THE MONOPOLISTS AT THE DOOR OF THE WHITE HOUSE.
The influence of this great corporate power does not spend all its force
at the interior department, but it is seen handing in its card at the
white house.
While we claim that railroads and other corporations have, to a
considerable extent, influenced the distinguished occupants of the
presidential chair, we do not wish to be understood as intimating that
any of our chief magistrates have acted corruptly. We simply assert that
this great corporate interest has secured favorable action from our
presidents when they have been appealed to. As will be seen by their
perusal, the acts of congress chartering the Pacific railroad and
branches, imposed certain duties upon the president in connection with
their location and construction. In the discharge of these duties the
wishes of the companies were in all cases complied with, and in some
instances to the injury and at the cost of the government and the
public, and under circumstances leaving no doubt that the president
acted wholly upon the representations of the companies.
In the act of July, 1864, the Union Pacific charter was so amended as to
permit any company organized under the laws of Iowa, Minnesota,
Nebraska, or Dakota, and designated by the president of the United
States, to construct a railroad from Sioux City, Iowa, to connect with
the Union Pacific road at some point not farther west than the
one-hundredth degree of longitude. A company was organized under the
laws of Iowa to build a railroad from Sioux City to Missouri Valley in
the same state, the latter point being some thirty miles east of Sioux
City, and seventy or more miles south. Another company was organized to
build a railroad from Missouri Valley to Fremont, in Nebraska, the
latter place being a point on the Union Pacific. These companies were
incorporated by a few men, among whom were several members of congress
who had aided in the passage of the act of July, 1864. Through the
influence of one of the incorporators, then a member of congress, now of
the United States senate, the president designated these companies as
the companies to build the Sioux City branch of the Union Pacific, and
their roads, representing two sides of a triangle, were adopted as the
branch road. The road is known as the Sioux City & Pacific. A road
running westerly from Sioux City to Fremont would be about seventy-five
miles in length. The road, as constructed between these two points, is,
as given in the Railroad Manual, one hundred and seven miles. The act of
congress required the road to be constructed on the most direct and
practicable route. This road received the same privileges, subsidies,
and grants, as the main line, with an addition of eighty sections of
land per mile. Now it cannot be presumed that the president, acting on
his own judgment, uninfluenced by the railroad company, would have
designated these companies, and these roads, as the Sioux City branch of
the Union Pacific road, with one hundred sections of land and $16,000
subsidy bonds for every mile of the road. We have given this instance to
show the direct influence of this corporate power over the president.
This great influence, so dangerous to the welfare of the country, is
indirect in its action. Vast numbers of men have their funds invested in
railroad stocks and bonds. They engage in Wall street speculations; they
buy and sell stocks and bonds; they operate in gold and values, and have
no interest in common with the laboring and producing classes of the
country. These corporations own and control property worth billions of
dollars; they rule the finances of the country; they have tens of
thousands of men in their employ; as they increase in strength and
wealth, they are constantly striving for greater powers and privileges.
Their lobbyists and retainers surround every department of the
government. When public offices are to be filled, they unite in favor of
men in their interest; and when decisions are to be made upon questions
affecting their rights and obligations, they take care that their
friends shall be in position to make or shape these decisions. The
president, with his appointing power, if influenced in their favor,
becomes an important ally. In his appointments to office, it is not to
be expected that he can personally know the qualifications and views of
every nominee. He must of necessity rely upon others, to a great extent,
in making his selections. Next to legislative action in their favor,
railroad companies are most deeply interested in the judicial decisions
affecting their interests. Judges are apt to be influenced by the same
motives that prevail with other men. Years spent by men as railroad
attorneys, or as attorneys for any other great interest, will, to a
certain extent, control their reasoning and decisions upon questions
coming before them should they be promoted to the bench. In close
relation with, and next in importance to the decisions of courts, on
points affecting this great corporate interest, are the rulings and
decisions of the attorney general of the United States. If these
important offices can be filled by persons whose past pursuits have
demonstrated that they entertain views favorable to the interests of
these companies, an important gain is made at the start in their favor.
To secure such appointments, all and every influence at the command of
these corporations are brought to bear upon the president. The services
of the most influential men, in congress and out, are engaged; the names
of the candidates selected are presented for the consideration of the
president, and their appointment urged by the whole railroad and
corporate interest of the country. The president, following a long
established precedent, usually appoints the persons who are most
strongly recommended. This fact is well understood by these corporate
interests and hence their vigilance and activity. We do not say that the
president, in yielding to this tremendous pressure, acts from improper
motives. We simply assert that this pressure is used, and that it is
scarcely to be resisted.
The fact that judges of ability and integrity differ in their
construction of the constitution and laws, is well understood by the men
who lead and control the corporate interests of the country; as also the
further fact that the time is not distant when the question whether the
people or railroad corporations shall govern, must be determined. To
prepare for this issue they use their great influence to have the
important positions in the government occupied by their friends. To a
considerable extent they have succeeded.
Mr. Ackerman, of North Carolina, was attorney general. He was what might
be termed a strict constructionist. His views were conservative. As the
legal adviser of the executive department, his opinions were adverse to
the interests of the railroad companies on certain questions submitted
to him. At the request of the president he resigned, and Judge Williams,
of Oregon, was appointed in his stead. No one will question the
integrity of the present attorney general. Yet it was a well-known fact
that, at the date of his appointment, he was one of the attorneys of the
Northern Pacific railroad company; that he was fully committed to the
railroad interests, and that his appointment was urged by railroad men
in all parts of the country. By his appointment a friend of these
corporations became a member of the cabinet, and an important ally is
present whenever questions affecting their interests are discussed in
executive council.
A question of the greatest importance to these corporations was the
construction to be given to the statutes of the United States, and
especially the "Legal Tender Act." The first of the legal tender acts
was passed July, 1862. This was followed by other acts increasing the
amounts of legal tender issues. Prior to the passage of these acts,
railroad corporations had issued and sold many millions of bonds, and
stipulated that both principal and interest should be paid in gold. Soon
after the issue of legal tender bills their value depreciated, and from
that time to the present there has been, and still is, a wide margin
between their value and coin. If these railroad companies could pay
their bond indebtedness with legal tender at par, a saving of from ten
to fifteen dollars could be effected on every hundred so paid. In the
year 1869, the question whether this act was retroactive in its
operation or effect was presented to the supreme court. The court was
then composed of eight justices. When the case involving this question
was presented to and decided by the court, but seven of the justices
were on the bench. Of these, four, including the chief justice, were of
the opinion that the statute did not affect contracts made before its
passage, and decided that these railroad companies must pay their bonds
in coin according to the contract. This decision was not acceptable to
this vast corporate power. It was condemned by railroad men throughout
the country. The president was approached on the subject, and his great
influence was besought in the matter. Four of the justices (one-half of
the court) having held adversely to the corporations, a full bench could
not reverse their decision. To effect a reversal, one of the four must
change his opinion, or the number of justices must be increased. The
latter alternative was decided to be the more feasible, and the
president asked congress to increase their number to _nine_. The reason
urged was, that upon important questions, before a full bench, the court
might be equally divided, and important questions would remain
undetermined. The railroad interest was fully represented in the lobby
at Washington, and congress provided for an additional justice. About
this time one of the justices retired from the bench, making a vacancy,
and rendering it necessary for the president to appoint two new
justices. This was a grand opportunity for the railroad interest. If men
who were identified with them could be appointed, the decision on the
"Legal Tender Act" could be reversed, and they could save from ten to
fifteen millions of dollars on every hundred million of dollars due from
them. Not only could they save this amount, but in future, as the
members of the court are appointed during life or good behavior, they
would have no apprehensions of a decision against their interest. At
once the president was importuned to appoint William Strong, of
Pennsylvania--a man who was fully identified with them by education and
employment, he being attorney for the Pennsylvania railroad company--and
Joseph P. Bradley, of New Jersey, who was also identified with this
interest, he being the attorney of the greatest railroad corporation in
that state. Neither of these men had any national reputation, but all at
once the city of Washington, as well as the whole country, was
enlightened as to their great judicial worth, and railroad men
throughout the country were urging their appointment. It was publicly
announced, and not contradicted, that they were in favor of reversing
the decision of the court on the legal tender act, and their
appointment was urged for this reason. This influence controlled the
president. These gentlemen were nominated by him, and their appointment
was confirmed by the senate in 1870. The decision on the legal tender
act was reversed, and railroad men were happy. As we shall attempt to
show, when we treat of the controlling influence of these corporations
upon the finances of the country, this reversal was most baneful to the
country, and detrimental to the best interests of the people. We do not
wish to be understood as accusing the president of being governed by
improper motives in the appointments of Messrs. Strong and Bradley to
the supreme bench; but we do mean that the railroad interests, by
concert of action, procured these appointments; it being known, or at
least well understood, that these appointments would insure a reversal
of the decision, as we have recounted, and that by such reversal their
interests would be greatly subserved. Nor do we wish to be understood as
accusing the persons so appointed of lacking the requisite ability for
the honorable stations for which they were selected, or that their
decisions were governed by personal considerations, or that they
reversed said former decision to specially subserve the interests of
railroad corporations. We have long since come to the conclusion that
judges of courts, like other men, are influenced by surrounding
circumstances; that they are not infallible, and that it is no unusual
thing for the most eminent judges to differ upon questions submitted for
their decision. While these decisions are honestly made, they are often
controlled or dictated by extra judicial considerations. As we shall
have occasion hereafter to examine this subject when treating of the
intimate and controlling relations between these corporations and the
courts of the country, we are content to leave the case of their
influence with the executive department to the proof submitted in these
three appointments of Williams, Bradley, and Strong.