the people
condemned them. History has proven that the election of a man to
congress, or to the legislature, does not clothe him with wisdom, not
always with honesty, but that the frailties of humanity affected him as
it did others. The same rule applies to courts and judges. They are made
of the same flesh and blood, and are subject to the same infirmities as
other men. Their knowledge is not perfect; their judgment is not
infallible, nor are their official decisions always pure and free from
bias. Instances are not wanting where judges have been impeached, and
removed for dishonest practices. They have been and still are being
influenced by popular feeling, by certain interests, and are always
more or less controlled by education and association. Their decisions
are often reversed, and they sometimes reverse their own decisions.
If we want examples of a corrupt bench, we can refer to the city of New
York, where certain judges have been impeached, and removed from office.
Of partisan judges, we find them in Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas,
Kansas, and many other states. Of ambitious judges, those who, while
acting in their official capacity, enter into political contests, and
use their judicial positions to secure other preferment, we need only to
look over the history of any of the states, and to the highest court in
the nation. Judges of the supreme court of the United States are found
identified with political parties; entering the lists as candidates for
higher distinction; and while they are holding high and responsible
offices, to which they have been appointed for life, they are seen
mixing with politicians as partizans, and seeking nominations. Judges
whose judicial decisions have been controlled by public sentiment, can
be found in Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Judges who have
reversed their own decisions, can be found in any state in the Union,
and we have recent examples in the supreme court of the United States.
Such being the facts, it is not strange that railroads, and other great
corporations, should, to a very considerable extent, influence the
actions and decisions of courts. We feel warranted in saying, that the
decisions of courts, more than everything else combined, have promoted
the rapid strides made by railroad corporations toward a complete
destruction of republican institutions. The pernicious practice of
solving all doubtful points in favor of these corporations by the
"judicial construction" of statutes, or what might be called "judicial
legislation," has been of vastly more benefit to them than all the
grants received from legislative bodies. Legislatures do not possess the
power to grant to any individual, company, or corporation, exclusive
rights or privileges, unless such power is conferred by the
constitution. The rule formerly obtained, that in cases where the rights
of the public and that of an individual or corporation came in conflict,
an act of the legislature of doubtful authority would be construed in
favor of the people. The reason for this rule of construction is
obvious. The people are sovereign. All the powers not delegated to the
government, or to some department of it, were retained by the people.
Hence, when a question was presented involving a doubt of its
constitutionality, and a decision in favor of the individual or
corporation would deprive the people of any of their reserved rights, it
was resolved in favor of the sovereign people. The act was held to be
unconstitutional because the legislature could not exceed the scope of
the authority conferred upon it. The constitution was a limitation upon
legislation.
In a former chapter we have attempted to show the distinction between
the power of the states and general government under the constitution;
to demonstrate that the power of states was supreme in all matters save
in those expressly conferred upon the general government by the
constitution, and that for this reason the constitution of the United
States should be strictly construed. We are warranted in saying that
this rule obtained until questions involving the interests of railroads
began to present themselves for the decisions of the supreme court of
the United States. When these questions began to arise, a different rule
was demanded by the companies, and by a gradual departure the supreme
court has reversed this old and just rule, and now the will of that
court must be treated as the supreme law of the land. Judicial
legislation has usurped the place of judicial investigation, and the
people are without remedy, unless a return can be had to constitutional
rule. There is now a general complaint throughout the whole land,
because of the recent interpretation given by the United States courts
to the constitution; their disregard of statutes, constitutions, and
decisions of state courts, which have reached a point which virtually
makes the will of the supreme court superior to all constitutional and
statute law. During the war, the power and jurisdiction of the United
States courts were enlarged, and special powers were conferred upon them
to meet the exigencies of the time. From that period to the present,
these courts, by judicial construction of their power under the
constitution and new interpretations of that instrument, and by judicial
legislation, have gradually extended their jurisdiction, until there
seems to be no constitutional or legal barrier to their decisions.
Questions connected with railroad companies have increased rapidly.
Conflicts have arisen between the public and these corporations; they
have multiplied in the federal courts, and, as a general rule, have been
decided in favor of the companies. In some instances, upon questions
arising exclusively under the constitution and statutes of a state, the
judges of the federal courts have disregarded the action of the people
of the state, overridden their state constitutions and statutes, and
pronounced the decisions of the state courts invalid, and refused to be
bound by them, substituting their own conclusions in the interest of
these monopolies. To prove this, let us compare some of the earlier
decisions of these courts with those of more recent date, citing cases
where the powers, rights, and privileges of corporations were involved,
and where conflicts arose between the government of states and of the
nation. In the early years of our republic, questions connected with
corporate rights were submitted to the supreme court of the United
States; they were ably argued by the best constitutional lawyers of the
nation, and were carefully considered and decided by the courts. Upon
the question as to whether state courts were inferior, the supreme court
of the United States decided that they were not. The same court, on a
question raised as to the authority of the legislature of a state to
grant to private parties exclusive rights to certain property in
Georgia, _held_, that the real party in interest was the people, and
that it was only when the legislature acted within the power conferred,
that their acts were valid; that it was the peculiar province of the
legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society,
but not to apply those rules to individuals of society.
The question as to the rights, powers, and privileges, of corporations,
came before the supreme court of the United States, and was fully
examined and decided, in 1819, in what is known as the "Dartmouth
College Case." The charter for the college had been granted by the king
of England for educational purposes. It was in no sense a corporation
for pecuniary profit. Without the consent of the trustees of the
college, the legislature of New Hampshire amended the charter in a
manner not acceptable to the trustees. They refused to recognize the
change made. A suit was instituted, and the case was taken to the
supreme court for a decision. The point at issue was whether the college
was a public or private corporation; and, also, as to the extent of the
power the state legislature possessed over its charter. It is not our
purpose to examine all the points raised and decided in that case, but
only to notice such as refer to the nature of corporations and the power
of the state governments to control them. In deciding these questions,
the court seems to have looked at the objects for which corporations
were intended. The court says; "A corporation, being a mere creation of
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it, either expressly or incidental to its very
existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to affect the
object for which it was created. * * *
"The objects for which corporations are created are universally such as
the government wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial to the
country, and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and, in most
cases, the sole consideration of the grant." * * "From the fact, then,
that a charter of incorporation has been granted, nothing can be implied
which changes the character of the institution, or transfers to the
government any new power over it. The character of civil institutions
does not grow out of their incorporation, but out of the manner in which
they are founded, and the objects for which they are created. The right
to change them is not founded on their being incorporated, but on their
being the instruments of government created for its purposes. The same
institution, created for the same objects, though not incorporated,
would be public institutions, and, of course, controllable by the
legislature. The incorporating act neither gives nor prevents this
control."
The doctrine above enunciated fixes the line of distinction between
public and private corporations. Those created for public or
governmental purposes are defined to be "public corporations," and those
created for the advancement of private enterprises are "private
corporations." Private corporations possess none of the attributes of
sovereignty, and hence are to be treated in law as private individuals;
the act of incorporation being for the purpose of affording the
corporators proper facilities for transacting business. Corporations
being the mere creatures of the law, they possess only those properties
which the charters of their creation confer upon them. Under the
decision to which we have referred, and from which we have quoted,
corporations are created by statute, and are subject to the control of
the power creating them. A grant from the sovereign power to an
individual, or to a company, is not necessarily irrepealable, nor will
it in all cases be treated as a contract. Corporations created for
public or governmental purposes are binding as contracts only so far as
they affect private interests, for the good reason that government
cannot contract with itself.
Nor could the legislature confer exclusive privileges upon a
corporation, the exercise of which would deprive the people of the
rights guaranteed to them in the constitution; for the reason that the
attempt to clothe a corporation with such privileges would be an
unauthorized act on their part. In the case of "Providence Bank _vs_.
Billings & Pittman," decided by the same court, in 1830, it is said that
"The great object of an incorporation is to bestow the character and
properties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men.
This capacity is always given to such a body; any privileges which may
exempt it from the burdens common to individuals do not flow necessarily
from the charter, but must be expressed in it or they do not exist." The
doctrine obtained that corporations can take nothing by implication, and
that unless the power to regulate and control them has been surrendered
by the legislature, that power remains undiminished. The rule that
grants of privileges to corporations are to be strictly construed, when
the rights of the public are affected, is recognized in this case. We
are warranted in saying that it is only since corporations have become
all-powerful in the land that a different rule has obtained. Under the
statutes of the United States, and as formerly held by the supreme
court, a promissory note given by a citizen of a state to another
citizen of the same state, but transferred to a citizen of another
state, could not be sued in the United States courts, but the holder was
compelled to bring his action in the state courts. This rule obtained
until counties, cities, and towns began to issue their bonds to railroad
companies, and was then disregarded. Railroad companies had sold and
delivered these bonds to parties in Wall street, or elsewhere; they had
failed to fulfil their contracts with the parties from whom they had
received the bonds, and when suit was brought upon them in the state
courts the bondholders were beaten. Suits were then commenced in the
federal courts, the plain letter of the statute was disregarded, the
established decisions of the supreme courts were overruled, state
statutes and constitutions were treated with contempt, the decisions of
the supreme court of a state, which had been followed for years, were
called "_oscillations_," and the interests, frauds, and deceits of
railroad corporations were fully protected and sustained; not because
this course was supported by the statutes or precedents, but because
such a course would subserve these harmful interests. This action on the
part of the supreme court was not the result of any dishonest or
partisan intent, but it was made to prevent what the court was pleased
to term great wrongs about to be inflicted on _innocent_ holders of
bonds purchased of railroad companies. In many instances the _innocent_
bondholders were the same parties who, as railroad men, had cheated the
counties and cities, and by fraud and false representation had obtained
these bonds, for which no consideration has been paid to the present
time. It will not be out of place here, as showing the influence of
these corporations over the supreme court of the United States, to refer
to the transactions that caused the first departure by the court from
the settled rules of decisions on questions arising under the
constitutions and statutes of states, and, we may add, initiated a rule
of decisions, followed to the present time, which have well nigh
destroyed states rights. Under this new rule the whole country is
governed by the supreme court and corporations. The people are
powerless, and monopolies reign supreme. We refer to the question of aid
by counties and municipal corporations to railroads. In many of the
states municipal corporations have subscribed stock and issued their
bonds to railroad companies, in some instances under express statute
authority, and in others without such authority. No one is prepared to
admit that compulsory payment by the citizen of a part of his property,
or money, to aid a private corporation in building a railroad, is the
payment of taxes for the support of government, or that the levy and
collection of a tax for that purpose can be supported by any section of
the constitution. Yet we all know that such taxes have been, and are
being, levied and collected. Judge Dillon, in his work on municipal
corporations, says: "The courts concur, with great unanimity, in holding
that there is _no implied authority_ in municipal corporations to incur
debts or borrow money in order to become subscribers to the stock of
railway companies, and that such power must be conferred by _express_
grant. To become stockholders in private corporations is manifestly
foreign to purposes intended to be subserved by the creation of
corporate municipalities, and the practice of bestowing powers of this
kind is of recent date and origin; and hence the rule, that in order to
exist, it must be specially conferred, and cannot be deduced from the
ordinary municipal grants."
If the above quotation is good law (and this no one will deny), the
recent decisions made by the supreme court cannot be supported. But in
order to avoid the force and effect of this principle, and to provide
for the collection of bonds illegally issued (by recent decisions), a
new doctrine has been promulgated by the court which overturns state
statutes, as well as the decisions of state courts. Treating of this
class of bonds, Judge Dillon says:--
"Respecting negotiable bonds issued under legislative authority, by
municipalities for such and kindred purposes, when in the hands of _bona
fide_ holders, the supreme court of the United States, influenced,
doubtless, by a keen sense of the injustice and odium of repudiation,
has at all times displayed a strong determination effectually to enforce
payment. Accordingly it has refused to follow the subsequent decisions
of the state courts against the validity of such bonds, in cases where
the prior rulings of the state courts had been in favor of the power to
issue them; it has adopted liberal constructions of statutes and
charters authorizing the creation of such debts; it has given no favor
to defences based upon mere irregularities in the issue of the bonds, or
non-compliance with preliminary requirements, not going to the question
of the power to contract; and has held that the circuit courts of the
United States were clothed with full power and authority by _mandamus_,
or otherwise, to enforce the collection of judgments rendered therein on
such bonds, and that this authority could not in the least be interfered
with, either by the legislature or the judiciary of the states." It will
be seen that for the purpose of relieving railroad companies from their
liabilities as guarantors, on bonds issued to them by municipalities
(for these bonds were uniformly so guaranteed), the supreme court of the
United States has declared the statutes of states, and the decisions of
state courts, absolutely null and void. In violation of both the letter
and spirit of the constitution, in order to compel the payment of bonds
issued without authority, and in violation of every principle known to
the law, it has said that these bonds must be paid because they are in
the hands of _bona fide_ holders.
This same court, as we will hereafter show, when the holders of bonds
issued by railroad companies were asking payment, has released the
companies from their written agreement to pay in coin, and compelled the
holders to take at par depreciated paper. When the bondholders are
demanding payment from the people, of the bonds issued without
authority, the court, in order to compel payment, nullifies state
government; but when these same bondholders demand that railroad
companies shall live up to their written contracts, have decided that
they need not do so. It fears the stigma of repudiation when the people
are called upon to pay, but when the call is made upon corporations it
decided in favor of repudiation. Our author continues: "It has upheld
and protected the rights of such creditors with a firm hand,
_disregarding at times, it would seem, principles which it applied in
other cases, and asserts the jurisdiction and authority of the federal
courts with such striking energy and vigor as apparently, if not
actually, to trench upon the lawful rights of states and the
acknowledged powers of the state tribunals_."
Municipal corporations have no right to become stockholders in private
corporations; acts of the legislature pretending to confer such
authority are void; the officers who control and administer the
municipal government are the mere agents of the municipality, and can
only act within the scope of the powers conferred upon them by the
charter of the municipality they represent. Neither the constitution of
a state, nor of the United States, nor the charter of a municipality,
can confer upon the nation, state, county, city, or town the authority
to compel any citizen against his will to bestow any part of his money
or property upon private corporations. And it matters not whether this
comes in shape of a tax, an arbitrary appropriation of a fraction or of
all his property or possessions to such private corporation, or by a
subscription of stock to it. If the national, state, or municipal
government can in either of the above methods compel him to aid in
building up and supporting private corporations, then private
corporations are clothed with attributes of sovereignty, and all private
citizens own and possess their property subject to the will of these
corporations. If a majority of the qualified voters of a state, or
particular locality, are in favor of taxing the state, or local
district, to the extent of one-tenth or one-half of the assessed value
of all property in the district, and investing the amount in a railroad
enterprise, the minority, notwithstanding their protest and
remonstrance, must submit to have their property taken from them and
applied to the same object. Their constitutional rights are taken from
them, and our boasted free government has no real existence. By recent
decisions of the supreme court of the United States, the people of the
whole country are placed in that position now. Railroad corporations
have been, and are now, under the fostering care and protection of this
court. Statutes have been so often disregarded by it, when their
interests were to be subserved, and in conflicts between the people and
these monopolies the decisions have been so uniformly in favor of the
latter, that it is now a question whether the government controls
corporations, or corporations control the government. If a pernicious
law is enacted by congress, or a state legislature, it is soon repealed.
The men who compose those bodies are constantly changing, their term of
office is short, and the errors committed by them can be speedily
corrected. The judges of the supreme court are appointed for life; the
people have no control over them; their decisions cannot be reversed by
any department of the government. A decision of the supreme court is
the supreme law of the land, and cannot be reversed or amended by any
other power in the land. It is superior to all statute law, and the
power of the court has no limit, save that fixed in the constitution and
statutes of the United States, both of which must receive _their_
construction and interpretation from the court. We have already said
that judges of this court are subject to the infirmities common to all
men; that they are liable to be influenced by the same causes that
influence others; that no matter how honest and pure they may be in
their intentions and actions, their decisions were liable to be
controlled by surrounding circumstances, and that the influence of this
great corporate power did control them. In proof of this we need only
look at their course of decisions on municipal bonds, and on bonds given
by railroad companies, before referred to, as well as their decisions
upon the nature of railroad corporations. It strikes us as remarkable
that the supreme court of the nation should have or entertain any doubts
as to the fact that these corporations are private. Upon what principle
the court can hold that railroads are public highways is not readily
seen. The stock, the roads, and all other property belonging to the
different railroad companies, are as much their individual or corporate
property as are the furnace, the factory, or the mining interests, the
property of the companies owning them. Their ownership is as complete as
that of the private person who owns the stage and team used for carrying
the mails in certain districts. The same law that governs other common
carriers, governs these corporations. Government can only interfere with
their business when they abuse the privileges granted in their charters.
It cannot compel them to carry the mails, save in pursuance of contracts
made with them. They own the ground upon which their roads are built,
and no one can travel upon these roads, or ship freight over them, save
by the permission of the companies. While courts and legislatures have
the constitutional right to regulate and control these corporations,
and, if need be to prevent abuses and oppressions, to declare their
charters forfeited, as in cases of banks, insurance companies, and other
corporations,--upon no principle of law can they declare them public
corporations. If it is a fact that they are public corporations, then as
a resulting consequence they are clothed with the attributes of
sovereignty, and are a part of the government. If railroads are public
highways for any purpose, they are for all. Until they cease to be owned
and controlled by private corporations, it will hardly be claimed by any
respectable court that they are public highways, in the same sense as
common public roads, nor can they be until they are open to public use.
This cannot be until the public becomes the owner of these railroads.
But we are told that the supreme court has decided the question, and
declared that they are public highways, no matter whether they are owned
by the state or private companies. We have not seen the decision; but if
such decision has been made, we are bound to accept it as the law of the
land, until the same court reverses it. Yet if the court was to decide
that a river was a railroad, or that a steamboat was a train of cars,
while we would accept this decision as the law, we would not admit that
such was the fact. We are not aware that the question as to whether
railroads are public highways has ever been before the supreme court,
save in connection with the right of municipalities to subscribe stock
and issue bonds therefor, and upon the question of voting taxes to aid
in their construction. When these questions have been presented to the
supreme court of the United States it has held that they were public
highways. It is noticeable that these decisions have been made only when
the interests of these corporations were to be subserved. In a recent
case from Wisconsin the supreme court decided that they were public
highways, and that it was just as lawful to levy taxes for railroads as
_for any other public works_. The same court has decided in a large
number of cases when suits were instituted on municipal bonds, that
railroad corporations were private companies, and in all of the states
where the question has arisen, we believe they have been held to be
private corporations. We might cite several recent decisions of the
supreme court to the same effect. In the cases of Kansas Pacific Railway
Company _vs_. Prescott, Ribon _vs_. Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific
Railway Company, Putnam _vs_. New Albany & Sandusky Railway Company, and
Chicago & Quincy Railway Company _vs._ the County of Otoe, tried in
Washington last winter, the court virtually decided the corporations
were private, and not public. The doctrine to be gathered from these
decisions is, that when the interests of these corporations demand it
they are to be treated as private, but when the question is as to their
right to compel the people to contribute of their substance to build
railroads, then the roads are public highways. If the corporations are
private, and their roads are built and owned by them, the fact that
these roads are private still exists, notwithstanding the courts as to
the law of the case decide that they are public highways. The fact that
such a decision has been made, is strong proof of the correctness of our
position, that the corporations have a controlling influence over the
judiciary of the country more to be dreaded by the people than all the
appliances that can be brought to bear upon the legislative and
executive department of the government. But in no other instance has the
influence of these corporations over the supreme court of the country
been made more manifest than in what is known as the "legal tender"
decision. And we might add that no other decision of the court, and no
act of any department of the government, has proved so disastrous to the
people as this decision. We have already referred to the means used by
these corporations to secure a majority of the supreme court favorable
to their designs, and of their success in the selection of judges
committed to their interests. It only remains for us to review this
decision to convince the most skeptical of the fact that corporations
have captured the supreme court, as well as the other departments of the
government, and the effect of this decision has given to these
corporations, and Wall street brokers, and gamblers, the absolute
control of the finances of the country. But before coming to the
decision, it will not be out of place to remark, that _money_ is always
the standard of value for all commodities; that the universally adopted
idea of money means coin--gold and silver--or, what is called the
precious metals. Bank bills, treasury notes, bills of exchange, and all
kinds of commercial paper are only valuable as the representatives of
money. The fact that they are expected to be converted into money gives
them their value in the market. Let it be understood that they cannot
at some future day be collected in money, and their commercial value
ceases. In proportion to the length of time that must elapse before any
bank bills, treasury notes, or other commercial paper can be paid in
specie, does its value increase or diminish in commercial transactions.
Nothing but money of the standard value can be made a legal tender in
contracts between individuals. Congress does not possess the power,
under the constitution, to say that A who has contracted to pay B $1,000
in money, can discharge that contract by paying him $1,000 in bank bills
or treasury notes, that are worth in money but $800. If such powers
exist, then all standard values of property is destroyed, and it
fluctuates in value as the price of the paper representing money
approaches to, or recedes from, the money standard. The rule that
nothing but gold and silver is, or can be, "legal tender" has been
uniformly adhered to from the formation of our government, until 1872,
when a majority of the supreme court reversed the rule, and decided that
what are termed treasury notes are, under the acts of congress, legal
tender for all contracts and business intercourse among men.
The question was fully argued in 1869 before a full bench, then composed
of a chief justice and seven associates, five of whom concurred in
deciding that the act of congress making anything but gold and silver a
legal tender was unconstitutional. Before the decision was announced
Justice Grier resigned, leaving but six associates on the bench when the
opinion was delivered. Chief Justice Chase delivered the opinion, and,
in speaking of the powers of congress, says: "No department of the
government has any other powers than those delegated to it by the
people. All the legislative power granted by the constitution belongs
to congress; but it has no legislative power which is not thus
granted. * * Not every act of congress, then, is to be regarded as the
supreme law of the land, nor is it by every act of congress the judges
are bound. This character, and this force, belongs only to such acts as
are made in pursuance of the constitution." The court then decides that
there is in the constitution no grant of legislative power to make any
description of credit currency a legal tender in payment of debts, and
that it does not exist as incidental to any of the granted powers. That
the power does exist in congress to issue bills of credit or treasury
notes, but not to make them legal tender for debts. The opinion
concludes as follows: "We are obliged to conclude that an act making
mere promises to pay dollars a legal tender to pay debts previously
contracted, is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, really
calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in congress;
that such an act is inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution,
and that it is prohibited by the constitution." This decision was not
acceptable to corporations and railroad managers. It would compel them
to live up to the contracts they had made, and destroy their power of
controlling, in connection with the Wall street stock jobbers and gold
brokers, the entire financial interests of the country. We have already
shown how this combination of corporate interests secured an increase in
the number of judges, and that Messrs. Strong and Bradley were appointed
because of their opposition to the legal tender decision. None of the
judges who had concurred in the decision of Judge Chase had changed
their opinions; these were then dissenting members of the court. The two
new appointees uniting with three dissenting judges, a majority of the
court could overrule the long settled decisions of the court, and
sustain the act of congress making depreciated paper a legal tender. The
law of the land, recognized since the organization of the government,
approved by all the eminent jurists and statesmen who have lived in the
last century, could be overturned; values could be unsettled; the
financial and commercial interests of the country could be made subject
to this great corporate power which had obtained such complete control
of the different departments of the government.
Soon after the appointment of the two judges above named the legal
tender question was again brought before the court, a full bench of nine
judges sitting and participating in the decision of the question. Five
of the nine concurred in holding the legal tender act constitutional,
Justice Strong delivering the opinion of the court. It is a noticeable
feature of the case that a judge who had just taken his seat should be
selected to pronounce the decision; that after a uniform course of
decisions, made and upheld by all the great jurists of the country for
eighty-five years, two judges who had just been appointed should be
found delivering opinions reversing this long settled rule, and that
both of said judges were appointed because of their avowed friendship
for the corporations which were to be so largely benefited by the
reversal of this long settled construction of the constitution upon the
question of legal tenders, and it seems that even these judges base
their decision upon what they deem the necessity for a reversal rather
than upon any constitutional grounds. Justice Strong, as preliminary to
the opinion of the court, says: "The controlling questions in these
cases are the following: Are the acts of congress, known as the legal
tender acts, constitutional when applied to contracts made before their
passage? and, secondly, Are they valid as applicable to debts contracted
since their enactment? These questions have been elaborately argued, and
they have received from the court that consideration which their great
importance demands. It would be difficult to overestimate the
consequences which must follow our decisions. They will affect the
entire business of the country, and take hold of the possible continued
existence of the government. If it be held by this court that congress
has no constitutional power, under any circumstances, or in any
emergency, to make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of all
debts (a power confessedly professed by every independent sovereignty
other than the United States), the government is without those means of
self-preservation which, all must admit, may, in certain contingencies,
become indispensable, even if they were not when the act of congress now
called in question was enacted. It is also clear that if we hold the
acts invalid as applicable to debts incurred, or transactions which have
occurred since their enactment, our decision must cause, throughout the
country, great business derangements, wide-spread distress, and the
rankest injustice. The debts which have been contracted since February
25th, 1862, constitute, doubtless, by far the greatest portion of the
existing indebtedness of the country. They have been contracted in view
of the acts of congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender, and in
reliance upon that declaration. Men have bought and sold, borrowed and
lent, and assumed every variety of obligation, contemplating that
payment might be made with such notes. Indeed, legal tender notes have
become the universal measure of values. If now, by our decision, it be
established that their debts and obligations can be discharged only in
gold coin; if, contrary to the expectations of all parties to these
contracts, legal tender notes are rendered unavailable, the government
has become an instrument of the grossest injustice, and debtors are
loaded with an obligation it was never intended they should assume. A
large percentage is added to every debt, and such must become the demand
for gold to satisfy contracts, that ruinous sacrifices, general
distress, and bankruptcy, may be expected. These consequences are too
obvious to admit of question. And there is no well-founded distinction
to be made between the constitutional validity of an act of congress
declaring treasury notes a legal tender for debts contracted after its
passage, and that of an act making them a legal tender for the discharge
of all debts, as well those incurred before as those made after its
enactment. There may be a difference in the effects produced by the acts
and in the hardship of their operation; but in both cases the
fundamental question, that which tests the validity of the legislation,
is, Can congress constitutionally give to treasury notes the character
and qualities of money? Can such notes be constituted a legitimate
circulating medium having a defined legal value? If they can, then such
notes must be available to fulfil all contracts (not expressed by
exception) in money, without reference to the time when the contract was
made."
This quotation from the opinion of the court may be taken as a sample of
the reasoning in favor of a reversal of former decisions on the question
of legal tender. After elaborate argument in the same strain, by Justice
Strong, and also by Justice Bradley, a majority of the court decide that
the legal tender acts are constitutional, while the four judges
remaining on the bench, who but a short time before had made a contrary
decision, dissent from the opinion of the majority. The argument of the
majority in favor of the decision seems to ignore the real question,
to-wit, the constitutionality of the acts of congress, and to place the
decision upon the ground that a contrary holding would be ruinous to the
financial interests of the country. The assertion is made that the
decision "_will affect the entire business of the country, and take hold
of the possible continued existence of the government_." The decision
was made about one year ago, and its effects on the business interests
of the country are made manifest. If the court believed that the
decision sustaining the legal tender acts would prove beneficial to the
people, it was sadly mistaken. But if it believed such a decision would
strengthen monopolies, and enable a few railroad managers and Wall
street brokers to corner and control the finances of the country, then
the decision was a success. The effect has been to unsettle the
commercial and financial interests of the country, and to show that
treasury notes, if they are the standard of values, are a fluctuating
standard. The consequence of the decision has taken "_hold of the
possible continued existence of the government_," and has enabled the
gold and stock gamblers in Wall street to suck the life-blood of the
nation. The decision gives strength to corporations, who, uniting with
Wall street brokers, are depleting the treasury of the nation to advance
their own private purposes. By the decision two standards of value are
fixed: one that is stable, and must ever remain so--the standard of
money--gold and silver; the other, the standard of fluctuating paper, of
no intrinsic value, liable to be inflated or depressed, as shall best
subserve the interests of the parties who, by combining, have got such
absolute control of the market as to be able to change the value of this
_legal tender_ paper at pleasure. The idea advanced in the decision,
that to declare that nothing but coin could be a legal tender, would
cause widespread ruin, presents but a partial view of this matter. As a
matter of fact, no act of congress prior to 1862 had ever been passed
making anything but coin a legal tender; nor was there any decision of
the supreme court recognizing or deciding that paper money could be a
legal tender until 1872; and yet no such widespread ruin had overtaken
the financial interests of the country as has manifested itself since
that decision was rendered.
Simultaneous with the decision of the court declaring treasury notes
legal tender, the quantity of coin in the treasury began to decrease,
and one year's experience has sufficed to reduce the amount from
one-third to one-half, and in proportion the amount controlled by Wall
street has increased. The secretary of the treasury is now obliged to
have recourse to the $44,000,000 of treasury notes held as a reserve to
prevent panic and disaster. This decision does not benefit the importing
merchant, who must pay in coin; it does not benefit the legitimate
business of the country; it does not benefit the farmer, or any of the
industrial interests of the country, because in buying and selling, if
payments are made in paper (_legal tender_) the prices of the articles
bought and sold are fixed by a gold or coin standard. Coin is, in all
dealings, the measure of values. The decision of the court does not and
cannot change these facts. The only parties who derive any real benefit
from it are corporations and brokers, who can save large amounts by
being released from their contracts. Another argument used by the court
in favor of the decision is, that every independent nation possesses the
power to make paper a legal tender, and that it must be possessed by our
government. The answer to this is, that the constitution does not confer
upon congress, or the courts, even by implication, any such power. And
if we admit that other nations possess it, we conclude it is because the
fundamental law recognizes it, or because the government is of unlimited
power.
The court decides that "_legal tender notes have become the universal
measure of values_." This is simply untrue. In all quotations of values,
the measure is fixed by gold, and then legal tender notes are quoted as
being worth such per cent less (or what amounts to the same thing); gold
is quoted as being worth ten, fifteen, twenty, or more cents to the
dollar more than paper, and while the value of gold is fixed, that of
treasury notes is constantly fluctuating. Under this decision railroad
companies, and their associates, the Wall street gamblers, control the
finances, while all the honest and legitimate business of the country
languishes. Had the court designed to place the whole interests of the
government and the people in the power of these corrupt rings and
dishonest brokers, no more effectual means could have been devised or
adopted. Justice Bradley, in his opinion concurring with the opinion of
Justice Strong, makes use of the following bold and dangerous language:
"It is absolutely essential to independent national existence that
government should have a firm hold in the two great sovereign
instrumentalities of the _Sword_ and the _Purse_, and the right to wield
them on occasions of national peril." Let this pernicious doctrine be
accepted as the law of the land; let the _purse and the sword_ be placed
in the hands of government officials without restrictions, and what
vestige of republican institutions is left? What difference is there
between our government and absolute despotism? But more than this, let
the highest court of a nation, by a partisan decision, place the _purse_
of the nation in the hands of a gigantic monopoly, banded together for
the purpose of plundering the public, and what vestige of independence
is left the people? Reader, look carefully at the almost unlimited power
the corporations of the country have obtained over each department of
the government; at the legal tender decision and its effect upon the
people of the country, and then ask yourself if we, as a nation, are not
nearing the point where we cease to be a republic, save in name. This
decision impairs the obligation of contracts, in violation of the letter
and spirit of the constitution. It compels the creditor to take from the
debtor irredeemable paper at par, on a contract payable in money. It
says that a mere promise to pay is a legal tender. It makes it
absolutely impossible to resume specie payment because it withdraws all
coin from circulation, and does away with the necessity for its use in
domestic transactions. The coin of the country is shipped to foreign
countries to meet demands against us in those countries, and to pay for
such commodities as we purchase from them. Credit currency, no matter
whether it is issued by the general or state government is not, nor can
it under the the constitution, be made a legal tender by act of congress
or by a decision of any court in the land, because the laws of trade
will control the whole matter, being stronger than legal enactments or
judicial decisions. Money is the universal medium or common standard
which fixes the value of all other things that can be sold or bartered,
and neither the congress of the nation, by the passage of a law
declaring that paper shall be a legal tender, nor the supreme court
deciding that such law is constitutional, can impart an actual value to
such paper, because it is but a promise to pay money. They can no more
accomplish this object than can the alchemist convert iron into gold.
The only effect of this decision, as we have attempted to demonstrate,
is to place the people more completely in the power of corporations. If
the reader has followed us he will not fail to perceive that all the
departments of the government are virtually controlled by the great
anti-republican corporate interests now overshadowing and cursing the
land; and that the supreme court of the United States, originally
intended to be a check upon unconstitutional legislation, and to guard
with jealous care the rights of the people, has become an instrument to
aid this great power in its war upon the rights of the citizen; that by
judicial construction of statutes involving the rights of corporations
and the people, such decisions have been made as leave the people but
little to hope for in the future, and induce the belief that the will of
the court, and not constitutional law, is to be the "supreme law of the
land."