who is made more compassionate by familiarity with sorrow, more placable

by contest, purer by temptation, and more enduring by distress.[28] It

is owing to the constant presence of this thought, to his sensibility to

the refining influence of sorrow, that Wordsworth is the only poet who

will bear reading in times of distress. Other poets mock us by an

impossible optimism, or merely reflect the feelings which, however we

may play with them in times of cheerfulness, have now become an

intolerable burden. Wordsworth suggests the single topic which, so far

at least as this world is concerned, can really be called consolatory.

None of the ordinary commonplaces will serve, or serve at most as

indications of human sympathy. But there is some consolation in the

thought that even death may bind the survivors closer, and leave as a

legacy enduring motives to noble action. It is easy to say this; but

Wordsworth has the merit of feeling the truth in all its force, and

expressing it by the most forcible images. In one shape or another the

sentiment is embodied in most of his really powerful poetry. It is

intended, for example, to be the moral of the 'White Doe of Rylstone.'

There, as Wordsworth says, everything fails so far as its object is

external and unsubstantial; everything succeeds so far as it is moral

and spiritual. Success grows out of failure; and the mode in which it

grows is indicated by the lines which give the keynote of the poem.

Emily, the heroine, is to become a soul

By force of sorrows high

Uplifted to the purest sky

Of undisturbed serenity.

The 'White Doe' is one of those poems which make many readers inclined

to feel a certain tenderness for Jeffrey's dogged insensibility; and I

confess that I am not one of its warm admirers. The sentiment seems to

be unduly relaxed throughout; there is a want of sympathy with heroism

of the rough and active type, which is, after all, at least as worthy of

admiration as the more passive variety of the virtue; and the defect is

made more palpable by the position of the chief actors. These rough

borderers, who recall William of Deloraine and Dandie Dinmont, are

somehow out of their element when preaching the doctrines of quietism

and submission to circumstances. But, whatever our judgment of this

particular embodiment of Wordsworth's moral philosophy, the inculcation

of the same lesson gives force to many of his finest poems. It is

enough to mention the 'Leech-gatherer,' the 'Stanzas on Peele Castle,'

'Michael,' and, as expressing the inverse view of the futility of idle

grief, 'Laodamia,' where he has succeeded in combining his morality with

more than his ordinary beauty of poetical form. The teaching of all

these poems falls in with the doctrine already set forth. All moral

teaching, I have sometimes fancied, might be summed up in the one

formula, 'Waste not.' Every element of which our nature is composed may

be said to be good in its proper place; and therefore every vicious

habit springs out of the misapplication of forces which might be turned

to account by judicious training. The waste of sorrow is one of the most

lamentable forms of waste. Sorrow too often tends to produce bitterness

or effeminacy of character. But it may, if rightly used, serve only to

detach us from the lower motives, and give sanctity to the higher. That

is what Wordsworth sees with unequalled clearness, and he therefore sees

also the condition of profiting. The mind in which the most valuable

elements have been systematically strengthened by meditation, by

association of deep thought with the most universal presences, by

constant sympathy with the joys and sorrows of its fellows, will be

prepared to convert sorrow into a medicine instead of a poison. Sorrow

is deteriorating so far as it is selfish. The man who is occupied with

his own interests makes grief an excuse for effeminate indulgence in

self-pity. He becomes weaker and more fretful. The man who has learnt

habitually to think of himself as part of a greater whole, whose conduct

has been habitually directed to noble ends, is purified and strengthened

by the spiritual convulsion. His disappointment, or his loss of some

beloved object, makes him more anxious to fix the bases of his

happiness widely and deeply, and to be content with the consciousness of

honest work, instead of looking for what is called success.

But I must not take to preaching in the place of Wordsworth. The whole

theory is most nobly summed up in the grand lines already noticed on the

character of the Happy Warrior. There Wordsworth has explained in the

most forcible and direct language the mode in which a grand character

can be formed; how youthful impulses may change into manly purpose; how

pain and sorrow may be transmuted into new forces; how the mind may be

fixed upon lofty purposes; how the domestic affections--which give the

truest happiness--may also be the greatest source of strength to the man

who is

More brave for this, that he has much to lose;

and how, finally, he becomes indifferent to all petty ambition--

Finds comfort in himself and in his cause;

And, while the mortal mist is gathering, draws

His breath in confidence of Heaven's applause.

This is the Happy Warrior, this is he

Whom every man in arms should wish to be.

We may now see what ethical theory underlies Wordsworth's teaching of

the transformation of instinct into reason. We must start from the

postulate that there is in fact a Divine order in the universe; and that

conformity to this order produces beauty as embodied in the external

world, and is the condition of virtue as regulating our character. It is

by obedience to the 'stern lawgiver,' Duty, that flowers gain their

fragrance, and that 'the most ancient heavens' preserve their freshness

and strength. But this postulate does not seek for justification in

abstract metaphysical reasoning. The 'Intimations of Immortality' are

precisely imitations, not intellectual intuitions. They are vague and

emotional, not distinct and logical. They are a feeling of harmony, not

a perception of innate ideas. And, on the other hand, our instincts are

not a mere chaotic mass of passions, to be gratified without considering

their place and function in a certain definite scheme. They have been

implanted by the Divine hand, and the harmony which we feel corresponds

to a real order. To justify them we must appeal to experience, but to

experience interrogated by a certain definite procedure. Acting upon the

assumption that the Divine order exists, we shall come to recognise it,

though we could not deduce it by an _à priori_ method.

The instrument, in fact, finds itself originally tuned by its Maker, and

may preserve its original condition by careful obedience to the stern

teaching of life. The buoyancy common to all youthful and healthy

natures then changes into a deeper and more solemn mood. The great

primary emotions retain the original impulse, but increase their volume.

Grief and disappointment are transmuted into tenderness, sympathy, and

endurance. The reason, as it develops, regulates, without weakening, the

primitive instincts. All the greatest, and therefore most common, sights

of nature are indelibly associated with 'admiration, hope, and love;'

and all increase of knowledge and power is regarded as a means for

furthering the gratification of our nobler emotions. Under the opposite

treatment, the character loses its freshness, and we regard the early

happiness as an illusion. The old emotions dry up at their source. Grief

produces fretfulness, misanthropy, or effeminacy. Power is wasted on

petty ends and frivolous excitement, and knowledge becomes barren and

pedantic. In this way the postulate justifies itself by producing the

noblest type of character. When the 'moral being' is thus built up, its

instincts become its convictions, we recognise the true voice of nature,

and distinguish it from the echo of our passions. Thus we come to know

how the Divine order and the laws by which the character is harmonised

are the laws of morality.

To possible objections it might be answered by Wordsworth that this mode

of assuming in order to prove is the normal method of philosophy. 'You

must love him,' as he says of the poet,

Ere to you

He will seem worthy of your love.

The doctrine corresponds to the _crede ut intelligas_ of the divine; or

to the philosophic theory that we must start from the knowledge already

constructed within us by instincts which have not yet learnt to reason.

And, finally, if a persistent reasoner should ask why--even admitting

the facts--the higher type should be preferred to the lower, Wordsworth

may ask, Why is bodily health preferable to disease? If a man likes weak

lungs and a bad digestion, reason cannot convince him of his error. The

physician has done enough when he has pointed out the sanitary laws

obedience to which generates strength, long life, and power of

enjoyment. The moralist is in the same position when he has shown how

certain habits conduce to the development of a type superior to its

rivals in all the faculties which imply permanent peace of mind and

power of resisting the shocks of the world without disintegration. Much

undoubtedly remains to be said. Wordsworth's teaching, profound and

admirable as it may be, has not the potency to silence the scepticism

which has gathered strength since his day, and assailed fundamental--or

what to him seemed fundamental--tenets of his system. No one can yet

say what transformation may pass upon the thoughts and emotions for

which he found utterance in speaking of the Divinity and sanctity of

nature. Some people vehemently maintain that the words will be emptied

of all meaning if the old theological conceptions to which he was so

firmly attached should disappear with the development of new modes of

thought. Nature, as regarded by the light of modern science, will be the

name of a cruel and wasteful, or at least of a purely neutral and

indifferent power, or perhaps as merely an equivalent for the

Unknowable, to which the conditions of our intellect prevent us from

ever attaching any intelligible predicate. Others would say that in

whatever terms we choose to speak of the mysterious darkness which

surrounds our little island of comparative light, the emotion generated

in a thoughtful mind by the contemplation of the universe will remain

unaltered or strengthen with clearer knowledge; and that we shall

express ourselves in a new dialect without altering the essence of our

thought. The emotions to which Wordsworth has given utterance will

remain, though the system in which he believed should sink into

oblivion; as, indeed, all human systems have found different modes of

symbolising the same fundamental feelings. But it is enough vaguely to

indicate considerations not here to be developed.

It only remains to be added once more that Wordsworth's poetry derives

its power from the same source as his philosophy. It speaks to our

strongest feelings because his speculation rests upon our deepest

thoughts. His singular capacity for investing all objects with a glow

derived from early associations; his keen sympathy with natural and

simple emotions; his sense of the sanctifying influences which can be

extracted from sorrow, are of equal value to his power over our

intellects and our imaginations. His psychology, stated systematically,

is rational; and, when expressed passionately, turns into poetry. To be

sensitive to the most important phenomena is the first step equally

towards a poetical or a scientific exposition. To see these truly is the

condition of making the poetry harmonious and the philosophy logical.

And it is often difficult to say which power is most remarkable in

Wordsworth. It would be easy to illustrate the truth by other than moral

topics. His sonnet, noticed by De Quincey, in which he speaks of the

abstracting power of darkness, and observes that as the hills pass into

twilight we see the same sight as the ancient Britons, is impressive as

it stands, but would be equally good as an illustration in a

metaphysical treatise. Again, the sonnet beginning

With ships the sea was sprinkled far and wide,

is at once, as he has shown in a commentary of his own, an illustration

of a curious psychological law--of our tendency, that is, to introduce

an arbitrary principle of order into a random collection of

objects--and, for the same reason, a striking embodiment of the

corresponding mood of feeling. The little poem called 'Stepping

Westward' is in the same way at once a delicate expression of a specific

sentiment and an acute critical analysis of the subtle associations

suggested by a single phrase. But such illustrations might be multiplied

indefinitely. As he has himself said, there is scarcely one of his poems

which does not call attention to some moral sentiment, or to a general

principle or law of thought, of our intellectual constitution.

Finally, we might look at the reverse side of the picture, and endeavour

to show how the narrow limits of Wordsworth's power are connected with

certain moral defects; with the want of quick sympathy which shows

itself in his dramatic feebleness, and the austerity of character which

caused him to lose his special gifts too early and become a rather

commonplace defender of conservatism; and that curious diffidence (he

assures us that it was 'diffidence') which induced him to write many

thousand lines of blank verse entirely about himself. But the task would

be superfluous as well as ungrateful. It was his aim, he tells us, 'to

console the afflicted; to add sunshine to daylight by making the happy

happier; to teach the young and the gracious of every age to see, to

think, and therefore to become more actively and securely virtuous;'

and, high as was the aim he did much towards its accomplishment.

FOOTNOTES:

[24] J. S. Mill and Whewell were, for their generation, the ablest

exponents of two opposite systems of thought upon such matters. Mill has

expressed his obligations to Wordsworth in his 'Autobiography,' and

Whewell dedicated to Wordsworth his 'Elements of Morality' in

acknowledgment of his influence as a moralist.

[25] The poem of Henry Vaughan, to which reference is often made in this

connection, scarcely contains more than a pregnant hint.

[26] As, for example, in the _Lines on Tintern Abbey_: 'If this be but a

vain belief.'

[27] See Wordsworth's reference to the _Wealth of Nations_, in the

_Prelude_, book xiii.

[28] So, too, in the _Prelude_:--

Then was the truth received into my heart,

That, under heaviest sorrow earth can bring,

If from the affliction somewhere do not grow

Honour which could not else have been, a faith,

An elevation, and a sanctity;

If new strength be not given, nor old restored,

The fault is ours, not Nature's.

_LANDOR'S IMAGINARY CONVERSATIONS_

When Mr. Forster brought out the collected edition of Landor's works,

the critics were generally embarrassed. They evaded for the most part

any committal of themselves to an estimate of their author's merits, and

were generally content to say that we might now look forward to a

definitive judgment in the ultimate court of literary appeal. Such an

attitude of suspense was natural enough. Landor is perhaps the most

striking instance in modern literature of a radical divergence of

opinion between the connoisseurs and the mass of readers. The general

public have never been induced to read him, in spite of the lavish

applauses of some self-constituted authorities. One may go further. It

is doubtful whether those who aspire to a finer literary palate than is

possessed by the vulgar herd are really so keenly appreciative as the

innocent reader of published remarks might suppose. Hypocrisy in matters

of taste--whether of the literal or metaphorical kind--is the commonest

of vices. There are vintages, both material and intellectual, which are

more frequently praised than heartily enjoyed. I have heard very good

judges whisper in private that they have found Landor dull; and the rare

citations made from his works often betray a very perfunctory study of

them. Not long ago, for example, an able critic quoted a passage from

one of the 'Imaginary Conversations' to prove that Landor admired

Milton's prose, adding the remark that it might probably be taken as an

expression of his real sentiments, although put in the mouth of a

dramatic person. To anyone who has read Landor with ordinary attention,

it seems as absurd to speak in this hypothetical manner as it would be

to infer from some incidental allusion that Mr. Ruskin admires Turner.

Landor's adoration for Milton is one of the most conspicuous of his

critical propensities. There are, of course, many eulogies upon Landor

of undeniable weight. They are hearty, genuine, and from competent

judges. Yet the enthusiasm of such admirable critics as Mr. Emerson and

Mr. Lowell may be carped at by some who fancy that every American enjoys

a peculiar sense of complacency when rescuing an English genius from the

neglect of his own countrymen. If Mr. Browning and Mr. Swinburne have

been conspicuous in their admiration, it might be urged that neither of

them has too strong a desire to keep to that beaten highroad of the

commonplace, beyond which even the best guides meet with pitfalls.

Southey's praises of Landor were sincere and emphatic; but it must be

added that they provoke a recollection of one of Johnson's shrewd

remarks. 'The reciprocal civility of authors,' says the Doctor, 'is one

of the most risible scenes in the farce of life.' One forgives poor

Southey indeed for the vanity which enabled him to bear up so bravely

against anxiety and repeated disappointment; and if both he and Landor

found that 'reciprocal civility' helped them to bear the disregard of

contemporaries, one would not judge them harshly. It was simply a tacit

agreement to throw their harmless vanity into a common stock. Of Mr.

Forster, Landor's faithful friend and admirer, one can only say that in

his writing about Landor, as upon other topics, we are distracted

between the respect due to his strong feeling for the excellent in

literature, and the undeniable facts that his criticisms have a very

blunt edge, and that his eulogies are apt to be indiscriminate.

Southey and Wordsworth had a simple method of explaining the neglect of

a great author. According to them, contemporary neglect affords a

negative presumption in favour of permanent reputation. No lofty poet

has honour in his own generation. Southey's conviction that his

ponderous epics would make the fortune of his children is a pleasant

instance of self-delusion. But the theory is generally admitted in

regard to Wordsworth; and Landor accepted and defended it with

characteristic vigour. 'I have published,' he says in the conversation

with Hare, 'five volumes of "Imaginary Conversations:" cut the worst of

them through the middle, and there will remain in the decimal fraction

enough to satisfy my appetite for fame. I shall dine late; but the

dining-room will be well lighted, the guests few and select.' He recurs

frequently to the doctrine. 'Be patient!' he says, in another character.

'From the higher heavens of poetry it is long before the radiance of the

brightest star can reach the world below. We hear that one man finds out

one beauty, another man finds out another, placing his observatory and

instruments on the poet's grave. The worms must have eaten us before we

rightly know what we are. It is only when we are skeletons that we are

boxed and ticketed and prized and shown. Be it so! I shall not be tired

of waiting.' Conscious, as he says in his own person, that in 2,000

years there have not been five volumes of prose (the work of one author)

equal to his 'Conversations,' he could indeed afford to wait: if

conscious of earthly things, he must be waiting still.

This superlative self-esteem strikes one, to say the truth, as part of

Landor's abiding boyishness. It is only in schoolboy themes that we are

still inclined to talk about the devouring love of fame. Grown-up men

look rightly with some contempt upon such aspirations. What work a man

does is really done in, or at least through, his own generation; and the

posthumous fame which poets affect to value means, for the most part,

being known by name to a few antiquarians, schoolmasters, or secluded

students. When the poet, to adopt Landor's metaphor, has become a

luminous star, his superiority to those which have grown dim by distance

is indeed for the first time clearly demonstrated. We can still see him,

though other bodies of his system have vanished into the infinite depths

of oblivion. But he has also ceased to give appreciable warmth or light

to ordinary human beings. He is a splendid name, but not a living

influence. There are, of course, exceptions and qualifications to any

such statements, but I have a suspicion that even Shakespeare's chief

work may have been done in the Globe Theatre, to living audiences, who

felt what they never thought of criticising, and were quite unable to

measure; and that, spite of all æsthetic philosophers and minute

antiquarians and judicious revivals, his real influence upon men's minds

has been for the most part declining as his fame has been spreading. To

defend or fully expound this heretical dogma would take too much space.

The 'late-dinner' theory, however, as held by Wordsworth and Landor, is

subject to one less questionable qualification. It is an utterly

untenable proposition that great men have been generally overlooked in

their own day.

If we run over the chief names of our literature, it would be hard to

point to one which was not honoured, and sometimes honoured to excess,

during its proprietor's lifetime. It is, indeed, true that much

ephemeral underwood has often hidden in part the majestic forms which

now stand out as sole relics of the forest. It is true also that the

petty spite and jealousy of contemporaries, especially of their ablest

contemporaries, has often prevented the full recognition of great men.

And there have been some whose fame, like that of Bunyan and De Foe, has

extended amongst the lower sphere of readers before receiving the

ratification of constituted judges. But such irregularities in the

distribution of fame do not quite meet the point. I doubt whether one

could mention a single case in which an author, overlooked at the time

both by the critics and the mass, has afterwards become famous; and the

cases are very rare in which a reputation once decayed has again taken

root and shown real vitality. The experiment of resuscitation has been

tried of late years with great pertinacity. The forgotten images of our

seventeenth-century ancestors have been brought out of the lumber-room

amidst immense flourishes of trumpets, but they are terribly worm-eaten;

and all efforts to make their statues once more stand firmly on their

pedestals have generally failed. Landor himself refused to see the

merits of the mere 'mushrooms,' as he somewhere called them, which grew

beneath the Shakespearian oak; and though such men as Chapman, Webster,

and Ford have received the warmest eulogies of Lamb and other able

successors, their vitality is spasmodic and uncertain. We generally read

them, if we read them, at the point of the critic's bayonet.

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